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MYRES S. McDOUGAL DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW: WILL THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL AND THE
EMERGING NEW NORM "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT" MAKE A
DIFFERENCE?
VED P. NANDA*
I will begin with a tribute to Professor Myres S. McDougal, who was the
reason I went to Yale Law School. After receiving an LLM. at Northwestern with
Professor Brunson McChesney as my advisor, my years at Yale (1962-65) were
the most enjoyable of my student life. An inspiring teacher, a creative scholar, and
a lifelong friend, Professor McDougal will always be my role model, and I am
deeply honored to give this lecture, established at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law in my mentor's name.
Professor McDougal had attracted brilliant and creative minds to Yale -
Harold Lasswell, Egon Schwelb, and Oscar Schachter, among others. Each one of
these teachers left a lasting impact on me. Dr. Schwelb taught what I understand
was the first ever course on international human rights law in any law school,
when the only course materials available were UN documents related to draft
international treaties on which Dr. Schwelb was working at the UN Headquarters.
While taking that seminar I decided that when I started teaching I was going to
introduce human rights as a separate course and my colleagues graciously
permitted me to do so here at DU in the 1960s. My passion for human rights goes
back to that period.
It is inherent in our being human that no matter who we are and where we
live, we are entitled to the enjoyment of basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms. And there is universal acceptance of the international law norm that
human rights of all, irrespective of their sex, race, ethnicity, religion, language,
. Vice Provost and John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh
Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law. This is a revised and updated version of the 2006 Myres S. McDougal Distinguished
Lecture delivered at the Sturm College of Law. I am grateful to my colleague Sergio Stone,
International and Comparative Law Librarian at the College of Law, for making available official
documents. I would also like to express my gratitude for the College's summer research grant, which
allowed me to complete the manuscript.
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social status, or political preferences and affiliations, must be protected and
secured. However, notwithstanding the endorsement of human rights protections
so eloquently expressed in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Bill of Rights, and numerous treaties, the rhetoric does not
match the stark reality. As gross and systematic violations of human rights,
including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, are an everyday
occurrence in so many parts of the world, our pious utterances and outcries of
"never again" sound like empty slogans.
The killing fields of Cambodia, the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur, and
severe violations of human rights in several other countries including Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Congo,
constantly remind us that the world community has yet to institute effective
mechanisms to prevent and deter these shameful blots on humanity. Nor are there
adequate means available to stop these tragedies once they unfold.
How do we explain this anomaly-numerous norms prescribing specific
conduct, states consenting to such prescriptions, and still the ongoing, persistent,
and systematic atrocities and violations blatantly in disregard of these norms all
over the world? The problem no doubt lies with inadequate implementation,
coupled with the lack of political will, for theoretical or perceptual differences
today on how universal or culturally relative these rights are, or on their content,
are rather muted. And the underlying cause remains the current state-centered
international system, under which each state jealously guards its sovereignty and
often invokes the doctrine of non-intervention in its internal affairs.
The twin challenges, therefore, for human rights scholars and practitioners,
and for politicians and statesmen alike, are: (1) to ensure that the existing norms on
human rights protection are further strengthened, that the existing institutional
framework is made effective, and that there are adequate processes in place to
provide suitable remedies to the victims and to bring the perpetrators to justice;
and (2) to redouble our efforts to create a keen awareness of the enormity of the
challenge and to establish a culture in which decision makers are motivated, and
indeed compelled, to make sufficient resources available and to take the necessary
action-multilateral, regional, bilateral, and even unilateral-to prevent atrocities
and violations, to take effective action to stop and deter them, and to provide
redress to the victims when such violations occur.
The preference is, of course, to prevent and deter violations of human rights
and to respond effectively to stop them by non-forceful means, but, if it becomes
necessary and only as a last resort, even by the use of force and in accordance with
international law norms. Problems with unilateral use of force are well known.
Abuses in the past remind us that they are likely in the future, as well, unless
adequate safeguards exist. It is, however, regrettable that the world community
failed to take effective action to address humanitarian disasters such as Rwanda
and Darfur. Several countries have even shied away from calling them genocides
because under the Genocide Convention states are obligated to prevent genocide
and to punish the perpetrators.
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These preliminary remarks set the stage for my discussion of a few recent
developments the world community has undertaken to strengthen the existing
international machinery for the protection of human rights. These are the
establishment of the Human Rights Council to replace the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights and the adoption of a new international law norm by the U.N., the
Responsibility to Protect. I will, however, not comment on international
humanitarian law, a very important subject indeed, especially in light of the abuses
in Abu Ghraib and Guant~namo.
II.
The international human rights movement is of relatively recent origin.
However, in a short time it has blossomed into a developed body of international
human rights law, with the establishment of necessary institutions for its
implementation and enforcement. As the movement is rooted in the world
community's response to the excesses inflicted upon humanity by the Nazi and
Fascist regimes during the Second World War, the founders of the United Nations
ensured that the Charter would reflect the close relationship between international
peace and security and international human rights. Thus, the first two goals
embodied in the Preamble of the U.N. Charter are: "to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war" and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, the
dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small...."' Article 1 of the Charter lists among
the purposes of the U.N. "[t]o achieve international co-operation in... promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 55 mandates that the United Nations promote "universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.",3 This is followed by a pledge by
all U.N. Member States "to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
Organization for the achievement of' the purpose stated above.4
Although there was no provision in the U.N. Charter on protection of human
rights, in 1946, soon after it was formed, the United Nations created the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights.5 Also, the U.N. began work on drafting an
instrument enumerating basic human rights, whose culmination was the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.6  The Declaration, adopted by the General
Assembly as a resolution in 1948, specifies civil and political, as well as economic,
social, and cultural rights. The next step was to codify these rights in a treaty form
1. UN Charter, Pmbl.
2. Id. art. 1,para. 3.
3. Id. art. 55(c).
4. Id. art. 56.
5. Id. art. 68. Under art. 68 of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) was empowered to set up a commission "for the promotion of human rights."
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doe. A/818 (Dec. 10, 1948). See generally, Oscar Schachter, The Genesis of the
Universal Declaration: A Fresh Examination, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 51 (1999).
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because as a resolution of the General Assembly the Universal Declaration was not
binding on states. The framers understood this, as Eleanor Roosevelt, the U.S.
Representative on the U.N. Commission and its Chair, called the Declaration "a
statement of principles.., setting up a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations."7 She further stated that the Declaration was "not a treaty
or international agreement... impos[ing] legal obligations." 8 The process was
protracted because of the ensuing Cold War and the resulting ideological conflict
between the then-super powers the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Eventually,
however, in 1966 negotiators agreed on two separate conventions, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 9 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,' 0 both of which came into force in 1976.
The Universal Declaration, together with the two covenants, is popularly known as
the International Bill of Rights. 11
The period since 1976 has witnessed great strides in the development of
international human rights law as an impressive body of norms, institutions, and
procedures has transformed the subject. Regional human rights machinery exists
in Europe, the Americas, and Africa, and is in the formative stage in Southeast
Asia, complementing the U.N. machinery created to promote and protect human
rights and to provide effective remedies. Customary international law has also
played a significant role in this process.
It would have been inconceivable sixty years ago to envisage the development
and progress of international human rights law we see today. To illustrate,
numerous international agreements have created a wide range of international
human rights norms, treaty bodies have been established to monitor
implementation by member states of their treaty obligations, and an ever-growing
body of soft law-emerging international human rights guidelines, principles, and
norms-has developed. All these developments are of great significance for every
student of international human rights law.
In the U.N. system, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, a
part of the United Nations Secretariat, acts as the principal focal point of human
rights research, education, public information, and human rights advocacy
activities. 12 It offers leadership in educating and empowering individuals and
assisting states in upholding human rights and supports the work of the U.N.
human rights mechanisms, such as the Human Rights Council and the treaty
7. Eleanor Roosevelt, quoted in John Humphrey, The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTs 39, 50 (Evan Luard ed.,
1967).
8. Id.
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-
20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
10. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976).
11. Nadine Strossen, United States Ratification of the International Bill of Rights: A Fitting
Celebration of the Bicentennial of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 203, 203 (1992).
12. The website is http://www.ohchr.org, for more information.
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bodies. Equally important, it promotes both the universal ratification and the
implementation of the major human rights treaties and respect for the rule of law
and ensures the enforcement of universally recognized human rights norms.
As I have previously written on the role of the Office of the High
Commissioner and the need to strengthen it, 13 I will not revisit that subject here.
Also, while the development of human rights norms through treaties, customary
international law and "soft law," and the existing machinery for implementation
and enforcement of international human rights are indeed most important subjects,
I leave their review for another day.
III.
The U.N. Human Rights Council was established on March 15, 2006, to
replace the U.N. Human Rights Commission. 14 During the first two decades of its
existence, the Commission was without authorization to provide any redress to
those who communicated that their human rights had been violated. This changed
in 1967 when ECOSOC authorized it to examine relevant information pertaining to
gross violations of human rights and to conduct studies of situations which
revealed a consistent pattern of violations.' 5  But as the communications and
complaints remained confidential the Commission could not refer to their
substance nor did it have any guidelines to consider or analyze those
communications. Consequently, three years later, in 1970, ECOSOC did provide
procedures for considering and analyzing such communications. 16  Under this
complaints mechanism, which remained confidential, submissions were authorized
by individuals, groups, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The
Commission could consider allegations of widespread patterns of gross violations
of human rights in any country.
In addition, thematic procedures were also instituted to address broader
human rights issues, ranging from disappearances, torture, arbitrary detention, and
extrajudicial executions, to the right to health, education, and the welfare of
internally displaced persons and minorities. The country-specific procedures and
thematic procedures are together called "special procedures," and they establish
mechanisms to address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all
parts of the world. 17 They are undertaken by either an individual, who is called a
special rapporteur, special representative of the Secretary-General, or an
13. Ved P. Nanda, 2005 Sutton Colloquium: Foreword: The Global Challenge of Protecting
Human Rights: Promising New Developments, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 7-10 (2006).
14. The Human Rights Council was established by G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251
(Mar. 15, 2006).
15. ECOSOC Resolution 1235 provided the authorization. ECOSOC Res. 1235, at 17, U.N.
ESCOR, 42nd Sess. Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (June 6, 1967).
16. ECOSOC Res. 1503, at 8, U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. IA, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1
(May 27, 1970).
17. UN WATCH, REFORM OR REGRESSION: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW HUMAN RIGHTS
COUNCIL 23 (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.unwatch.org/atf-/cf/%7B6DEB65DA-BE5B-
4CAE-8056-8BFOBEDF4D17%7D/Reform%20or%20Regression%206%2oSept%202006.pdf
[hereinafter UN Watch, Reform or Regression].
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independent expert, or a working group, usually composed of five members (one
from each region). 
18
For several years before its replacement by the Human Rights Council, the
Commission's work had come under increasing scrutiny, especially by human
rights NGOs. While there was general support and appreciation for the thematic
procedures, the Commission faced severe criticism for its seeming obsession with
singling out one country, Israel, for condemnation, while showing little concern
with egregious violations elsewhere. According to the U.N. Watch, 30 percent of
the Commission's resolutions between 1946 and 2006 condemning human rights
violations by specific states were against Israel and that percentage had risen to
almost 50 in the few years preceding the establishment of the Human Rights
Council.1 9 In 2005, the Commission adopted eight resolutions under country
procedures, four against Israel and the combined total of four against all other
states in the world, one each against Belarus, Cuba, Myanmar, and North Korea. 20
The Commission's credibility had been undermined by such selective
condemnation. To illustrate, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in his
March 2005 report to the General Assembly that:
the Commission's capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly
undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. In
particular, States have sought membership of the Commission not to
strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to
criticize others.... As a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which
casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a
whole. 21
Similarly, a task force of the American Bar Association's Section on
International Law, on which I served, stated in its August 2005 report: "The
standing of the Commission was severely compromised by the selection of Libya
as chair, the re-election of Sudan as a member in the midst of the genocide in
Darfur, and the shameful failure of the Commission last year to adopt a resolution
clearly condemning that genocide. 22
Several reform proposals addressing the Council's size, functions,
composition, criteria for membership and members' responsibilities, election
18. As to the range and scope of the mandates, mechanisms, and responsibilities under these
procedures, see, e.g., the report of the Commission's concluding session (13-27 Mar. 2006). U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Sixty-Second
Session, at 1-4, Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/2006/23, E/CN.4/2006/122 (Mar. 13-27, 2006).
19. UN Watch, Reform or Regression, supra note 17, at 6 n.3.
20. Id.
21. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, 182, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
22. Task Force on Reform of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, A.B.A. Standing
Comm. on Law and Nat'l Sec., Replacing the Commission on Human Rights with a Human Rights
Council, 2005 A.B.A. Sec. Int'l. Law Rep. 9 [hereinafter ABA Report].
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process, and status in the U.N. system were made, most calling for a smaller and
more nimble body to be elected directly by the General Assembly.23
In establishing the Human Rights Council, the General Assembly enhanced
the Commission's status by creating it as a subsidiary organ of the Assembly
instead of being a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council. 24 It is
smaller in size, comprising 47 members, compared with the 53-member
Commission, and elected directly by a majority vote of the General Assembly. 25
Members are to "uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of
human rights," and every country is subject to universal periodic review of its
human rights obligations and commitments.26 Under the Resolution, the Council's
work is to be guided by the principles of "universality, impartiality, objectivity,
and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation....27
The establishment of the Council was consequently widely hailed. Secretary-
General Annan said the establishment of the Council would be "remembered as a
historical achievement," and he exhorted the Council member to bring about "a
change in culture [to replace] the culture of confrontation and distrust, which
pervaded the Commission in its final years, [by] a culture of cooperation and
commitment, inspired by mature leadership. 28  In his address to the opening
session of the Council, the President of the U.N. General Assembly, Jan Eliasson,
said, "We are entering a new chapter in the United Nations' work on human
rights. 2 9 Human rights NGOs welcomed the creation of the new Council.3°
After a review of the Council's first regular session in June 2006 and its first
two special sessions in July and August of that year, I found the record to be
mixed. On the positive side, it had adopted a draft convention on enforced
disappearances and a draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, and had
decided to continue the work of the Commission on special procedures and to
establish a working group to "develop the modalities of the universal periodic
review mechanism."
31
23. Among many suggestions, see for example those by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International cited in UN WATCH, Reform or Regression, supra note 17, at 8 n.12; ABA Report, supra
note 22, at 10, 14-15; Task Force on the United Nations, U.S. Inst. of Peace, AMERICAN INTERESTS
AND UN REFORM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS, 34-35, June 2005; Secretary-
General, Address to the Commission on Human Rights (April 7, 2005), in In Larger Freedom, supra
note 21, at App. 1, 7 6.
24. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 14, 1.
25. Id. 77.
26. Id. 7 9, 5(e).
27. Id. 4.
28. Secretary-General, Address to the Human Rights Council on 19 June 2006, available at
www.un.org/apps/sg/printsgstats.asp?nid=2090.
29. Jan Eliasson, Statement at the first session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva (June 19,
2006), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/statements/hrc0606l9pgae.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Press Releases of March 15, 2006, cited in UN WATCH, Reform or Regression, supra
note 17, at 8 n.12.
31. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the First Session of the
Human Rights Council, at 22, 32, 58 & 73 (June 30, 2006) (establishment of the working group on
universal periodic review at 22; Convention text in Annex at 32; text of Declaration in Annex at 58; and
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On the negative side, the Council again singled out Israel for censure,
requesting the relevant Special Rapporteurs to report on the "Israeli human rights
violations in occupied Palestine" to the next session of the Council.32 I had then
concluded:
The Council's decisions and actions regarding Israel demonstrate that it
is continuing to follow the one-sided approach which was a hallmark of
the Commission's activities and a major reason for its replacement.
Major international human rights NGOs including Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and Human Rights First have
uniformly condemned the Council's approach. Furthermore, it is hard
to explain the Council's indifference to the tragedy in Darfur, for it did
not take any action on the subject, although some statements were made
by a few countries at the Council meeting.
33
The Council, however, did adopt a text on Darfur at its second session in
November 2006,34 which noted "with concern the seriousness of the human rights
and humanitarian situation in Darfur," and called on "all parties to put an
immediate end to the ongoing violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law."35  It is ironic that the Council welcomed "the cooperation
established by the Government of the Sudan with the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the Sudan," 36 when it had been quite evident for
several years that the Sudanese government had not been cooperating with the
United Nations to stop the ongoing atrocities perpetrated by the Janjaweed.
The following month, as a promising development, the Council at its fourth
special session decided to dispatch a High-Level Mission appointed by the Council
president to assess the human rights situation in Darfur. 37 The Mission could not
visit Darfur as the Sudanese authorities refused to issue a visa to one of its
regarding extension of the Commission's mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities at 73).
32. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the First Session of the
Human Rights Council, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/l/L.10/Add.1 (July 5, 2006) (The Council took no
decision and no action against any country other than Israel. On the Council's decisions on Israel in its
first and second special sessions, see U.N. Human Rights Council, Report on the First Special Session
of the Human Rights Council, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-1/3, (July 18, 2006) (S-I/Res.I Human Rights
Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory)); U.N. Human Rights Council, Afghanistan, Algeria,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic qt), Jordan, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia: Draft Resolution, The Grave Situation of Human
Rights in Lebanon Caused by Israeli Military Operations, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-2/L.1 (Aug. 9,
2006).
33. Ved Nanda, New U.N. Initiatives for the Protection of International Human Rights 16
(manuscript to be published in a forthcoming book on human rights by Toda Institute, Honolulu, 2007
(manuscript is on file with the author).
34. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the Second Session of the
Human Rights Council, at 2/115 (Darfur), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/L. 11/Add.I (Nov. 28, 2006).
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id. at 5.
37. U.N. Human Rights Council, Summary Record of the 4th Meeting, at 2, 4, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/S-4/SR.4 (Jan. 23, 2007).
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members. Hence it produced its report based upon visits to neighboring countries
and interviews with humanitarian agencies and African Union officials working in
Darfur.3" The report concluded that the human rights situation in Darfur
remains grave, and the corresponding needs profound. The situation is
characterized by gross and systematic violations of human rights and
grave breaches of international humanitarian law. War crimes and
crimes against humanity continue across the region. The principle
pattern is one of a violent counterinsurgency campaign waged by the
government of Sudan in concert with Janjaweed/militia, and targeting
mostly civilians. Rebel forces are also guilty of serious abuses of
human rights and violations of humanitarian law.... [T]he government
of the Sudan has manifestly failed to protect the population of Darfur
from large-scale international crimes, and has itself orchestrated and
participated in these crimes. As such, the solemn obligation of the
international community to exercise its responsibility to protect has
become evident and urgent.
39
Among specific recommendations of the Mission was one for the Security
Council to deploy a proposed U.N./African Union peacekeeping/protection force.4 °
The Mission's recommendation for the Sudanese government included the
government's ceasing all support for the Janjaweed/militia forces, cooperating
fully in the deployment of the proposed hybrid peacekeeping force and with
prosecutors at the International Criminal Court, and holding accountable all
perpetrators of human rights violations.4 '
The Council took note of the report at its March 2007 session and adopted a
resolution expressing deep concern
regarding the seriousness of the ongoing violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in Darfur, including armed attacks on the
civilian population and humanitarian workers, widespread destruction
of villages, and continued and widespread violence, in particular
gender-based violence against women and girls, as well as the lack of
accountability of perpetrators of such crimes.
4 2
The Council further decided to establish an experts group on Sudan, which is
to work with the African Union and the Sudanese government.43
38. For the report of the Mission see U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation of General
Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council": Report of the High-
Level Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur Pursuant to Human Rights Council Decision
S-4/101, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/80 (Mar. 9, 2007).
39. Id. at 76 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 77(d).
41. Id. at 77(d)-(e).
42. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the Fourth Session of the
Human Rights Council, at 13, 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/L. l/Add. I (Mar. 30, 2007).
43. Id. at 6-7.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
In a detailed 71-page report submitted to the Council at its fifth session in
June 2007, the experts group reiterated the gravity of the situation in Darfur.44 The
report provided a roadmap for addressing human rights violations there. It
recommended that the government of Sudan fulfill its earlier commitments and
take immediate action to restore order and to secure human rights in the Darfur
region.45 While the Council deferred action on the report,46 it nonetheless
welcomed the report, requesting the group of experts to continue its work for six
months and to submit an update at the next session of the Council in September
2007 and a final report at the Council's following session.
47
Another promising development related to the Council is the election of its
membership in May 2005, and the General Assembly's rejection of Belarus for
failing to meet the basic criteria for election to the Council because of its poor
human rights record. Instead, the Assembly elected Bosnia-Herzegovina. 48
As the Human Rights Council concluded its fifth session on June 18, 2007,
and its organizational meeting four days later,49 this marked the end of the
Council's first year of operation. The first year's report card still shows a mixed
record. The Council's country-specific mandates for Belarus and Cuba were
44. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the Fifth Session of the
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/L.10 (July 9,2007).
45. The experts group report was presented to the Council by the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation on Human Rights in the Sudan and chairperson of the group of experts on June 13, 2007, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/5/L.10, para. 51, 9 July 2007. For the text of the report, see U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/6, 8 June
2007. The experts group made a number of specific recommendations to the government of Sudan
aimed at protection of the civilian population, including internally displaced persons. To illustrate, the
experts group called upon the government of Sudan to
[i]ssue and enforce clear orders to the armed forces and any militias under
Government's control that it is prohibited to make civilians or civilian objects
(including cultivated land and livestock) the target of attacks or to launch
indiscriminate attacks (including burning of villages and aerial bombardments);
that such attacks can amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, that
suspects, including bearers of command responsibility, will be investigated and
brought to justice, and that any immunities would be waived.
Id. at $ 51; U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15
March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council," at 12, U.N. Doe. A/HRC/5/6 (June 8, 2007)
(Recommendation 1.1.1); U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly
Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council," at 44, 26, U.N. Dec.
A/HRC/5/6 (June 8, 2007).
46. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the Fifth Session of the
Human Rights Council, at 63, U.N. Doe. A/HRC/5/L.10 (July 9, 2007); U.N. Human Rights Council,
Report to the General Assembly on the Fifth Session of the Human Rights Council, at 56, § 5/102, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/5/L.11 (June 18, 2007).
47. Follow-up to resolution 4/8 of 30 March 2007 adopted by the Human Rights Council at its 4th
session entitled "Follow-up to decision S-4/101" of 13 December 2006 adopted by the Council at its 4th
special session entitled "Situation of human rights in Darfur," U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to
the General Assembly on the Organizational Meeting of the Human Rights Council, at 4, § OM/I/3,
U.N. Doe. A/HRC/OM/l/L. 11, (June 20, 2007) (adopted without a vote).
48. Human Rights Council Election (17 May 2007), www.un.org/ga/61/elect/hrc.
49. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the Organizational Meeting
of the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doe. A/HRC/OM/l/L.l 1 (June 22, 2007).
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discontinued under political pressure, thus eliminating independent experts
reviewing their human rights records, while the remaining mandates, which
address human rights in Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Haiti, Liberia, North Korea, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Somalia,
and Sudan, were renewed.5 0  All mandates are to be further reviewed by the
Council.5 1  The Council continues its disproportionate focus on Israel and its
agenda has singled out one situation, Palestine and Other Occupied Arab
Territories, for the Council's attention, disregarding so many other human rights
situations needing special attention, as well. 2
On the positive side, the Council's institution-building process has had a
favorable outcome. Its new institutional machinery includes the universal periodic
review mechanism, the special procedures, an Advisory Committee replacing the
Commission's Subcommission, and the complaint procedure replacing the
confidential 1503 procedure. The universal periodic review of the human rights
record of every country begins with the initial members of the Council to be
reviewed first, 53 The existing 38 special procedures-mechanisms which address
either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world and are
considered the most responsive, flexible, and effective mechanisms within the UN
human rights system-are retained. And special procedure mandate-holders will
be appointed under an agreed process and set criteria to ensure that individuals
with the highest standard of expertise, experience, independence, and impartiality
are selected. 54 Further, the mandate-holders are subject to a code of conduct aimed
at strengthening their capacity and the effectiveness of the system.
55
The Council's advisory committee will function as a think-tank of the Council
and will be composed of 18 experts elected by the Council who will serve in their
50. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the Fifth Session of the
Human Rights Council, at 38-44 (Appendices I-1I), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/L.11 (June 18, 2007)
[hereinafter Human Rights Council's Report on the Fifth Session].
51. Id. at 13-15.
52. Id. at 25 (agenda item 7). During its Sixth Session, the Council adopted two resolutions
critical of Israel. Resolutions 6-18 and 6-19, adopted on September 28, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/L. 11
(October 5, 2007). The Council held a Sixth Special Session, at which it again adopted a resolution on
Israel, calling for "urgent international action to put an immediate end to the grave violations committed
by the occupying Power, Israel, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory .. " U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-6/L. 1,
operative para. 2 (January 23, 2008). US President George W. Bush in his address to the U.N. General
Assembly on September 25, 2007, said:
The United States is committed to a strong and vibrant United Nations. Yet the
American people are disappointed by the failures of the Human Rights Council.
This body has been silent on repression by regimes from Havana to Caracas to
Pyongyang and Tehran -- while focusing its criticism excessively on Israel. To
be credible on human rights in the world, the United Nations must reform its
own Human Rights Council.
Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070925-4.html.
53. Human Rights Council's Report of the Fifth Session, supra note 50, at 4-11 (Annex 1).
54. Id. at 11-15.
55. Id. at 45-55 (which includes Resolution 5/2 adopted by the Council and the text of the code of
conduct).
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personal capacity.5 6 The confidential complaint procedure, based on the previous
"1503 procedure," will address consistent patterns of reliably attested gross
violations of all human rights, will be more victim-oriented, and will be assisted by
two working groups. 57 The Council is to meet regularly throughout the year and
will hold special sessions when needed, according to the newly established rules of
procedure.
58
It is in this context that several human rights NGOs, including Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, the Carter Center, Open Society Institute, and
World Federalist Movement, wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, urging
the United States to work with other U.N. member states to make the Council
strong and effective:
The disappointments of the Council's first year-such as the
discontinuation of consideration of Iran and Uzbekistan under the 1503
procedure and the failure of the Council to address comprehensively the
situations in Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories-should
spur the United States not to disengagement, but to greater
engagement....
The United States, together with other countries, must invest greater
political capital and more staff and resources into making the Council
an effective forum for the promotion and protection of human rights.
With its long tradition of leadership in human rights, it has an important
role to play in helping to ensure that the Council will become the
success that the victims of human rights violations all over the world
badly need it to be.
59
As this discussion shows, the Council has failed to meet the expectations of
those who envisaged the dawn of a new era of human rights protection with its
formation. The United States is reportedly considering withdrawal of its funding
for the Council to show its disapproval of the Council's actions. 60 However, the
positive aspects noted above demonstrate as well that if members of the Council
with strong commitment to human rights make concerted efforts and human rights
NGOs keep a vigilant eye and continue to exert pressure, the Council could
conceivably reach its potential, which was so eloquently articulated in the General
Assembly Resolution establishing it.
56. Id. at 15-18. The advisory council replacing the former Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights will be established to support the Council's work.
57. Id. at 19-24.
58. Id. at 32-37. For the final version of the Human Rights Council's Report to the General
Assembly on the Fifth Session of the Council, see U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/21 (Aug. 7, 2007).
59. Amnesty International USA Joint Letter, July 9, 2007,
www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGUSA20070716001.
60. See Betsy Pisik, U.N. Panel Faces Loss of U.S. Funding, WASH. TIMES., Sept. 11, 2007, at
AO1.
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IV.
The tension between sovereignty and human rights lies at the heart of the
Responsibility to Protect concept. Sovereignty, of course, remains sacrosanct in
the Westphalian state-centered system. Sovereign equality and territorial integrity
are cardinal principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter. 6' Thus, the Charter
mandates non-intervention in a state's internal affairs 62 and prohibits the use of
unauthorized force 63 as means to ensure that there is no infringement on state
sovereignty. The human rights movement-the development and growth of
human rights norms, institutions, and processes outlined earlier-lays claim to its
genesis in the U.N. Charter, as well.
Reconciling these competing considerations continues to be a daunting task.
The struggle began soon after the founding of the United Nations. Apartheid in
South Africa, Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia, and
the expulsion of Asians from Uganda were among the initial challenges the U.N.
faced. The genocide in Cambodia led by the Khmer Rouge and the Pol Pot regime
intensified the tension. There were other instances.
The debate centered on the concept of humanitarian intervention--coercive
intervention by military action against a state to protect people in that state
suffering or threatened with genocide and other massive violations of human
rights. Invoking articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, critics reject unilateral
humanitarian intervention, asserting that it is a prohibited intrusion on state
sovereignty. Proponents, on the other hand, contend that in order to protect the
human rights of those suffering or threatened with genocide and massive violations
of that nature, even unilateral use of force is permissible under article 2(4) when
the Security Council is paralyzed, there is inaction on the part of regional
organizations, and the force is used as a last resort. I should note that humanitarian
intervention has indeed been abused in the past and many states with colonial
experiences perceive it as undermining their sovereignty and suspect that it is
likely to be abused by powerful states. The validity of humanitarian intervention
has been challenged on both doctrinal and policy grounds.
During the 1990s the international community helplessly watched grievous
assaults on human security. No effective measures were taken to prevent or
respond to the genocide in Rwanda and mass murders and other crimes against
humanity in many other countries. Critics failed to present any desirable and
feasible alternative to humanitarian intervention, and voices seeking international
action to protect those suffering from heinous acts within their countries were met
with silence. Thus the pertinent question was: how should the international
community protect those who need protection within a state when the government
is unable to protect them or is complicit?
61. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
62. Id. at para. 7.
63. Id. at para. 4.
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It is in response to these tragic events of the 1990s that then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan addressed the dilemma of humanitarian intervention in his
Millennium Report to the General Assembly in April 2 0 0 0 .
64 After noting his
1999 call to member states "to unite in the pursuit of more effective policies to
stop organized mass murder and egregious violations of human rights," he
acknowledged the controversy his comments had generated.65
He stated the critics' concerns-that the concept could "become a cover for
gratuitous interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states"; that "it might
encourage secessionists movements deliberately to provoke governments into
committing gross violations of human rights in order to trigger external
interventions"; and that "there is little consistency in the practice of intervention ...
except that weak states are far more likely to be subjected to it than strong ones.",
6 6
He then recognized the importance of these arguments and of the principles of
sovereignty and non-interference, which offer "vital protection to small and weak
states," but said, "to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of
human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?,
67
He added that, while humanitarian intervention "is a sensitive issue, fraught
with political difficulty and not susceptible to easy answers,"
[w]here such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been
exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf oft he
international community. The fact that we cannot protect people
everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can. Armed
intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face
of mass murder it is an option that cannot be relinquished.68
I quote Kofi Annan extensively here because the genesis of the Responsibility
to Protect concept is in response to his challenge, which he subsequently reiterated
for the Security Council members. That was in his address to the General
Assembly in 2003, in which he urged the Council members
to engage in serious discussions of the best way to respond to the threats
of genocide or other comparable massive violations of human rights....
Once again this year, our collective response to events of this type-in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Liberia-has been
hesitant and tardy.69
64. The Secretary-General's Millennium Report, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations
in the Twenty-First Century, 47-48, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Apr. 3, 2000), available at
www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf.
65. Id. at 47.
66. Id. at 47-48.
67. Id. at 48.
68. Id.
69. The Secretary-General's Address to the General Assembly, Sept. 23, 2003,
www.un.org/apps/sg/printsgstats.asp?nid=517.
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In September 2005, the U.N. World Summit, which brought together heads of
state and government from almost all member states, answered the Secretary-
General's call by accepting each individual state's "responsibility to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes...."70 The
Summit further resolved:
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means... to help to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context,
we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council,... on a case-by-case basis and in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.71
Before analyzing the nature of the commitment, it would be useful to provide
the context to the Summit agreement. A number of factors combined to prompt
several initiatives by think-tanks 72 and governments in search for an effective
response to massive violations of human rights within many states in the 1990s in
which the government either failed to prevent the violations or was involved in
causing the harm. These factors included the ineffective international response and
the Secretary-General's challenge to the international community.
The governments of Denmark,73 The Netherlands,74 Sweden,75 and the
United States 76 were among those engaged in this quest. Also, during the mid
1990s the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced
Persons, Francis Deng, had already redefined sovereignty as responsibility. 77 It
was, however, a report entitled "The Responsibility to Protect," of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by the
70. World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1 138, U.N. Doe. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Summit Outcome Document].
71. Id. at 139.
72. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: CRAFTING A
WORKABLE DOCTRINE (Alton Frye ed., 2000).
73. DANISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and
Political Aspects (1999).
74. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ISSUES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Humanitarian Intervention (2000).
75. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (Oxford University Press 2000).
76. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTER-AGENCY REVIEW OF U.S. GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN
HUMANITARIAN AND TRANSITION PROGRAMS (2000), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB30/index.html#doc.
77. Francis M. Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 249 (1995); FRANCIS M
DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (The Brookings
Institution 1996).
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government of Canada in cooperation with a group of major foundations, which
proved most influential in shaping the concept.78
Rejecting the traditional language of the sovereignty-intervention debate-the
"right of humanitarian intervention" 79 or the "right to intervene"--the Commission
shifted the debate to focus instead on the "responsibility to protect," suggesting
that the proposed change reflected "a change in perspective, reversing the
perceptions inherent in the traditional language." 80 The Commission clarified that
the term "the responsibility to protect" implies focusing on the point of view not of
those who may be considering intervention but of those seeking or needing
support.8 It explained that the Responsibility to Protect comprises three distinct
responsibilities-the responsibility to prevent; 82 the responsibility to react, which
may include in extreme cases military intervention; 83 and the responsibility to
rebuild after military intervention.84  It further explained that the primary
responsibility to protect "rests with the state concerned, and that it is only if the
state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator,
that it becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in its
place.... Thus, the [concept] is more of a linking concept that bridges the divide
between intervention and sovereignty.... ,85
The Commission conducted roundtable discussions around the world and
consulted a wide range of academic experts. In light of its goal of providing a new
78. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect
(Dec. 2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS Report].
79. There is voluminous literature on humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane
eds., 2003); V.S. Mani, Humanitarian Intervention Today, 313 RECUEIL DES COURS (2005); SEAN D.
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER
(1996); FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY
(2d ed. 1996); Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and
International Administration, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 99 (2004); Ruth E. Gordon, Intervention by
the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, 31 TEX. INT'L L. J. 43 (1996); Christopher C. Joyner,
"The Responsibility to Protect": Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness ofArmed Intervention, 47
VA. J. INT'L L. 693 (2007); Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the U.N. Security Council in Protecting
Human Rights in Crisis Situations: U.N. Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 3 TuL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1995); James A.R. Nafziger, Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of
Power, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 219 (1994); Ved Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia,
Yugoslavia, and Haiti -- Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law,
Pt. I, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1992); Ved Nanda et al., Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia,
Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia -- Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law, Pt. 11, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 827 (1998); W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the
Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention,
II EUR. J. INT'L L. 3 (2000); Yogesh K. Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16
Mich. J. Int'l L. 883 (1995); Thomas G. Weiss, The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention?
Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 135 (2004).
80. ICISS Report, supra note 78, at 2.29.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3.1-3.43.
83. Id. at 4.1-4.43.
84. Id. at 5.1-5.31.
85. Id. at 2.29.
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approach to military intervention on human protection grounds, the Commission
proposed a "just cause threshold" for such intervention to be "serious and
irreparable harm" to human beings, such as "large scale loss of life, actual or
apprehended, with genocidal intent or not," or "large scale 'ethnic cleansing,'
actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of
terror or rape."
86
Next, the Commission enumerated four precautionary principles to guide the
use of force once the above-mentioned threshold has been reached: (1) right
intention, the primary purpose of which must be to "halt or avert human
suffering"; 87 (2) last resort-military intervention can only be justified when all
diplomatic and non-military avenues have been explored; 88 (3) proportional
means-military intervention should be the minimum necessary to achieve the
humanitarian goal;89 and (4) reasonable prospects of success in halting or averting
the suffering that justified the intervention, "with the consequences of action not
likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction." 90
As to the right authority to authorize military intervention, the Commission
identified the U.N. Security Council, suggesting that "[t]he task is not to find
alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the
Security Council work better than it has." 91 On the use of the veto by the five
Permanent Members of the Security Council, the Commission said that they should
agree not to use it where their vital state interests are not at stake if otherwise there
is majority support for such action.
92
In case of inaction by the Security Council, the Commission offered
alternative options-the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, under which the General
Assembly considers the matter in an emergency special session; 93 action by
regional organizations "subject to their seeking subsequently authorization from
the Security Council"; or other means by concerned states "to meet the gravity and
urgency of [the] situation," in which case "the stature and credibility of the United
Nations may suffer....
The response to the Commission's proposal was initially mixed among
states 95 as well as nongovernmental organizations96 and scholars. 97  It is
86. Id. at 4.18-4.19.
87. Id. at 4.33.
88. Id. at 4.37.
89. Id. at 4.39.
90. Id. at XII; see also id. at 4.41.
91. Id. at xii.
92. Id. at 51.
93. Id. at xiii.
94. Id.
95. See generally Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian
Intervention and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHIcS & INT'L AFFAIRS 143, 151 (2006) [hereinafter
Whither the Responsibility to Protect].
96. See William R. Pace and Nicole Deller, Preventing Future Genocides: An International
Responsibility to Protect, 36.4 WORLD ORDER 15, 21 (2005).
97. See, e.g., Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and
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noteworthy that the Constitutive act which created the African Union authorizes
the A.U. to undertake humanitarian intervention, although the A.U. has never used
this authority. 98  Also, the language of authorization is accompanied with
qualifications and is conceivably ambiguous. 99
Kofi Annan established a High-Level Panel in September 2003 with the task
of examining the challenges to international peace and security and the
contribution the United Nations could make in addressing those challenges more
effectively. 100 A year later, the panel endorsed what it said was the "emerging
norm" of a collective international responsibility to protect, which was
"exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last
resort, in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or
serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments
have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent."'
101
The Panel did not identify alternative sources of authority when the Security
Council fails to act but focused instead on making the Security Council "work
better than it has."'10 2 It endorsed the ICISS's "just cause" threshold and its
precautionary principles. However, it added "serious violations of international
humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended" to the Commission's list. 1
03
It renamed the basic criteria of legitimacy-seriousness of threat, proper purpose,
last resort, proper means, and balance of consequences. 104 It recommended that
the Security Council and the General Assembly should adopt declaratory
resolutions embodying these guidelines for authorizing the use of force.' 05 In his
March 2005 report, Kofi Annan accepted the Panel's recommendations.1
0 6
International Administration, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 99, 104-10 (2004); S. Neil MacFarlane, et al.,
The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?, 25 THIRD WORLD
Q. 977, 979-81 (2004); Joelle Tanguy, Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention, 17 ETHICS & INT'L
AFFAIRS 1419 (Spring 2003); David Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an
Imperfect World, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2003); Jennifer Welsh, et al., The Responsibility to Protect:
Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 57 INT'L J.
489 (2002).
98. See generally Whither the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 95, notes 57-70 and
accompanying text. Article 4 recognizes the "right of the Union to intervene in a Member State
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity."
99. Id.
100. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Names High Level Panel to Study Global
Security Threats and Recommend Necessary Changes, U.N. Doe. SG/A/857 (Apr. 11, 2003).
101. U.N. General Assembly, A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility -- Report of the
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para. 203 (Dec. 2, 2004).
102. Id. para. 198.
103. Id. para. 207a.
104. Id. para. 207a-e.
105. Id. para. 208.
106. Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 2005).
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In June 2005, an influential report entitled American Interests and L
Reform 117 was released by a bi-partisan task force established under the initiative
of the U.S. Congress. It recommended that the U.S. government "should affirm
that every sovereign government has a 'responsibility to protect' its citizens and
those within its jurisdiction from genocide, mass killing, and massive and
sustained human rights violations."' 1 8 It further urged the U.S. government to call
on the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly to affirm such responsibility
of every sovereign government. 109 The report said that if the government fails to
provide protection, "it forfeits claims to immunity from intervention.., if such
intervention is designed to protect the at-risk population." In such a case, the
"collective responsibility of nations [under the Security Council auspices] to take
action cannot be denied." 110
Under the task force's recommendations, the Security Council's failure to act
must not be used as an excuse by concerned members to avoid protective
measures.... Those engaged in mass murder must understand that they will be
identified and held accountable."'' This implies that member states' use of force
in extreme cases would be valid even outside the U.N. framework. To illustrate,
the report specifically recommended that the U.S. propose to the Security Council
that it impose sanctions, including economic sanctions authorized under the U.N.
Charter, to stop genocide and mass murder. If these measures do not succeed, the
Security Council should consider authorizing military intervention. And what if it
does not do so? The task force's answer: "[If] the Security Council is derelict or
untimely in its response, states-individually or collectively-would retain the
ability to act."
112
All these reports were available to member states before the World Summit
met in September 2005. As already mentioned, the Summit endorsed the emerging
norm and the responsibility of each individual state to provide protection, and
called upon the international community to assume responsibility to help to protect
populations from the specified crimes-genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity-and to support the U.N. in establishing an early
warning capability. 113
The timing, however, was not propitious. The Iraq invasion had resulted in
Saddam Hussein's overthrow but Iraq continued to suffer from insurgency,
violence, and terrorism. One of the rationales for the invasion of Iraq by the
United States and United Kingdom was that Saddam Hussein was guilty of
perpetrating gross violations of human rights, especially by committing atrocities
on the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South, and the use of military force
107. Task Force on the United Nations, American Interests and UN Reform, U.S. Institute of Peace,
2005.




112. Id. at 32. See generally id. at 31-32.
113. Summit Outcome Document, supra, note 70, para. 138-139.
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to topple his regime was aimed at protecting the population from further abuse.
That undoubtedly was a misuse of the concept.
According to Gareth Evans, co-chair of the ICISS and president of
International Crisis Group, this misuse was the "biggest inhibitor of all to the ready
acceptance of [the Responsibility to Protect] as an operating principle."' 1 4 He
argues that even if the threshold issue of the seriousness of the security threat to
Iraq's population might have been met, the others, especially that "the results of
military action would not be worse than taking no action," was certainly not
satisfied, 15 for at the time of the invasion that judgment could not responsibly
have been made.
The Document did not include massive violations of human rights or any
similar formulation as part of the threshold, thus raising the threshold for
intervention. Nor did it contain a provision to the effect that the Security Council
has the obligation to intervene with the use of force if the national government
fails to provide protection, although it recognized the international community's
responsibility through the United Nations to use "appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means" for this purpose. 1 6 As to the use of force,
the states agreed that they are "prepared to take collective action" through the
Security Council or regional organizations "on a case-by-case basis... [if] national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.""' 7
The Summit Document thus reflects some states' resistance to give a blank
check to the Security Council to undertake military intervention and on the other
hand some states' unwillingness to assume an obligation to act as was
recommended by the ICISS. To illustrate, in his address to the General Assembly
on September 15, 2005, President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela challenged the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine by asking, "Who is going to protect us? How
are they going to protect us?" He called it a "very dangerous" concept that
"shape[s] imperialism [and] interventionism" in the attempt "to legalize the
violation of the national sovereignty.""1
8
In response to the Revised Draft Outcome Document, "9 which was released
on August 10, 2005, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton
wrote a letter to the President of the General Assembly on August 30, 2005. In it
he argued that member states have no obligation or responsibility "of a legal
character" to intervene, rejecting the suggestion "that either the United Nations as
114. Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 703, 717 (2006) [hereinafter Responsibility to Protect].
115. Id. at 717-18.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 715.
118. President Hugo Chhvez, Speech at 70th UN General Assembly, New York (Sept. 15, 2005),
available at www.embavenez-us.org/news.php?nid=1745.
119. Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General
Assembly of September 2005 Submitted by the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doe.
A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev. 2 (Aug. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Revised Draft Outcome Document].
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a whole, or the Security Council, or individual states, have an obligation to
intervene under international law." 
120
The Document removed the proposed recommendation from the Draft
Outcome Document that called on Permanent Security Council members to refrain
from using the veto in cases involving the specified violations. 121 It may be
recalled that the ICISS had suggested that the Security Council's Permanent
Members should abstain from the use of the veto in such cases unless their vital
interests are involved. 122 Opponents to any restraint on the use of the veto fall into
two camps-those who consider the veto as a tool to prevent interventionism and
those who consider any constraint on the veto as limiting their freedom of action.
Nor was there any mention in the Document of criteria or standards to guide states
in determining when force may be used. Also, the agreement fails to provide any
guidance on who has the responsibility to protect if the Security Council does not
act because of the use of veto or for any other reason.
Skeptics may not find much that is new in the Summit Outcome Document.
They could argue that it adds nothing substantial regarding the use of military
force, since the Security Council is authorized under the Charter to use force and
the Council has interpreted the qualifier "a threat to international peace and
security" pretty broadly. And the language "prepared to take collective action"
gives a great deal of leeway to member states.123 Furthermore, the determination
of when a state is "manifestly failing to protect [its] populations" can be subject to
varying interpretations. 124
What the skeptics miss is the importance of the solemn core declaration,
reached by consensus among member states that each state has the responsibility to
protect its populations from violations of the specified human rights. To accept
sovereignty as responsibility represents a major shift from the traditional notion of
sovereignty as connoting complete control. Thus no longer can a government hide
behind the shield of sovereignty, claiming non-intervention by other states in its
internal affairs, if it fails to protect the people under its jurisdiction from massive
violations of human rights. The states also agreed on a "just cause" threshold and
reaffirmed the Security Council's predominant role for protection purposes when a
state fails in its obligation.
Indeed, many of the ICISS's recommendations, especially the guidelines on
when legitimately to intervene, were left out in order to ensure the adoption of a
consensus document. But the result is an important first step, which should be
considered in the nature of a framework agreement. Of course, much more needs
to be done before the concept can be operationalized.
120. Letter from John R. Bolton, U.S. Representative to the U.N., to members of the General
Assembly (Aug. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileld=219.
121. Revised Draft Outcome Document, supra note 121.
122. ICISS Report, supra note 80, para. 6.21.
123. Summit Outcome Document, supra note 72, at para. 139.
124. Id
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
V.
The Security Council took its first step by reaffirming the "provisions of
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document Regarding
the Responsibility to Protect Populations from Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic
Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity" in its Resolution 1674 of April 28, 2006,
on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.1 25 Two months later, then U.N.
Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland said at a Security Council meeting,
We as the U.N., and you as the Security Council, now have the
responsibility to protect as reaffirmed in Resolution 1674. There are too
many times when we still do not come to the defence of civilian
populations in need [as] we appear to wash our hands of our
humanitarian responsibilities to protect lives." 1
26
Subsequently, on August 31, 2006, the Security Council called for the rapid
deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in Darfur in its Resolution 1706, which
incorporated the doctrine as it referred to the "responsibility of the Government of
the Sudan, to protect civilians under threat of physical violence."'
127
The General Assembly and the Security Council must adopt guidelines to
determine when threats to civilian populations rise to the level requiring Security
Council action. Also, guidelines on the legitimate use of force need to be
established by these bodies. These are essential prerequisites for the
implementation and enforcement of the doctrine. A case in point is the Darfur
crisis, which has been ongoing since early 2003. The U.S. President has
characterized the atrocities in Darfur, in the words of the Bush administration, "by
their rightful name: genocide."'2 8 Similarly, the U.S. Congress has also called the
situation genocide. 1
29
There is no dearth of reliable reports on the gravity of the situation in
Darfur. 130  For example, in his July 2006 report to the U.N. Security Council on
125. Resolution 1674 of April 28, 2006 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/1674, para. 4, April 28, 2006.
126. Statement of Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland at the open meeting of the Security
Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 28 June 2006, available at
http://ochaonline.un.org/Humanitarianlssues/ProtectionofCiviliansinArmedConflict/DocumentsLibrary/
tabid/1 142/Default.aspx.
127. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 706, para. 12(a), Aug. 31, 2006. For a review of earlier U.N. resolutions
on Darfur, see generally Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in
Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 31 (2005).
128. The White House, President Bush Discusses Genocide in Darfur, Implements Sanctions,
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/print/20070529, May 29, 2007 [hereinafter
Bush Implements Sanctions] (adding 31 Sudanese companies to those already under economic
sanctions and targeting sanctions against individuals, as well).
129. Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, P.L. 109-344, 120 Stat. 1869, 1873, at §4(1). In
his address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 2007, President Bush reiterated that the
atrocities in Darfur amount to genocide: "In Sudan, innocent civilians are suffering repression -- and in
the Darfur region, many are losing their lives to genocide." Available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070925-4.html.
130. See, e.g., Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations
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Darfur, Kofi Annan stated, after providing a brief history of the conflict in the
region:
The notorious Janjaweed, coupled with militia attacks and
indiscriminate air bombardment, contributed to the razing and burning
of villages, the rape of girls and women, the abduction of children and
the destruction of food and water resources. The result has been death,
devastation and destruction in Darfur, with more than 200,000 civilian
casualties, more than 2,000,000 people displaced in their homes and
condemned to misery, and millions more having their livelihoods
destroyed. '
3'
He further added that the Darfur crisis threatens regional peace and security
and that cross-border violence between the Sudan and Chad has exacerbated the
humanitarian crisis in the region. 1
32
A year later, the Secretary-General's Report on Darfur13 3 noted continuing
violence and insecurity in Darfur. According to the report, violence against the
African Union mission and the United Nations mission, as well as the NGO
community in Darfur, had increased. The Secretary-General noted that earlier in
2007 the government of Sudan carried out several air bombardments in Northern
and Southern Darfur, ground attacks had occurred against civilian villages,
systematic sexual and gender-based violence had continued against the female
population of Darfur, attacks against aid workers and their assets had become a
daily occurrence, 134 and in the first seven months of 2007 more than 150,000
people had been newly displaced. 1
35
In November 2006, as mentioned earlier, the Human Rights Council
appointed a High-Level Mission to assess the human rights situation in Darfur, 36
which submitted a report concluding that the international community has a
solemn obligation to exercise its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur.137
Subsequently the Council also adopted a resolution in March 2007 expressing deep
concern regarding the serious situation in Darfur and established an Experts Group
on Sudan, which reiterated the gravity of the situation in Darfur at the Council's
Secretary-General, Geneva, Jan. 25, 2005, available at www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/ici-
sud-25feb; Monthly Reports of the Secretary-General on Darfur to the Security Council, such as those
cited in notes 133-136,infra; Crisis Group, Crisis in Darfur (updated May 2007), available at
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3060&l=l; International Crisis Group, Getting the UN into
Darfur, Africa Briefing No. 43, Oct. 12, 2006; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices -- 2006, Sudan, Mar. 6, 2007, available at state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78759.
131. U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, U.N. Doc. S/2006/591,
para. 4 (28 July 2006).
132. Id.
133. U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, U.N. Doc. S/2007/462 (27
July 2007).
134. Id. paras. 2-24.
135. Id. paras. 2-23.
136. Supra note 38.
137. Supra notes 38-41.
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meeting in June 2007.138 In its report to the next Council meeting in September
2007, the Experts Group concluded that the Sudan government had only partially
implemented its prior recommendations. 1
39
Let me mention other notable developments related to the Darfur situation.
Efforts to press universities' retirement and pension funds and states to divest from
companies doing business in Sudan or with the government of Sudan have been
ongoing since 2004.140 The United States further strengthened the sanctions
regime14 ' it had earlier imposed against Sudan. 142  Several NGOs are actively
promoting the wider acceptance and operationalization of the Responsibility to
Protect principle and its application to the Darfur crisis. 143 In February 2007 the
prosecutor requested the International Criminal Court to summon before the Court
a Sudanese government official (Minister of State for the Interior) and a Janjaweed
officer, charging them with crimes against humanity. 144 Also, the International
Court of Justice ruled in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro,1
45
that the 1995 massacre of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica was
an act of genocide. In doing so, the Court established an important precedent: that
a state in a position to prevent genocide must act to stop it. Under this rationale
Sudan may be held responsible to halt the genocide in the Darfur region. 146
On July 31, 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1769,147
reaffirming paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome Document on the
Responsibility to Protect. It established a United Nations and African Union
138. Id. Supra notes 45-47 and the accompanying text.
139. For the Report of the Panel of Experts, see Letter dated 10 September 2007 from the Panel of
Experts on the Sudan addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, U.N. Doc. S/2007/584, Annex, at 2. "The
Panel has determined that the governments of Chad and the Sudan have failed to fully implement the..
provisions of resolutions 1591 (2005) and 1672 (2006)." Id. at 3. "The Government of the Sudan has
abjectly failed to take the necessary steps to protect and fulfil the human rights of individuals in Darfur,
notwithstanding the security and access constraints that the Government experiences in certain parts of
Darfur." Id. at 5. See Human Rights Watch, UN: Rights Council Should Set Benchmarks for Sudan --
Darfur Experts' Report is Basis for Assessing Progress, Sept. 24, 2007, at 1, available at
hrw.org/english/docs/2007/09/24/sudan16943 txt. In a briefing paper, Ten Steps for Darfur: Indicators
for Evaluating Progress in the HRC Group of Experts Process, Human Rights Watch outlines actions
drawn from the recommendations compiled by the Group of Experts to improve the human rights
situation in Darfur, available at www.hrw.orgfbackgrounder/un/sudan09O7/.
140. See, e.g., Sam Graham-Felson, Divestment and Sudan, THE NATION, May 8, 2006.
141. Bush Implements Sanctions, supra note 130.
142. Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, supra note 131; Executive Order: Blocking
Property of and Prohibiting Transactions with the Government of Sudan, Oct. 13, 2006, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/print/20061013-14.
143. See, e.g., Responsibility to Protect/Engaging Civil Society, www.responsibilitytoprotect.org,
and Save Darfur, www.savedarfur.org.
144. International Criminal Court, ICC-02/05, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, 27 Feb. 2007, available
at www.icc-cpi.int/cases/Darfur.
145. IC Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (Feb. 26 Feb).
146. See Ved Nanda, Bosnia Ruling a Victory for International Law, DENVER POST, Feb. 28, 2007,
at B7.
147. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
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hybrid peacekeeping force consisting of 19,555 military personnel and more than
6,000 police. 148 Thus, it is to augment the 7,000 African Union peacekeepers
already in Darfur, which are underfinanced and poorly equipped, thus unable to
provide protection to the people in Darfur.
Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter the Security Council authorized
this hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur "to take the necessary action" in order to
protect their personnel and aid workers' freedom of movement, to prevent the
disruption of the Darfur Peace Agreement and to protect civilians. 149 However,
because of the lack of consensus among the Permanent Members, especially the
opposition of China, the force is not authorized to disarm the Janjaweed militia or
to seize illegal weapons.150 Nor did the resolution contain a threat of sanctions
against the government of Sudan if it failed to cooperate as it has done on
numerous occasions in the past. 
151
Subsequently, in September 2007 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon
visited Sudan, Chad, and Libya. He announced that peace negotiations between
the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels would begin in Libya on October
27 under the auspices of the U.N.-A.U. envoys to Darfur, Jan Eliasson and Salim
Ahmed. 152 However, the peace talks faltered, as several rebel groups boycotted
them. 153
The grave situation in Darfur continues. In a statement issued on January 11,
2008, on behalf of the U.N. Security Council on January 11, 2008, the President of
the Council condemned "in the strongest possible terms the January 7 attack by
elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces, as confirmed by the United Nations
African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) on a UNAMID supply convoy.'
154
He added: "The Council expresses concern about the deterioration of security and
humanitarian conditions in Darfur and calls upon the UN and all member states to
facilitate the rapid and complete deployment of UNAMID."
1 55
148. Id. para. 2.
149. Id. para. 15.
150. In id. para. 9, the authorization is simply to "monitor" arms.
151. But see Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of Britain, and Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France,
We are Pushing and Pushing to Save the Darfuris, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 31, 2007 at 19 ("If
progress is not made on security, the ceasefire, political process and humanitarian access, we will work
together for further sanctions against those who fail to fulfill their commitments, obstruct the political
process or continue to violate the ceasefire." They further added, "It is the combination of a ceasefire, a
peacekeeping force, economic reconstruction and the threat of sanctions that can bring a political
solution to the region -- and we will spare no efforts in making this happen.)
152. Ban Ki-Moon, What I Saw in Darfur; Untangling the Knots of a Complex Crisis,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2007, at A13.
153. See, e.g. Barney Jopson, Darfur Rebels' Disunity Leads Only to Disarray, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), October 31, 2007, at 8: "Boycotts threatened to scuttle the process before it had begun but it
is clear that, even if all the rebels had come, their disparate diagnoses of Darfur's problems would make
it hard to find common demands to put to Sudan's government."
154. Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/1 (January 11,
2008).
155. Id.
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Jan Eliasson, U.N. Special Envoy for Darfur, told the Security Council in an
open meeting on February 8, 2008: "Over the last few months, the security and
humanitarian situation in Darfur and the region has dramatically deteriorated, most
recently through events related to Chad. ' 156 At the same meeting, the UNAMID
Force Commander "voiced his strong concern over reported Government attacks
against villages.., in Western Darfur, with initial information indicating that many
houses have been burned and lives lost. There have also been reports of aerial
bombings in Silea village." 15 7 UNAMID is the hybrid United Nations and African
Union peacekeeping operation, which formally took over peacekeeping
responsibilities from the AU mission in the Sudan on December 31, 2007. ' On
February 9, 2008, UNAMID and the Sudanese government signed the Status of
Forces Agreement, which provides the legal framework to allow the peacekeepers
to operate. 159
VI.
Clearly the government of Sudan is "unwilling or unable" to provide
protection to people in Darfur who have continued to suffer brutal repression for
four years. Under the Responsibility to Protect principle, in such a case the
international community should assume that responsibility, which it has not yet
done. What is obviously absent in implementing the principle is not only
operational capacity but even more important, political will and commitment. '60
Until the Security Council establishes guidelines on whether the threshold is
met and on whether the use of military force is warranted, questions will continue
to be raised as they have been with respect to Darfur. The task awaiting the
Security Council remains that of translating the concept into a practical and
enforceable tool.
Let me conclude by reiterating that a dramatic, indeed revolutionary, change
has taken place with the international community's focusing sharper attention on
international human rights issues around the world. We can be rightfully proud of
this historic achievement in creating the essential norms, as well as the
implementation machinery. What is still sorely lacking is the implementation and
enforcement of those norms by states as the major actors that matter. That remains
the unfinished agenda.
156. U.N. News Service, Darfur: Ongoing Violence Thwarting Peace Prospects, Say Top UN
Officials, available at www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=25562. The Darfur crisis has
adversely affected the region. Tens of thousands of refugees from Darfur have sought protection in
Chad. In early February, an attack by Chadian rebels, armed by Sudan, on the capital of Ndjamena, was
repulsed. See Chad -- A Regime Saved, for the Moment, ECONOMIST, February 9, 2008, at 53; Lydia
Polgreen, Chad Capital Under Curfew Days After Coup Effort Failed, N.Y. TIMEs, February 8, 2008, at
A6.
157. Id.
158. Statement by President of the Security Council, supra note 154.
159. U.N. News Service, Secretary-General Speaks Out Against Recent Attacks in West Darfur,
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=25564&Cr-darfur&Crl=#,
160. See Gareth Evans, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 114, at 716-21 (identifying a number
of problems with the concept's practical application).
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INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE
TRIAL JUDGE'S VANTAGE POINT
JUDGE JoHN KANE*
When I was appointed to the bench twenty-eight years ago, the vast area of
international law was primarily a matter of intellectual curiosity for federal district
judges. We looked at comparative legal systems with an eye toward making our
own work a little less burdensome and confusing. The trial judge is essentially a
pragmatist controlled by the discipline of rules and dominated by the ideologies of
others in the form of binding authority. Until recently, we were not called upon to
examine the judgments and decisions of other nations.
International law today, however, is rapidly emerging in ways that affect a
court's daily tasks. This emergence is coincident to globalization and a judge's
intellectual curiosity has shifted to pragmatic necessity. The importance of
globalization is obvious: twenty-five percent of the U.S. gross domestic product is
internationally derived.'For example, there is no longer such a thing as an
American car; its parts, design and various manufactures come from throughout
the world.2Another example: guess, for a moment, the number of countries in
which the clothes you are now wearing have their origins and assemblies.
We operate today under a growing number of international conventions,
treaties and protocols. Moreover, globalization comprehends increased awareness
of and access to cultures and places far different from our own. The reach of
multi-national corporations, the speed of world-wide communications and the
growth of English as a universal language have given international law an
importance in the federal trial courts that could not even be imagined a quarter of a
century ago.
Until 1992, the district court of Colorado had cumbersome procedures for
admitting lawyers from other parts of the United States to appear as counsel.
*Judge John Kane is a United States Senior District Judge in the District of Colorado and a graduate of
the University of Denver College of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge Professor Ved Nanda for
inviting him to present this paper at the Sutton Colloquium and thus provoking these thoughts about an
important topic.
1. Flerida Ruth P.Romero, Lecture: Legal Challenges of Globalization, Delivered as Part of the
Indiana Supreme Court Lecture Series at Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis, 15 IND.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 501, 503 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration Is Not Your Father's Oldsmobile,
2005 J. DIsp. RESOL. 323, 324 (2005).
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Admission was couched in the antiquated phrase pro hac vice and required the
persistent presence of a Colorado lawyer as local counsel.3 Today, the price of
admission is $160 plus a statement listing the various courts to which the applicant
has been admitted. 4At least half of the lawyers appearing before me come from
other parts of the United States. More to the point, I have given the temporary
right of audience to lawyers from England, India, Hong Kong and Canada. With
increasing regularity I receive written submissions from lawyers in Europe, Asia,
Australia and South America. Depositions in cases tried in my court take place
with local authorization in Japan, South Africa, Indonesia and elsewhere. It would
require an entirely separate speech to address the international aspects of patent
and other intellectual property cases that form a major part of my docket today.
(For the first ten years I was on the bench, I never had a patent case assigned to
me.)
The fact is that international law and foreign law are being raised in our
federal courts more often and in more areas than our courts have the knowledge
and experience to handle. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed, "There is a
great need for expanded knowledge in [this] field, and the need is now.
'5
With the foregoing in mind, I will describe the approach that I take in
developing this needed knowledge and skill as a trial judge. I will not be able to
resist also opining on some of the problems we face as judges because of the
xenophobia and obduration of some appellate judges and politicians. Undoubtedly
I will talk about what most of you already know, but my viewpoint as a trial judge
may assist you in understanding the need to educate judges in the area of
international law, as Justice O'Connor suggested.
International law in U.S. courts is considered a branch of our law in much the
same way that torts, contracts or securities law are part of our system. We use it
when the facts of the case demand it. The question of whether an individual
invoking international law has rights or obligations on the international plane is
essentially irrelevant. What is relevant is whether this or that international law, as
a matter of American law, is appropriate to the resolution of the controversy before
the court. The source of the rights and obligations at bar may be international law,
but the determinations will be made in the same way and to the same extent that
the source would be domestic legal rights and obligations.
3. See D.C. COLO. L. Civ. R. 301 (repealed 1992).
4. See D.C. COLO. L. Civ. R. 83.3 and D.C. COLO. L. CT. R. 57.5; see also Application for
Admission to the Bar of the Court in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
(2005), http://www.co.uscourts.gov/forms/bar-app-new.pdf (requiring applicants to list all jurisdictions
in which they are admitted to practice and submit a check to the Clerk of the Court in the amount of
$160.00).
5. Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice, United States Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the




THE TRIAL JUDGE'S VANTAGE POINT
In a very real sense, it is not the international legal system that operates in
U.S. courts but rather principles of international law that a judge determines are
appropriate in the particular case. This role of international law in U.S. courts was
addressed by the Supreme Court in 1900 in the landmark case of The Paquete
Habana.6 While one can never feel secure in the stability of precedent as cases are
decided, and this particular case seems to be awaiting the judicial hangman, The
Paquete Habana remains controlling authority. In the opinion, the Court noted
that President William McKinley had ordered a naval blockade of the Cuban coast
during the Spanish-American War "in pursuance of the laws of the United States,
and the law of nations applicable in such cases."7  The blockade commander
captured two fishing vessels that were sold as prize of war.8The original owners
sued to recover the proceeds of the sales. 9The Supreme Court, sitting in admiralty
as the prize court, held that international law prohibited seizing coastal fishing
vessels during time of war. 10
The Court wrote:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.... I I
The meaning of this broad language has been the subject of academic
controversy, but for a trial judge the message is clear. I am instructed that a treaty,
executive act, legislation or authoritative judicial decision trumps customary
international law. If there is no trump, then the customary international law card is
played. The commentators, however, are more subtle. One view is that the first
sentence, which quoted that "International law is part of our law" etc., means that
international law is automatically and directly applicable in U.S. courts whenever
relevant issues are up for decision. According to this analysis, customary
international law is one of the laws of the United States comprising "the supreme
law of the land" under Article VI of the Constitution that must be faithfully
executed by the President under Article IL, Sec. 3.12 Under this view, courts have
no independent role in their interpretation or application. Other commentators
emphasize the second sentence regarding the trump cards and point out that
President McKinley limited the application of customary international law in his
executive order. Acts in violation of the executive order were therefore ultra vires
and perforce void. Under this view, international customary law is treated as any
other law under the common law method. Thus, the conclusions of U.S. courts are
6. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
7. Id. at 712.
8. Id. at 679.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 708.
11. Id. at 700.
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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influenced by prior international decisions or practice of the community of nations,
but not compelled by them.
Perhaps more to the point of this address, the Restatement (Third) on the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States rejects the view that newly developed
customary international law could supersede a prior federal statute.1 3 Unless,
however, it is clear that Congress intended a different result, U.S. courts will
attempt to interpret federal statutes to conform to customary international law,
obligations and conventions. The courts will give special consideration and
deference to views of the executive branch when called upon to interpret
customary international law, and those rules or principles whose existence is
disputed by the executive branch will normally not be given effect.
I also think it safe to say that in this area of developing jurisprudence for the
federal courts, as in most other instances, considerable weight is given to the
Restatement. When confronted with a question of international law, a federal trial
judge is most likely to ask counsel, "What does the Restatement say?"
Having described the basic outline of the trial judge's approach, I want to turn
to what is for me, and I hope for you, a more interesting aspect: the revolution in
the subject of international law in the U.S. courts. It is the recognition of
individuals as capable of both exercising international rights and being compelled
to respect international obligations. What was once the exclusive province of
nation-states, national interests and sovereignty has been transformed into a
dynamic and volatile subject of modem litigation. Individuals are no longer
passive objects of international legal actions.
In this new development, a very old and unused law has been revived: I speak
of the Alien Tort Statute that was passed by Congress in 1789 and hardly used at
all until recently. This statute incorporates into U.S. law the law of nations for a
specific purpose. The Alien Tort Statute gives federal courts original jurisdiction
over civil actions "by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."' 14 This statute was intended to assist the
newly formed United States government in taking its place among the civilized
nations of the world, primarily to obtain something more than mere sufferance
from the nations of Europe.
The statute was designed to avoid international conflict by providing an
objective forum in which aliens could seek redress for injuries inflicted by
American citizens, either in the United States or abroad, when those injuries were
such as to implicate the honor or protective duty of the injured alien's country.
The statute is solely a grant of jurisdiction and does not require a particular result
in any case.
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115
(1987).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007).
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In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a 1980 decision of the Second Circuit, the court
found jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute over a claim by an alien against an
official of his own government for the torture-slaying of the plaintiff's son. 15 The
court found that torture conducted under color of law was a violation of the law of
nations and that the international law of human rights did not distinguish between
violations directed at one's own subjects and violations directed at others. 16 Faced
with a possible flood of cases brought by aliens against their own governments
asserting violations of international human rights law, the federal courts have
moved to limit Filartiga's principles both on political question and lack of
available remedy grounds. 
17
However, jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute does not lie against a
foreign state. Jurisdiction in such cases is found only if the cause of action falls
within one of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. In general terms the exception to sovereign immunity does not
apply to discretionary acts; the Supreme Court has held that the exception is
limited by its terms to damages occurring in the United States. 18U.S. embassies are
not within this exception. 19
As one commentator has stated about the Alien Tort Statute:
[O]ver the last quarter-century, starting with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
the venerable statute has been deployed as the basis for a thriving
body of human rights jurisprudence, permitting U.S. judges to give
effect within their courtrooms to some of the most fundamental
commitments made by nations to one another in the years following
World War 11.20
This brings us to a discussion of some U.S. Supreme Court cases that, among
other things, have prompted legislation which at first blush is amusingly stupid, but
on reflection is dangerous both to the concept of international law and to the place
of the United States in the community of nations.
The first case is the 1992 decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain that
has been condemned even by nations friendly to the United States and described
by Justice Stevens as "monstrous.",2' The Court held that the conduct of an agency
of the United States, the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], in kidnapping a
foreign national while in his own country and transporting him to the United States
against his will despite the existence of a fully functioning extradition treaty, did
not affect the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court over his person.22 The Court
15. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1117-20 (9th Cir. 2006).
18. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004) (listing the exceptions of violation of safe
conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy).
19. See id.
20. Steven M. Schneebaum, The Paquete Habana Sails On: International Law in U.S. Courts
After Sosa, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 81, 82 (2005).
21. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 687 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
22. See id. at 668-70.
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held in effect that treaties do not confer rights on individuals unless they are
expressly so described in the advice and consent to their ratification.23 Alvarez
was tried for his alleged role in the brutal murder of DEA Agent Enrique
Camarena. 24 The judge directed a verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the
prosecution's case. It was a good result for the plaintiff, but a sorry one for the
law of nations.
Dr. Alvarez-Machain then sued DEA Agent Sosa and the other individual
kidnappers. 26 The burden on Dr. Alvarez-Machain as plaintiff was not to prove
that the Alien Tort Statute created a private cause of action, but that the facts
alleged in the complaint described a violation of international law. For reasons
that do not bear scrutiny, the Court found that Dr. Alvarez-Machain failed to
establish that there was a firm international consensus on an enforceable right to be
free from temporary restraint by law enforcement officers acting
extraterritorially.27
It is not, however, the result that has spurred opposition, but rather the Court's
announced premise that international human rights are the legally enforceable
rights of individuals and that the conduct of individuals may be found to be
actionable violations of those rights. The Bush Administration had called upon the
Court to reject those propositions that carry with them the tradition dating back to
Chief Justice Marshall that international law is part of our law, with its
interpretation consigned to the judicial branch.28
In this sense, there is a Marbury v. Madison flavor to Justice Souter's opinion.
Marbury did not get his appointment as a justice of the peace, but the doctrine of
judicial review of the political branches' actions in determining the law was firmly
established. In Sosa, Dr. Alvarez-Machain did not recover for the wrongs done to
him, but the principle of international law being part of U.S. law was emphatically
stated.
The third case is the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons,
holding that executing an offender for crimes committed before he was eighteen
years old would be cruel and unusual punishment.29 Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion cites international instruments and other nations' practices to demonstrate
evolving standards and attitudes against capital punishment of youthful
offenders.3 °  Justice Scalia's dissent attacks the majority's reliance upon
international treaties and foreign practices.31 Justice O'Connor filed a separate
23. Id. at 667-69.
24. Id. at 655; U.S Drug Enforcement Administration, Biography of Agent Enrique Camarena,
http://www.dea.gov/agency/IObios.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
25. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655-56.
26. Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 107 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1996).
27. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
28. David R. Mapel, Fairness, Political Obligation, and Benefits Across Borders, 37 POLITY 426,
437 n.25 (2005).
29. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
30. Id. at 575-76.
31. Id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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dissent finding insufficient evidence of a national consensus on the issue, but
endorsing the relevance of international practice to Eighth Amendment analysis.
32
Justice O'Connor's comments merit emphasis. She said:
Obviously, American law is distinctive in many respects.... [b]ut this
Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values
prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we should not be
surprised to find congruence between domestic and international
values, especially where the international community has reached
clear agreement - expressed in international law or in the domestic
laws of individual countries- that a particular form of punishment is
inconsistent with fundamental human rights.
33
Interestingly enough, in the 2004 decision Olympic Airways v. Husain, Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented from the majority opinion for its
failure to address how the courts of U.S. treaty partners addressed the issue of what
constitutes a factual event under the Warsaw Convention.34 Justice Scalia's
dissents must be studied carefully to discern when and under what circumstances
he thinks international law is relevant to American judicial enquiry. That,
however, is not my assigned topic. Suffice for the moment to say that Justice
Scalia asserts that foreign law should have no bearing on the proper interpretation
of the U.S. Constitution and judges interpreting our Constitution should pay no
heed whatsoever to how other countries interpret their own constitutions.35
Two other decisions merit reference in this regard. The 2002 case of Atkins v.
Virginia held that the cruel and unusual punishments prohibition of the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution of mentally retarded defendants. 36 The Court
determined that "the evolving standards of decency" that mark the progress of a
maturing society placed the execution of the mentally retarded beyond the pale.
37
In so ruling, the Court took account of practice in American states, but also
referred favorably to a brief filed by the European Union that catalogued the
overwhelming repudiation of the practice by the rest of the world.38
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas and invalidated a state
law criminalizing homosexual sodomy. 39 The Court's opinion focused on U.S.
sources, but Justice Kennedy's majority opinion also cited a 1967 Act of the
English Parliament and a 1981 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights
invalidating similar criminal prohibitions.4 ° Justice Kennedy alluded to these
32. See id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 605.
34. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 316 n.21; see also Brief for The European Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 4-10, McCarver v. N.C., 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727).
39. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
40. Id. at 572-73; see also id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Canadian case law with
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foreign laws to rebut the claim of the supporters of the Texas law that criminal
prohibition of homosexual sodomy was universally accepted within Western
civilization.
All of these cases, and particularly the last two, prompted a U.S. congressman
and a U.S. senator to introduce a bill called the "Constitution Restoration Act" that,
among other things, would make it an impeachable offense for a federal judge to
base a decision on foreign law. Section 201 of the Act states:
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a
court of the United States may not rely upon any constitution, law,
administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial
decision, or any other action of any foreign state or international
organization or agency, other than the constitutional law and English
common law.4'
Aside from its grammatical incompetencies, the proposed Act does not define
what it means by "constitutional law" and "English common law." A plain reading
suggests that a judge could be impeached for relying on the Ten Commandments.
Pretty clearly, John Locke, Montesquieu, Edmund Burke, and Rousseau would be
suspect, and I could be impeached for citing Plato's Republic. Aside from all else,
it would make determining the intent of the Framers a more onerous task.
As for the English common law, one would need to tread softly. Most
American states include within their constitutions or statutes a provision that the
common law of England that can be considered of full force stops as of March 24,
1607: the day the first ship sailed from England to what would become the lost
colony of Jamestown, Virginia. I would dare not cite the Statute of Frauds which
was enacted by the British Parliament in 1677. A host of other precedents, such as
the McNaghten Case, would be swept away from the American lexicon. I think
the point is made that this proposed statute is utterly stupid. In the unlikely event
that Congress would enact the Constitution Restoration Act, it would not be
enforceable and the first court to review it would likely strike it down without
having to rely on any foreign law.
I said earlier, however, that further reflection suggests to me that beyond the
xenophobic blindness of this proposed legislation, a more insidious danger lurks.
We cannot afford to ignore outrageous demonstrations of ignorance such as the
canard that the Holocaust never happened, nor the instant one which presumes that
the fundamental law of the United States can be understood without reference to
the history of western civilization.
On a more practical basis, the attack on the use of international law receives
aid and comfort from significantly influential elements of the business community.
It is not directly related to the Guantanamo cases, nor for that matter to the brutal
murder of DEA agent Camarena described in the Sosa decision. The gravamen is
disapproval as an example of "judicial imposition of homosexual marriage").
41. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 201 (2004); Constitution
Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005).
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that human rights activists have begun to use the Alien Tort Statute in suits against
businesses, including UNOCAL and others, for allegedly participating in systemic
human rights abuses in cooperative ventures with Third World governments.42
The threat of subjecting overseas activities of American businesses to judicial
review is ominous. As the United States government increases its use of American
businesses and their subsidiaries to enforce and enlarge the new American
imperium, the idea of being sued in American courts for reprehensible acts is not
an unrealistic proposition. Why, one must speculate, would the U.S. Department
of Justice argue for the most restricted judicial interpretation of the Alien Tort
Statute? One has only to suggest the different consequences of class actions and
individual tort claims to come up with a plausible explanation.
From a trial judge's perspective, the class action looms large. Indeed, only a
few mega-verdicts would be enough to change much of the overseas conduct of
American businesses.
It is obvious that our world is becoming increasingly interdependent. The age
of nationalism is not over, but it will change or perish. There is much to learn
from every system of law and government and if we fail to take advantage of these
experiences and wisdom, we do so at our peril. It is neither desirable nor possible
that this country we love so much can go it alone or sustain the status of a
superpower without embracing the concept and the reality of mutual global
concern. What a wonderful reality it would be for this country to be loved for
what we do and revered for the justice we provide.
42. See, e.g., Nat'l Coal. Gov't of the Union of Burma v. UNOCAL, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334
(C.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Doe I v.
UNOCAL Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
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THE MULTI-STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
VIOLATIONS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS*
TODD HOWLAND**
"At some point in the development of every legal system, the original strict
and formal application of rules is supplemented by a freer approach which aims to
go beyond the positivist strictures.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues for a change of perspective in the enterprise of promoting
and protecting human rights. Long the province of the relationship of individual
citizens to their state, this article goes beyond the present trends related to human
rights obligations of non-state actors and its extraterritorial application. This
article posits that multiple states can and do hold legal responsibility to protect and
promote the human rights of the same individual.
The idea that multiple states have human rights obligations to the same
individual is derived, in part, from the author's own experience working in "failed
states" and as part of multilateral efforts to bring peace, respect for human rights,
and stability to war-tom and dysfunctional countries. Often the resources (e.g.,
power and financial capacity) at the disposal of the "host state" were extremely
limited, while the United Nations Member States choosing to intervene in that
country, either bilaterally and/or multilaterally, had extensive resources and at
times more political power than the host country.
Oddly, considering legal developments in other fields and the nature of
human rights, there is a continuing practice of placing all legal obligations for
violations of human rights on the country where such violations occur. Those
'" Senior Professor of Human Rights Law at the dual degree program of the UN University for Peace
and the Graduate School of International Area Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in
Seoul, Korea. This work was supported by the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund.
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the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Ved Nanda
for being a tremendously positive influence on his career and that of so many others and to congratulate
him on his 40th anniversary at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would also
like to thank Dino Kritsiotis, Amy Beer, Elliot Grossman, Nancy Dorsinville, Watson Galleher, Bella
Haiz, Monika Kalra Varma, Annette Larkin and Susthetha Gopallawa for input or feedback on earlier
versions of this article. All errors remain those of the author.
1. Martin Josef Schermaier, Bona fides in Roman Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 63 (Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker eds., 2000) at 63.
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states that have voluntarily joined in efforts to rehabilitate failed states have
enjoyed total impunity. This impunity is enjoyed regardless of the relative power
and financial capacity brought to bear in what these states would call a collective
endeavor to bring peace, the respect for human rights and stability to war torn and
2dysfunctional countries.
Most relevant to development of the theory presented in this article is the
author's recent work related to Haiti. Thus, the article begins with contextual
information about Haiti. It continues with a discussion of theoretical
considerations regarding the multi-state responsibility for extraterritorial violations
of economic and social rights. This discussion first addresses historic
humanitarian purposes, intervention industry reality, 3 the essence of human rights
law, the legal concept that sovereignty is not jurisdiction, the criminal and civil
nature of human rights law, and voluntarily assumed legal obligations. These
theoretical considerations will then ground a discussion of specific hurdles to
achieving multi-state responsibility for extraterritorial violations of economic and
social rights, including marginalization of economic and social rights, exterritorial
application of human rights law and multi-state responsibility. The article will
conclude with a policy suggestion.
II. How RECENT EXPERIENCE IN HAITI INFORMS THE ARGUMENT
Every year, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial bestows its Human Rights
Award on a creative and courageous activist.4 During the period when the author
directed the Memorial's Center for Human Rights, the Center committed to
working for many years with the recipient to help her or him achieve specific
2. In fact, the United Nations was founded for this reason. See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl.
We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow
to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom, And for these Ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with
one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international
peace and security, and to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the
economic and social advancement of all peoples, Have Resolved to Combine our
Efforts to Accomplish these Aims Accordingly, our respective Governments,
through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have
exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the
present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international
organization to be known as the United Nations.
3. Considering the cost and frequency of military, peacekeeping, humanitarian and development
interventions, they have become an industry.
4. Robert F. Kennedy Memorial,
http://www.rfkmemorial.org/legacyinaction/humanrightsawardadvocacy/ (last visited April 20, 2007).
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human rights changes. In 2002, Loune Viaud, a right to health activist from Haiti,
won the award.
After the ouster of President Aristide in February 2004' Viaud was skeptical
about the new transitional government, 6 although she was hopeful that this
international intervention, the 5
th UN peacekeeping operation to Haiti,7 would
become more engaged in and supportive of development in Haiti than past
missions. She was skeptical about the change because her organization had
developed a number of projects implemented with the Aristide government that
were measurably improving access to health care and had a positive impact on the
AIDS crisis in the country. In fact, this was one of the reasons why she won the
award. After Aristide's ouster, however, programs such as these, run jointly with
the new government, were negatively impacted.
Haiti was considered a "failed state" and had a temporary or interim
administration that was established extra-constitutionally with a good deal of
support, cajoling, arm-twisting, and imposition by important states such as the
United States. Much against the council of experience and of experts, the US
militarily intervened to facilitate Aristide's removal and the "restoration" of order
8when regional actors were against the idea and most favored preventive measures.
The US obtained UN Security Council support for the US led "multinational
interim force" intervention and quickly turned the intervention over to the UN.9
The Member States voluntarily intervening in Haiti, acting bilaterally and
collectively, were better resourced and arguably may have exerted more influence
over the country's direction than those nominally running the transitional
government. But what is key here is that power and resources were brought to
bear by various Member States to achieve a common objective: to bring peace,
respect for human rights and stability. They brought resources that were much
greater than those of the Government of Haiti. 10
5. President Aristide had been deposed once before. In fact, Haiti never had a democratic
transition until 1994, when President Aristide handed power over to Rene Preval, who won the
Presidential vote. Aristide was barred from running for a second consecutive term, but was elected
again in 2001 in the context of growing instability. See, e.g., Paul Farmer, Haiti's Wretched of the
Earth, T1KKUN MAGAZINE, May-June 2004; Walt Bogdanich & Jenny Nordberg, Democracy Undone -
Mixed U.S. Signals Help Tilt Haiti to Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al.
6. The Transitional Government was a disappointment from a traditional human rights
perspective as well. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International Report 2005:The State of the
World's Human Rights, Haiti section, Al index POL 10/001/2005, May 25, 2005, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/hti-summary-eng.
7. See S.C. Res. 1542, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (April 30, 2004); See generally, United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/minustah/index.html (last visited
April 23, 2007).
8. US interventions in failed states have basically been failures and should be used rarely as
opposed to as a tool invoked without trying many alternatives. See, e.g., Anatol Lieven, Failing States
and US Policy, Sept. 2006, Stanley Found. Pol'y Brief. available at
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab06failingstates.pdf.
9. S.C. Res. 1529, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004).
10. Todd Howland, Peacekeeping and Conformity with Human Rights Law - How MINUSTAH
Falls Short in Haiti, 13 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 462, 470 (2006).
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Haiti is not the exception. The author has seen the problem first hand while
working with the UN in post-genocide Rwanda, where those participating in the
international intervention were much better resourced than the post-genocide
government. When the author arrived in Rwanda, the Ministry of Justice, tasked
with responding to the genocide, had almost no resources. Most of the
infrastructure of the Ministry had been destroyed. The only vehicle the Ministry
had was the Minister's old worn out private car, which on most days needed to be
push started. Situations vary in terms of relative resource capacity and political
power, but every country in crisis with an international intervention shares some of
the same characteristics. In the absence of a war, a ceasefire, a peace process, or a
peace accord, the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH)" was an
especially clear example of a relatively well-resourced peacekeeping mission sent
to a country with extreme poverty and a long history of bad governance.
A few months after the UN established a peacekeeping operation in Haiti,
Loune Viaud would call the author and complain that "the UN was in Haiti on
vacation" or that the donors say they have pledged over a billion dollars, but that
she saw no visible impact from this money and questioned if any had actually been
disbursed. 12 Given she runs one of the largest NGOs in Haiti, if she and her staff
are unaware of the positive impact there probably was none. Viaud became more
and more outraged at the fact that the UN had taken over Haiti's only medical
school for its troops. The UN troops had electricity, running water and transport,
but Haitian communities did not. She would call and complain that kids were
lining up outside the UN compound to read because it was one of the few places in
town with good light at night. Research done at that time by the RFK Memorial
Center for Human Rights demonstrated an enormous gap between significant
11. On April 30, 2004, the UN Security Council decided to establish the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the
Multinational Interim Force (MIF), authorized by the Security Council on February 29, 2004, to
MINUSTAH on June 1, 2004. See S.C. Res. 1542, supra note 7; S.C. Res. 1529, supra note 9.
12. Ms. Viaud's concern about lack of disbursement of promised funds was confirmed by research
conducted by the RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights in 2005 and early 2006. Much of the money
promised in the donor conferences had not been operationalized. See Interim Cooperation Framework,
Summary (April 2006) (unpublished study, on file with the Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy). The UN, through a recent high-level panel, has recognized that "the UN and its specialized
agencies have much to offer in the way of expertise, knowledge, resources and practical experience...
[b]ut the system is failing widely." They pointed to a lack of institutional effectiveness, cost efficiency
and focus. Poor governance, unpredictable funding, and outdated practices, as well as an often
fragmented and weak UN presence on the ground were also cited. The Panel blamed "policy
incoherence, program duplication, and vested interests in the status quo," with attempts by UN staff to
remedy the situation "thwarted by inappropriate administrative procedures, mediocre management and
ill-conceived loyalties." Shaukat Aziz, Luisa Dias Diogo & Jens Stoltenberg, Unifying the UN, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/l 1/08/opinion/edaziz.php;
See also The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level
Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the




pledges, their disbursement, and their operationalization. This research supports
Viaud's anecdotal account.
13
There was no hot war in Haiti, so it was unclear why the main response of the
UN Security Council was to send troops. Making change on the ground is no easy
task, 14 but sending the wrong tool does not make it any easier.
MINUSTAH's annual budget was larger than that of the Government of Haiti.
Larger. This is without considering other multilateral and bilateral support not
already part of the annual governmental revenue or loan stream, or the amounts
that come into Haiti which are not part of Government revenue. For example, the
US in 2004 and 2005 disbursed $352 million in assistance for Haiti; most of it
through US based NGOs. 15
The Haitian government had annual revenues of about US$400 million and
expenditures of about US$600 million in 2005,16 whereas the approved 2005
MINUSTAH budget was US$518.30 million. 17
Remarkably, an ally of former President Aristide, his former Prime Minister,
was elected President a little more than two years following Aristide's ouster.'
8
His election brought about a reduction in political violence, which could indicate
that international intervention may have contributed to, as opposed to minimizing,
the political violence.
Viaud's complaint can be boiled down to the following:
Has the international intervention, with all its expenditures, actually
measurably improved the human rights situation in Haiti?
Her complaint begs the question: do those participating in the international
intervention collectively (e.g., as the UN or World Bank) and/or as individual
States actually have an obligation to spend monies allocated or design programs in
a way to consciously maximize their positive impact on the human rights situation?
This article sets out to demonstrate that the answer to this question is yes. At
present there is a gulf between those scholars who convincingly assert that such
13. Interim Cooperation Framework, Summary (April 2006) (unpublished study, on file with the
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy).
14. See DR. JAMAL BENOMAR, RULE OF LAW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN HAITI: LESSONS
LEARNED, A World Bank Conference: "Empowerment, Security and Opportunity through Law and
Justice," St. Petersburg, Russia (July 8-12, 2001) available at
http://haiticci.undg.org/uploads/Lessons%20Learned%2OJustice_.2001.pdf (discussing how to advance
reform in a political environment not conducive to change and characterized by protracted political
crisis and paralysis).
15. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Haiti, Jan. 2007,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm (last visited May 14, 2007).
16. The CIA World Factbook, Haiti, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ha.html
(last visited April 23, 2007).
17. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Budget for the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the Period from I July 2005 to 30 June 2006, U.N. Doe.
A/60/176 (Aug. 1, 2005).
18. Louis Aucoin, Haiti's Constitutional Crisis, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 115, 118 (1999).
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human rights obligations exist 19 and operational entities that seem to even
begrudge being bound by humanitarian law after a directive from the UN Secretary
General.20
III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
As odd as it may sound, political and bureaucratic concerns trump human
rights obligations in the organization of international missions, mainly because
Member States and multilateral and bi-lateral bureaucrats do not consider
themselves bound by human rights law in the organization and operation of an
intervention.
How human rights obligations can more effectively organize mission
resources and hold accountable those involved in international interventions needs
to be better defined. For a variety of reasons, the questions "Who holds human
rights?" and "Who has the obligation to respect human rights?" are increasingly
complex.
A. Humanitarian Purpose v. The Intervention Industry
Historically, linked to the work of the International Red Cross and the content
of humanitarian law or the rules of war, interventions with a humanitarian purpose
have developed a certain mystique. They enjoy international protection: not just
limited scrutiny, but affirmative privileges.
The problem is that interventions with an ostensible humanitarian purpose
now regularly include a full range of operations, from aid programs to sending
troops (known informally as "blue helmets"). 21 This complicates any effort to
hold individual states responsible, since a state may easily avoid scrutiny by
claiming a humanitarian purpose.22
In the International Court of Justice's consideration of the complaint by the
Nicaraguan government regarding the covert war the US was waging against it, the
ICJ even entertained the United States' argument that its activities in Nicaragua
should be considered of humanitarian nature and, therefore, legitimate. The ICJ
stated: "the provision of humanitarian aid cannot be regarded as an unlawful
intervention or in any way contrary to international law... if [implemented] to
avoid violations of sovereignty and limited to the purpose 'to prevent and alleviate
19. MARGOT SALOMON & ARiUN SENGUPTA, The Human Rights Obligations of Multilateral
Institutions and of States as Members of the MLI, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: OBLIGATIONS OF
STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 39-40 (2003), available at
http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/pdf/IPRTDSalomonSengupta.pdf (last visited Apr.
17, 2007).
20. The Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian
Law, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999); See, e.g., Ray Murphy, An Assessment of UN Efforts to
Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel, 13 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 531, 532 (2006).
21. DAVID RIEFF, A BED FOR THE NIGHT: HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS 308, 328 (2002).
22. Adding to the complexity is that more and more state functions, such as delivering foreign aid,
are being contracted to private entities (both for profit and non-profit). See Laura A. Dickinson,
Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under
International Law, 47 WM & MARY L. REV. 135, 146-60 (2005).
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human suffering' and 'to protect life and health' and to ensure respect for human
beings and given without discrimination. 23
Although the ICJ did not find the US intervention in Nicaragua to have a
humanitarian purpose, its tautological statement that humanitarian aid cannot be
regarded as contrary to international law is consistent with the mystique that has
developed around humanitarian purpose. Humanitarian intention is now used
instrumentally by governments and NGOs as a means to avoid seriously evaluating
whether their intervention actually contributes to measurably improving the human
rights situation. If the intervention can be classified as having a humanitarian
purpose, intervening states can avoid scrutiny. The question should be not whether
there is a humanitarian purpose, but whether interventions have a measurable
impact on human rights.
Within many international NGOs, there has been a reaction and soul-
searching whether good intentions are good enough.24 There has not been a
similar process for states and international organizations. Scholars of
humanitarianism have discussed the need for human rights to be respected and
promoted by NGOs.25
The reality that international interventions have become a major industry
needs to be considered. The fact that public monies fuel this industry is not a
reason to avoid scrutiny, but rather a reason for it. If one was to sum all the entities
which contribute to work that may fall into the vaguely worded humanitarian
purpose, the amount would be significant.26
The international intervention industry offers goods and services and should
be treated like any other industry. Having good intentions should not free the
industry from human rights obligations. The public policy behind holding those
who manufacture goods or provide services responsible for their quality applies to
all actors, including those with the ostensible intention to do good.
The fact that governments have long history of making laws and not applying
those laws domestically simply highlights the historical challenge, but it does not
negate the importance of forcing governments to accept their legal obligations.
B. The Essence of Human Rights Law
The preamble of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
asserts that "the essential rights of man are not derived from him being a national
of a particular state, but are based upon attributes of his human personality. 27
23. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 242-243 (June 27).
24. See generally MARY B. ANDERSON, Do No HARM: How AID CAN SUPPORT PEACE OR WAR
(1999); Hugo Slim, Doing the Right Thing: ReliefAgencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility
in Political Emergencies and War, 21 DISASTERS 244, 244 (1997).
25. Hugo Slim, Not Philanthropy But Rights: The Proper Politicisation of Humanitarian
Philosophy in War, 6 INT'L. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 8 (2002).
26. For example, all the foreign aid budgets, the budgets of international organizations (e.g. UN,
WB), even some parts of defense budgets designated for this purpose, as well as NGOs and private
foundations for this purpose.
27. O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
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States during the Vienna Conference declared, "Human rights and
fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings; their protection and
promotion is the first responsibility of Governments. 28 What is noteworthy in this
language is that it reiterates attachment of rights to the individual and the use of the
plural form of government, inferring that more than one government can be
concerned with the rights of a particular individual.
But for years there has been theoretical debate and practical confusion about
human rights. To some degree, growing out of the state-centric reality of
international law, it is understandable how many attempted to limit human rights to
being a matter between a citizen and his or her state of citizenship. Being about
the individual without a link to a particular state seems fanciful, but if the objective
of law is the protection of the individual and creation of a just world, that is the
logical outcome.29
If entities with the capacity to effect positive changes in human rights are not
bound by human rights principles, this reinforces the idea that human rights law
has no restraining normative content and may be manipulated simply for political
ends. 30 The more often human rights law is applied to those with the power to
comply with those obligations, the closer we are to a place where the individual
person, not states, forms the essence of the law.31
It has been a time-honored practice to ridicule the fact that human rights law
and international law in general are violated and to question their validity based on
this fact. For example, in Candide Voltaire mocks:
He passed over heaps of dead and dying, and first reached a
neighboring village; it was in cinders, it was an Abare village which the
Bulgarians had burnt according to the laws of war.32
The fact that all laws are broken, however, does not mean there is no law-
but it does affect the law's acceptance and effective enforcement. What is most
problematic, however, is the relative difficulty of getting the most powerful entities
actually to accept and comply with their human rights obligations. While lack of
mechanisms, effective forums and third party oversight do not negate the existence
of rights, it certainly makes our job as human rights advocates challenging.
American System, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003); 43 AJIL Supp. 133 (1949).
28. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme
ofAction, I(l), U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
29. In many ways this is already a well established principle, for example, "Aliens shall enjoy, in
accordance with domestic law and subject to the relevant international obligation of the State in which
they are present ...." Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the
Country in which They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, Art.5, Annex, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doe.
A/40/53 (Dec. 13 1985).
30. MARTn KOSKENNIEMI, APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 251-54 (2005)
31. JANNE ELISABETH NuMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 457-73 (2004).
32. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (Boni & Liveright, Inc. 1918) (1759).
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Western tradition related to rights seems grounded in a tight knit community
or nation, where a contract between governed and governors defines these rights.
This idea, in times of little movement between one nation and another, worked
adequately enough to ground human rights law. But today, human rights law is
about protecting individuals from those who have the capacity to respect or violate
their rights.33 The "community" is heterogeneous and international, and therefore
laws ought to apply globally. Indeed, in 1993, the Vienna Conference affirmed the
idea that human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated,
yet we have not achieved full acceptance of human rights as a constant limitation
of power.
[Tihe contracting states do not have any interests of their own; they
merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'etre of
the convention... The high ideals which inspired the Convention
provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and
measure of all its provisions.
34
Historically, human rights law has been viewed too narrowly and has been
portrayed as a dichotomy based on intentions, good or evil. In fact, because
human rights apply to everyone, not only people with evil intentions can violate
them. Often organizations created to do good, such as the UN, NGOs and even
human rights groups, can violate an individual's human rights. The idea that
violators must be evil limits the understanding and application of human rights.35
C. Human Rights Law has Both Criminal and Civil Aspects
It is important to be reminded of the criminal and civil aspects of human
rights law in order to highlight that it is very common in both these areas of law to
have multiple actors held responsible for actions that took place in another country.
A human rights violation can constitute a violation of both criminal and civil
law. In many legal systems cases based on one set of circumstances will include
both civil (e.g. monetary damages against individuals, corporate or government
entities) and criminal aspects (e.g. jail time for individuals, usually working in
some official capacity). For example, in the United States, the same violation may
trigger two different actions, one using the criminal justice system and the other
civil. On the international level, the same violation may also be treated in two
ways. Actions to regional bodies are similar to civil actions, given monetary
damages and orders to change practice will be the frequent remedy. For certain
33. See, e.g., Alon Harel, How (and Whether) to Rethink Human Rights, 9 INT'L LEGAL THEORY
87, 88 (2003).
34. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
1951 I.C.J. 3, 23 (May 28).
35. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? 15 HARv.
HUM. RTS. J. 101, 109, 111 (2002). One should question the effectiveness of international interventions
and of the overriding usefulness of the dominant paradigm, given the world should be better off then we
are. Review Essay Symposium: Phillip Allott's Eunomia and Health of Nations - Thinking Another
World: 'This Cannot Be How the World Was Meant to Be' Discussion, 16 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 255, 256,
260 (2005).
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enumerated human rights violations, an action can be brought to the International
Criminal Court.
Jurisdiction in criminal law can be asserted where the crime occurred, based
on nationality (of defendant or victim), universal jurisdiction (certain enumerated
crimes, for example crimes against humanity) or by treaty. 36 In civil law,
jurisdiction has been easier to obtain and is often asserted through minimum
contacts that do not offend notions of fair play. 37
Many theories regarding accountability of multiple actors have been
developed and are in use throughout the world. Most of these theories allow for
degrees of responsibility or fault, distinguishing the actions of one wrongdoer from
another involved in the same action. Theories and practice, ranging from simple to
very sophisticated, have developed to allocate or apportion fault, responsibility and
liability, which include: co-defendant and co-conspirator liability, agency, contract,
vicarious liability, respondeat superior, market share liability, joint and several
liability, enterprise liability and comparative fault.38
D. Jurisdiction in Human Rights Law
Unfortunately, human rights and humanitarian law are often lumped together
within the public international law field. Practitioners often practice both, and
human rights lawyers are far from immune from the phobia that human rights law
may be more fantasy than fact. Because humanitarian law is the more developed
discipline, practitioners often wrongly borrow its obsession with a threshold
jurisdictional hurdle, when no such hurdle need be crossed in human rights law.
This desire to first determine if human rights law applies has created a problem for
its extraterritorial application; such a hurdle should not have been created in the
first place.
Human rights is distinct from most international law or law between nations.
For example, whether refugee law is a distinct discipline within international law,
or rather a part of human rights law, makes a difference as to how these laws are
interpreted. Laws relating to refugee rights use language about such laws applying
in the territory of the Contracting State.39 The territorial limits included in the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees have been interpreted narrowly by
Contracting States. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a narrow
36. See, e.g., Tarik Abdel-Monem, How Far do the Lawless Areas of Europe Extend?
Extraterritorial Applications of the European Convention on Human Rights, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 159, 173 (2005).
37. This jurisdiction must "not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
38. See generally KENNETH ABRAHAM, CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (2000); CONTRACT
LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPARISONS (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds.,1989); EUROPEAN
GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW (Springer-Verlag/Wien 2005); EUROPEAN
PRODUCT LIABILITY (Rebecca Attree & Patrick Kelly eds., 1992); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL.,THE LAW
OF TORTS (2005); William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care
System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1997).




interpretation of refugee law as traditional international law, as opposed to a part of
human rights law, found that detention of Haitians in Guantanamo, Cuba, was not
covered by the Refugee Convention, since that would be an "uncontemplated"
extraterritorial obligation.4 ° Viewing the Refugee Convention as protecting the
human rights of individuals first, rather than as simply an agreement between
states, would have resulted in a different decision that protected the rights of the
refuge-seeking Haitians.4 1
Again, human rights law focuses on the rights of individuals and the core
protection or essence of the law is to protect people.
Human rights law is not humanitarian law, with all its jurisdictional
definitions. Humanitarian lawyers spend countless hours in mental contortions
attempting to either show how humanitarian law applies or does not apply to a
42particular circumstance. Is it an international conflict? Where the participants
engaged in combat? Were they wearing uniforms? And recently, is he or she an
enemy combatant? Such a practice appears to help these lawyers comfort
themselves that humanitarian law is really law.
Human rights apply and belong to humans. Although this may be a stark and
sweeping statement, this is the nature of the law, and this is why human rights law
now applies to non-state actors,43 to corporations and in the private sphere (e.g.,
discrimination).44 It is out of step with these developments, which represent the
essence of human rights law, to limit the extraterritorial application of human
rights law and to presume that only one state may be held responsible for violating
an individual's rights. To some degree these limits have been based on the desire
to avoid the difficult task of evaluating government policy in a war abroad. In
addition, the international law state-based approach appears to limit the inquiry to
one state at a time. In the main, though, limitations are due to an enculturation
from humanitarian law/traditional international law, where we review the actions
of one state at time and where some sort of jurisdictional hurdle must be crossed
before the law applies. Human rights law is relevant when an individual's rights
are violated.
40. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (1993) cited in Gerald Neuman,
Extraterritorial Violations of Human Rights by the United States, 9 AM UNIV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 213,
219(1993).
41. Gerald Neuman, Extraterritorial Violations of Human Rights by the United States, 9 AM
UNIV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 213, 219 (1993).
42. A clear example of this is US government lawyer efforts to show that somehow humanitarian
law does not apply to its war on terror. For an effective critique of this mental yoga see Human Rights
Watch, Briefing Paper, International Humanitarian Law Issues In A Potential War In Iraq (Feb. 20,
2003), available at http://www.hrw.orgibackgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm (last visited Jan 30, 2007).
43. Nigel S. Rodley, Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights? in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 297 (Kathleen E. Mahoney et al. eds., 1993).
44. See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1996); Mark Gibney
& R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law and the Protection of
Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable to Domestic and International
Standards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123 (1996); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human
Rights: A Theory ofLegal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
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E. Duty to Act
General principles of tort, contract and criminal law create a number of
situations requiring an affirmative duty to act, including: A duty to act may be
based in the relationship of the parties (e.g. parent to child, pilot to passenger) or in
contract; a duty based in a voluntary assumption of care; a duty arising from the
fact that a person created a risk from which a need for protection arose (e.g., the
Good Samaritan principle, where no duty exists to intervene, but once a person
intervenes she has a duty to intervene appropriately); a duty arising from a special
relationship that makes the non-acting partner criminally responsible for the actor's
criminal action (e.g. one person beats the other and leaves the victim lying on the
ground injured); a duty can arise from the fact that one owns the real property upon
which the victim is injured; the duty to act and the resulting criminal liability for
failing to act, based upon statute.45
Borrowing and applying these general principles of law to instances of states
intervening in another state in any way (from invasion, to peacekeeping, to
development work), a duty would often exist.
Perhaps the strongest basis to assert a duty is the Good Samaritan principle,
given states would argue that they had no duty in the first place to intervene. Just
as in general principles of law, a Good Samaritan has no obligation to intervene,
but if he or she does, he or she is held to certain legal obligations.
Another basis for an affirmative duty could be asserted depending on the
circumstance. For example, considering Chapter IX of the UN Charter and various
human rights agreements,46 it could be argued that a contractual or statutory duty
exists. Or where a state has intervened in another country, for example militarily
or economically, and damage has been done, a duty could arise.
The idea is established rhetorically and intellectually that a human rights duty
applies to protect the "target beneficiaries" of international actors involved in
development projects. This understanding, however, has yet to be accepted and/or
operationalized by most states and other international actors. It is notable that on
paper the World Bank already recognizes this:
Human rights foster accountability of all actors involved in
development by locating duty for particular development outcomes on
duty-bearers (usually States). This advances accountability to the poor
and a consequent empowerment of the poor. In short, human rights
improve the processes through which development occurs for those it is
designed to benefit.
47
45. See, e.g., David C. Biggs, The Good Samaritan is Packing: An Overview of the Broadened
Duty to Aid your Fellowman, with the Modern Desire to Possess Concealed Weapons, 1997 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 225, 229-230 (1997).
46. U.N. Charter art. 55-60.
47. Robert Danino, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank, para. 2
(Jan. 27, 2006) (on file with the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy).
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F. An Agent or Sub-contractor Cannot Avoid Legal Obligations
In general principles of law, it is clear, whether that under contract, agency or
tort law, that an individual or entity cannot escape legal responsibility by forming
an association with others. In these cases, one is held to be liable for the acts or
omissions of the other.
Similarly, international organizations have human rights obligations, and
entities that created these organizations do not escape liability by acting through
the international organization:
International organizations are entities created by states delegating
power to achieve certain goals and perform specified functions.... It
would be surprising if states could perform actions collectively through
international organizations that states could not lawfully do
individually. 4
[I]ntemational organizations are subjects of international law and, as
such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general
rules of international law.49
Case law interpreting the European Convention of Human Rights has
consistently held states to be responsible for their actions, regardless of the banner
or entity through which such actions were carried out. 50 For example, it would be
incompatible with the purposes of the European Convention to absolve states from
responsibility when acting through international organizations.5 1
IV. SPECIFIC HURDLES
Ending obligations to respect human rights at a nation's borders severely
limits human rights law's capacity to effectuate positive change. This
interpretation is anachronistic and flows against an actual trend of globalization of
commerce as well as conflicts. Our present world is amazingly interconnected.
Corporations have obligations to respect human rights wherever they operate; so
how, when human rights principles apply in the private sphere across borders, can
countries claims that only a host state has human rights obligations, and that
human rights obligations that apply domestically do not apply when that country is
working in another, either directly or through an agent (e.g., UN, OAS or World
Bank)?5 2 Some aspects of this issue have received academic attention.
53
48. Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 273, 309 (2002); see also Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
49. Interpretation of the Agreement of March 25, 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J.
73, 89 (Dec. 20).
50. Michael Kearney, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the European Convention on Human Rights,
5 TRINITY C.L. REV. 126, 139 (2002).
51. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 261, 262 (1999).
52. For example, both home and host states have an obligation to regulate multinational
corporations. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 48. It is a general principle that those with power must be
accountable for the way in which they exercise it. International organizations have developed limited
and limiting ways to hold themselves to account. See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complainants
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There is a growing understanding of the application of human rights law to
individuals serving in international operations. For instance, human rights
principles proscribe "blue helmets" from torturing or raping those they have been
sent to protect.54 At the same time, mechanisms to create accountability for these
violations are underdeveloped.55
An understanding of how human rights law should be considered in how
Member States organize their interventions in another country and how human
rights law provides a vehicle for accountability related to money spent is also
underdeveloped and requires further attention. 6 It should be noted that Zanmi
Lasante/Partners in Health, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human
Rights, and the International Human Rights Clinic at the New York University
School of Law requested and received a hearing on the human rights obligations,
specifically economic and social rights, members of the OAS have when
implementing projects in Haiti.57 The purpose of the hearing was to remind the
Commissioners of the confusion regarding this issue and the ripeness for further
clarification.
A. Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law
Extraterritorial responsibility has been well established in international law
for decades. The seminal case, the Trail Smelter Arbitration, held that: "no state
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury.., in or to the territory of another" (emphasis added).58
Do these principles also apply to human rights violations arising from
decisions taken in one country that result in actions carried out in another? A
and International Organizations: a Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in
International Financial Institutions, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 403 (2005).
53. Professor Ved Nanda has been sitting on a Committee of the International Law Association
that has been grappling with this topic already for a number of years and has already caught the wave in
a recently published article. See Ved Nanda, Accountability of International Organizations - Some
Observations, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 379 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 20, at 531-46.
55. Some scholars see a more gradual acceptance by the UN and Member States of their human
rights obligations, for example when acting as a quasi-sovereign. See, e.g., Frederic Megret and Florian
Hoffmann, The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing
Human Rights Responsibilities, 25 HuM. RTS. Q. 314 (2003).
56. Some scholars believe the general principles of state responsibility apply to human rights law
and that the host state would be justified in approaching the intervening state for compensation for the
violation of the rights of its citizens. The logical extension of this argument is that Haiti could bring a
case in the ICJ against various states for violating the economic and social rights of its citizens. See,
e.g., Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential Means of Holding
Private Actors Accountable for Human Rights, 5 MELB. J. INT'L L. 1, 26-27 (2004).
57. Statement of Partners in Health/Zanmi Lasante before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (March 3, 2006), available at
http://www.rfkmemorial.org/humanrights/2002_Loune/PIHStatement.pdf
58. The Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 684 (1941), quoted in
Rebecca M. Bratspies, Trail Smelter's (Semi)Precautionary Legacy (2006), in REBECCA M. BRATSPIES,
TRANSBOUNDARY HARMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER
ARBITRATION, (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell Miller, eds., Cambridge University Press 2006).
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number of forums and scholars have argued that this should be the case. Many
scholars argue that decisions against the extraterritorial application of human rights
law is anathema to the effective protection of individual rights, the very purpose of
human rights law.5 9
Notably, states actually take interest in the impact of their corporate actors
abroad (e.g., product liability) 60 or acts of individuals (e.g., pedophiles, money
launderers, tax dodgers) and international humanitarian law attaches to the actor,
not the place. 6' Yet, human rights NGOs and advocacy groups have not spent a lot
of time looking at the extraterritorial impact of state actions. One author has said,
"[g]reater commitment is needed to the complex and broad-ranging business of
transforming the political culture both nationally and internationally in order to
create greater transparency and accountability in relation to state actions
overseas."
62
The human rights advocate's position, and one that has significant theoretical
support, is that it is unconscionable to interpret human rights treaty obligations in
such a way that would permit the violation of human rights by a Contracting Party
extraterritorially, but find that same violation condemnable when done in its own
63territory.
59. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 82
(1995). See also John Creone, Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict
Kosovo, EUR. J. INT'L L. 469, 475 (2001).
60. In fact, some have argued that various states, including the US, have gone too far in asserting
extraterritorial jurisdiction or application of their laws in other countries. (This is a far cry from the US
position on the application of human rights to their actions extraterritorially.) See, e.g., Note,
Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International and
American Law, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1308, 1309 (1983); see also Jerry W. Cain, Jr., Extraterritorial
Application of the United States' Trade Embargo Against Cuba: The United Nations General
Assembly's Call for an End to the U.S. Trade Embargo, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379, 380 (1994);
see generally Note, Constitutional Law - Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth Amendment to
Actions Taken by or at the Direction of United States Agents Against Aliens Residing in Foreign
Nations, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1473, 1479 (1974-1975) and Randall L. Sarosdy, Comment, Jurisdiction
Following Illegal Extraterritorial Seizure: International Human Rights Obligations as an Alternative to
Constitutional Stalemate, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1439, 1468 (1975-1976) (discussing the ebb and flow of the
extraterritorial application of the individual rights guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution); see also Angela
Fisher & Margaret Satterthwaite, Beyond Guantanamo: Transfers to Torture One Year After Rasul v.
Bush, CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, June 28, 2005, available at
http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/Beyond%20Guantanamo%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (providing a more
recent example of the ebb and flow of the extraterritorial application of the individual rights guaranteed
in the U.S. Constitution).
61. See, e.g., Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed Forces
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 330 (2000).
62. Ralph Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law
on Civil and Political Rights, MICH. J. INT'L L. 739, 770 (2005).
63. Michael Kearney, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the European Convention on Human Rights,
5 TRINITY C. L. REv. 126, 126-129 (2002).
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The issue has been litigated often in the European Court on Human Rights.
These cases turn mainly on the definition of "jurisdiction" found in article 1 of the
European Convention.
64
There have been many critiques of the European Court's approach to
extraterritorial application of the Convention, a number of which show what
appears to be somewhat inconsistent judgments that tend to support the idea that
the Court has placed the higher interests of the State Parties above examining
serious human rights violations. 65 Cases against Turkey and Russia have tended to
support the extraterritorial application, while cases against core European states do
not.66
In the context of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, the Court stated: "[A]
Contracting State to the Convention could not, by way of delegation of powers to a
subordinate and unlawful administration, avoid its responsibility for breaches of
the Convention, indeed of international law in general. 67
The term 'jurisdiction' is not limited to the national territory of the High
Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be involved because of acts of their
authorities producing effects outside their own territory.65
One line of cases clearly does not limit jurisdiction to territorial boundaries
and uses the "effective control" or "degree of control" test based on power or
authority to determine if the European Convention should be applied
extraterritorially.69
In the Bankovic case, plaintiffs attempted to hold states responsible for a
bombing in Belgrade by NATO forces, but the Court narrowed the applicability of
the Convention extraterritorially to the territories of the Contracting States. By
taking this tack, the Court avoided the more interesting question regarding the
degree State Parties are responsible for actions carried out within the framework of
NATO. 0
... [T]he Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating, subject to Article
56 of the Convention, in an essentially regional context and notably in
64. "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
65. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 63 at 126-157 (providing an analysis of several decisions of the
European Court regarding the extraterritorial application of international human rights laws).
66. Some scholars have pointed to the odd development of jurisprudence in this area as related to
Europe's colonial past. Louise Moor & A.W. Brian Simpson, Ghosts of Colonialism in the European
Convention on Human Rights, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 121 (2005).
67. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 71 (May 10, 2001).
68. Drozd & Janousek v. France & Spain, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 91 (1992); See also
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 62 (1995).
69. See Cyprus v. Turkey supra note 69 at 71; Loizidou v. Turkey supra note 68 at 62; Ocalan v.
Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2004); Ilascu v. Moldova & Russia, App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R (2004).
70. See, e.g., Alexandra Ruth & Mirja Trilsch, International Decision: Bankovic v. Belgium
(Admissibility), 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 168, 172 (2003).
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the legal space (espacejuridique) of the Contracting States. The FRY
clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not
designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the
conduct of Contracting States. Accordingly, the desirability of avoiding
a gap or vacuum in human rights protection has so far been relied on by
the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction only when the territory
in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would
normally be covered by the Convention.71
Although this reading of the European Convention moves away from
extraterritorial application, the "espace juridique" concept would reinforce the
notion that regional human rights instruments apply throughout the territories of
the Contracting States. Taking this line of thinking a logical step further, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were designed to
apply throughout the world, so it is not a stretch to define "espacejuridique" to be
global.72
In matters related to extraterritorial application of the American Convention
on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission has taken a position that is
conceptually consistent with the essence of human rights law. It has held: "[g]iven
that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity, each
American state is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its
jurisdiction., 73 This appears to mean that all OAS Members are bound by Inter-
American human rights law when intervening in Haiti.
The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights has also specified the
non-nationality basis for conceiving human rights.74 If human rights law cannot
support a distinction between nationals and foreigners domestically, should it be
able to do so extra-territorially?
Perhaps most important for the purposes of this article, the "jurisdiction"
limitation that exists in the European Convention, the ICCRP and the American
Convention on Human Rights is conspicuously absent in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article 2 begins:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
71. Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 para 80 (Dec. 12,
2001).
72. It should be noted that the Human Rights Committee has not been so expansive in its view of
extraterritorial application. In its General Comment 31 on Article 2 it stated, "that a State Party must
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control
of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party." U.N. Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State
Parties to the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26,2004).
73. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. 37 (1999).
74. Wilde, supra note 62, at 791.
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resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
75
It should be noted that only article 14 of the ICESCR specifies that each State
Party must have a plan for securing free primary education in its territory or under
its jurisdiction. Otherwise, the ICESCR requires international cooperation to
achieve the rights of the Convention in all State Parties.
The Committee on Economic and Social Rights clarifies this point:
The Committee wishes to emphasize that in accordance with Articles 55
and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, with well-established
principles of international law, and with the provisions of the Covenant
itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all
States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a
position to assist others in this regard.76
This certainly can be read as an attempt to create an obligation to provide
foreign assistance, but it also supports the idea that if a state or states choose to
intervene in another nation, the intervening states continue to be bound by the
Covenant. In another General Comment, the Committee mandates that the rights
of Covenant be considered by State Parties in their international work. These
statements underscore the applicability of the ICESCR extraterritorially:
The second principle of general relevance is that development
cooperation activities do not automatically contribute to the promotion
of respect for economic, social and cultural rights. Many activities
undertaken in the name of "development" have subsequently been
recognized as ill-conceived and even counter-productive in human
rights terms. In order to reduce the incidence of such problems, the
whole range of issues dealt with in the Covenant should, wherever
possible and appropriate, be given specific and careful consideration.
77
Every effort should be made, at each phase of a development project, to
ensure that the rights contained in the Covenants are duly taken into
account. This would apply, for example, in the initial assessment of the
priority needs of a particular country, in the identification of particular
projects, in project design, in the implementation of the project, and in
its final evaluation.
78
75. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
76. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment 3: The Nature of
States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par.1 of the Covenant), 14, U.N. Doc. 14/12/90 (Dec. 14, 1990).
77. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment 2: International
TechnicalAssistance Measures (Art. 22 of the Covenant), 7, U.N. Doc. 02/02/90 (Feb. 2, 1990).
78. Id. at 8(d).
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The extraterritorial application of Contracting Parties obligations under the
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is much clearer than that under
the European Convention and the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights and clearer than the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.
B. Marginalization of Economic and Social Rights
Economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) have been marginalized in
practice. 79 Many governments and a number of leading NGOs see economic rights
more as the equivalent of letters to Santa Claus rather than as justiciable rights.8 °
A few states, like the US, still cling to the outdated notion that human rights are
limited to civil and political rights. 81 But we in the advocacy community also are
part of the problem.82 Our focus on civil and political rights has helped to
marginalize ESCR. Importantly, violations of ESCR affect women
disproportionately since women tend to be marginalized in terms of political
power, there may be a correlation.
83
Up to now, most discussions (both academic and in the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR)) of the extraterritorial application of human rights law have related to
civil and political rights. The marginalization of ESCR can be seen from this fact,
especially considering the distinct wording between the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which favors the extraterritorial application
of ESCR rights.
Many countries, like Canada and Brazil, have developed very sophisticated
ways of measuring positive change in the level of respect for ESCR. 84 When
intervening abroad, these countries should bring this experience with them in order
79. Human rights as implemented today can mask power relations. While economic and social
rights have been marginalized, market attributes have been formalized through the WTO. See Tony
Evans, International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge, 27 HUM RTS. Q. 1046 (2005).
80. "Right to Health," 6 Human Rights Features 1 (31 March - 1 April, 2003). For an alternative
view of the justiciable nature of economic, social and cultural rights, see Trinidad Antonio Cancado, "A
Justicabilidade dos Direitos Economicos, Socias e Culturias no Plano Internacional," in Volio Jimenez
Collection 171 (2002) (on file with author).
81. Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and
Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467, 468 (1983).
82. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced
by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (2004); Leonard S. Rubenstein,
How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A
Response to Kenneth Roth, 26 HUM. RTs. Q. 4 (2004).
83. See Joe Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization:
International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for People's Rights in Africa, 18 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 851, 876-79 (2002-2003).
84. See, e.g., Todd Landman, Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice and Policy, 26 HUM.
RTS. Q. 906 (Nov. 4, 2004); Katarina Tomasevski, Measuring Compliance with Human Rights
Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC LAW AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICIES OF THE
NORDIC COUNTRIES, 109 (1989); Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the
Obligation to Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693 (1994).
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to demonstrate whether money being spent is actually improving the human rights
85situation.
There is a growing understanding of the many ways of viewing and working
internationally. But too often when viewing human rights problems, we borrow
only from the criminal aspect of the law and forget about its social justice
component, and thereby fail to include a focus on the obligations to improve the
economic, social and cultural reality of the people in the country where the
international entities are intervening. Often, for example, in the field of
transitional justice, economic, social and cultural rights are marginalized.86
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts are lagging well behind in terms of
measuring their impact on ESCR. Whereas human rights are normally included in
the report of the Secretary General to the Security Council related to a specific
peacekeeping operation, these reports almost always focus on civil and political
rights and contain minimal if any discussion of ESCR.
C. Multi-State Responsibility
Roman law offers one of the first examples of how a legal system is renovated
under the influence of equitable ideas. 87 It is time for our thinking about multi-
state responsibility for violations of economic and social human rights to be
renovated.
In general principles of law, for example, we find co-defendants and co-
conspirators in criminal law, and joint enterprises and joint enterprise liability in
civil law. 8 Many actors (e.g., States, multilateral organizations and NGOs) are
part of the joint enterprise of bringing sustainable peace and the respect of the full
spectrum of human rights to Haiti. There should be shared responsibility and
accountability. 89 Not only general principles of law, but general principles of
international law support this position.
90
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has already held that
if states fail to abide by their obligations in the Covenant when entering bilateral or
multilateral agreements they can violate their obligations under the Covenant.91 It
85. Tools have been created that are useful in determining if a state is taking steps to the
maximum of its available resources. See, e.g., Claudio Schuftan, Dignity Counts: A Guide to Using
Budget Analysis to Advance Human Rights, 27 HUm. RTS. Q. 134 (2005).
86. Louise Arbour, United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Economic and Social Justice
for Societies in Transition (Oct. 25, 2006), available at http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/1025.htm.
87. Schermaier, supra note 1 at 65.
88. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1266-1380 (1996-97).
89. More has been written on obligations of UN and multilateral entities than holding multiple
states responsible for the same violation; however, more work is needed to flush out how states must
abide by their human rights obligations while acting collectively. See, e.g., Cerone, supra note 59;
Kritsiotis, supra note 61.
90. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 15 (Jan. 29).
See, e.g., Salomon and Sengupta, supra note 19.
91. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment 14, The Right to the
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is a logical step to consider states bound by the Covenant in the implementation of
these agreements. States are individually and collectively bound by human rights
law. The question remains as to how to achieve acceptance of this principle. In
the case of "decisions... made collectively, one cannot disaggregate such actions
and attribute them to individual member States. Member States are then obliged to
discharge their obligations undertaken qua members pursuant to those collective
decisions, and will be held... responsible under international law for the breach
thereof."
92
Despite some developments, human rights law and accountability for
violations still have not evolved to hold multiple actors liable. We are very much
still in the state-citizen mode in terms of the application of human rights law. This
is true despite the fact that the reality on the ground is complex, multidimensional
and involves many actors. In places like Haiti, where the government was not
trusted or had a limited capacity to absorb funds from international donors, a
different way of looking at human rights obligations needs to be developed.
Importantly, in Haiti, most money flows from a donor directly to NGOs or
corporations (implementing projects approved by the donor), but yet the
government of Haiti is held responsible for improving the human rights situation
and is accountable for whether these projects - which the Government has very
little influence over - actually benefit the people. Something is wrong with this
picture: the UN peacekeeping mission to Haiti, the OAS mission, the Inter-
American Development Bank, World Bank and all the Member States' missions
and projects to Haiti, NGOs and corporations, are all exponentially better
resourced than the Government.
Numerous entities exercise some power and impact the lives of Haitians. In
multiple ways, the relative power of each entity should be examined when
determining levels of responsibility to respect and promote the human rights of the
Haitians. Interestingly, all of those entities, except corporations, would accept that
one of their missions is to improve the human rights situation in Haiti. The
problem is that the expectation and measurement of each entity's contribution to
improving the human rights situation remains undeveloped. All accountability still
flows to the entity considered by many to be corrupt and ineffective - the Haitian
government-while the Member States and their agents enjoy moral high ground
and no accountability. Even "do gooders" need to examine carefully to see if their
work is actually producing a human rights benefit, including the human rights
components of UN mission.
93
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 50, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000); Comm. on Econ., Soc.
and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, 19, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1999/5 (1999).
92. U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Progress Report: Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, 58,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (Aug. 2, 2001) (prepared by Joseph Oloka-Onyango and Deepika
Udagama).
93. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 108.
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Even if huge projects could not be completed within the next few years, many
projects could be implemented that would help transform lives and give the Haitian
people some control and influence over the resources being spent in their name.
This, in and of itself, is mandated by human rights law. Political participation in
the decisions affecting the Haitian people is fundamental in human rights law.
Why it can be ignored at a time of crisis is far from clear, especially when it is the
people's participation and empowerment that can help to build the basis for a
sustainable peace through laying the foundation for good governance.
It is not simply the international intervenors' responsibility; obviously the
host Member State has significant obligations, but it is past due to begin a process
to define that each intervenor has human rights obligations and those obligations
need to be considered in the way interventions are structured and their impact
measured.
Rights also have addressees who are assigned duties or responsibilities. A
person's human rights are not primarily rights against the United Nations or other
international bodies; they primarily impose obligations on the government of the
country in which the person resides or is located. The human rights of citizens of
Belgium are mainly addressed to the Belgian government. International agencies,
and the governments of countries other than one's own, are secondary or "backup"
addressees. International human rights organizations provide encouragement,
assistance, and sometimes criticism to states in order to assist them in fulfilling
their duties. 
94
A growing acceptance of the responsibility to protect highlights the
significance of "backup" responsibility: the principle makes it an obligation of UN
Member States to intervene to end massive human rights violations. 95
Contemporary practice makes it hard to see how states other than the primary
state have duties in a Hohfeldian sense, but such practice is out of step with other
areas of law that clearly contemplate multiple duty holders. There is nothing in
human rights law that prevents us from using a similar analysis. In fact, the call
for state cooperation to achieve full respect for human rights seems to highlight the
duty. "Starting with a human act, we must next find a causal relation between the
act and the harmful result; for in our law - and it is believed in any civilized law -
liability cannot be imputed to a man unless it is in some degree a result of his
act."
96
The main hurdle is the means for moving from a lack of an obligation to
intervene in another country, for example, when the responsibility to protect does
not exist and the recognition of a duty on states that voluntarily intervene in
another country. In this case, we can simply borrow from the general principles of
94. James Nickel, Human Rights, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Fall 2006,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/ (emphasis excluded).
95. See, e.g., Mukesh Kapila, United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, The
Responsibility to Protect: Moving from Words to Action (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.aegistrust.org/index.php ?option=comcontent&task=view&id=318 &Itemid = 147.
96. Joseph Beale, The Proximate Consequences ofAn Act, 33 HARV. L. REv. 633, 637 (1920).
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law. Just as in the case of the Good Samaritan, there may be no duty to intervene,
but the act of an intervention, or voluntary operation in another state, creates legal
duties to respect human rights law.
Once we get over the duty hurdle, it is also not clear what standard should be
applied. Until now, states could point to their good intentions as a reason why they
should not be held responsible. However, given that mens rea or bad intention is
only required in some cases of criminal law, other standards need to be looked at,
such as recklessness, negligence and strict liability. In many ways a violation of
human rights law is a malum prohibitum or a prohibited wrong. When such a
wrong happens the parties involved are liable. This should be the case in human
rights law.
Once a violation of human rights can be demonstrated, liability and
responsibility should be divided based on relative power and ability to have ended
the violation.
V. RECOMMENDATION/CONCLUSION
Recently, member states of the UN, including most notably the United States,
have been preoccupied with the concept of the UN's accountability. But what is
needed is accountability to the UN's guiding principles rather than to the agenda of
particular Member States.
Further defining the extent of states' human rights obligations when
intervening in other states will help to improve transparency, accountability and
effectiveness of these interventions. It is hoped this article will create more
interest in this area.
The IACHR examination of multi-state responsibility for extraterritorial
violations of economic, social and cultural rights of Organization of American
States Member States is an important step in the direction of formalizing a new
understanding of what human rights duties are held by states voluntarily
intervening in other state. Hopefully, the IACHR will help clarify the legal
obligations that do in fact exist.
Once there is a growing understanding of this responsibility, the heavy lifting
will be the operationalization of this obligation when Member States and their
agents (e.g., UN and World Bank) operate in another country.
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GLOBALIZATION, COMMUNITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:





Globalization is placing increasing stress on individuals and communities,
particularly in rural areas in developing countries. Increased trade and other
economic activities, for example, result in higher demand for wood and other
forest products, oil and other minerals, fish products, arable land, etc. - resources
that indigenous and other local communities often depend upon for their
livelihoods and cultures. Large-scale development projects such as dams, mines
and highways often displace local populations, exploit their natural resource base,
and interfere with or destroy their livelihoods and cultures.2 Even new protected
areas such as national parks - terrestrial and maritime - often displace local
populations or restrict their access to land and resources on which they
traditionally rely.3
Local communities often are unable to protect themselves in the face of these
pressures. There are various reasons for their vulnerability, ranging from
limitations in resource mobilization or technical expertise to more structural issues
of political opportunity and power dynamics. Many communities lack knowledge
or experience in mobilizing resources to defend their rights, such as technical,
scientific or legal expertise, or other helpful skills such as how to use the media.
At the most basic level, communities may not have access to a base of resources,
1. Daniel Magraw is President of the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL),
Washington, DC and Geneva, Switzerland. Lauren Baker is a Program Associate at CIEL in the Law
and Communities and Human Rights and Environment programs. The authors gratefully acknowledge
the germinal work on CBPRs done by Owen Lynch (widely and accurately credited as the progenitor of
CBPRs) and on PIC by Anne Perrault, as well as specific input on this article by each of them and by
Jaesa McLin and Julie Locasio.
2. See, e.g., JOAN MARTINEZ-ALIER, THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2002).
3. See, e.g., Mac Chapin, A Challenge to Conservationists, 17(6) World Watch. 17, 17-31
(2004); COLIN M. TURNBULL, THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE 20-32, 129-39 (1972) (recounting how the
society of the Ik people was destroyed as a result of their having been denied access to their traditional
lands after the creation of Uganda's Kidepo Valley National Park).
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like a place to meet, money for basic supplies such as copying and telephones, or
technology such as computers and the internet.
A more pervasive and structural problem is that rural people, while
comprising a large majority in many developing countries, are frequently
neglected, or even repressed, by national governments or local elites. A set of
political variables, such as the openness of the political system, the State's capacity
or propensity for repression, the stability of elite alignments, and the presence of
elite allies all may influence the ability or limitations of a community to protect
itself in the face of pressures. 5 Fundamental political and economic problems and
the exploitation of the politically powerless often result in environmental
injustices, including disparities in the benefits that flow from natural resources
development. 
6
A related concern is that many nations continue to mirror the policies and
biases of their former colonial governments, including land laws. In many
countries, including in much of Asia and Africa, the State claims ownership of vast
areas, including areas traditionally occupied by indigenous groups. Since political
independence was attained in the 1960s by many African nations, State assertions
of ownership have actually been broadened and legally strengthened in many
nations.7  In Indonesia, the State's authority over its resources since its
independence has also been maintained and expanded, and in 1980s the State
classified over 75% of the total land area as State Forest, including over 90% of the
Outer Islands.! Given this pattern of State control of land and resources, local
communities are often vulnerable to losing access to their traditionally occupied
lands or resources, and thus to their means of sustenance, way of life, and culture.
This article addresses two related human rights norms that are emerging to
counteract pressures being placed on vulnerable communities. The first of these is
Community-Based Property Rights, which relate to the rights of long-established
communities, especially indigenous ones, to manage and control natural resources
they have traditionally utilized, and to maintain and adapt their often complex
community rules and norms. The second is Prior Informed Consent by indigenous
and other local communities with respect to the use of natural resources that they
reside in or upon which they are otherwise dependent.
4. See, e.g., Joe Foweraker, Theories of Social Movements, in THEORIZING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
16 (Pluto Press 1995). (Resource mobilization theory).
5. See, e.g., id. at 18 (Political opportunity theory).
6. See, e.g., Gary Bryner, Assessing Claims of Environmental Justice: Conceptual Frameworks,
in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES AND APPLICATIONS 31-56 (Kathryn
Mutz et al. eds., 2002).
7. OWEN LYNCH, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AMPLIFYING LOCAL
VOICES, STRIVING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE AFRICAN PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW AND COMMUNITY-BASED PROPERTY RIGHTS WORKSHOP, USA RIVER, TANZANIA, AUGUST 1 - 4,
2000 (Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. L 2002).
8. OWEN LYNCH & EMILY HARWELL, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW,WHOSE NATURAL RESOURCES? WHOSE COMMON GOOD? TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN INDONESIA (Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. L., 2002).
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Before describing these concepts, it is helpful first to recall the legal context
in which these norms are emerging. The international legal system underwent a
radical change at the end of World War II when the international community
recognized the existence of human rights. This development was radical because
for the first time subjects other than States had rights. Human beings had these
rights solely by virtue of their being human. Moreover, they had these rights vis-A-
vis their own State, for no longer could a State treat its nationals any way it liked
with legal impunity.
As is well known, these rights were first recognized in 1948 in a non-binding
declaration of the United Nations General Assembly - the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 9 They later were established in two binding agreements - with the
solemn name "covenants" - one on civil and political rights, 10 and the other on
economic, social and cultural rights."These and other rights have also been
enshrined in a multitude of regional and specialized international agreements,
including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms,' 2 the American Convention on Human Rights,' 3 the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,' 4 the Convention concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169),"' the
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 16  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women,'
7 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,'
8
and most recently, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.19
Eventually, these human rights became recognized as customary international
20 2law, some even reaching the status ofjus cogens. '
9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G.A. res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 at
71 (Dec. 12, 1948).
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
3171 (1976).
11. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Jan. 2, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
12. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8,
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11, which entered into force
on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, Jan. 1, 1990, and November 1, 1998 respectively.
13. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 21, June 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
14. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 14, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
15. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27,
1989, International Labour Organization No. 169, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991, 72 I.L.O. Official
Bulletin 59.
16. International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4,
1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
17. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3,
1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
18. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
19. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/61 1.
20. For a description of how this occurred with respect to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, see Jo M. Pasqualucci, Louis Sohn: Grandfather of International Human Rights Law in the
United States, 20 Human Rts. Q. 924, 939-940 (1998).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702,
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This area of human rights has continued to evolve over the half century since
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For example, in the 1990s the
international community finally recognized that these rights applied to women, not
just men,22 and human rights efforts have focused increasingly on rights of
indigenous people.23 More recently, the evolution of human rights has included
24environmental considerations, recognizing, for example, that pollution can
violate the rights to life and property.
In 1992, the international community took a bold step towards acknowledging
the link between human rights and environment by recognizing sustainable
development as the overarching paradigm for improving the quality of life of
people around the world through the adoption of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development 26 and Agenda 21.27 The importance of sustainable
development has been recognized many times since adoption of the Rio
Declaration. 8 Sustainable development has four defining characteristics: the
interests of future generations must be taken into account; the needs of the world's
poor must be given priority; the environment must be protected; and social,
environmental and economic policies must be integrated.29
At about the same time, the environmental justice movement came to the fore
in the United States when research by the Christian Science Monitor and others
revealed that environmental hazards and pollution were disproportionately located
in poor and minority areas, with race being the most significant predictor of the
cmnt. n (AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1990).
22. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 15,
1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995) and A/CONF. 177/20/Add.1 (1995). For a description of the
role of civil society in reaching that realization, as well as a compilation of the 49 most significant
international instruments leading up to the Beijing Declaration's recognition that women's rights are
human rights, see generally C. LOCKWOOD ET AL-, INSTRUMENTS OF CHANGE: THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN (ABA Press 1998).
23. See, e.g., Vice President and Rapporteur, Report to the General Assembly on the First Session
of the Human Rights Council, at 56-73, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (June 30, 2006).
24. For early articles regarding that relationship, see Dinah. Shelton, Human Rights,
Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 103 (1991); Philip
Alston, Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 612
(1984).
25. See, e.g., San Mateo de Huanchor v. Peri, Petition 504/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
69/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004), discussed infra at text accompanying notes [40-42]
[hereinafter San Mateo]. See also Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, at 25 (Aug. 31, 2001), discussed infra at text accompanying notes [37-39]
[hereinafter Awas Tingi].
26. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.ACONF.151/26 (June 25,
1993), 31 I.L.M.874 (1992).
27. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-
14, 1992, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26 (June 25, 1993).
28. See, e.g., World Summit for Social Development, March 6-12, 1995, Copenhagen, Den.,
Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (Apr. 19, 1995).
29. Daniel Magraw & Lisa Hawke, Sustainable Development, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 613 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds. 2007).
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location of hazardous facilities.3 °  There is widespread agreement in the
environmental justice movement that disadvantaged communities have a right to
participate in decisions affecting them, that they should not bear a disproportionate
environmental burden, and that they should share in the benefits of environmental
protection, such as clean drinking water, sanitation, and access to parks.
Environmental justice should also be viewed as requiring effective and equal
access to justice by those injured by environmental degradation, as well as the
protection of the environment sufficient to maintain a healthy quality of life.
3 1
In 1991, the first national environmental justice event was held, in which
environmental justice activists from the United States and other countries forged
the "Principles of Environmental Justice", which are still looked to as a defining
document of the movement.32 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency created
an Environmental Justice office in 1992. The American Bar Association, which
had endorsed sustainable development in 1992, adopted an environmental justice
resolution in 1993. 33 Additionally, in 1994, President William J. Clinton signed an
Executive Order on Environmental Justice, which declared that every federal
agency should make "achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing... disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations.,
34
As the movements for sustainable development and environmental justice
progressed, it became increasingly evident that they were inextricably linked since
they both addressed the confluence of social, environmental and economic factors,
both required that the environment be preserved at a level sufficient to maintain a
healthy quality of life, and both considered justice implications of development
31projects and processes.
One set of instances where the search for environmental justice and
sustainable development coincide is the treatment of long-established communities
that are dependent on particular natural resources for their sustenance, their
livelihood, their shelter, or their culture. This is the case, for example, with
indigenous communities in the Amazon rainforest that depend on their
30. John Bryne et al., A Brief on Environmental Justice, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
DISCOURSES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (John Bryne et al. eds., 2002).
31. Daniel Magraw & Owen Lynch, One Species, One Planet: Environmental Justice and
Sustainable Development, in 2 WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW, EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 441,
442-45 (Ana Palacio ed., 2006).
32. For a discussion of The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, see
David H. Getches & David H. Pellow, Beyond "Traditional" Environmental Justice, in JUSTICE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES AND APPLICATIONS, (Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds.,
2002).
33. Policy Positions Adopted by ABA House of Delegates, Environmental Justice, Aug. 11, 1993,
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/environmental/environjus.shtml.
34. Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations. Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 at 7629-
32 (1994).
35. See Magraw & Lynch, supra note 31.
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surroundings for their way of life. In some communities in the Amazon,
community members have reported using 30 different plant species for commercial
sale alone, and many more forest materials for food and medicines, such as Brazil
nuts for sale, palm fibers for clothes, seeds for oils, locust for medicine, heart of
palm for food, etc., in addition to fishing and hunting for food.36 Other examples
include traditional coastal or river fishing communities that depend on fishing for
their livelihoods, and communities that depend on rivers or lakes for their water.
Unfortunately, as indicated above, these communities are often vulnerable to
outside threats. Essentially, natural-resource dependent communities often are
highly vulnerable to losing their land or access to resources.
Some threats can be addressed by using standard human rights mechanisms in
international law. For example, the Awas Tingni case in the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights addressed the violations of the right to property of the
community by the Nicaraguan State, when Nicaragua granted a concession to a
company to carry out road construction work and logging exploitation on Awas
Tingni lands, without the consent of the Awas Tingni community.3 7 The court
spoke of the rights to property of the Awas Tingni, and other indigenous
communities in Nicaragua and elsewhere, in their finding that "[i]ndigenous
groups, by the fact of their very existence, have the right to live freely in their own
territory; the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and
understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their
integrity, and their economic survival. 38 The Court ruled that the State had to
adopt legislative, administrative, and other necessary measures to provide property
title to the indigenous communities in accordance with their customary law,
values, and customs.
39
Another example of the application of standard human rights mechanisms is
the San Mateo de Huanchor case in the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR). This case addressed the environmental and health impacts from
mining contamination in San Mateo de Huanchor, Peru.40 The IACHR requested
that Peru take precautionary measures, including taking steps to remove the
tailings dump that was contaminating their community and the river on whose
bank it was located, and to provide medical assistance to community members who
had been harmed by the contamination. 4' As a result of the request of the
Commission, the toxic mine tailings were removed and the State has taken some
initial efforts to provide medical assistance to community members as of 2007.42
36. Philip Fearnside, Extractive Reserves in Brazilian Amazonia: An Opportunity to Maintain
Tropical Rain Forest under Sustainable Use, 39 BIOSCIENCE 387 (1989).
37. Awas Tingi, supra note 25.
38. Id. atpara. 149.
39. Id. at para. 25. Another point of particular note by the Court was the finding that, given the
significance of this relationship, indigenous peoples' customary law is adequate to support recognition
of a property right even in the absence of State recognition of that right (para. 151).
40. San Mateo, supra note 25.
41. Id. at para. 12.
42. Another point of particular note is that the IACHR's decision highlights the linkage between
pollution and human rights, the decision of the Commission sets a precedent to consider environmental
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Sometimes, however, it is not possible to apply standard human rights
doctrine or, in other instances, standard human rights mechanisms are inadequate.
Community-Based Property Rights (CBPRs) and Prior Informed Consent (PIC)
have emerged to fill this gap.
II. COMMUNITY-BASED PROPERTY RIGHTS
The term "community-based property rights" was first publicly invoked by
the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) in 2000. 4' Among other
things, the CBPR concept was designed to be useful in advocating on behalf of
local communities and their legal rights to manage and control their natural
resources.
CBPRs relate to the rights of long-established communities, including
indigenous ones, to natural resources they have traditionally utilized. CBPRs also
include the right to maintain and adapt the complex and dynamic rules and norms
of their communities that often are formed over long periods of time in response to
local environmental conditions.
In contrast to widely used and largely uniform Western concepts, CBPRs
within any given local community typically encompass a number of different
rights, including rights to ownership, use and transfer (including inheritance) of
natural resources, all of which are understood and respected by a self-defined
group of local people. CBPRs often include several distinct property rights within
a community area, like private property that is owned by an individual or family,
common property areas that can be accessed by all members of the community
although not open to people outside of the community, and other types of property,
such as areas that may be closed to any form of use in order to encourage
regeneration of natural resources (e.g., forest or fish sanctuaries) or due to cultural
reasons (such as sacred spaces). CBPRs can likewise include rights to land,
wildlife, water, forest products, fish, marine products, and intellectual property.
Furthermore, CBPRs may vary in time and place to include rights to seasonally
available resources such as fruit, game, fish, water or grazing areas. They often
specify under what circumstances and to what extent certain resources are
available to individuals and communities to inhabit, to harvest, to hunt and gather
on, and to inherit.
A key feature of CBPRs is that they derive their authority from the local
community in which they originated and operate, not from the State where they are
located. These rights emanate from and are enforced by communities. In this way,
CBPRs are akin to human rights, which derive their authority from and are
pollution or degradation, not as environmental management decisions, but as actions that violate human
and community rights. The recognition of such linkages has been resisted by governments on the
ground that pollution is a matter of environmental management, and that every State is sovereign to
determine its levels of protection. The IACHR had earlier issued a report making the connection
between pollution and human rights. See the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, Doe. 10 rev. 1, at Chapter VIII (1997).
43. Much of this section is drawn directly from LYNCH & HARWELL, supra note 8. Owen Lynch
developed the concept of CBPRs while head of the CIEL's Law and Communities Program.
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recognized by international law as well as by natural law concepts. International
human rights law also forms a basis for CBPRs, because it recognizes basic civil
and political rights essential to CBPRs, as well as other relevant rights such as the
right to enjoy the benefits of culture.
CBPRs exist in many places throughout much of the Global South and are
often distinguishable from Western property rights concepts, most notably private
individual property rights. Where CBPRs exist, communities should be able to
maintain these rights, including associated property and natural resources,
particularly when the area is an ancestral domain or indigenous territory. Formal
legal recognition of CBPRs by the State is important in this regard, and can help to
ensure that CBPRs are respected and used in the pursuit of the public interest.
Formal state recognition of these rights makes it more difficult for property and
resources traditionally used by communities to be usurped, and recognizes the
human rights of these communities to their livelihoods and culture. Formal State
recognition of CBPRs also provides State assurance that local people will be better
able to profit from investments of their time and labor, recognize local
communities' authority to prevent migration into their territories, and help local
communities better protect and maintain natural resources by bolstering the
enforcement of local management regulations.
Legal recognition of CBPRs by States should be understood to be an
aspirational and optimal goal, and while full legal recognition of CBPRs as private
rights may not be the final outcome of a particular negotiation with States, it is
important that long-marginalized local communities and persons who advocate on
behalf of such communities know of and pursue an optimal ideal outcome. The
first step to recognize and support CBPRs is for governments to acknowledge
officially their responsibility to help resource-dependent communities defend and
benefit from their natural resources and from their rights relating to the
environment. In many countries, constitutions can be interpreted as already
protecting the CBPRs of indigenous peoples (i.e., original long-term occupants).
There are also procedural and substantive rights associated with the recognition of
CBPRs.
Procedural rights include the right of communities to participate in decision
making processes that affect them. These rights of participation are related to Prior
Informed Consent (PIC), and will be discussed in the next section.
Substantive rights, the strongest form of State recognition of CBPRs, are
achieved primarily through the creation of a legal presumption of local community
ownership where CBPRs exist. An example of this is Certificates of Ancestral
Domain Title, as provided in the Philippines, which will be described in more
detail below as an example of how CBPRs and PIC have been legally recognized.
The ideal State-local community arrangement would be private property
rights for the community. This would entail legal recognition of private group or
community property rather than of individual or public property. Of course,
individual rights already exist within most CBPR systems and are already well
known to community members. These rights probably would and should endure,
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although the community, and not necessarily the State, would remain the primary
guarantor.
Despite being a departure from typical Western conceptions of property
rights, such an arrangement would best capture the unique and dynamic nature of
CBPRs. The main benefit that local communities would gain from being legally
recognized as private group property rights holders would most likely be the
increase in bargaining leverage with outside interests, including their own
government. Moreover, in light of the property rights being group-held, decisions
to sell any rights must involve the group, thereby limiting the vulnerability and
"commodification" of the property rights.
In summary, the concept of CBPRs and the State's recognition of CBPRs are
emerging innovations in the protection of human rights. Legally recognizing and
supporting these rights will allow communities to continue to maintain their
traditional ways in addition to better managing their interactions with and their
adaptations into mainstream societies and economies. It helps protect their rights to
livelihood and culture, and in doing so, safeguards their human rights.
III. PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
PIC is another important innovation in the protection of the human rights of
local communities in developing countries. PIC is generally defined as a
consultative process whereby a potentially affected community engages in an open
and informed dialogue with individuals or other persons interested in pursuing
activities in the area or areas occupied or traditionally used by the affected
community.44 Discussions should occur prior to, and continue throughout, the
time the activity is conducted.45 Furthermore, communities should have the right
to withhold consent at decision-making points during the project cycle.46
Throughout the process, these communities should be able to gain a clear
understanding of how they specifically will benefit or be harmed by proposed
projects, and these projects will take into account cultural valuations of impacts or
benefits and traditional modes of decision-making.47
44. Much of this section is drawn from ANNE PERRAULT ET AL., PARTNERSHIPS FOR SUCCESS IN
PROTECTED AREAS: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND LOCAL COMMUNITY RIGHTS TO PRIOR INFORMED
CONSENT (PIC) 19 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 475-542; see also Robert Goodland, Free, Prior and
Informed Consent and the World Bank Group. 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 66, 66 (2004). PIC is
also referred to as "free, prior informed consent", in order to be absolutely clear that consent must be
free and not be given under duress. We consider that essential idea to be inherent in the word
"consent" Thus for purposes of this article, we only refer to the term "Prior Informed Consent" (or
"PlC") and encompass "free, prior informed consent" within that terminology.
45. See United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Inter-Agency Support Group
on Indigenous Issues, REPORT ON FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT (May 2004).
46. See Fergus MacKay, Indigenous Peoples' Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the
World Bank's Extractive Industries Review, IV(2) Sust. Dev. Law and Policy, Spec. Issue: Prior
Informed Consent: 43-65.
47. L. MEHTA & M. STANKOVITCH, OPERATIONALISATION OF FREE, PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
(2000).
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Although PIC is framed and understood in a theoretical and broad manner,
explicit discussions and applications of PIC typically arise in more concrete
situations. Indeed, like CBPRs, PIC includes essentially local aspects that must be
taken into consideration if PIC is to be successful.
The importance of PIC has been highlighted for the process of creating new
protected areas, particularly since indigenous peoples and other communities have
often lost access to traditionally controlled land and resources as a result of
conservation activities. 4 8 In this context, PIC can serve as a tool for: facilitating
more transparent and effective negotiations between communities, conservation
groups, and government officials; reconciling local and national interests relating
to environmental conservation on indigenous territories; and securing better
protection of biological diversity and other resources in protected areas.49
The right to PIC has also been acknowledged in the context of access to and
benefit sharing of genetic resources under the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD). 50 PIC is seen as essential to ensure the equitable treatment of "providers"
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge as pharmaceutical companies
develop products and obtain patents to use them. This was recently highlighted at
the CBD 71h Conference of the Parties (COP 7) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in
February 2004, during which the Parties to the Convention collectively recognized
the need to strengthen the CBD's approach towards the access of indigenous
people to genetic resources and benefit sharing.51
Also, the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation require
"broad community support" for certain projects as part of their Revised
Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on Indigenous Peoples, and Policy on
Social & Environmental Sustainability, respectively. These policies indicate that
"broad community support" from individuals or representatives of the affected
communities should be obtained in order for the project to go forward, although it
is not yet known what this looks like in practice, or whether it satisfies PIC
requirements.52
48. See Chapin, supra note 3; TURNBULL, supra note 3; Peter Wilshusen et al., Contested Nature,
Conservation and Development at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, in CONTESTED NATURE:
PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL BIODIVERSITY WITH SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(Peter Wilshusen et al. eds., 2003).
49. See PERRAULT, supra note 44.
50. Article 80) of the CBD requires that "Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as
appropriate ... respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and
local communities ... and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from [their] utilization. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 LL.M.
818.
51. CBD Conference of the Parties 7, Decision VII/19 E. Access and benefit-sharing as related to
genetic resources (Article 15). Measures, including consideration of their feasibility, practicality and
costs, to support compliance with prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing genetic
resources and mutually agreed terms on which access was granted in Contracting Parties with users of
such resources under their jurisdiction.
52. See REVISED OPERATIONAL POLICY AND BANK PROCEDURE ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (OP/BP
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Finally, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was
adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2007 (with a resounding
majority of 144 in favor, with 4 opposed and 11 abstentions), strongly endorses the
rights of indigenous peoples to PIC. The Declaration has several articles on PIC
(which it refers to as "free, prior informed consent;" FPIC), including language
that provides that: no relocation shall take place without the FPIC of the
indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation;
no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or
territories of indigenous peoples without FPIC; States shall provide redress with
respect to cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their
FPIC; States shall obtain FPIC before adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures that may affect them; and States shall obtain FPIC before
approving any project affecting their lands or territories, particularly in connection
with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other
resources. 53  Each country that voted against the Declaration (i.e., Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States), cited provisions on FPIC as a major
reason for their opposition, raising concerns that these provisions could be
understood as a right of veto over the decisions of a democratic legislature.
54
Despite some initial efforts and successes at applying PIC, in practice there
have also been difficulties in the application of this right. States and businesses
have sometimes had difficulty determining who to ask for consent, how to do it
(especially in light of cultural differences), how much information is necessary,
and what constitutes consent. For example, communities may not have set
processes for PIC, or may have procedures that are not clear, transparent or
broadly representative. Also, different people within a community may have
different or incompatible interests and expectations for a proposed project.
Dialogue between communities and outside interests may also be impeded by
language, cultural barriers, or distrust. Finally, those seeking access to community
land or resources may believe that PIC procedures are unnecessary, or too costly or
time-consuming, and thus may resist or engage only minimally in the process.
These difficulties are tractable, but in order to achieve PIC effectively, they
must be addressed in specific situations, including drawing from best practices and
building capacities of stakeholders involved in the dialogue. 5 It is also extremely
valuable to support enabling conditions at the local, State, international and project
levels, as is touched upon below.56
4.10) (World Bank, July 2005); see also POLICY ON SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY at
paras. 19-20 (Int'l Fin. Corp., 2006).
53. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, 32,
G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. AIRes/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
54. U.N GAOR, 61st Sess., 107thplen. mtg. at 11-15, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 2007).
55. See SARAH LAIRD, BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: EQUITABLE
PARTNERSHIPS IN PRACTICE (2001); World Commission on Dams Guidelines, in WORLD COMMISSION
ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT, A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION (2000); L. Mehta and M.
Stankovitch, Operationalisation of Free Prior Informed Consent, in WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS,
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT, A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION (2000).
56. See PERRAULT, supra note 44.
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A first key enabling condition at the community level is to have a clear
understanding, and if possible, legal recognition of property rights, including
CBPRs. This provides greater certainty and incentives for those proposing projects
and for the potentially affected local communities. Strengthening of communities
can also include: community mapping of ancestral territories; identifying
community needs and priorities regarding management of land and other natural
resources; identifying criteria and procedures to guide efforts to obtain PIC; and
building technical and legal capacity to engage fully in PIC processes.
A second set of enabling conditions relates to State efforts to develop
mechanisms and requirements for PIC, including enacting legislation, rules and
policies that support this right, as well as establishing or strengthening institutions
to facilitate PIC. Mechanisms and policies should incorporate concerns, criteria
and procedures identified by local communities, and should facilitate an
understanding of and capacity to implement appropriate processes for attempting
to obtain PIC. In addition to the strengthening of laws, institutions and policies,
the State can also better enable PIC by supporting capacity-building efforts of local
communities, assisting with mapping efforts, and recognizing property rights of
local communities.
On the international level, the existence of fair and impartial dispute
resolution and enforcement mechanisms that fully recognize the PIC rights of local
communities is critical. Much remains to be done in this regard, although some
mechanisms currently exist. The World Bank Inspection Panel is available, for
example, to examine whether the Bank's "broad community support" criteria was
met in a particular project.
Project-level enabling factors relate largely to when and how communities
should be involved in decision-making processes and how they relate to other
actors. Project cycles will, of course, vary, but generally a project cycle includes
the following components: project identification, project preparation and appraisal,
project implementation, project monitoring, and project expansion or temporal
extension (if either is proposed).
The project identification stage usually involves identification of various
prospective sites and includes a summary of the proposed project, which is used to
identify subsequent project requirements. For purposes of enabling PIC, it is
critical that local communities potentially impacted by a project are identified at
this stage and processes are established with their input for facilitating their
participation. The project preparation and appraisal stage involves, at a minimum,
the following tasks: defining project objectives; identifying key issues; assessing
baseline conditions; developing options; assessing environmental and social
impacts and feasibility; and selecting options.
Enabling successful PIC requires meaningful engagement with potentially
affected local communities on each of these tasks. Project implementation should
be consistent with and conform to prior agreements with local communities, and
should involve communities to the extent the option chosen reflects such
involvement. Project monitoring, among other things, should review and if
necessary ensure - that the rights and interests of communities (as reflected in law,
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custom, and written agreements) are being respected and supported. Finally, any
proposals to expand the scope of the project or extend the time of a project should
also include PIC throughout.
At each stage of the project cycle, the implementation of PIC should consider
the specific cultural contexts of the project. For example, a person seeking access
should obtain consent from every affected community in the traditionally
recognized manner, i.e., according to the customary laws and practices of the
concerned community. Also, information should be provided to local communities
in culturally appropriate ways, e.g., by both written and oral presentations and in
local languages understood by potentially affected communities. Another key
point about PIC implementation is that discussions should be inclusive so that all
affected people have opportunities to participate actively. Consent should be part
of all ongoing processes conducted throughout the project cycle.
In summary, putting PIC into operation involves strengthening international
regimes for recognition of this right, strengthening domestic laws and policies by
establishing mechanisms to facilitate PIC, and carrying out PIC in culturally
sensitive ways at all stages of the project cycle, from project identification through
monitoring and project adjustments. Recognizing CBPRs is also useful in the
realization of community rights to PIC since it clarifies territorial boundaries and
reinforces the rights of local communities to the property and resources
traditionally held by them.
IV. RECOGNITION OF CBPRs AND PIC: Two EXAMPLES
The rights of communities to PIC are related to CBPRs in several important
ways. At the most basic level, both concepts recognize the rights of local
communities to procedural guarantees that ensure their participation in decisions
that would affect them. Both PIC and CBPRs also incorporate more substantive
rights, especially the ability of communities to stop projects that would unjustly or
arbitrarily expropriate their property rights or natural resources. Both CBPRs and
PIC also possess essential local characteristics.
There are also key differences: the application of PIC is carried out in
response to proposals for new projects that would occur in or impact a community
area, and is more focused on a process of dialogue, compared to the
acknowledgement of CBPRs which involve State recognition of community
property or resource management.
These rights are gaining increasing recognition by national legislatures and in
international hard and soft law instruments, especially in regard to indigenous
peoples. Below are two examples of official recognition of these rights.
The government of the Philippines' acknowledgement of CBPRs and PIC is a
good example, specifically in regards to its passage and initial efforts towards the
implementation of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997.1 7 This law
57. An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples,
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefore, and for Other Purposes, Rep.
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recognizes the right of indigenous peoples in and to their ancestral domains, as
well as their rights to cultural integrity. IPRA provides for private, communal
ownership of ancestral domains and sustainable traditional resource rights for
indigenous groups, including portions of the physical and spiritual environment
used by them for their subsistence, such as fishing and hunting grounds.58 IPRA
details rights to ancestral domain that include: right of ownership, right to develop
lands and natural resources, right to regulate entry of migrants, right to safe and
clean air and water, and rights in the case of displacement (such as from natural
catastrophes).59
IPRA also includes explicit rights of indigenous groups to PIC, which it
defines as the "consensus of all members of the [indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples] to be determined with their respective customary
laws and practices, free from any external manipulation, interference or coercion,
and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of the activity, in a
language and process understandable to the community., 60  Having the right to
PIC has meant that communities can deny projects or programs that may affect the
community financially, economically or culturally, and can stop or suspend any
project that has not satisfied the requirements of PIC.
61
In the last 10 years since the passage of IPRA, and despite many challenges,
implementation has been slow and steady. A National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples has been created to carry out the policies enshrined in the law, which has
approved 29 Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title and 48 Certificates of
Ancestral Land Title62 and has approved 23 Certificates of Compliance to the PIC
process that certify that the community has given its consent.63 IPRA is a good
example of the legal recognition that a State can carry out to protect the social,
economic and cultural rights of a subset of the long-established communities in the
country, as well as to prevent the potential human rights violations that can occur
Act 8371, 94:13 O.G. 276-2295, (March 20, 1998) (Phil.), available at
http://www.ncip.gov.ph/downloads/philippines-ipra- 1999-en.pdf [hereinafter IPRA].
58. Grizelda Mayo-Anda, Loreto L.Cagatulla, and Antonio G. M. La Vina, Is the Concept of
'Free and Prior Informed Consent' Effective as a Legal and Governance Tool to Ensure Equity among
Indigenous Peoples? A Case Study on the Experience of the Tagbanua on Free Prior Informed Consent,
Coron Island, Palawan, Philippines (2006) (unpublished paper presented at "Survival of the Commons:
Mounting Challenges and New Realities," the Eleventh Conference of the International Association for
the Study of Common Property, Bali, Indonesia, June 19-23, 2006). Paper also adapted for a book:
SHARING NATURAL WEALTH FOR DEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDIES FRO PALAWAN PROVINCE,
'PHILIPPINES (forthcoming).
59. IPRA, supra note 57, at § 7.
60. Id. at § 3(g).
61. See id. at § 59. See also National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Administrative
Order No. 3, Series of 1998 (setting guidelines for the issuance of NCIP certifications that are required
for applications to lease, permit, license, contract and other forms of concession in ancestral domains,
and which are only issued with the free and prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples
concerned).
62. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT CY 2004, at
2-3.
63. Id. at 24.
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when development projects are undertaken in the ancestral domains of
communities without the legal guarantee of PIC.
A second example of the legal recognition of CBPRs and PIC is in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights' decision of Moiwana Village v. Suriname. In
this case, the Court found that communities, including those that are not
indigenous to a given area, but have established significant physical, spiritual, and
cultural ties to the land, have rights to property and to PIC.64 The Court noted that
the Moiwana community members, a N'djuka tribal people:
possess an 'all-encompassing relationship' to their traditional lands,
and their concept of ownership regarding that territory is not centered
on the individual, but rather on the community as a whole. Thus...
their traditional occupancy of Moiwana Village and its surrounding
lands - which has been recognized and respected by neighboring
N'djuka clans and indigenous communities over the years... should
suffice to obtain State recognition of their ownership.65
The Court also explicitly recognized the rights of the community to PIC by
finding that Suriname must take legislative, administrative, and other measures
necessary to ensure the human rights and property rights of the community "with
the participation and informed consent of the victims as expressed through their
representatives, the members of the other Cottica N'djuka villages and the
neighboring indigenous communities. 66 Furthermore, the court ruled that:
[u]ntil the Moiwana community members' right to property with
respect to their traditional territories is secured, Suriname shall
refrain from' actions - either of State agents or third parties acting
with State acquiescence or tolerance - that would affect the
existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property located in the
geographical area where the Moiwana community members
traditionally lived....67
In the findings of the Court, CBPRs, or at least the rights of a long-established
community to ownership of traditionally occupied lands, as well as the right to PIC
are explicitly recognized, paving the way for substantive action by the State.
Although just two examples, these situations demonstrate how governments
and regional courts can and have already begun to recognize formally CBPRs and
PIC.
V. CONCLUSION
While there remains much to do to ensure that CBPRs are recognized and the
right to PIC is achieved, there is a growing array of experience in bringing each of
these approaches to life. PIC, in particular, is gaining increasing recognition in
64. Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at 54-55 (June 15,
2005).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 81.
67. Id. at 81-82.
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international hard and soft law instruments, both by international finance
institutions and private sectors across the globe and through national legislation. It
is critically important that efforts continue and become more effective with respect
to both CBPRs and PIC. Continuing these efforts supports and protects the human
rights of local communities and betters the conditions of an important but
increasingly vulnerable segment of the world's population. Finally, societies that
take part in CBPRs and PICs will benefit as a whole, because these human rights
concepts will increase the stability and legitimacy of the countries' governing
structures in light of the State's willingness to protect the human rights of
indigenous and other local communities.
DOES THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
END WITH THE ICC? THE "ROAMING ICC": A MODEL
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR A STATE-CENTRIC WORLD
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Christopher "Kip" Hale*
"If women, children, and old people would be murdered a hundred miles from
here ... wouldn 't you run to help? Then why do you stop this decision of your heart
when the distance is 3,000 miles instead of a hundred? " Raphael Lemkin
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Getting the world to agree on any issue of global importance is an extremely
arduous task.2 Almost all international agreements require years of negotiations,
* Managing Editor, 2006-2007, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. A previous draft of this
Note placed in the 40"' Leonard v.B. Sutton International Law Writing Contest. I thank the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy for giving me the chance to publish an extension of this Note
and for accepting this Note for publication. I profusely thank Professor Ved Nanda not only for his help
with this particular paper, but for being the inspiration that spurred me to the field of international law.
Lastly, but not least, I also thank those that helped me in the editing of this rather large Note. Your help
is much appreciated.
1. SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 26-7
(Harper Perennial ed., 2003) (2002). Raphael Lemkin was a fascinating person and an even more
fascinating story that should inspire anyone who works in any area of international criminal law to work
even harder for the advancement of the field. Lemkin's story starts as a young Jewish lawyer who used
his academic credentials to escape Nazi controlled Poland. He ended up in the U.S.A, where he
spearheaded efforts to bring attention to the atrocities being committed by Nazis, which at the time
where relatively unknown to the world. This quote comes from a speech he gave in North Carolina
while touring the U.S.A. trying to drum up support for U.S. military intervention against Germany-
before the U.S. entered the World War Two- in order to stop the Nazi concentration camps. Lemkin
invented the crime of and coined the term "genocide". After World War Two, he worked tirelessly to
persuade Nuremberg Tribunal officials to recognize "genocide" in any way, shape, or form. Then,
Lemkin set out on a crusade to make genocide an international crime by working without sleep or
distraction during the negotiations of the Genocide Convention, becoming an absolute pest to
international diplomats, constantly pleading with them to form a formidable genocide treaty. After the
signing of the Genocide Convention, Lemkin went almost directly to work, trying to persuade the U.S.
Senate to ratify the treaty. Tragically, but most unsurprisingly, Lemkin died of a heart attack in 1959
while waiting in a public relation's office, waiting to lobby for the ratification of the Genocide
Convention almost 11 years after the U.S.A. signed the treaty. See id. at 17-78.
2. See e.g., Alison Purdy, The Kyoto Protocol, Guardian, Feb. 16, 2005, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,12374,1415660,00.html; Fact Sheet, infra note 334
(exhibiting an example of the world's inability to agree on important world issues).
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thousands of miles traveled, hundreds of hours drafting, not to mention the money
needed to bring about these agreements. Taking into consideration the laborious
and costly nature of international relations in tandem with the divergent positions
of many States on international criminal law, the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) that established the International
Criminal Court (ICC) must be viewed as a tireless, monumental success.3 Despite
the United States' (U.S.) ongoing unwillingness to partake in the ICC,4 it cannot
be ignored that the time, effort, and money that went into fashioning the Rome
Statute resulted in 104 nations becoming ICC State Parties.5 As a result, the ICC is
currently functional, and most importantly, already adjudicating alleged
international criminals. 6 However, the ICC has the lofty goal of ending
international impunity, 7 and it is only natural to question if the ICC is sufficiently
capable of achieving such a gargantuan feat?
For any international criminal system to pledge that all future international
criminals will receive punishment, the most basic requirement that such an
international criminal system must fulfill is the guarantee that not one criminal will
find State sanctuary from prosecution anywhere in the world. Accordingly, only an
international criminal enforcement mechanism backed by all nations could make
such a guarantee, because an international criminal only needs one safe haven to
escape justice. The ICC falls well short of obtaining full international support
considering that some of the most powerful countries-U.S., Israel, Russia, China,
and India-are not State Parties to the ICC. At present, the lack of full worldwide
support significantly reduces the likelihood that ICC can deliver on its mandate,
particularly its goal of catching and punishing all international criminals.
From this shortcoming of the ICC, it becomes evident that a true international
criminal system demands the inclusion and participation of every sovereign State.
An international criminal enforcement mechanism without an all-inclusive global
identity cannot solve a dilemma that rises to the level of international crime. Far
from being simply a semantic critique, any and all legitimate goals of an
international criminal system, be it international peace and security, deterrence of
international crime, or the end of international impunity, cannot be realized with
only partial cooperation, because an international criminal system short of full
universal support lacks the integrity and reliability necessary to fulfill its purpose.
8
3. See Rome Statute of the ICC, infra note 207. The Rome Statute established the ICC, but the
Rome Statute did not enter into force, and thus create a working ICC, until the 60th country became a
State Party, which occurred on July 1, 2002. International Criminal Court, Establishment of the Court,
http://www.icc-cpi.intabout/ataglance/establishment.html.
4. See Fact Sheet, infra note 334 (exemplifying the U.S. opposition to the ICC).
5. Establishment of the Court, supra note 3.
6. See International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html.
7. United Nations, Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm.
8. A domestic analogy of this critique would be if there were laws against murder in only 38 U.S.
states. Such a gap in criminal coverage would illegitimize the U.S. criminal system and would cast
doubt on the U.S.' desire and willingness to punish murderers. Of course, the response to this critique
would be that unlike domestic law, this is the nature of international law, for any international legal
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Therefore, anything less than the membership of every single nation cannot
rationally be deemed an adequate international criminal enforcement mechanism.
Otherwise, the world is left with an international criminal system, like the ICC,
riddled with holes from which international crime thrives.
The purpose of this Note is to propose a theoretically different international
criminal tribunal, one with the potential to bring about full worldwide
participation. This Note's proposed international criminal system, called the
"Roaming International Criminal Court" (Roaming ICC), brings together the three
elements necessary to create a truly international criminal system: reality of the
Westphalian State-centric system of international law, 9 the philosophic and legal
beliefs of the opponents of the current ICC, and the philosophic and legal beliefs of
the proponents of the current ICC. The result is a plausible international criminal
system that will be the best equipped to face the challenges of prescribing,
adjudicating, and enforcing international criminal law in all instances. 10
This Note will methodically trace the evolution of international criminal law,
starting in Part II with an analysis and critique of universal jurisdiction. Considered
the backbone of international criminal law, universal jurisdiction weaves in and out
of all subjects in international criminal law. The purpose of Part II will be to define
universal jurisdiction and its many forms, compare and distinguish universal
jurisdiction from other areas of this Note, and finally conclude that universal
jurisdiction practiced by individual States or international tribunals cannot
represent an effective international criminal system.
Part III will focus on the most notable international criminal tribunals of
modem era: the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg), the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the
mechanism-be it international environmental law, international maritime law, or international trade
law-does not enjoy complete universal support. However, international criminal law differs from all
other types of international law, because international criminal law deals with the base, the unrighteous,
and the evil. There is a reason why the practice of law is often divided between criminal law and
everything else. Accordingly, the fight against the commission of international crimes requires the
world's undivided support at a minimum.
9. The terms "Westphalia" and "State-centric" should be considered interchangeable when used
in this Note. Moreover, variations on these terms will be used in this Note liberally, such as
Westphalian world order, Westphalian State-centric world of international law, State-centric world
order, Westphalian order of international law. More or less, all of these terms refer to the same idea.
Specifically, Westphalia refers to the treaties that ended the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), commonly
known in their collective form as the Peace of Westphalia. See Treaty of Peace of MOnster, Fr.-Holy
Roman Empire, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Parry 271; Treaty of Osnabrilck, Swed.-Holy Roman Empire, Oct 24,
1648, 1 Parry 119. "[B]oth law and society looked different after the Peace of Westphalia established
the modem secular state and the society of such states [a]n international (inter-state) system
assumes a conception and a definition of a state; the Peace of Westphalia (1648) confirmed that
conception." DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (4th ed. 2001). The
social, political, and legal power infrastructure of the world has State-centric since Westphalia; thus,
this State dominance of world power has been labeled the Westphalian world order.
10. See O'Keefe, infra note 14, at 747 n.50 (citing the multitude of humanitarian conventions,
which is evidence that the world community is capable of agreeing on important world issues, a
capability that must be used to create the Roaming ICC).
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). A quick overview of the
precedent set down by Nuremberg will help shed light on the analysis, both factual
and legal, of the ICTY and ICTR. International criminal law, by its very nature,
adjudicates the worst human behavior imaginable. Therefore, the sections devoted
to the ICTY and ICTR thoroughly examines the underlying conflicts and the facts
that led to the creation of these two ad hoc tribunals as a reminder of the very
reasons why the world must have a fully functioning, fully backed international
criminal system. Part III will conclude that ad hoc tribunals, while necessary for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda conflicts, are not viable international criminal
enforcement mechanisms for the world at large.
Part IV will detail the creation of the ICC, the structure of the ICC, and the
benefits of the ICC over its ad hoc tribunal predecessors. However, is the evolution
of international criminal law supposed to end with the ICC? Part V will answer this
question in the negative, primarily because the current ICC is contrary to the
reality of a State-centric world of international law. The Westphalian system of
State domination over the international legal order, while certainly challenged and
altered in recent years, is not in jeopardy of radical change or of future demise. An
effective international criminal system must embrace the State-centric reality of
international law, in that it must be tailored to work in our State-centric world. In
promoting such a philosophical change in the international community's approach
to creating an international criminal system, Part V will introduce the Roaming
ICC and explain its benefits. As will be demonstrated, the central appeal of the
Roaming ICC is that it incorporates every single nation, appeases both sides of the
current ICC debate, and brings about an effective international criminal
enforcement mechanism to punish those that perpetrate the worst of human
behavior. '
1
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: ANALYSIS OF THE CONTROVERSIAL JURISDICTION
PRINCIPLE
The concept "universal jurisdiction" does not have a consistent definition,
which is a revealing sign of its limitations. As cited in a recent International Court
of Justice (ICJ) opinion, "[tihere is no generally accepted definition of universal
jurisdiction in conventional or customary international law"' 12 However, for this
11. Just as important as it is to discuss what this Note is about, it is just as important to discuss
what it is not about. The focus of this Note is not jurisprudential, in that the legality or illegality of
specific international criminal laws will not be discussed. Rather, this Note will instead focus on
philosophical legal ideas, particularly pertaining to jurisdictional issues associated with international
criminal law.
12. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v Belg.), 2002 I.C.J 3, 165 (Feb. 14)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/121/8144.pdf [hereinafter Arrest Warrant]. For point of reference, customary
international law should be defined and differentiated from conventional international law. Customary
international law, historically and presently, is the centerpiece of international law. CARTER ET. AL,
infra note 385, at 120-121. Customary international law along with international conventions/treaties
and principles of law accepted by the world's legal systems are the sources of international law
recognized by the ICJ. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0. Considering that there is not an
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Note's purposes, universal jurisdiction is a principle of law that enables and/or
requires a State to exercise jurisdiction over specific crimes without a connection
between the offense, offender, or victim and the State exercising jurisdiction. 13 In
the hierarchy of legal principles in international law used to justify the jurisdiction
of a State to act, the universal jurisdiction principle is often used only in the
absence of any other legitimate option. 14 Whereas other international legal
principles ground jurisdiction in a nexus between the actor, victim, place, or state
interest with the exercising state, universal jurisdiction is void of such a nexus. 15
Instead, universal jurisdiction focuses on the nature of the crime, in that the crime
is so repulsive and threatening to international security 16 that the mere occurrence
international legislative body that enacts laws for the world, it is an academic and legal pursuit to
identify international law. Convention/treaty law is relatively easy to identify, because it is written
down in a legal instrument. Customary international law is a far harder item to identify. The generally
accepted elements of customary international law-and the elements used to identify customary
international law-are state practice (objective element) and opinio juris (subjective element). North
Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-45 (Feb. 20), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/52/5561.pdf; CASSESE, infra note 59, at 156-60; CARTER ET. AL, infra note 385, at
124-25; International Law Association, Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International
Law, Final Report on the Committee Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General
Customary International Law 8 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf
[hereinafter CIL Report]. The Restatement on Foreign Relations best summarized how customary
international law is formed when it simply stated that "[c]ustomary international law results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris)." Restatement of the Law (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 (2) (1987)
(alteration added) [hereinafter RST Foreign Relations]. "State practice" can include diplomatic relations
between States, international acts or inactions of States, internal practices of State, decision by State
tribunals, decisions by international or regional tribunals, practice of international organs, treaties,
juristic writings, etc., but state practice need not be perfectly uniform or include absolute consent of all
nations to be bound in order for a customary international law to form. RST Foreign Relations, supra
note 12, § 102 cmt. b; CASSESE, infra note 59, at 162 ; CARTER ET. AL, infra note 385, at 121-22.
Depending on the subject matter of a proposed customary international law, state practice must be
practiced over a sufficient duration of time, uniformly and consistently applied, and generally practiced
worldwide. GURUSWAMY ET AL., International Environmental Law and World Order 102-04 (1999).
Finally, customary international law can develop out of a convention or treaty, and a convention or
treaty could be a codification of an already existing customary international law or crystalization of a
potential customary international law. CASSESE, infra note 59, at 167-69; CARTER ET. AL, infra note
385, at 127-28.
13. Universal jurisdiction has been defined in many ways. E.g., International Law Association,
Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 2-3 (2000), http://www.ila-
hq.org/pdf/Human%20Rights%2OLaw/HumanRig.pdf; Gabriel Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction After the
Creation of the International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 503, 510 (2004) (defining
universal jurisdiction).
14. See Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal
Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 399, 400 (2001); Roger
O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concepts, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735, 744 (2004).
15. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 511-12; Broomball, supra note 14, at 400; O'Keefe, supra note
14, at 745-46. (explaining the differences between universal jurisdiction and other jurisdictional
principles).
16. Not any crime is subject to universal jurisdiction, but only a limited amount of criminal
conduct determined to be of such a degree that the commission of the criminal conduct itself translate
into a right of a State to act or use universal jurisdiction, if need be. See BROOMHALL, infra note 59, at
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of the criminal act justifies legal response by any State or appropriate international
organization. 17 Despite being devoid of a traditional nexus, the legitimacy of
universal jurisdiction itself is not questioned, as the principle of universal
jurisdiction is a customary international law. 18
"... [T]he term 'universal jurisdiction' is shorthand for 'universal jurisdiction
to prescribe' or 'universal prescriptive jurisdiction'..."19 This definition highlights
an essential aspect of universal jurisdiction worth noting. When jurists and other
international legal commentators commonly used the term "universal jurisdiction",
it is in reference to the universal jurisdiction to prescribe, not to enforce. 20 For
example: universal jurisdiction, absent other jurisdictional principles, means that a
State prescribes genocide committed by a foreign tyrant in another State, against
foreign persons, and not in conflict with the prescribing State's national interests -
as a violation of their domestic law, conventional international law, and/or
customary international law-,but the State cannot enforce their domestic genocide
law and/or any type of international law prohibiting genocide unless the tyrant
comes within the State's territory or the State decides to try the tyrant in
absentia.2
107-08.
17. Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction 28 (2001), http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/univejur.pdf [hereinafter Princeton
Principles] (showing that the focus of universal jurisdiction is on the nature of the crime committed). In
addition to determining that universal jurisdiction is justified due to the nature of the criminal conduct,
international legal scholarship also adds that the need for a forum to adjudicate these heinous
international crimes and the consensus among States-gauged by customary or conventional
international law- regarding the reprehensibility of such criminal conduct also justifies the use of
universal jurisdiction. Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect to Gross
Human Rights Offenses, supra note 13, at 2-3; Monica Hans, Comment, Providing for Uniformity in the
Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or an
International Criminal Court Accomplish this Goal?, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 357, 360, 392-93 (2002);
Sriram, infra note 18, at 305, 375, 377; see Menno T. Kamminga, Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is it
Legal? Is it Desirable?, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 123 (2005) (explaining that a justification for
universal civil jurisdiction is that the "unlawful conduct is a matter of international concern.").
18. Princeton Principles, supra note 17, at 29 (stating that a judicial body of any State may
exercise universal jurisdiction in connection with serious crimes under international law such as piracy,
slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture); Madeline H.
Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 337,
346-47 (2001); Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses,
19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 301, 314 (2003).
19. O'Keefe, supra note 14, at 745.
20. Id. at 750 ("The fact is that prescription is logically independent of enforcement. On the one
hand, there is universal jurisdiction, a head of prescriptive jurisdiction alongside territoriality,
nationality, passive personality and so on. On the other hand, there is enforcement in absentia, just as
there is enforcement in personam. In turn, since prescription is logically distinct from enforcement, the
legality of the latter can in no way affect the legality of the former, at least as a matter of reason."); see
Sriram, supra note 18, at 316 ("In essence, under universal jurisdiction, a state is competent to judge an
accused alleged to have committed certain international crimes and found in its territory"). Later on in
this Note, there will be a discussion on jurisdiction to adjudicate, which will add another layer of
jurisdictional analysis to this discussion. See infra section IV, 3.
21. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 400; O'Keefe, supra note 14, at 750. This example is an
oversimplification of "prescribe", because every country "prescribes" differently. Prescribe could
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Turning now to application, the practice of universal jurisdiction, as defined
by international legal scholars, is bifurcated into permissive and mandatory
forms.22 The distinction between permissive and mandatory universal jurisdiction
hinges on whether a State exercises universal jurisdiction from a customary or
conventional international law obligation. 23 As the adjectives connotate, the
difference between the practice of mandatory and permissive universal jurisdiction
is the degree of obligation imposed on States. Permissive universal jurisdiction
occurs when a State has the option to exercise universal jurisdiction under the
guise of a customary international law violation, and the State may enact domestic
legislation that conforms to customary international law. 24 Permissive universal
include legislative and/or judicial action by a State, depending on if the State already has domestic
legislation against, for example, war crimes that comports with customary or conventional international
law prohibiting war crimes. Jurisdiction to adjudicate, while an important issue in this discussion on
universal jurisdiction, is not addressed in this Note's section on universal jurisdiction, because
jurisdiction to adjudicate "generally follows jurisdiction to prescribe", in that if a State prescribes
genocide, it follows that the State can adjudicate genocide violators. SADAT, infra note 200, at 112-119
(discussing jurisdiction to adjudicate in the context of universal jurisdiction, international criminal law,
and domestic States). See infra section IV, 3. Additionally, the example used does not include a
situation where a State's authorities enter another State to enforce its own laws that the invading State
has prescribed as internationally criminal. A State going to such ends to enforce its laws
extraterritorially, however, is very unlikely in world affairs.
22. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401-405; see Bottini, supra note 13, at 516-521 (describing the
interplay between universal jurisdiction pursuant to customary and pursuant to conventional
international law). It should be noted that traditionally, universal jurisdiction is not split up into these
two forms, but rather, universal jurisdiction is historically thought only to be permissive. Johan D. van
der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 14 EMoRY, INT'L
L. REV. 1, 72 (2000). However, Prof. Broomhall introduced the bifurcation of universal jurisdiction into
permissive and mandatory forms, highlighting the different impacts that customary and conventional
law have on the practice of universal jurisdiction. Some even argue that under customary international
law, universal jurisdiction is mandatory now, "[flrom this perspective, universal jurisdiction flows
directly from the fact that the core crimes of international criminal law rest on norms ofjus cogens that
give rise to obligations erga omnes." Broomhall, supra note 14, at 405; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 64
(1996).
23. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401. ("In ordinary usage, 'universal jurisdiction' encompasses
both permissive and mandatory forms, where a state may and where a state must exercise jurisdiction.
This largely parallels the distinction between the doctrine's manifestations under customary and under
conventional international law"). Although his terminology is different and his analysis of universal
jurisdiction possesses more nuances, Prof. Summers makes similar discussion about "conventional
universal jurisdiction" stemming from conventional international law and "customary universal
jurisdiction" coming from customary international law. See Mark A. Summers, The International Court
of Justice's Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How has it Affected the Development of a Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction that Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B. U. INT'L L. J.
63, 73-88 (2003).
24. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 400-01, 404-05; Hans, supra note 17, at 362. A State acting
under permissive universal jurisdiction, or said differently, acting under a customary international law
obligation, is not required to enact domestic legislation at all in order to ground jurisdiction for the
violation of a customary international law. The State or non-State actor can simply ground jurisdiction
over a defendant for violating customary international law without every having any domestic
legislation on point, theoretically speaking. See, e.g., Loi modifiant la loi du 16 juin 1993 relative A la
repression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire et l'article 144 ter du Code judiciaire,
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jurisdiction is attractive in some respect, because it justifies a State in grounding
universal jurisdiction over a defendant for violations of customary international
law, or international law that the entire world is obligated to abide by and
uphold, 25 regardless of a complete consensus of States. 26 Yet, without a defined
entity consistently acting as the announcer and enforcer of customary international
laws, the murky contours of this type of international law discourages States from
enforcing such laws.27 Also, States can simply ignore customary international law
obligations with little to no repercussions 21 given that States have the discretion
not to use universal jurisdiction to prosecute a customary international law
violation.29
Alternatively, mandatory universal jurisdiction occurs when a State must
exercise universal jurisdiction under its conventional international law
obligations-which are obligations beset from conventions or treaties-and such a
State must enact domestic legislation that conforms to the conventional
international law that it has ratified. Commonly, a requirement to practice
Apr. 23, 2003, M.B., May 7, 2003 translated in 42 I.L.M 749 (2003); see Steve R. Ratner, Belgium's
War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 889 (2003). However, due to the desire for
jurisdictional clarity, some States prefer or require that domestic legislation effectuating a customary
international law is enacted, and jurisdiction over the defendant is grounded in both the domestic law
and the customary international law. As will be discussed in the paragraph below devoted to traditional
application of universal jurisdiction, Prof. Sriram accentuates this point by focusing on the diversity of
laws that domestic courts rely on when exercising universal jurisdiction, and classifying States into two
categories accordingly. Prof. Sriram calls one "pure universal jurisdiction" and the other "universal
jurisdiction plus" Some States simply ground jurisdiction for the violation of customary or
conventional international law-assuming the conventional international law at issue is self-executing
and/or the country does not require domestic legislation in the ratification process of a
convention/treaty-and simply do not rely on domestic legislation on point, if it exists at all. Other
States will ground jurisdiction over an individual for a violation of customary or conventional
international law and for a violation of some domestic legislation on point. See Sriram, supra note 18,
at 306-311, 358-361.
25. It must be remembered that customary and conventional international law can play off each
other, with one helping creating the other and vice versa. See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-
AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 98 (Oct. 2, 1995),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm; Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-14 (June 27); supra note 12.
26. BROOMHALL, infra note 59, at 110; Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the
International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41,
52-59 (1996). This does not consider the persistent objector rule, which theorizes that States that
consistently express their opposition to and act in opposition to a potential customary international law
are not bound by that custom if it were to become recognized sufficiently as a customary international
law by the international community. However, the persuasiveness and authority behind the persistent
objector rule is not clear or supported adequately. CARTER ET. AL, infra note 385, at 124; CASSESE, infra
note 59, at 162-63.
27. METTRRAUX, infra note 113, at 14-18.
28. See, e.g., In the Dispute Between Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) and the
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic Relating to Petroleum Concessions 16, 17, and 20, Apr. 12,
1977, 20 I.L.M. I (1981) (exemplifying the ability of a sovereign nation to walk away from customary
international legal obligations).
29. See Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401.
30. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401; Hans, supra note 17, at 362-63. Again, the requirement to
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mandatory universal jurisdiction is included in conventions and treaties through an
aut dedere autjudicare ("either prosecute or extradite") provision, where a State
must prosecute a suspected violator of a conventional international law or extradite
the alleged offender to another State Party to the convention/treaty that will
prosecute the violation. 3' Furthermore, the same convention or treaty will require
the State to enact domestic legislation prohibiting the conduct at issue in the
convention or treaty.32 Notwithstanding the wholly theoretical difference between
aut dedere autjudicare provisions and pure universal jurisdiction,33 aut dedere aut
judicare provisions and the corresponding required domestic legislation
exemplifies how conventions and treaties can feasibly bind State parties to abide
by and practice universal jurisdiction, just like any contract binds the parties to the
terms of the deal. Nevertheless, this oversimplification of the convention and treaty
process glosses over the major drawback to mandatory universal jurisdiction,
which is the extreme difficulty associated with getting States to obligate
themselves, in writing, to practice universal jurisdiction. In addition, a sovereign
State agreeing to an aut dedere aut judicare provision in a convention or treaty
does not unequivocally bind a signatory party to prosecute or extradite, because
there is no true central enforcement mechanism to force a sovereign State to fulfill
its conventional international law obligations, nor has aut dedere autjudicare itself
enact complying domestic legislation depends on the domestic rules on ratifying that a State Party to a
convention or treaty uses. Some states, like Botswana and Slovakia, automatically make every
convention or treaty these countries sign enforceable domestic law. See Handbook for FCTC
Ratification Campaigns, Infact Report (Infact, Boston, MA), at 24, 37, available at
http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/files/pdfs/Ratification%2Handbook-English2OO5.pdf. Other states,
like Canada, require domestic legislation in order for a convention or treaty that Canada signed to be
ratified and thus enforceable domestically. See Id. at 39. A majority of States, like the U.S.A., have
hybrid ratification procedures unique to those countries. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. All of
this could be moot if the convention or the treaty itself is self-executing, meaning that a country signing
a convention or treaty makes the convention or treaty enforceable law within the signing country. See
RST Foreign Relations, supra note 12, § 111 cmt. h.
31. See e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, pmbl, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available
at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm (containing typical examples of these prosecute or
extradite provisions that are common in international treaties).
32. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401; Hans, supra note 17, at 362-63.
33. Arrest Warrant, supra note 12, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal, para. 41; Bottini, supra note 13, at 516-17; Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401. Broomhall
emphasizes that mandatory universal jurisdiction "...is not truly 'universal,' but is a regime of
jurisdictional rights and obligations arising among a closed set of states' parties.. Under customary law,
states are (at least in the prevailing view) merely permitted to exercise universal jurisdiction over, for
example, piracy on the high seas or crimes against humanity. The phrase 'universal jurisdiction' more
accurately describes matters of custom than it does the jurisdiction that arises only inter partes through
a convention." Id. This is a theoretical difference, because in reality, a defendant could, under either
mandatory universal jurisdiction or permissive/pure universal jurisdiction, be charged by a foreign State
that has no other jurisdictional nexus with the defendant. So, regardless if the defendant is brought
before a domestic court pursuant to a customary or conventional international law obligation of said
State, the outcome is the same, and the defendant will argue that the domestic court does not have
jurisdiction over him/her.
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become unequivocal customary international law.
34
While the permissive/mandatory paradigm helps establish a strong theoretical
understanding of universal jurisdiction in application, this Note is primarily
concerned with what the empirical evidence of States practicing universal
jurisdiction reveals. First, the evidence shows that the lion's share of universal
jurisdiction activity, historically and presently, is by individual States acting as
pseudo-international legal bodies.35 It should not come as any surprise that
sovereign States, rather than international organizations or international tribunals,
practice universal jurisdiction more often considering the historical primacy of the
sovereign "State" in international law36 and that universal jurisdiction was initially
formulated for States to use to combat piracy.37 Therefore, traditionally, States
have a monopoly over the practice of universal jurisdiction. Second, the evidence
also supports the conclusion that when a State exercises universal jurisdiction, the
State will either justify jurisdiction over a defendant solely for violating the State's
34. A sovereign nation, being a sovereign, can choose neither to prosecute nor extradite, unless
aut dedere aut judicare reaches the level of customary international law. However, -'prosecute or
extradite" provision have not attained the status of customary international law, and this is the reason
why ICTY intervention in former Yugoslavia was somewhat legally objectionable, because the actors in
the former Yugoslavia conflict did not violate customary international procedural law, i.e. aut dedere
aut judicare. Michael J. Kelly, Cheating Justice By Cheating Death: The Doctrinal Collision for
Prosecuting Foreign Terrorists - Passage of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare Into Customary Law & Refusal
to Extradite Based on the Death Penalty, 20 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491, 497-503 (2003) (offering
both sides of the argument that aut deder autjudicare itself is not customary international law). Even if
aut dedere aut judicare did gain customary international law status, this Note has highlighted that
customary international law obligations can simply be ignored by a sovereign State.
35. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 403 (explaining that universal jurisdiction usually means an
individual State prosecuting a suspect on behalf of the international community); see e.g., Fiona
McKay, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: Criminal Prosecutions in Europe Since 1990 for War
Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Torture and Genocide, REDRESS TRUST REP.,
http://www.redress.org/publications/UJEurope.pdf [hereinafter Redress Memo]; Ariana Pearlroth,
Universal Jurisdiction in the Europe Union: Country Studies, REDRESS TRUST REP.,
http://www.redress.org/conferences/country/ 20studies.pdf [hereinafter New Redress Memo]. These
two reports exemplify that universal jurisdiction is primarily practiced by sovereign States, because the
clear majority of present-day universal jurisdiction cases are undertaken by individual European
countries.
36. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1982)
(stating that "international law is primarily concerned with states"); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-88 (2003) (explaining that all things international law stem from the
State, because the State is the primary actor in the international arena); Sammons, infra note 49, at 114-
15.
37. See CASSESE, infra note 59, at 435-36. It should be stressed that the first evolutionary step in
international criminal law was sovereign States applying universal jurisdiction. As the Note progresses,
the move away from sovereign States being the only participants in international criminal law will be
shown by the introduction of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY, and the ICTR. In order for these
tribunals to practice international criminal law, these tribunals used a combination of universal
jurisdiction and the delegation of sovereign authority by the U.N. or international community to do so.
The most recent evolutionary step in international criminal law is the ICC, where a combination of




own domestic laws even if an international law on point exists, 3s or the State
exercises "universal jurisdiction plus", whereby the State justifies jurisdiction over
a defendant for violations of both its domestic laws and an international law on
point. 39 Extremely rare is the situation where a State uses universal jurisdiction to
gain jurisdiction over a defendant in order to apply an international law
exclusively,40 and even rarer, where universal jurisdiction is applied by a non-State
actor.4'
Sovereign States, historically and practically, are the predominant universal
jurisdiction participants; however, the international legal community argues
extensively whether international tribunals, both old and new, exercise or have
exercised universal jurisdiction through the delegation of the power to use
universal jurisdiction from sovereign States.42 Even though the purpose of this
Note is not to decide this issue definitively, the concept of "universal jurisdiction"
should not be conflated with international tribunals as one in the same.43
International tribunals practice "international jurisdiction", or delegated authority
from the international community to adjudicate international crimes. 44 The
38. S.R. RATNER & J.S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL Law 161 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2001); O'Keefe, supra note 14, at 746
(discussing the reality that the practice of universal jurisdiction usually means that a domestic court take
jurisdiction over a person without a direct connection to the State (i.e. universal jurisdiction), but does
not apply international law, but the State's own domestic law).
39. Sriram, supra note 18, at 356, 360 (defining universal jurisdiction plus as "claims about the
universal nature of the crime are combined with reliance on ordinary domestic criminal legislation or
other principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction... Judges may seek to assert jurisdiction in accord with
specific provisions of domestic legislation that provide explicitly for extraterritorial application of
criminal legislation, or with domestic legislation incorporating provisions of treaties that provide for
such jurisdiction, or with domestic criminal legislation. In some of these cases, judges simultaneously
maintain that jurisdiction could be based in addition to, or solely on, universal jurisdiction").
40. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant, supra note 12, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf (exhibiting an example of a sovereign state using universal
jurisdiction to apply international law within a domestic court).
41. Potential non-State actors would be international tribunals. See next section on ad hoc
international criminal tribunals for more insight into international entities exercising universal
jurisdiction.
42. Bottini, supra note 13, at 513-14 (differentiating between universal jurisdiction and
international tribunals); Morris, supra note 18, at 350-51; Madeline Morris, High Crimes and
Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26-30, 35-37
(2001) (arguing that States cannot delegate jurisdiction in regards to third parties, and the delegation of
universal jurisdiction to international tribunals is not binding or feasible); but see Damir Arnaut, When
in Rome... ? The International Criminal Court and Avenues for U.S. Participation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L.
525, 549-53 (2003) (making persuasive arguments that universal jurisdiction can be delegated to
international tribunals, specifically through treaty processes).
43. Bottini, supra note 13, at 513-14.
44. Id; see infra note 113; infra note 221. The question becomes, where did the international
community get the jurisdiction it just delegated to the international tribunal to adjudicate these
international crimes? Presumably, it could come from consent of the delegating State(s), or from the
UN's delegated authority to enforce international peace and security on behalf of Member States, or
from the customary/permissive or mandatory/conventional universal jurisdiction obligation that
individual States of the international community have that requires them to adjudicate such criminal
conduct. The latter would in fact be a situation where an international tribunal was exercising delegated
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possibility, however, that international tribunals could, or do, practice universal
jurisdiction should not be discounted.45 Nonetheless, international tribunals can,
do, and have grounded jurisdiction in a multitude of legal jurisdictional principles
other than the universal jurisdiction principle.46 Hence, it is best, conceptually, to
perceive universal jurisdiction as a means to an end, and international tribunals as
actors, just like States, that are able to use universal jurisdiction.47
For all its potential, universal jurisdiction remains an unrealized and
underused idea. 8 Some have suggested that the lack of sufficient investigation and
academic inquiry into universal jurisdiction is the reason preventing world-wide
acceptance and usage of universal jurisdiction. 49 However, the explanation for
universal jurisdiction's underutilization may be grounded in mere pragmatism.
The lack of a "link or nexus with the [exercising] forum" makes universal
jurisdiction facially undesirable to States. 50  Although universal jurisdiction
grounds itself in the moral responsibility of States to apprehend violators of such
abhorrent conduct, it simply does not possess enough legal persuasiveness, in
comparison to other jurisdictional principles, to enlist States into using universal
jurisdiction regularly. For some, universal jurisdiction poses a direct threat to the
Westphalian State-centric construct of international law, 51 and practicing universal
universal jurisdiction. See SADAT, infra note 200, at 116-117.
45. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 240
(1999) (stating that "the ICC can exercise universal jurisdiction when a situation is referred to it by the
Security Council"); Arnaut, supra note 42, at 551-53. Given the fact that the ICTY and ICTR have
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (more or less equally) and both ad
hoc tribunals stated that these international crimes do give rise to universal jurisdiction, an argument
can be made that the ICTY and ICTR are actually undertaking universal jurisdiction. Prosecutor v.
Tadid, supra note 25, 62; Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR-90-40-T, Decision on the
Prosecutors Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, 1 (Mar. 18, 1999). Not to mention, the ICTY and
ICTR are adjudicating violations of international law that occurred in places outside of the tribunals'
country of residence, done by foreign people, against foreign people, so by definition, it can be argued
that they are exercising universal jurisdiction.
46. See Morris, supra note 18, at 350 (discussing that international tribunals, specifically the ICC,
can ground jurisdiction in universality principle and other legal principles). An example of an
international tribunal grounding jurisdiction over an international crime without universal jurisdiction
would be the Nuremberg Tribunal, as a majority of scholars argue. See infra section III, A. Important to
know that in regards to the Roaming ICC proposal of this Note, the Roaming ICC is an international
tribunal that would not ground jurisdiction in the universality principle exclusively.
47. In order to understand this entire Note fully and correctly, it is imperative to keep this
paragraph in mind when reading the sections devoted to the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC, the Roaming
ICC.
48. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 241, 245
(2001).
49. See Anthony Sammons, The "Under-Theorization" of Universal Jurisdiction: Implication for
Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 111, 113-14
(2003) (stating that the "incomplete theoretical development of universal jurisdiction", due to a lack of
investigation by legal commentators and others, has led to the under-usage of the jurisdictional
principle).
50. Herv6 Ascensio, 'Are Spanish Courts Backing Down on Universality? The Supreme Tribunal's
Decision in Guatemalan Generals'. 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 690, 699 (2003).
51. Summers, supra note 23, at 83; see e.g. Arrest Warrant, supra note 12; Regina v. Bartle ex
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jurisdiction breaches conservative notions of sovereign authority, sovereign
immunity, and immunity for State officials. 2 Although these antiquated notions of
sovereignty are perceived to be the biggest roadblocks to proper enforcement of
international criminal law, universal jurisdiction must mesh with the reigning
Westphalian world order, or else be doomed to under-usage. Additionally,
questions surround the legal legitimacy of universal jurisdiction, specifically its
clarity, internal consistency, and adherence to other legal principles.5' The
disproportionate use of universal jurisdiction by developed countries against the
citizens of developing countries calls into question whether the doctrine is fair and
predictable, and whether universal jurisdiction instigates sovereign inequality.
54
Allowing universal jurisdiction to be practiced in domestic courts is called
undemocratic by some, because the practice of universal jurisdiction is principally
judge-made law that has little to no legislative input and may not reflect the
"...deepest commitments of their own political communities." 55 Finally, sovereign
States using universal jurisdiction have patently failed and will continue to fail at
bringing justice to the commission of international crimes. Relying on States to
conduct international criminal cases remains the linchpin problem for universal
jurisdiction.56 Sovereign states have the luxury of pursuing or ignoring
international law violations,57 and coupled with the lack of experience, resources,
cooperation, and numerous procedural obstacles that face a State court in
exercising universal jurisdiction,58 it is easy to see why universal jurisdiction is
often avoided. Although the State-centric model of universal jurisdiction fails to
parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581, 634-38 (1999) (separate
opinion of Lord Hutton) (discussing the conflicting, competing interests of having immunity for high
government officials versus the need for accountability for those that commit international crimes).
52. Arrest Warrant, supra note 12, at 22-23; Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing
Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 141, 149 (2004) (arguing that state sovereignty is the most important facet of international order and
authority); Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of Immunity: England's House of Lords Holds that a
Former Head of State is Not Immune for Torture, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 263, 269-70 (2000).
53. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 50-194 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1990); Sriram, supra note 18, at 368-69.
54. Sriram, supra note 18, at 369-71; Bottini, supra note 13, 554-57; see e.g., Redress Memo,
supra note 35, New Redress Memo, supra note 35.
55. Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic
Principles, 92 GEO. L. J. 1057, 1101-02, 1091-93 (2004); see also Bottini, supra note 13, 550-52
(explaining that universal jurisdiction violates the commonly held legal principle of due process of law,
because of differences in domestic criminal laws, disagreement over what crimes spur universal
jurisdiction, and the defendant in a foreign country, "may not possess any knowledge of their laws,
penalties, or criminal procedures. There are sometimes great differences among members of the
international community in the definitions of crimes, the determination and extent of the penalties,...").
56. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 399; see Bottini, supra note 13, at 506, 557-561 (discussing in
depth why universal jurisdiction lacks sufficient incentive to national authorities-which are present in
other jurisdictional principles-to proceed with a case).
57. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 514; Scharf, supra note 26, at 52-59.
58. BROOMHALL, infra note 59, at 118-126; See Broomhall, supra note 14, at 410-18 (listing all
the reasons a national court would refrain from taking on a universal jurisdiction case, such as finances,
evidence, security, witnesses, inexperience).
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fulfill the global need for an effective international criminal enforcement system,59
the continued use of universal jurisdiction by States should not be discouraged,
because such State practices will play a vital supplementary role in enforcing
international criminal law and developing an effective international criminal
system. 60
III. TRIBUNALS
A. Nuremberg Tribunal. Overview of the First International Criminal Tribunal
"The international court established to adjudicate at Nuremberg marked the
creation of the first such tribunal to evaluate war crimes and crimes against
humanity. ' '61 The jurisdictional theory of the Nuremberg Tribunal is not entirely
clear, for a majority of international legal scholars contend that the Nuremberg
Tribunal was simply the Allied forces (U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., and France)
exercising their newly attained sovereign authority over Germany, or more
specifically, exercising criminal judicial functions as the newly established
government of the defeated Germany.62 However, one argument gaining
legitimacy is that the Nuremberg Tribunal constituted the first example of
sovereign States acting as the judicial agents of the international community
through "a type of universal jurisdiction theory." 63 This argument promotes the
belief that the Nuremberg Tribunal was an extension or adaptation of traditional
universal jurisdiction, particularly the idea of collective universal jurisdiction
whereby each Allied power could have exercised universal jurisdiction over the
Nazis for international crimes individually, but the Allied powers instead choose to
adjudicate the Nazi international criminals collectively; thus, combining each
Allied powers' ability to adjudicate "international crimes over which there exists
59. BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
112-127 (2003) (cataloguing numerous reasons States have abstained from practicing universal
jurisdiction); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 452-53 (2d ed. 2005); SADAT, infra note 200, at
10.
60. See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-4, 16-20, 75-101 (2002) (detailing the benefits
and characteristics of a system of courts exercising universal jurisdiction); see e.g., Redress Memo,
supra note 35; New Redress Memo, supra note 35.
61. Laurie A. Cohen, Comment, Application of the Realists and Liberal Perspectives to the
Implementation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies of Nuremberg and Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 113, 143 (1997); but see SADAT, infra note 200, at 27, fn. 22 (explaining that historical
examples of international criminal tribunals, prior to the Nuremberg Tribunals, do exists, but none of
them possesses the legal significance as that of the Nuremberg Tribunal); see also SCHABAS, infra note
331, at 7 (describing how the distinguished jurists and judge B. V. A. Rbling maintained that the Tokyo
and Nuremberg tribunals were not "'international tribunals in the strict sense' but were more aptly
described as "'multinational tribunals"').
62. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with
Respect to Germany, U.S.-USSR-UK-Fr., June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, TIAS 1520; The International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentence reprinted in 41 AM J. INT'L L.172, 172, 216,
248 (1947) [hereinafter Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946]; See SADAT, infra note 200, at 28; Morris, supra note
18, at 342-45 ("The Nuremburg tribunal, then, likely was not an instance of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in the post-war trials"); Morris, supra note 42, 37-43.
63. Tonya J. Boller, The International Criminal Court: Better Than Nuremberg?, 14 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 279, 304 (2003).
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universal jurisdiction." 64 While it is inconsequential for this Note's purposes which
argument prevails, it is undisputed that the Allied forces established jurisdiction
over the defeated Nazis through the "Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
annexed to the London Agreement, [which] provided the blueprint for the
Nuremberg Tribunal.,
65
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal was a joint agreement of
the Allied Forces enumerating international criminal charges that the Allied forces
could bring against Nazi suspects, specifically charges for the violation of
international laws against war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. 66 Evidence in support of these charges was overwhelming, and
understandably, there was considerable world-wide support, led by the U.S., for
the judicial adjudication of the Nazis' use of concentration camps and other
criminal activities. 67 However, the international community's ability to prosecute
the Nazis for their conduct was limited given that international criminal law, at the
time, was scant and what law did exist was vague. 68 Consequently, the Nuremberg
Tribunal has been criticized for taking part in the application of ex post facto laws,
and criticized further that even if the Nuremberg Tribunal applied valid laws, these
international laws did not impose individual criminal responsibility for their
violation. 69 The Nuremberg Judgment, in answering these objections, plainly
stated that these crimes existed through custom and treaties at the time of their
commission, and that "[c]rimes against international law are committed by men,
64. SADAT, infra note 200, at 117; see Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, supra note 62, at 216 (stating
that when the Allied Powers applied international customary and conventional laws against the defeated
Nazis, "they have done together what any one of them might have done singly" . ..) This breed of
universal jurisdiction is termed "universal international jurisdiction", such where a collection of States
have universal jurisdiction over an international crimes due to its jus cogens status, and rather than
argue over primacy of jurisdiction, the States agree to form a non-State actor to adjudicate the crime or
crimes. However, this concept is altered a bit in the ICC, in that the formation of the non-State actor to
adjudicate the crime(s) is formed prospectively, not in an ad hoc fashion, like the Nuremberg, ICTY,
and ICTR. This idea is discussed more in depth later in this Note. Infra note 220 and accompanying
text.
65. M&S YUGO, infra note 60, at 3; SADAT, infra note 200, at 27-8.
66. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288, 59
Stat. 1546, 1548 annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544; CASSESE, supra note 59,
at 439.
67. CARTER ET. AL, infra note 385, at 1085; CASSESE, supra note 59, at 439; POWER, supra note 1,
at 31-7; Cohen, supra note 61, at 118-35 (chronicling the long list of evidence against the Nazi
suspects, and exhibiting the international and public opinion for an international tribunal to try the
Nazis).
68. Cohen, supra note 61, at 137 (asserting that the only international criminal laws available at
the time of the Nuremberg trial was the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, which had little
international criminal precedent associated with them); Remarks by M. Cherif Bassiouni, Panel Session,
Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Impact of the War Crimes Trials on
International and National Law, 80 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 56, 62-63 (1986); Remarks by Telford
Taylor, id, at 57-58.
69. CASSESE, supra note 59, at 440-41; M&S YUGO, infra note 60, at 9; SADAT, infra note 200, at
30; Boiler, supra note 63, at 310. For an explanation on the importance of individual criminal liability,
read relevant portions of Mettreaux's book. See METTRAUX, infra note 113, at 9-12.
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not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced... 70 Yet, the
Nuremberg Tribunal, having been established by the victors of World War II, has
not fully escaped the criticism of "victor's justice".7'
Despite these and other legitimate concerns, the Nuremberg Charter, Tribunal,
and subsequent Judgment represents the most significant development in the
advancement of international criminal tribunals, international criminal law, and
indeed, one of the greatest developments in international law itself 72 The
Nuremberg Tribunal established the foundational principles of international
criminal law, which includes the principle that any individual-including generals
and presidents-can be held criminal responsible for violations of international
law, and the principle that international law preempts national law.73 These and
other foundational international criminal law principles instituted by the
Nuremberg Tribunal, Charter, and Judgment--commonly referred to as the
Nuremberg Principles-were determined to be customary international law by the
U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. International Law Commission.
74
Additionally, the Nuremberg Tribunal produced much needed international
criminal law precedent, 75 and legitimized the use of law in fair trials with due
process as a method of correcting international wrongs. 76 Prospectively, the
Nuremberg Principles influenced a majority of international human rights
70. Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, supra note 62, at 221; CASSESE, supra note 59, at 440.
71. M&S YUGO, infra note 60, at 9. It is hard not to believe that the Nuremberg Tribunal was, to
some degree or another, unfair and an example of victor's justice. The Allied forces surely committed
international crimes during one of only two world wars. Regardless of this glaring defect, the
Nuremberg Tribunal was an invaluable moment in international criminal law.
72. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 19, 42, 49 (stating that the Nuremberg legacy gave birth to
"modern system of human rights protection" and "underpin(ned) the relationship between sovereignty
and the international system in the post-War era"); M&S YUGO, infra note 60, at 9; see CARTER ET. AL,
infra note 385, at 976, 1085. Although there was a sister tribunal to the Nuremberg Tribunal, commonly
called the Tokyo Trials, this tribunal does not carry the same amount of historical and legal weight as
the Nuremberg Tribunal, because the Tokyo Trials were fundamentally unfair to defendants. SADAT,
infra note 200, at 27; M&S RWANDA, infra note 123, at 8 n.42 ("[i]n his dissenting opinion, the French
Judge at Tokyo expressed his view that 'so many principles of justice were violated during the trial that
the Court's judgment certainly would be nullified on legal grounds in most civilized countries').
Furthermore, the Tokyo Trials were formed by military order of the U.S. Supreme Commander of the
Allied Forces at Tokyo. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, Special
Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, April 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1589,4 Bevans 20.
73. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 63, art. 7; SADAT, infra note 200, at
29, 30.
74. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Ntinberg
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/46/IMG/NR003346.pdf?OpenElement
[hereinafter Nuremberg Principles]; Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Ntirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 364, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add. 1, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf.
75. See e.g., Nuremberg Principles, supra note 74.
76. M&S YUGO, infra note 79, at 9, 10.
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conventions, and provided invaluable legal precedent and philosophical support to
subsequent international tribunals, to Alien Tort Claims Act jurisprudence in U.S.
courts, and to the enforcement of international criminal law in many domestic
forums around the world.77
B. ICTY
1. The History of the Former Yugoslavia and Facts that Led to the Formation
of the ICTY
Geographically, former Yugoslavia was situated inside the Balkans, a large,
rugged region of southeastern Europe. The Balkans peninsula is one of the most
historically rich and fervently fought-over areas of the world. Ethnic wars,
centuries-long occupations, and social struggles have littered its history for longer
than a millennium. 78 The Balkans' turbulent history, for the most part, is credited
to the struggle between three religious groups that each possess very strong,
distinct identities: Roman Catholic Croats, Orthodox Christian Serbs, and Muslims
who mainly constitute converts to Islam while the area was under the Ottoman
Empire rule. 79 The advent of World War II and the Nazi occupation of the Balkans
revived inter-ethnic fighting in the region, which eventually resulted in the
execution of thousands of Croats, Serbs, and Muslims. 80 However, the Balkans'
misery ended with the creation of the former Yugoslavia-the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia-after the end of World War II, which was a loosely
federated nation under the Communist rule of Josip Tito. 1
The former Yugoslavia was made up of several republics, namely Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Bosnia), Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia. 82
77. Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 414 (31 July 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/stakic/trialc/judgement/stak-tj030731e.pdf; SADAT, infra note 200, at 28; Paul
L. Hoffman, Justice Jackson, Nuremberg and Human Rights Litigation, 68 ALB. L. REV. 1145, 1145-
1152 (2005) (emphasizing the practical and theoretical impact of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
Nuremberg Principles on international human rights conventions, Alien Tort Claims Act jurisprudence
in U.S., and in other countries' jurisprudence as well); Henry King, Jr., Commentary: The Modern
Relevance of the Nuremberg Principles, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279, 280 (1997) (characterizing the
Nuremberg trials and the Nuremberg Principles as extremely influential in the formation of most major
human rights conventions/treaties).
78. POWER, supra note 1, at 285; ARNOLD SHERMAN, PERFIDY IN THE BALKANS 26-29
(Psichogios Publications 1993) (giving overview of Balkan history); Cervoni, infra note 171, at 490;
Andras Riedlmayer, A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovenia, (1993),
http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/briefhis.htm (chronicling the history of the Bosnia).
79. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 18
(1995) [hereinafter M&S YUGO]; Cervoni, infra note 171, at 489-90; Riedlmayer, supra note 78.
80. M&S YUGO, supra note 79 (detailing how Croat forces ethnically cleansed Serbs in Croatia,
and Serbs retaliated with the ethnic cleansing of Croats and Muslims under Serb control); Cervoni, infra
note 171, at 491 (detailing the international crimes that occurred under Nazi occupation of the
Balkans); Riedlymayer, supra note 78.
81. M&S YUGO, supra note 79; Cervoni, infra note 171, at 491; Riedlymayer, supra note 78.
82. M&S YUGO, supra note 79; Aileen Yoo, Kosovo: Jeruselum of Serbia, WASH. POST, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/overview/kosovo.htm (last updated
July 1999) (discussing Yugoslavia's communists roots).
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Despite social, political, cultural, and economic prosperity under Tito, ethnic
tensions in the former Yugoslavia were not solved, but rather squelched with
"stem repression".8 3 The fifty plus years of "pent-up hatred" shared among these
three groups for each other lead to a large degree of anxiety and tension in the
former Yugoslavia-especially in Bosnia-during the late 1980's to early 1990's
as a result of the power vacuum that occurred after the death of Tito and the
collapse of Soviet influence in the area. 4 In the summer of 1991, the situation
evolved into violence as Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats
clashed with each other in armed conflicts over the future of Bosnia. 85 On the one
hand, the Bosnian Muslims-who were the largest group in Bosnia--desired
Bosnia to secede from what was left of the former Yugoslavia. 86 On the other
hand, Bosnian Serbs who were militarily and financially supported by Slododan
Milosevir's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not want Bosnia to secede from
Yugoslavia for military, cultural, and historical reasons. 87 In late 1991 and into
1992, Bosnian Muslims and other groups successfully orchestrated the secession of
Bosnia from the former Yugoslavia through un-"representative" elections that
were mainly boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnia was recognized by the world
community as a sovereign nation.
88
The internationally recognized secession of Bosnia from the former
Yugoslavia naturally agitated the more militarily powerful Bosnian Serbs-who
declared themselves as another independent nation called the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, later to be renamed Republika Srpska-into
directing large-scale military onslaughts against the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
83. M&S YUGO, supra note 79; Cervoni, infra note 171, at 491.
84. Cervoni, infra note 171, at 491-92; Kalinauskas, infra note 86, at 387-388; see Tim Ito, Bosnia
and Herzegovenia, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/overview/bosnia.htm (last updated October 1998) (discussing the history of
the Bosnian conflict).
85. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 19-20; Mark A. Bland, An Analysis of the United Nations
International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels,
Problems, and Prospects, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 233, 238-39 (1994) (discussing the beginning
of the Bosnia conflict). Samantha Power offers a concise, yet thorough investigation into the lead-up to
and actual commission of international crimes in Bosnia, reciting all that this Note has and will
describe. POWER, supra note 1, at 247-81.
86. Bland, supra note 85; Mikas Kalinauskas, The Use of International Military Force in
Arresting War Criminals: The Lessons of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 389-90 (2002).
87. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 4, 87 (Feb 26), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf; Bland, supra note 85 at 239; see M&S YUGO, supra
note 79, at 19-20. In light of Milosevid's death mid-trial, it is still being litigated at the ICTY as to the
criminal responsibility, if at all, that Serbian superiors have for the military and financial support the
Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia gave to Bosnian Serbs during the Bosnian war. See, e.g., Prosecutor
v. Perii6, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Amended Indictment, (Sept. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/per-ai050926e.pdf.




Croat populations.8 9 "The ensuing three-year war between the Bosnian Muslims,
Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs would prove to be one of the most brutal
conflicts in recent memory."
90
As U.N. and European Union attempts to broker a cease-fire and peace in
Bosnia failed, it became apparent through many public and private international
observers that international crimes were occurring in Bosnia. 91 A U.N. report
found that Bosnian Serbs militias, with the help of Yugoslavian military forces,
were "making a concerted effort... to create ethnically pure regions..." of Bosnia,
92
which included the forced mass deportation of Muslims, mass executions of
Muslims, whole-scale destruction of Muslim towns, and creation of over 400 Serb
controlled detentions centers where Muslims were tortured and killed in the
thousands. 93 Although popular media characterized Bosnian Serbs and Serbs
elsewhere as the sole perpetrators of international crimes during this war, Muslims
and Croats in and out of Bosnia were very much involved in their own ethnic
cleansing campaigns, albeit on relatively smaller scales. 94 Regardless of which
group deserves what portion of blame, the commission of international crimes
during Bosnia's succession from the former Yugoslavia led to death of over
250,000 civilians and the displacement of millions more.
95
2. U.N. Intervention
The growing accounts of atrocities combined with the unwillingness on the
89. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 19-20; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 389; see Ito, supra note
84.
90. Ito, supra note 84.
91. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 20-21.
92. The Secretary General, Further Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 749, 5, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23900 (May 12, 1992); Cervoni,
infra note 171, at 492-93.
93. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 21-22; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 389-90.
94. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 22; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 390; Ito, supra note 84; see
generally SHERMAN supra note 78 (making a persuasive case that each Bosnian ethnic group had plans
and/or undertook plans to "'ethnically cleanse" Bosnia of the other ethnic groups, and further argued that
US/UN/NATO intervention in Bosnia in defense of Muslims and Croats and against Serbs was
arbitrary, because each Balkan ethnic group was equally reprehensible for war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and other international crimes); but see POWER, supra note 1, at 307-10 (stating that
attempts to blame all ethnic groups in Bosnia for committing international crimes distorts the reality
that Serbs were by far the worse international criminals in Bosnia during this war, and such distorting
efforts were done by Western countries as an excuse for not intervening into the Yugoslavian war).
Regardless of the rhetoric on both sides of the argument, international crimes were committed by Croats
and Muslims in and outside of Bosnia, and have been and are being adjudicated by the ICTY. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Orid, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, (July 30, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/oric/trialc/judgement/ori-jud06630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case
No. IT-06-90-PT, Joinder Indictment, (July 24, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/got-joind060724e.pdf.
95. Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, Preface to M&S YUGO, supra note 79; M&S YUGO,
supra note 79, at 22 (stating the over 2.1 million people, or over 50% of the Bosnian population were
"killed or driven from their homes..."); POWER, supra note 1, at 251(estimating 200,000 Bosnian
deaths); Paul R. Williams & Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between
Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347 (2004).
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part of the world community to intervene militarily and the ineffectiveness of
economic sanctions 96 led to passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 780 in
1992 that created a commission of experts to investigate and collect evidence
regarding alleged violations of international criminal and humanitarian law in the
former Yugoslavia. 97 This U.N. Commission submitted its report concluding that
violations of international humanitarian law were in fact occurring in the former
Yugoslavia and formally endorsing the formation of an ad hoc international
tribunal to adjudicate these violations. 98 Pursuant to this report, the U.N. Security
Council passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 808 (Resolution 808) in 1993
that ".... 'officially' declared 'ethnic cleansing' in the former Yugoslavia to be a
'threat to international peace and security'... "99 and most importantly, confirmed
the U.N. Security Council's intention to create an ad hoc tribunal.100
Although Resolution 808 was the first stage in creating the ICTY, in that it
obligated the U.N. to create such an ad hoc tribunal, "[t]he Security Council did
not indicate in Resolution 808 either the legal basis or the method for establishing
the tribunal."'' 1 In order to assist the Security Council on how to create the an ad
hoc international criminal tribunal, Resolution 808 mandated that the Secretary-
General issue a report on the legally acceptable methods of creating what would
later become the ICTY. 10 2 This report evaluated three options: Security Council
Resolution, General Assembly negotiations, or treaty negotiations. 103 Both Treaty
and General Assembly negotiations were discarded as viable options, mainly
because time requirements needed for negotiations of any type did not comport
with the expressed urgency to create the ICTY. 10 4 Adopting the U.N. Security
96. Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How The International Tribunals Recast
the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1, 19 (2006).
97. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/4597908.html; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 24-26; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at
393.
98. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary General Addressed
to the President of the Security Council, 7 31-60, 7 72-74, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 10, 1993); M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 28-29; Cervoni, infra note 171, at 493
("In October of 1992, after more than a year of engaging in ineffective scare tactics in light of well-
documented atrocities, the UN Security Council.. finally decided to act."); Kalinauskas, supra note 86,
at 393.
99. Cervoni, infra note 171, at 493.
100. S.C. Res. 808, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/29842 1.8.html; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 31.
101. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 40; Danner, supra note 59, at 19; see Ralph Zacklin, Some
Major Problems in the Drafting of the ICTY Statute, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 361 (2004).
102. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 100, 2; see Kerry R. Wortzel, The Jurisdiction of an International
Criminal Tribunal in Kosovo, 11 PACE INT'L L. REv. 379, 387 (1999) (exhibiting the importance of UN
Resolution 808, and the legal authority behind the ICTY).
103. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), 7 18-30, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993) [hereinafter Res. 808 Report].
104. Id. at 7 19-22; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 40-42; Zacklin, supra note 101, at 361-62
(explaining additionally that treaty negotiations only bind those that sign and ratify the treaty, and it
would be inconceivable that parties to the Bosnian conflict would sign onto such a treaty).
VOL. 35:3/4
THE "ROAMING ICC"
Council Resolution approach,105 the U.N. Department of Legal Affairs, with
assistance from States and non-governmental organizations, drafted a proposed
statute for the ICTY. 106 The draft statute of the ICTY was adopted without change
and little to no debate by Security Council members in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 827 (Resolution 827) of 1993, marking the U.N. Security Council's
second and final step in creating the ICTY.1
07
As asserted by the U.N. Security Council, the cumulative effect of Resolution
808 and 827 gave the U.N. Security Council the legal authority to create the ICTY.
As previously mentioned, the U.N. Security Council decided in Resolution 808
that the situation in the former Yugoslavia was a "threat.. .to... intemational peace
and security" in violation of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. l0 8 Consequently,
Resolution 808 triggered the U.N. Security Council's ability to use Article 41 of
the U.N. Charter, which states that "[t]he Security Council may decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to
its decision."' t 9 Article 29 of the U.N. Charter and ICJ's jurisprudence on Article
29 confirmed the U.N.'s ability to create subsidiary, judicial bodies as a
"measure.. .to give effect to its decision"." 0
Theoretically speaking, a UN ad hoc tribunal, like the ICTY, is a product of
each U.N. Member State bestowing a part of its sovereignty, specifically "a
measure of criminal jurisdiction", to the U.N. Security Council to establish an
international criminal tribunal to adjudicate violations of international law on
behalf of the Member States."' The precedent created by the Nuremberg Tribunal
validates that States individually or collectively have the power to create tribunals
105. See M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 41-42 (explaining that the U.N. Security Council
Resolution approach was expeditious and binding on all states).
106. Res. 808 Report, supra note 103, at annex; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 32-33; Danner,
supra note 59, at 19-20; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 393; see Zacklin, supra note 101, at 361.
107. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doe. S/RES/827, (May 25, 1993), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf.OpenElement; M&S
YUGO, supra note 79, at 33-34; Danner, supra note 59, at 20 ("For the first time since Nuremberg and
Tokyo, an international court was endowed with the authority to punish violations of the laws of war.
A step that had been steadfastly resisted by delegates at the Diplomatic Conferences in 1949 and 1974-
77 was, in the press of events in 1993, embraced by the Security Council almost without comment.");
Michele Caianiello & Giulio Illuminati, From the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407, 420 (2001);
Christopher S. Wren, Judge Says Yugoslavia Impedes Work of War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 1999, atA7.
108. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 100; Chapter VII of U.N. Charter, Article 39 states: "The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain and restore international peace and security." U.N. Charter, ch. 7,
art. 39.
109. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 42-44; Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 107, at 420-21;
Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 395-96.
110. U.N. Charter, art. 29; Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53-56 (July 13), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/21/2123.pdf, Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 395-96.
111. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 45.
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for the exclusive reason of adjudicating violations of international criminal law.112
Correspondingly, this power to create tribunals was one of the powers Member
States bestowed to the U.N. Security Council to use towards effectuating their
decisions, or in the case of the former Yugoslavia, to give effect to its decision in
Resolution 808 to maintain international peace and security.
113
As an ad hoc tribunal with limited territorial, temporal, and personal
jurisdiction, 114 the ICTY was bound to adjudicate only law that was "beyond any
doubt customary international law" at the time of the conflict '15 Otherwise, the
ICTY would be plagued with additional, complex jurisdictional questions, such as
if the former Yugoslavia--or any of the sovereign nations that came out of the
Yugoslavian conflict-was a State Party to a particular convention or treaty and if
such convention or treaty imposed criminal responsibility on individuals?116
Consequently, the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY consisted of four
112. Id.
113. The establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction can be achieved only by States
which, in effect, confer on the international court a measure of the criminal jurisdiction which every
State possesses as an essential element of its sovereignty. As recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunal,
any State or group of States may decide to establish a court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction
with respect to crimes under international law. In this particular instance, the States that were members
of the Security Council decided to establish an international criminal jurisdiction by means of a binding
decision of the Council. In doing so, these States acted not as individual States on their own behalf, but
rather as the Security Council exercising its right to adopt measures for the maintenance of international
peace and security on behalf of the Member States of the United Nations. Id; but see Prosecutor v.
Milutinovi6 et al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, 46-8 (May
6, 2003) (separate opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson) (arguing that while theoretically true that the
U.N. could have formed the ICTY or like court via Nuremberg-type delegation of jurisdiction, the
ICTY was in fact formed by the Security Council independently exercising its Chapter VII powers to
adopt measures for the maintenance of international peace and security, and not upon delegated
authority from States). Judge Robinson's opinion on universal jurisdiction is worth reading. He clarifies
that "a large part of the difficulty in determining whether an international criminal tribunal such as the
Nuremberg IMT, the ICTY or the ICTR exercises universal jurisdiction is explained by the failure to
distinguish between the basis for the creation of that tribunal (a question that raises the issue of the
delegation by States of their jurisdictional powers to an international tribunal), and the jurisdiction that
is actually exercised by it by virtue of its Statute or customary international law." Id., at 34.
114. Pursuant to its Statute, the ICTY possessed limited temporal jurisdiction (only international
crimes committed after January 1, 1991) limited personal jurisdiction (only people, not corporations, or
States), and limited territorial jurisdiction (only areas under the territory of the former Socialists Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia). Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, arts. 1, 6, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/legaldoc-e/basic/statutstatute-feb06-e.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
115. Res. 808 Report, supra note 103, 34; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 51-52; GItNAEL
METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD Hoc TRIBUNALS 5 (2005).
116. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 51-52; see METTRAux, supra note 113, at 6-7; but see
Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, In 63 et seq. (Dec. 5, 2003),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/galic/trialc/judgement/gal-tj031205e.pdf (convicting the defendant
of "terror" and "attacks on civilians" based on Additional Protocol I of Geneva Conventions, not
considered customary law at the time); infra section III, D. On a similar note, because U.N. Security
Council decisions only bind States, it was necessary for the Security Council-in the case of ICTY and
ICTR-to create a subsidiary judicial body that could make judicial decisions on individuals and have
those decisions be binding, rather than recommendations. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 44-47; M&S
RWANDA, infra note 123, at 102, 106.
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categories of customary international criminal laws: 117 grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention; violations of the laws and customs of war; genocide, and
crimes against humanity. '18
(This Note would fail to recognize the full scale of international crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia if it did not mention that after the creation of
the ICTY in 1993, the commission of international crimes within the former
Yugoslavia continued at a shocking pace. Probably the most horrific international
crimes occurred in the UN-protected Srebrenica enclave of Bosnia in 1995 where
over 7,000 Muslim men and boys were executed and many more Muslim women,
young children, and elderly were deported.119 Additionally, the Serbian siege of
Kosovo in the late 1990's also ended in the commission of international crimes
that resulted in the death of over 11,000 Muslims and the mass deportation of
Muslims out of Kosovo.120 These later episodes of international crimes in the
former Yugoslavia, however, are being adjudicated by the ICTY as well. 121)
C. ICTR
1. The History of Rwanda and Facts that Led to the Formation of the ICTR
Colonization by European powers significantly shaped the history of Rwanda,
which is a common story among African countries. Unfortunately, Europe's
influence over Rwanda did not cease when the last colonizers left. The foundation
117. The term "customary international criminal law" will be used often in this Note, and refers to
international criminal laws that have attained customary international law status. The term
"conventional international criminal law" will also be used, and refers to international criminal laws
created by convention or treaty. However, it is important to remember that most conventional
international criminal laws do not attach individual criminal liability for their violation, but rather
obligates State Party to the convention or treaty to enforce the law of the convention or treaty, and the
convention and treaty will only make the State Parties directly responsible for their violation. See infra
section III, D; IV, A.
118. ICTY Statute, supra note 114, arts. 2-5. For an easy to understand comparison of the
difference in subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR, read former ICTY President and
Judge McDonald's article on international criminal tribunals. Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The
International Criminal Tribunals: Crime & Punishment in the International Arena, 25 NOVA L. REV.
463, 466-67 (2001). Additionally, the ad hoc tribunals' statutes were formulated with Judges in mind,
"[t]he Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) contain much more than the skeletons of the
crimes that are within their jurisdictions. The defmitions of these crimes and the application of the law
of international crimes in general, therefore, call further refinement to be made by the Court which has
been entrusted by the Security Council with the task of apply to Statute whilst ensuring that it was not
thereby legislating new international law. METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 5 (alteration).
119. DAVID ROHDE, End Game: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre
since World War If, at XVI, 388, 402; POWER, supra note 1, at 411-421. Power's entire portrayal of the
international crimes that occurred in Srebrenica is amazing in its own right. See POWER, supra note 1, at
391-441. Yet, nothing gives a more riveting and captivating story of all facets of the Srebrenica
massacres and mass deportations than Rohde's book End Game. See generally ROHDE, supra note 119.
120. POWER, supra note 1, at 466, 472.
121. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovid et al., Case No. IT-05-88-PT, Consolidated Amended
Indictment, (Nov. 11, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/pop-
scai0606l4.pdf; Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6 et al., Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Third Amended Joinder
Indictment, (June 21, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/milu-
3aji06062 le.pdf.
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of the international crimes that occurred in Rwanda in 1993 unquestionably grew
out of Rwanda's colonial days. 122 Prior to the influx of a German population into
Rwanda at the end of the nineteenth century, 123 the two main socio-ethnic groups
that comprise Rwanda, the Hutus and Tutsi, are believed to have shared a peaceful
co-existence. 124 Despite stereotypical physical differences between the two groups,
some ethnographers and historians believe Tutsis and Hutus are not exclusive
ethnic groups, and furthermore, most Tutsis and Hums share the same language
and religion. 125 Unfortunately, minor social, economic, and political differences
between Tutsis and Hutus were brought to the forefront after German colonizers
took control of Rwanda, doing so by using Tutsis as the proxy rulers over the Hutu
population. 126 Belgium took control of Rwanda after World War I, and instituted a
brutal hierarchical system whereby Tutsis were molded and manipulated into the
ruthless ruling class of Rwanda and Hutus were subject to excessive forced labor,
which in tm, created a bright line in Rwanda's population between Tutsis and
Hutus. 127 The most lasting effect of Belgium's rule was an identification card
system instituted in 1933 that labeled Rwandans as either Hutu or Tutsi, which
later played an enormous role in the genocide and international crimes that played
out in Rwanda in 1994.128
As Belgian colonizers' rule over Rwanda drew to an end, Belgium switched
allegiance to the Hums, encouraging them to revolt against the ruling Tutsi, which
eventually led to the Hutu population seizing control of the country in 1959.129 The
following decades in Rwanda resulted in the mass exodus of Tutsis into
neighboring countries, Hutu domination, and "...numerous massacres of members
of the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda ...in 1963, 1966, 1973, 1990, 1992, and 1993. "13°
After the bloody fighting between the Hum-dominated Rwanda government and
Tutsi rebels ceased in 1993, the U.N.-backed Arusha Accord was signed, which
122. See generally, Paul J. Magnarella, Special Issue: Rwanda 10 Years On. I.) How Could It
Happen? The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 801 (2005)
(tracking the pre-colonial and colonial history of Rwanda and its effect on the genocide that occurred in
1994 that lead to the creation of the ICTR).
123. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA 49 (1998); id. at 802 [hereinafter M&S RWANDA].
124. Magnarella, supra note 122, at 803; but see Magnarella, supra note 122, at 802-06 (explaining
that Tutsis held a higher social class, possessed a majority of the political and military power, and
essentially the ruling class of Rwanda in comparison to the larger group. Being Tutsis was widely
considered nobility whereas being Hutu was considered peasantry).
125. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 4, 33 (1999),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm#TopOfPage; M&S RWANDA, supra
note 123, at 48-9; see Magnarella, supra note 122, at 804-805.
126. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 49; Magnarella, supra note 122, at 806-07; see Mark A.
Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 41,43 (2005).
127. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 34-38; Magnarella, supra note 122, at 807-08.
128. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 37-38; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 49; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 808.
129. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 38-39; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 50; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 809.
130. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 47; DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 39-40; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 809-12.
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called for the political and military integration of the Hutus and Tutsis into a single
government. 131 However, a retrospective view of Rwanda at this time reveals the
specter of genocide lurking beneath the surface. Even before the negotiations of
the Arusha Accord, Hutu hardliners grew weary of their increasingly moderate
President Juvdnal Habyarimana, and these hardliners, which included close allies
of President Habyarimana, laid the groundwork to kill every single Tutsi in
Rwanda. 132 The genocidal framework included: stockpiling massive amounts of
machetes and six million dollars worth of firearms all across Rwanda,133training
large amounts of Hutus on "methods of mass murder and indoctrination in ethnic
hatred", 134constant radio transmission encouraging genocidal intent against Tutsis,
and similar radio banter labeling the Arusha Accord as an agreement between
Tutsis rebels and Hutu sympathizers. 135 President Habyariamana, while returning
from a meeting in Tanzania on the implementation of the Arusha Accord, was
assassinated when his plane was shot down by Hutu hardliners, who in turn blamed
Tutsis rebels for the assassination in numerous radio addresses to the population of
Rwanda.
136
What followed the assassination was -... the most efficient mass killing since
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" and a "...rate of
slaughter.. .three to four times that of the number of Jews killed in the
Holocaust."' 137 Within 30 minutes of the crash, the elite Presidential Guard sealed
off the airport,-which stopped any attempts by the U.N. to investigate the
airplane crash-checked every single Rwandans' identity card, and executed any
identified Tutsis.138 After the assassination of President Habyariamana and the
airport massacre, the Hutus hardliners executed their plan for genocide, which
spread like an angry beehive throughout the country.
The assassins' first priority was to eliminate Hutu opposition
leaders.. After that, the wholesale extermination of Tutsis got
underway... With the encouragement of [radio] messages and leaders at
every level of society, the slaughter of Tutsis and the assassination of
Hutu oppositionists spread from region to region. Following the
militias' example, Hutus young and old rose to the task. Neighbors
hacked neighbors to death in their homes, and colleagues hacked
131. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 123-26; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 50-51;
Magnarella, supra note 122, at 813.
132. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 3-5; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 51-53; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 814.
133. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 3-5, 127; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 52.
134. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 52; see Magnarella, supra note 122, at 814.
135. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 4-12; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 51-52; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 814.
136. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 5-6. 181-85; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 53;
Magnarella, supra note 122, at 815.
137. Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Paradox of International Adjudication: Developments in the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the World Court, and the
International Criminal Court, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 551, 556; 585 (2000).
138. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 54.
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colleagues to death in their workplaces. Doctors killed their patients,
and schoolteachers killed their pupils. Within days, the Tutsi
populations of many villages were all but eliminated... Radio
announcers reminded listeners not to take pity on women and
children. 1
39
As the days wore on, militias "were sent to rural areas not just to kill, but to
force the local people to kill. Often, people were compelled to kill their neighbors
or members of their own families. The extremists' aim was for the entire Hutu
population to participate in the killing." 14° One hundred days later, 800,000 Tutsis,
and Hutus that were perceived as sympathizers, were killed, representing ten to
eleven percent of Rwanda's total population.14 ' The genocide did not stop until
exiled Tutsis rebels-who were just as cognizant of the international crimes
occurring in their country as the rest of the world yet received little to no
international support in their efforts-invaded and amazingly fought their way into
control of Rwanda. 1
42
2. U.N. Intervention
Unsurprisingly, the very first similarity that the creation of the ICTR shared
with the creation of its predecessor, the ICTY, was the international communities'
inability to do anything swiftly in reaction to the international crimes occurring in
Rwanda. Adding insult to injury, the mere thought of setting up the ICTR only
came about well after genocide and hostilities were "virtually over."' 143 Even the
impassioned pleas by the newly elected prime minister of Rwanda for the
formulation of an international tribunal and a report by an U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights detailing the criminal events in Rwanda were not
enough to persuade the U.N. Security Council or the U.S. to live up to their
respective duties to act in the face of genocide.144 Fortunately, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Rwanda submitted his extensive report to the U.N. Security
Council which "finally spurred the Security Council to acknowledge that 'acts of
genocide have occurred in Rwanda"' in Security Council Resolution 925 14 and
caused U.S. Secretary of State to testify before the U.S. Senate that "[i]t's a terrible
situation that calls out for international action."'
146
Using the ICTY as a precedential template, the U.N. Security Council
instituted a Commission of Experts for Rwanda to investigate violations of
139. Magnarella, supra note 122, at 815.
140. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 58 (stating that one estimate had half of the Hutu
population participating in the genocide).
141. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 15-16; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 55; Drumbl, supra
note 126, at 42; Magnarella, supra note 122, at 816; Tiefenbrun, supra note 137, at 556.
142. Drumbl, supra note 126, at 44.
143. Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 501, 505 (1996); see M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 61.
144. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 61-62; see DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 24-25, 640-44.
145. S.C. Res. 925, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (June 8, 1994), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/5305671 .html.
146. Christopher Urges Trial Over Genocide in Rwanda, WASH. POST, July 1, 1994, at A29.
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international humanitarian law. 147 Despite the clear indication by the Commission
of Experts that violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda called for
the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal, 48 bureaucratic and diplomatic wrangling
dragged on for months. While the international community wrestled with the
decision to create either a separate ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda or add jurisdiction
over Rwanda to the 18 month old ICTY, the government of Rwanda fluctuated in
its support for an ad hoc Rwanda tribunal, ultimately ending in official opposition
to the formation of such a court. 149 However, the Rwanda's leadership indicated
that the government would cooperate if such an ad hoc tribunal was created despite
its official opposition, thus clearing the way for the U.N. Security Council to pass
Resolution 955 (Resolution 955) in 1994 establishing the ICTR. 50
In Resolution 955, the U.N. Security Council determined that "genocide and
other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian
law" committed in Rwanda "constitute a threat to international peace and
security."'1 51 Relying on its precedent in forming the ICTY, Resolution 955
additionally called for the creation of an ad hoc tribunal to combat the threat to
international peace and security in Rwanda; thus, the ICTR was created in one
resolution with an attached ICTR statute, rather than the two resolutions that
created the ICTY. 152 Except for this minor difference in legislative history, the
U.N. Security Council established both the ICTY and ICTR pursuant to its powers
under Chapter VII, particularly Article 39 and 41, and created both ad hoc tribunal
based on the same legal and philosophic theories. 1
53
The ICTR and the ICTY diverge, however, in terms of subject matter
jurisdiction. Even though "[t]he ICTR Statute was modeled closely on that of the
ICTY", 154 as reported by the Secretary General, "...the Security Council elected to
take a more expansive approach to... the applicable law than the one underlying the
147. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. Doe. S/RES/935, 1 (July 1, 1994), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/1393874.html.
148. Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance with
Security Council Resolution 935, 146-49, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125
(Oct. 4, 1994); Raymond Bonner, U.N. Commission Recommends Rwanda 'Genocide' Tribunal, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1994, at A13.
149. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 66-71.
150. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, 1 (Nov. 8, 1994), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/2132961.htm [hereinafter Res. 955]; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 71-72.
151. Res. 955, supra note 150, at 1; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 103; Akhaven, infra note
152, at 502.
152. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security
Council Resolution 955, 7, delivered to the Security Council, UN Doe. S/1995/134, 1; 9 (Feb. 13,
1995) [hereinafter Res. 955 Report]; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 101; Payam Akhavan, The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 501, 502 (1996) ("In establishing the Rwanda Tribunal, however, the Security Council decided
that 'drawing upon the experience gained in the Yugoslav Tribunal, a one-step process and a single
resolution would suffice."'); Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 109 (1997).
153. See infra Part III, Section B. ICTY / U.N. Intervention. This same legal/philosophic theories
discussed in this section apply to the ICTR as well.
154. Danner, supra note 59, at 23.
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statute of the [ICTY]."' 155 Two circumstances dictated a subject matter change in
the ICTR. First, genocide and crimes against humanity played a more prevalent
role in Rwanda and in the U.N. Security Council's reactions to Rwanda compared
to the former Yugoslavian situation. 156 Second, the armed conflict that occurred in
Rwanda was an internal armed conflict and purely incidental to the international
crimes committed in Rwanda, 157 thus certain international humanitarian laws did
not apply. 158 Consequently, several aspects of the ICTR statute differ from the
ICTY statute: the preamble of the ICTR statute specifically mentions genocide and
the first international criminal offense listed is genocide; 159 Article 3 of the ICTR
statute on crime against humanity does not require a nexus with an armed conflict,
but rather requires a nexus between the proscribed inhumane acts and
discriminatory grounds; 160 the grave breaches provisions of 1949 Geneva
Conventions are not included in Article 4 of ICTR dealing with war crimes,
because those provisions only deal with international armed conflicts and; Article
4 of ICTR statute does include common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Additional Protocol II, which are provisions that apply to internal
armed conflicts. 1
61
D. The Flaws of the Ad Hoc Tribunals
There is no doubt that the ICTY and the ICTR are tremendous triumphs in
international criminal law. 162 These ad hoc tribunals have unquestionably chipped
away at international impunity, added considerably to international criminal
jurisprudence, exemplified the viability of international criminal law, and
established the willingness of the international community to fight international
hostilities with the rule of law. 163 The UN ad hoc tribunals' most notable
155. Res. 955 Report, supra note 152, 12; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 127; Cervoni, supra
note 171, at 497-498; but see METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 10 (indicating that this distinction by the
Secretary General between the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR might have been "'an
unintentional distinction').
156. Cisse, supra note 152, at 109-110.
157. Id. at 107.
158. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 142; Akhavan, supra note 152, at 503; Tiefenbrun, supra
note 137, at 562-63. It is imperative to stress that the belief at the time of the creation of the ICTR that
international humanitarian law did not unequivocally apply to internal armed conflicts, as opposed to
international armed conflicts, has changed dramatically since the ICTR's creation. Today, international
humanitarian law is applied to internal armed conflicts. Prosecutor v. Tadid, supra note 25, 128-30;
133-34; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 128-30.
159. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Pmbl., art. 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Cisse, supra note 152, at 109-110.
160. ICTR Statute, supra note 159, art. 3; Akhaven, supra note 152, at 503; see M&S RWANDA,
supra note 123, at 126.
161. ICTR Statute, supra note 159, art. 4; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 126; Akhaven, supra
note 152, at 503.
162. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 37; Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and
Reconciliation: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 667, 738 (1999); Beth Stephens, Accountability for International
Crimes: The Synergy Between the International Criminal Court and Alternative Remedies, 21 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 527, 541 (2003).
163. Tolbert & Solomon, infra note 164, at 36-37 (stating additionally that the ad hoc tribunals
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contribution is its impact on the future, for the "['ICC'].. .would not have been
possible without the ad hoc tribunals' trailblazing work."'' 64 Without intentionally
trampling on the predominantly positive legacy of the ICTY and ICTR, it is
imperative to point out that these and any other ad hoc tribunals are merely
stepping stones towards the realization of a true international criminal law system,
and not end goals in themselves. An examination of the various types of problems
faced by both the ICTY and ICTR illustrates the serious inadequacies with ad hoc
tribunals.
On a practical level, the ICTY and ICTR were forced to confront a whole host
of problems intrinsic with being ad hoc tribunals. As ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY
and ICTR each had to be built from the ground up, literally and figuratively. 165 In
the case of the ICTR, all of the components that any judicial institution needs to
operate, such as roads, courtrooms, legal staff, and detention units, were far from
being finished before the ICTR began working. 166 During the time wasted on
establishing the entire infrastructure of these ad hoc tribunals, there were no
mechanisms in place to protect evidence and, as in the situation with the ICTY, to
stop further international crimes from occurring. 67 Not surprisingly, being
required to build the ICTY and ICTR from scratch made both not only time-
consuming, but also overly expensive. 168
Both ad hoc tribunals suffered from severe logistical and administrative
nightmares. 169 The ICTY labored through years of little to no cooperation from
"...have an international legal basis and avoid the label of 'victor's justice',... [the ad hoc tribunals]
have been widely viewed as conducting fair trials, providing a measure of justice to victims, and
removing war criminals from the seats of power and thus 'clearing the ground' for more responsible
government.") see generally Payam Akhavan et al., The Contribution of the Ad Hoc Tribunals to
International Humanitarian Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1509 (1998).
164. David Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in
Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 37 (2006).
165. Everything and anything imaginable that is associated with operating a judicial tribunal had to
be established for both the ICTY and ICTR from scratch. Hiring thousands of employees, creating
hiring procedures, establishing document storage systems, building detention centers for suspects,
finding buildings where the tribunal and its satellite office would be placed, developing internal tribunal
rules and procedures, starting health care programs for personnel, purchasing security systems, wiring
the buildings for internet, and so on, are components of any judicial tribunal that in the case of the
ICTY and ICTR, were non-existent and needed to be established in order for these tribunals to function.
And in the future, all of the money and time that went into creating the ICTY and ICTR will finish with
these institutions shutting down forever.
166. Erik Mose, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 920, 921-22 (2005);
Akhaven, supra note 152, at 508-509.
167. SADAT, infra note 200, at 31.
168. Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Recent Developments in International Criminal Law: Trying to Stay
Afloat Between Scylla and Charybdis, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 691, 693-94 (2005); see Akhaven, supra
note 152, at 508-509.
169. To this day, these types of problems persist. The ICTY, for instance, has not been able to
secure the arrest of General Ratko Mladid, who allegedly directed the Srebrenica massacres, and the
alleged mastermind behind the commission of international crimes by Serbs, Serbian politician
Radovan Kradzdid. BBC News, The Hague's Wanted Men,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1935955.stm#km (last visited October 19, 2007).
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former Yugoslavian States and Western countries.' 70 Most disturbing was the fact
that extraditing indicted individuals, serving subpoenas, or carrying out court
orders were near impossible tasks.171 This severe lack of cooperation was caused
by the "toothless" language in the U.N. Resolutions that created the ICTY, which
effectively undercut the ICTY's authority over indicted suspects.'72 If a State
refused to cooperate with the ICTY, the ICTY's only recourse was to complain to
the U.N. Security Council. 173 Although the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 174 -
an agreement between the former Yugoslavian republics that included provisions
mandating their cooperation with the ICTY-was created to fix these cooperation
issues, the DPA could not fully cure the structural problems inherent in the
ICTY. 17' As for the ICTR, it may have experienced more State cooperation than its
sister UN ad hoc tribunal, but it endured through allegations of corruption, terribly
inadequate facilities, and severe pre-trial delays and detentions.' 76 Combining
these problems with complaints about their physical location and poor outreach
programs, and both UN ad hoc tribunals appear distant, ineffective, political, and
illegitimate to the affected populations. 177 Indeed, the population of Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia themselves have expressed these precise negative opinions
in regards to the ICTY and ICTR. 178 As a result, the ICTY and ICTR are unable to
gain authenticity with those who were the most affected by the tragedies in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Theoretically and legally, ad hoc tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR have
additional faults. Focusing first on the legal perspective, both ad hoc tribunals
apply international criminal law which is far from flawless, as illustrated by the
subsequent conduct of these tribunals' chambers. While both the ICTY and ICTR
were given statutes by the U.N. Security Council to use, the scope of their
170. Danner, supra note 59, at 24-25; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 399.
171. Rocco P. Cervoni, Beating Plowshares Into Swords-Reconciling the Sovereign Right to Self-
Determination With Individual Human Rights Through an International Criminal Court: The Lessons
of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a Frontispiece, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 477, 510
(1997); Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 399-400; See Igor Jovanovic, Serbia and the UN War Crimes
Tribunal: An Historical Overview, S.E. EURO. TIMES (Belgrade), Jan. 24, 2004 available at
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtm/en-GB/features/setimes/articles/2005/0 1/24/reportage-
01 (reporting either specifics instances or reports of Bosnian war criminals evading the ICTY).
172. Cervoni, supra note 171, at 509.
173. Id. at 508-09.
174. See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with
Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) (signing of which was meant to cure the jurisdictional
issues regarding the ICTY obtaining former Yugoslavian criminal suspects).
175. See Cervoni, supra note 72, at 514 (arguing that the DPA had no real effect on the situation of
Bosnian war criminals evading extradition or other means of being subjected to the ICTY);
Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 399-410 (discussing the lack of cooperation and structural problems with
the ICTY, but additionally discussing the unfortunate consequences on ICTY's mandate that came from
the ICTY having to resort to other enforcement measures, which including using NATO).
176. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 137, at 589.
177. Danielle Tarin, Prosecuting Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq, 45 VA. J. INT'L
L. 467, 512-514 (2005); see id. at 564-65; 583-584.
178. Jean-Marie Kamatali, From the ICTR to ICC: Learning from the ICTR Experience in Bringing
Justice to Rwandans, 12 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 90.
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jurisdiction ratione materiae and the definitions of the crimes within their
jurisdiction were left to the ad hoc tribunals to determine. 9 In the case of the
ICTY, the U.N. Security Council and the ICTY Appeals Chambers specifically
directed the ICTY to make their jurisdictional determinations and crime definitions
based solely on customary international criminal law that existed at the time of the
Yugoslavia conflict, because those are the only international crimes that without
doubt applied to the potential defendants at the time of commission. "0 Although
the ICTY today diligently follows the rule that only customary international
criminal law applies within ICTY Chambers, 181 the influential Tadie Appeals
Chambers hinted at the application of international conventional law to ground
jurisdiction over a defendant, 182 and an ICTY Trial Chamber actually did ground
jurisdiction over a defendant based on treaty law. 183 In relation, the ICTR,
following what it believed was the broader mandate given to it by the U.N.
Secretary General to use international customary and conventional law, 184 has used
international conventional law to ground jurisdiction over a defendant's conduct
and/or define crimes it applies against defendants much more expansively than its'
sister UN tribunal. 185
By permitting such judicial conduct, the ICTY and ICTR exposes itself to
legitimate legal criticism. The most notable concern is the problem evident in the
legal distinction between "illegality and criminality." 186 Facially, international
conventional laws only bind States, not individuals, 187 so it is illegal, but not
criminal for anyone to violate international conventional law or treaties.188 Only
the ratifying State is liable for the violation of an international conventional law,
and depending on the international conventional law violated, an individual who
violated an international convention or treaty law would only become liable for
such a violation if a ratifying State gained jurisdiction over the violator and choose
to prosecute the individual. 189 Criminality, on the other hand, refers to violations
of either customary international criminal law or international conventional laws
179. METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 5; see supra section III, B-C.
180. Res. 808 Report, supra note 103, 29; see e.g., Prosecutor v. Blatkid, Case No. IT-95-14-A,
Judgment, 1 10, 139, 141 (July 29, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/judgement/bla-aj040729e.pdf.
181. See METrRAUX, supra note 113, at 9.
182. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, supra note 25, 143.
183. Prosecutor v. Gali, supra note 116, 63 et seq.
184. See Res. 955 Report, supra note 152, 12.
185. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 604-607 (Sept 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, 353 (May 15, 2003).
186. METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 9.
187. There exist conventional international criminal laws that create individual criminal
responsibility for violations of provisions within these international convention or treaty, such as
Genocide Convention or the ICC's Rome Statute. Rome Statute of the ICC, infra note 207, art. 25; see
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 4, 6, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
Stat. 2045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/pgenoci.htm
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]. However, these types of conventions/treaties are the extreme
minority.
188. METrRAUX, supra note 113, at 8-9, 11.
189. Id. at 8.
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that have attained the status of customary international criminal law whereby the
violation includes individual criminal responsibility for the perpetrator of the
violation. 190 Therefore, when the ICTY and ICTR grounds jurisdiction' 91 over
defendants for violating international conventional law alone or in conjunction
with other reasons, these ad hoc tribunals are artificially attaching individual
criminal responsibility to "illegality", or violations that have not attained criminal
status as a matter of customary international law.192 The ICTY and ICTR, hence,
show a willingness not only to charge a defendant with a violation of a
conventional international law, but also to convict the defendant, in part or in
whole, due to this violation, simply because the Judge says the violation itself is
criminal. Consequently, the jurisdictional and judicial purity of these ad hoc
tribunals is called into question in light of their failure to take the critical step of
demonstrating that a conventional international law has attained individual
criminal responsibility as a matter of customary international law.
There is an additional concern surrounding the use of international
conventional law by ad hoc tribunals. Oftentimes, the use of international
conventional law confuses the clarity of the crimes charged by and the jurisdiction
asserted by the ad hoc tribunals. Specifically, many international conventional
laws used by the ICTY and ICTR are outdated and some crimes listed under the
ICTY and ICTR statute only exists in international customary law, so the use of
international conventional law in tandem with customary laws or exclusively
sacrifices uniformity in the development of customary international criminal
law. 193 Accordingly, ad hoc tribunals lack the legal justification to prosecute under
most conventional international law, and should properly be relegating to using
customary international criminal laws only. Yet, this is not an attractive
predicament considering that customary international criminal law is not easily
defined and amorphous in nature.
From a theoretical perspective, the very notion of ad hoc international
criminal tribunals is disjointed when one considers the context within which these
tribunals were formed and the underlying crimes that these tribunals adjudicate.
190. Id. at 9, 11. Technically, attaining criminality status means that the individual can be
criminally prosecuted for the violation without any need for a domestic State to prosecute the
individual. However, that presumes that the individual was under the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal that could prosecute the individual (i.e. ICTY, ICTR, ICC). In reality, n violation of an
international custom or international conventional law that has attained customary international criminal
law status would most likely be prosecuted by a domestic nation that had legitimate jurisdiction over
the perpetrator.
191. When the word "jurisdiction" is used in this way, it is meant to include jurisdiction to
adjudicate.
192. See METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 5-11. There are circumstances where a conventional
international law/treaty could be applied against a defendant without legal questions being raised. In the
case of the ICTY and ICTR, it would be where a defendant was charged with a violation of a
convention/treaty that either Yugoslavia or Rwanda was a ratifying member of, and the corresponding
violation can be legally proven to include individual criminal responsibility for the perpetrator of the
violation. "But that is not the same as suggesting.. .that, regardless of its crystallization under customary
international law, the treaty itself may form the basis of a criminal conviction." Id. at 9.
193. See id. at 11.
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The moral outrage expounded by the world community in regards to the former
Yugoslavian and Rwandan war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide was
unmistakably intense.'1 94 Additionally, it is beyond doubt that the underlying acts
that led to the creation of these ad hoc tribunals represent the absolute worst and
most reprehensible human behavior. Juxtapose these examples of unforgivable
human conduct and subsequent widespread intense outrage next to the ultra-
political, slow to materialize, and problem-riddled ICTY and ICTR, and the
incongruence is readily apparent. The world's reaction of disgust and
condemnation to these instances of grotesque international criminal conflicts must
justly be followed by the fair adjudication of the breaches of international criminal
law in an already established forum or tribunal. Anything less than an established
tribunal for the prosecution of alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, etc. intrinsically casts doubt on the veracity of the world's contempt
against such deplorable human behavior. The method of creating the ad hoc
tribunals, moreover, is ridiculed as undemocratic and unfair, because the ICTY and
ICTR were bestowed with the requisite sovereign authority to practice
international criminal jurisdiction indirectly from U.N. States pursuant to U.N.
Security Council resolution, which means all these States ceded away their
sovereignty without a vote on or a genuine chance to "engage in a debate about
their cession of sovereignty."'
95
The lack of a permanent international criminal tribunal creates ex post facto
institutional problems as well, for the formation of the tribunal occurs after the
commission of the crime. This last point differs from ex post facto criminalization,
or the criminalization of conduct after the conduct occurs,1 96 because an ex post
facto institutional problem instead focuses on. the lack of an institution to
adjudicate breaches of international criminal law. Within a domestic jurisdiction, it
would be unfair if the jurisdiction criminalized conduct X and never created or
expressed any intention to create an institution responsible for adjudicating
conduct X, but then indicted an individual for committing conduct X and created
194. See POWER, supra note 1, at 251, 276; Bland, supra note 85, at 234; Cervoni, infra note 72, at
483-84; J.F.O. McAllister Washington, Atrocity and Outrage: Specters of Barbarism in Bosnia Compel
the U.S. and Europe to Ponder: Is It Time to Intervene?, TIME, Aug. 17, 1992 available at
http://www.time.con/time/archive/preview/0,10987,976238,00.html; see, e.g., Editorial, Bosnia
Without Illusions - Bosnian Crimes Against Humanity, NAT'L REV., Aug. 31, 1992, at 12, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/isn17_v44/ai_1 2 666339/pg_l. It must be
highlighted that unlike the entire world's reaction of moral outrage to the international crimes being
committed in Bosnia, the response to the international crimes occurring in Rwanda was different.
Unfortunately, only non-governmental organizations and like international organizations called for
intervention into Rwanda, and powerful nations were simply indifferent to the Rwandan situation or
intervened with small, relatively inconsequential forces. See Toby Gati, Intelligence and the Use of
Force in the War of Terrorism, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 150, 152, (2004) (explaining the
importance of NGO's in bringing the world's attention to the international crimes in Rwanda); Marlise
Simons, France is Sending Force to Rwanda to Help Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994, at Al; see
UN Body Concedes It Failed Rwanda, Security Council Vows To Do More Next Time, GLOBE & MAIL,
Apr. 15, 2000, at A25.
195. SADAT, infra note 194, at 31.
196. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
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an institution to prosecute the individual after the fact. Applying this same idea to
the international arena, there might be agreement or codification that conduct X is
internationally criminal, but without defming the forum in which conduct X crimes
will be adjudicated, proper notice is not given to potential defendants that these
crimes will be enforced. Concurrently, "ad hoc tribunals give the impression of
arbitrary and selective prosecution", 197 because ad hoc tribunals are only designed
to try particular international criminals, not all international criminals. 198 For this
reason and others, ad hoc tribunals are seen as unfair, partial, and only applicable
in narrow circumstances.' 99 Law can only be applied fairly if the bricks and mortar
created to house the law and the flesh and bones charged with enforcing the law
exist, because without people and institutions, law is merely symbolic.
IV. ICC: LATEST DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
"The International Criminal Court is the last great international institution of
the Twentieth Century. It is no exaggeration to suggest that its establishment could
reshape our thinking about international law., 20 0 The creation of this "last great
international institution of the Twentieth Century" did not materialize overnight.
The ICC is the product of more than a century of international diplomacy in
tandem with the learned experiences of the ICTY and ICTR.
20 1
Prior to its establishment, the ICC was preceded by a multitude of beneficial,
but ultimately unsuccessful international efforts to create the world's first
permanent international criminal tribunal.20 2 The catalytic events which propelled
197. SADAT, infra note 196, at 31. For some, the word "'ad hoc" in the context of international
criminal law means "selective". Antonio Cassese, Is The ICC Still Having Teething Problems?, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 434 (2006).
198. The UN, which was the most important single institution in bringing about the ICC, itself
criticized ad hoc tribunals as being "selective justice", due in part because the institutions themselves
are built only after the crime is committed. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra
note 7.
199. Summary Record of the 23 00'h Meeting, [1993] 1 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 16, 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.2300, available at http://untreaty.un.orglilc/documentation/english/a-cn4sr2300.pdf ("In
the first place, as every lawyer knew, ad hoc courts were not the best method of administering criminal
justice. The members of a court set up in response to a particular situation might be influenced by that
situation and by, as it were, an obligation of result.") M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 38; see M&S
RWANDA, supra note 123, at 39-46.
200. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 8 (2002) (continuing by stating that "[for if
many aspects of the Rome Treaty demonstrate the tenacity of traditional Westphalian notions of State
sovereignty, there are nonetheless element of supranationalism and efficacy in the Statute that could
prove extremely powerful. Not only doe the Statute place State and non-State actors side-by-side in the
international arena, but the Court will put real people in real jails. Indeed, the establishment of the Court
raises hopes that the lines between international law on the one hand and world order on the other are
blurring, and that the normative structure being created by international law might one day influence or
even restrain the Hobbesian order established by the politics of States.").
201. SADAT, supra note 200, at 42.
202. BROOMI-ALL, supra note 59, at 27-30, 63-66; id. at 21-45 (documenting the many episodes of
international negotiations that either were failed attempts to create an ICC-like institution which
contributed to the creation of the ICC anyway-or episodes that generally contributed to the future
creation of the ICC).
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the international community over the proverbial hump that previously inhibited the
creation of a permanent international criminal tribunal were undoubtedly the ICTY
and ICTR.2 °3 The mere existence of the ICTY and ICTR, not to mention the
trailblazing role in legal precedent that the ICTY and ICTR forged for the ICC,
convinced the world community of the viability of a permanent international
criminal court. °4 While the successes of the ad hoc tribunals spurred the world
community into action, the ills of the ad hoc tribunals laid out shortcomings for the
ICC to avoid, and to a degree, further accentuated the need for a permanent
international criminal tribunal.20 5 With this in mind, numerous governmental and
non-governmental delegations from across the globe underwent the arduous and
fragile task of meshing the varied legal backgrounds of the world, the varied
beliefs on international criminal law, and the varied proposals put forth by each
delegation into a single agreement to create a permanent international criminal
court.20 6 Their effort culminated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Rome Statute) in 1998, which marked a new era in international law.20 7 The
following sections offer an historical, legal, and analytical overview of the ICC,
which will serve as a context illustrating the problems solved and the issues missed
by the ICC.
A. "Constitutional Moment": ICC's Revolutionary Jurisdiction to Prescribe
"When the creation of an international criminal court was first conceived, the
focus was to build an effective prosecution and punishment regime ' 20 8 In order to
build such a regime, the ICC had to be "[t]he first permanent international criminal
court..."20 9 Yet, permanence was not the only factor necessary to create such a
regime, for how such a regime was to be constructed became ever more important.
The Rome Statute Framers, in deliberating on the method for creating the ICC,
were influenced greatly by the ways in which Nuremberg, the ICTY, and the ICTR
came to be, and also by the lessons learned from past futile attempts to create a
permanent international criminal tribunal in a State-centric world of international
203. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 71 (discussing the catalytic impacts of the ICTY and ICTR,
including substantive and procedural international criminal law formation and successes of State
cooperation, on the formation of the ICC); SADAT, supra note 179, at 39-40.
204. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 70; Bottini, supra note 13, at 504 (comparing the attitude of
the world towards a permanent international criminal court before and after the ICTY and ICTR).
205. SADAT, supra note 200, at 40 ("even the problems they (ICTY/ICTR) faced . did not
dampen enthusiasm for the ICC. Rather, they highlighted the urgent need for a permanent institution.").
One of the stated goals of the ICC is "[t]o remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals." Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, supra note 7.
206. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 70-76; SADAT, supra note 179, at 1-9, 275; Roy S. Lee, How
the World Will Relate to the Court: An Assessment of the ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750, 752
(2002) (describing the negotiation process needed to create the ICC statute).
207. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37
I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatute_120704-
EN.pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute].
208. Lee, supra note 206, at 758.
209. PBS.org, Online News Hour, U.N. Creates International Criminal Court,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/court_04-11-02.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
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law. Given that there is no supreme sovereign authority on this planet, 210 the
historical foundation of all international laws is a "horizontal" system where the
only actors are sovereign, independent States. 211 As a result, the only examples of
international criminal law in practice is the few instances where the domestic
courts of sovereign States are willing to apply international criminal law using
some form of universal jurisdiction,2 2 and the even fewer instances where
sovereign States consent to the creation of an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal.213 With the reality being that States have a monopoly over the
implementation of international criminal law and that the "horizontal" international
law system is diametrically at odds with the inherently "vertical" legal concept of
criminal law,214 the Rome Statute Framers knew that a new approach was required
in order to establish the ICC properly. More traditional international law-making
approaches simply failed in creating a permanent international criminal court in the
past, and new ideas and methods were required for the international community to
accomplish the immense task of succeeding where others had failed.
As a result, the negotiations that preceded the creation of the Rome Statute
were unlike any treaty negotiations in the history of international diplomacy. The
Rome Statute, considering all of the facets of its creation, can be considered a
"'[c]onstitutional moment'.., a sea-change in international law-making" where
true legislative behavior, a more or less unheard of concept in international
rulemaking, was being undertaken by the international community.2 5 Such
international legislative action by the international community, as displayed during
the creation of the Rome Statute, differs from traditional treaty or convention
lawmaking in several respects.216 First, the Rome Statute is not a "suppression
convention" where State Parties agree, in the form of a treaty, that conduct X is
criminal and that each State Party must make sure conduct X does not occur on its
territory or anywhere within the State Party's control by passing domestic
legislation criminalizing conduct X. 217 For this reason alone, it is said that
210. SADAT, supra note 179, at 11 (stating that one of the objections to the creation of an
permanent international criminal tribunal "has been the absence of an international sovereign power
with the authority to exert prescriptive jurisdiction over the human beings of the world").
211. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 65; CASSESE, supra note 59, at 5-6.
212. Again, domestic courts applying international criminal law includes the possibility that the
court is applying customary and/or conventional international criminal law, and that the court uses
permissive or mandatory universal jurisdiction to gain jurisdiction over the defendant(s) solely or in
combination with domestic jurisdiction statutes. See supra section II.
213. Also, this statement does not imply that the international criminal tribunals were using
universal jurisdiction in all instances. See supra section II; III. A.-C; supra note 44, 46.
214. See BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 59, 65.
215. SADAT, supra note 200, at 11-14, 78-79, 108-09, 277; see also BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at
31, 67; but see generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2(1), Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. The Law of the Sea Convention, while another example of groundbreaking quasi-
legislating by the international community in the creation of true international law, cannot be said to
have the same implications or severity of legislating as the Rome Statute. SADAT, supra note 179, at 13.
216. See SADAT, supra note 200, at 12-13 (stating that given the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the Rome Statute, it cannot be feasible to explain the legitimacy of the Statute on "classic
theory of contract between absolute sovereigns (treaty-making)...").
217. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 12-14, 37. These suppression conventions are the exact kind of
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suppression convention impose obligations on States, not on individuals
directly. 218 Additionally, it is these suppression conventions that give rise to the
already discussed "mandatory universal jurisdiction", or said differently, an
obligation on a State Party to a convention or treaty to comply with the convention
or treaty by discharging the State Party's jurisdictional authority-be it via
territorial, nationality, passive personality, etc.-by making conduct X criminal
domestically and punishing its commission within the State Party's territory or
anyone under State Party's control.219 In contrast to suppression conventions, the
Rome Statute legislated directly that certain actions of individuals are
internationally criminal per violation of Rome Statute law using a new form of
universal jurisdiction that requires no subsequent State party legislation. Building
off of the concept of "universal inter-state jurisdiction ' 220 in developing the
concept of "universal international jurisdiction", 221 the Framers of the Rome
conventions/treaties that give rise to "mandatory universal jurisdiction" discussed above in this Note's
section dedicated to universal jurisdiction. See supra section II.
218. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 13, 37.
219. Id. at 12-14, 37. The conduct criminalized under such suppression conventions, which in turn
give rise to mandatory universal jurisdiction, are commonly called "treaty crimes" Id. at 30; see also
SADAT, supra note 179, at 109. Note of clarification: Sadat refers to the conceptual ideas of "mandatory
universal jurisdiction" and "permissive universal jurisdiction (concepts discussed extensively earlier in
this Note) as "universal inter-State jurisdiction." It is from this concept of universal inter-state
jurisdiction, as Sadat describes, that the Rome Statute alters this concept into universal international
jurisdiction. Infra note 220.
220. The term "universal inter-state jurisdiction" is no different from the term "universal
jurisdiction" used prevalently in this Note. Sadat defines universal inter-state jurisdiction no differently
from the definition of universal jurisdiction used in this Note, "...the well-accepted theory of universal
jurisdiction that derives from the idea that when criminal activity rises to a certain level of harm..., or
sufficiently important interests of the international society are threatened, any State may apply its laws
to the act, 'even if it occurred outside its territory, even if it has been perpetrated by a non-national, and
even if its nationals have no been harmed by [it]"' SADAT, supra note 200, at 109-10 (footnote omitted).
Inserting the term "inter-state" simply accentuates the use of universal jurisdiction by States, rather than
non-State actors. The larger concept of "absolute" universal jurisdiction is simply any entity exercising
universal jurisdiction over individual(s) under the same theory already discussed heavily in this Note.
SADAT, supra note 200, at 109; see supra section II.
221. SADAT, supra note 200, at 109-10. "Universal international jurisdiction" is not the same, but
similar to the concept of "international jurisdiction" mentioned earlier in this Note. Supra note 44 and
accompanying text. International jurisdiction is the broader concept, and universal international
jurisdiction is a subset of international jurisdiction. As stated above, international jurisdiction is where a
non-State actor (i.e. an international tribunal like Nuremberg) receives delegated authority from State(s)
to prescribe particular conduct as internationally criminal, adjudicate an individual(s) for commission of
the international crime(s), and hopefully enforce their decisions through some means. Under the
concept of international jurisdiction, there is no inquiry into the source of jurisdiction from which the
delegating State(s) delegate jurisdictional authority to the non-State actor in the first place. If the
delegated authority comes from the territorial jurisdiction of the delegating State(s), it would be said
that the tribunal is practicing "territorial international jurisdiction." If, however, the source of the
jurisdiction that the State(s) delegates to the non-State actor stems from universal jurisdiction, this can
be said to be "universal international jurisdiction", as is the situation where the ICC Prosecutor will
receive referrals from the Security Council, but not entirely the situation where the Prosecutor initiates
their own investigation or an ICC State Party refers a case to the ICC Prosecutor (i.e. that would be
territorial, or even nationality, international jurisdiction). In the U.N. Security Council referral situation,
the ICC will initiate investigations into a suspected international crime using true universality principle,
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Statute criminalized, in specific circumstances, 222 certain conduct of foreign
individuals in foreign lands against foreign victims "by embodying prescriptive
norms for the international community as a matter of substantive criminal law."
223
Specifically, the Rome Statute allows the ICC "to supplement, or even displace,"
national criminal laws applied pursuant to territorial principle in favor of the
international criminal code set forth in the Rome Statute applied pursuant to
universal international jurisdiction.224 Hence, without any prerequisite for State
Party legislations, the Rome Statute applies obligations on individuals directly by
establishing a criminal code that is "universal in thrust and unbounded by
geographical scope.
' 225
Second, the method in which the Rome Statute was formed deviated from
traditional convention and treaty creation methods, where the default rule is that
decisions during negotiations are only made by consensus or unanimity, a blatant
and traditional ode to sovereignty. 226 Instead,, the Rome Statute negotiations
employed legislative voting procedures whereby super or simple majority votes
resolved disputes and also brought about final substantive decisions. 227 Third, in a
true sign of unparalleled international legislating the Rome Statute empowered the
ICC to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce, all in one
document, which are jurisdictional powers that have historically been "the most
jealously guarded precinct of State sovereignty., 228 A further indication that the
because the State where the crimes occurred would not have anything to do with U.N. Security Council
referring a situation to the ICC Prosecutor for possible investigation and prosecution, and the ICC
Prosecutor-an non-State actor- obviously has no connection to the crime or criminal. Sadat defines
universal international jurisdiction as, "[t]he international community as a whole, in certain limited
circumstances, to supplement, or even displace, ordinary national laws of territorial application with
international laws that are universal in thrust and unbounded in geographical scope." Id. at 110.
222. Rome Statute only makes criminal "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole." Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 5(1). As will be discussed later in this Note,
this is a pretty blurry line to draw.
223. SADAT, supra note 200, at 108-110. As discussed previously and will be discussed further in
this Note, it is not as if the State Parties to the Rome Statute conjured up previously unheard of
international laws, but were negotiating on the codification of already existing, but undefined customary
international criminal laws, "the elaboration and adoption of an international criminal code as part of
the Rome Treaty was perhaps the least controversial of the three jurisdictional axes within the Rome
Statute, for the four categories of crimes within the Statute were consider jus cogens norm by most
writers, even though their precise definition had not yet been completely agreed upon by all States." Id.
at 108 (footnote omitted).
224. Id. at 108.
225. Id. at 110. The end result of the Rome Statute negotiations is that "the universality principle
[universal jurisdiction] has been extended from a principle governing inter-State relations to one of
general prescriptive international law..."Id. at 116-17 (alteration).
226. See generally INT'L L. COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING PROCESS,
U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.B/21 (1985).
227. SADAT, supra note 200, at 11-14, 109, 280.
228. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 68; SADAT, supra note 200, at 107-108 (describing the Rome
Statute as, "[t]hrough a rather extraordinary process, these three jurisdictional categories classically
known to international law have been transformed from norms providing 'which State can exercise
authority over whom, and in what circumstances,' to norms that establish under what conditions the
international community ... may prescribe international rules of conduct, adjudicate breaches of those
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Rome Statute possesses a unique international legislative quality is that the ICC is
an independent legal and judicial entity, completely distinct from the U.N.229
Finally, explicitly not permitting States to condition their signatures with
reservations or deviations from the laws and procedures set forth in the Rome
Statute solidifies the unprecedented legislative nature of the Rome Statute's
230creation.
B. Role of Customary International Criminal Law in the ICC
While it is notable that the Rome Statute negotiations were radically different
from treaty norms, the most revolutionary aspect of the Rome Statute was the
Rome Statute itself. In the realm of international criminal tribunals, predecessors
of the ICC were not created by treaty. 231 The ICC, therefore, was the byproduct of
an extraordinary international act whereby an international criminal tribunal,
including its substantive and procedural attributes, was created from the ground up
through treaty negotiation between sovereign States. Aside from the obvious
length of time treaty negotiations take, establishing the first permanent
international criminal tribunal pursuant to treaty possesses advantages over other
options, such as the ability to clarify and refine complex international criminal
laws, create new binding substantive and procedural laws if need be, allow
sovereign voices to be heard, and choose how treaty laws are to apply, if at all.232
The difficult obstacle of creating the ICC demanded that the ICC be created by
treaty negotiation rather than by other options, such as U.N. resolution,233 but
treaty negotiations complicated the relationship between customary international
law, the historical hallmark of international criminal law, and the ICC. Past
international criminal tribunals, including Nuremberg, ICTY, and ICTR, relied
heavily on customary international law, because those international criminal
tribunals were simply forums to adjudicate already existing customary
rules, and enforce those adjudications"); see Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trend Towards Criminal
Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 6
(1998) (stating that one of the most precious powers of sovereignty is criminal/penal jurisdiction).
229. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 1, 2; SADAT, supra note 200, at 78-9.
230. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 120. This concept of not allowing reservation by Rome
Statute signatory States must be distinguished from the Roaming ICC's concept of not allowing any
deviations from the substantive and procedural Roaming ICC laws passed by Roaming ICC signatory
States. See infra section V, B. Under the Rome Statute, when a State signs the Rome Statute, it cannot
condition its signature/ratification with reservations to the substantive and procedural laws set forth in
the Rome Statute. While this idea is also incorporated in the Roaming ICC proposal, when this Note
says that Roaming ICC State Parties are not allowed to deviate from the substantive and procedural
Roaming ICC laws, it is meant that the Roaming ICC State Parties cannot deviate from the Roaming
ICC substantive and procedural laws that those State Parties enact into their own jurisprudence. See
infra section V, B. This is not a reference to conditional signatures.
231. Both ad hoc tribunals were created by U.N. Resolutions. See supra section III, B-C.
Nuremberg was a pseudo-treaty, but better described as either an agreement among Allied Powers on
how to handle war criminals or the Allied powers acting as new government of Germany in exercising
criminal jurisdiction. See supra section III, A.
232. SADAT, supra note 200, at 261 (detailing treaty advantages in regards to the ICC); see M&S
YUGO, supra note 72, at 40 (explaining the advantages of creating the ICTY pursuant to treaty).
233. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 67-68.
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international criminal laws.234 Although it would be disingenuous to argue that
customary international criminal law did not heavily influence the international
criminal laws established under the Rome Statute, customary international law
does not have the same relationship with the ICC as it did with Nuremberg, ICTY,
and ICTR. 235 Differing from its predecessors, the ICC would solely adjudicate "the
criminal code for the world", 236 or the laws legislatively created under the Rome
Statute negotiations, and apply those laws prospectively; 237 hence, customary
international criminal law is not the legal foundation of the ICC nor is it required
that the ICC only apply customary international criminal law. Yet, customary
international criminal law, by its nature, continues to evolve independently from
the ICC 238 and the extent to which existing or future customary international
criminal law would or would not influence the crimes enumerated in the Rome
Statute or the future work of the ICC was an issue that needed resolution.
The dilemma surrounding the relationship between customary international
law and the ICC is borne out of the political reality of the treaty making process, a
reality that was particularly prevalent during the Rome Statute negotiations.
Negotiations on any contentious international legal issue, like creating a permanent
international criminal court, will involve a battle between two age-old competing
interests: "sovereignty" and "international rule of law". 2 39 In the context of the
Rome Statute negotiations, "international rule of law" supported the creation of a
treaty that would attract sufficient State support to create an impartial,
authoritative, and legitimate international criminal system, whereas "sovereignty"
supported a treaty that would safeguard the independence, power, and discretion of
all States.240 As these competing interests expectedly bore themselves out during
the Rome Statute negotiations in the form of the political compromises, anxiety
grew over the effect such compromises would have on existing customary
international criminal law, "[t]he concern arose that the treaty-making process
234. It can be argued that Nuremberg partook in pseudo-legislating international criminal laws, as
pointed out earlier in this Note. See supra section III, A. Nevertheless, none of these predecessor
international criminal tribunals could be said to legislate international criminal laws. As pointed out
elsewhere in this Note, each of these predecessor tribunals, being tribunals that were created after the
commission of the crimes, were relegated to adjudicating laws that stood at the time the alleged
suspects committed the crimes. See supra section III, A-C. The ICC is not limited in this fashion,
however, and can thus formulate laws that it will adjudicate in the future, regardless if they existed at
the time the Rome Statute was initially created.
235. SADAT, supra note 200, at 11-12.
236. Id. at 263.
237. The Rome Statute's use of the term "[f]or purpose of this Statute" indicates that the criminal
laws under the treaty are not customary international criminal laws, but laws specifically legislated for
use by the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 6, 7(1), 8(2).
238. See SADAT, supra note 200, at 263.
239. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 68. "The former President of the [ICTY], Antonio Cassese,
describes the choice in stark terms: either one supports the international rule of law, or one supports
State sovereignty. The two are not, in his view, compatible." Id. at 56. Cassese's statement directly
highlights the eternal conflict waged between the international rule of law and State sovereignty, and
how this conflict is ever present in international law/politics/diplomacy. This idea will be addressed
more fully later in this Note.
240. Id. at 67-68.
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might, rather than advance the cause of international justice, actually produce
definition of crimes that would be 'lowest common denominator' definitions far
more restrictive than those generally believe to be part of customary international
law...,,241 To squelch these worries, Article 10 was added, "[n]othing in this
[Statute] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.,
2 42 At
first blush, Article 10 appears to permit the existence of two sets of equally
universal international criminal law that differ from each other, one being the more
restrictive Rome Statute2 43  and the other being pre-existing customary
international criminal law. However, as noted, customary international criminal
law will continue to evolve; thus, Article 10 does not partition the Rome Statute
from customary international criminal law, but instead is an admission that
political compromises were made during the Rome Statute negotiations and these
compromises are the floor, or the "minimum rules of conduct and [those outside
the tribunal] (and the Court itself) must read it that way.",244 Consequently, Article
10 creates a "pick and choose" mechanism, whereby the parts of the Rome Statute
that pair back on contemporary customary international criminal law are limited in
application to the ICC, and the more progressive parts of the Rome Statute are its
contributions to the development of customary international criminal law.
24
Furthermore, as customary international criminal law continues to develop in the
future, Article 21 permits the ICC to use these developments to supplement its
decision as a type of "gap filler": 246 "[t]he Court shall apply.. .where appropriate,
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict."247 While the
future will determine if the Rome Statute Framers made a mistake or were brilliant
in allowing for the existence of a law outside of the Rome Statute, their recognition
and subsequent action to detail the relationship between the Rome Statute and
customary international criminal law shows a subjective belief on the part of the
Rome Statute Framers that they were truly legislating a world criminal code.248
C. The Structure of the ICC and Its Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
The end result of the Rome Statute negotiations was the ICC, an international
legal and judicial body unlike any other in history. The Rome Statute clearly was
an unprecedented exercise of international prescriptive jurisdiction, and as a result,
241. SADAT, supra note 200, at 267.
242. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 10.
243. The ICC is universally applicable to all-regardless if an individual is from a State that has
not ratified the Rome Statute-when a case is referred to the ICC from the U.N. Security Council.
244. SADAT, supra note 200, at 263. Sadat also states that "article 10 retains tremendous
importance not as a rule of decision but as a principle of interpretation." Id.
245. Id. at 269. This idea is not foreign, for the Nuremberg Judgment echoed a similar sentiment in
regards to the Nuremberg Charter when it said that the Charter was an "'expression of international law
existing at the time of its creation" while simultaneously "a contribution to international law." Judgment
of Oct. 1, 1946, supra note 62, at 186, 216-17.
246. SADAT, supra note 200, at 270.
247. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 21(1)(b).
248. SADAT, supra note 200, at 271.
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the ICC is the first international tribunal to possess prospective subject matter
jurisdiction over any international crime, which in the ICC's case is jurisdiction
over genocide, 24 9 crimes against humanity, 25° war crimes,
2 51 and aggression.2 52
Yet, there are substantial limits placed on the ICC by the Rome Statute that make
the ICC very different from a domestic court. The Rome Statute bestowed the ICC
with limited temporal and personal jurisdiction, failing to give the ICC jurisdiction
over past international crimes and jurisdiction over corporations or States.253 The
most significant restraint on the ICC is on its jurisdiction to adjudicate. Unlike any
domestic court in any domestic jurisdiction, the Rome Statute does not allow
jurisdiction to adjudicate to follow naturally from jurisdiction to prescribe. 254 Only
in limited instances will the ICC be able to adjudicate the commission of an
international crime(s) that the Rome Statute prescribed as internationally criminal.
To illustrate the regimen created to determine when the ICC can exercise its
jurisdiction to adjudicate, the first step will be to discuss the separate organs of the
ICC and their roles, followed by a discussion on how the ICC's jurisdiction to
adjudicate is triggered and the limits of the ICC's jurisdiction to adjudicate.
The ICC is divided into four main parts: The Presidency, the Judiciary, the
Registry, and the Office of the Prosecutor.2 5 5 The Presidency is primarily called
upon to ensure the "proper administration of the Court, with the exception of the
Office of the Prosecutor",256 which includes managing the Judges in the Judiciary,
deciding if an increase in Judges is necessary,257 and anything else that the Rome
Statute may in the future call the Presidency to do. 258 The Presidency is made up
249. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 6.
250. Id. at art. 7.
251. Id. at art. 8.
252. The crime of aggression or crimes against peace was not specifically defined under the Rome
Statute, thanks in part to its highly controversial status. The crime of aggression is prescribed under the
Rome Statute in theory. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207, pmbl., art. 5(2). However, aggression
will not become justiciable until it is defined pursuant to the Rome Statute's amendment procedures,
which will be an ongoing, slow process for the ICC to undertake. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art.
121, 123; BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 46-7; SADAT, supra note 200, at 134-8.
253. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 1, 11, 25(1).
254. For example, if a domestic jurisdiction prescribes murder as criminal, the adjudication of
murder in that domestic jurisdiction by that domestic jurisdiction's judiciary will always occur. The
ICC does not make such a smooth transition from jurisdiction to prescribe to jurisdiction to adjudicate,
as will be described below.
255. Boller, supra note 63, at 282; see SADAT, supra note 200, at 86-98. While not specifically an
organ of the ICC, there also exist the Assembly of State Parties, which is charged with general oversight
of the ICC's "operations and functioning", including management and budget oversight, changes to
amount of judges, potential amendments to the Rome Statute, and alterations to ICC's Criminal,
Procedural, and Evidentiary rules. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 112(2)(a-b, d-e); SADAT, supra
note 200, at 98-99. A decision made by the Assembly of the Parties is made by consensus, but if there is
no consensus, a decision is made by either supra-majority or simple majority depending on the type of
decision. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 112(7).
256. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 38(3)(a)
257. Id. at art, 36(2).




of full time Judges elected by a majority of their peers.
The Judiciary, or what the Rome Statute identifies as the "Appeals Division, a
Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division",260 is made up of eighteen Judges from
signatory State Parties to the ICC, with strict regulations on the term limits,
election procedure, moral character, and geographic makeup of the Judges.26'
Selection of Judges also includes a consideration of an equitable geographic
distribution of Judges and legal systems, equal distribution of gender,262 their
special expertise in specific areas of concern,263 competence and experience in
criminal law and procedure, and competence and experience in international law,
particularly humanitarian law and law of human rights. 264 Each Judge within the
Judiciary serves a non-renewable nine year term, 265 which was agreed upon to
avoid the politicization of Judge selections. However, some argue the term-limit
diminishes the legitimacy, institutional memory, and competence of the
Judiciary.266 Once the Judiciary is set, the Judges are tasked with organizing
themselves within the Appellate, Trial, and Pre-Trial divisions.267 While almost all
legal systems are familiar with Trial and Appellate divisions, the Pre-Trial division
is a civil law concept that is "actively involved in the organization and supervision
of the case by the Prosecutor during the pre-trial phase",268 which, among other
things, includes deciding whether reasonable evidence exist to proceed with an
investigation or begin a prosecution, 269 hearing challenges to admissibility or
jurisdiction of the ICC,270 preserving evidence, protecting national security
information,27 1 and confirming charges for admittance to Trial division. 72
The Registry, while handling the operation of the ICC with respect to non-
legal matters,273 has immensely important responsibilities that have direct impact
on ICC cases.274 Chief among those responsibilities is the selection and facilitation
259. Id. at art. 35(2), 38.
260. Id. at art. 34(b).
261. Id. at art. 36(3); Boiler, supra note 63, at 282-283.
262. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 36(8)(a).
263. Id. at art. 36(8)(b).
264. Id. at art. 36(3)(b)(i-ii).
265. Id. at art. 36(9)(a).
266. SADAT, supra note 200, at 87-88. Another contentious issue is the power to issue majority and
minority judicial opinions by both Trial and Appeals Chambers, and separate opinions by the Appeals
Chambers, which the ICC Judiciary does have. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207, art. 74(5),
83(4). A good overview of the arguments surrounding this issue are found in Sadat's book. SADAT,
supra note 200, 88-90.
267. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 38(1).
268. SADAT, supra note 200, at 91.
269. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 15(4), 53(2).
270. Id. at art. 15(3), 17-19, 57(2).
271. Id. at art. 57(3)(c).
272. Id. at art. 61.
273. Id. at art. 43(1).
274. SADAT, supra note 200, at 96. Registrars in the ICTY and ICTR manage the detention units,
maintain court records, handle all language related services, and control the Tribunals' budget. M&S
YUGO, supra note 79, 168-70; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 396-98.
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of defense counsels for suspects. 275 Registry is controlled by a full-time, elected
Registrar, and the possibility does exist for the appointment of a Deputy
Registrar.276
The highly controversial Office of the Prosecutor, a separate entity from all
other ICC organs, 277 has a Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor that are subject to
very similar membership requirements and election procedures as the Judiciary.
278
The main purpose of the Office of the Prosecutor is to make determinations as to
the appropriateness of exercising the ICC's jurisdiction to adjudicate: 279 "[t]he
Prosecutor is responsible for receiving referrals and substantiating information on
crimes within the jurisdiction of the [ICC], for examining those referrals and for
conducting investigation and prosecutions., 28 0 There are three avenues from which
the Prosecutor can commence an investigation or prosecution: referrals from a
State party, referrals from the U.N. Security Council, or investigations and
prosecutions started proprio motu (on his or her own motion). 28 Bestowing State
Parties and the U.N. Security Council with substantial power to determine when
and where the Prosecutor acts is clearly inserted in the Rome Statute to appease the
sovereignty of States;282  however, allowing the Prosecutor, in limited
circumstances, to initiate investigations/prosecutions on their own proves that the
Rome Statute Framers understood that political, economic, and other non-legal
reasons would inhibit States and the U.N. Security Council, in many instances,
from referring cases to the ICC.283 Furthermore, an independent Prosecutor would
bring legitimacy and effectiveness to the ICC and give an incentive to States to
275. SADAT, supra note 200, at 98.
276. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 43(4-5).
277. Id. at art. 42(1).
278. Id. at art. 42(4); Boller, supra note 63, at 283.
279. As alluded to elsewhere in this Note, jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate are
related, but different. Supra note 254 and accompanying text. Using the ICC as an example, jurisdiction
to prescribe certain conduct as internationally criminal revolves around this Note's prior discussion on
universal international jurisdiction, or the ICC's jurisdiction to deem particular conduct as
internationally criminal wherever it takes place. Supra note 220 and accompanying text. The subsequent
conversation here discusses whether the ICC can/should adjudicate an individual(s) who has violated
the Rome Statute. Hence, jurisdiction to prescribe is the legislative power to make certain conduct
criminal, and jurisdiction to adjudicate is the judicial power to judge whether certain laws have been
violated. The theoretical jump from jurisdiction to prescribe to jurisdiction to adjudicate is not so
immediate under the ICC regime in comparison to domestic jurisdiction, because under domestic
regimes, jurisdiction to adjudicate follows naturally from jurisdiction to prescribe; only restricted by
reasonableness. Supra note 254 and accompanying text. However, under the ICC, the State consent
regime, the principle of complimentarity, and the principle of neb is in idem are three ways the ICC is
restricted from adjudicating Rome Statute crimes that the ICC has prescriptive jurisdiction over and
could theoretically prosecute. SADAT, supra note 200, at 112.
280. SADAT, supra note 200, at 95; Boiler, supra note 63, at 283.
281. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 13.
282. Additionally, the U.N. Security Council option was included to take care of situations where
international crimes occurred exclusively domestically, and that certain State was either not party to the
Rome Statute, was a State Party that refused to adjudicate the case domestically, or a State Party that
refused to refer a situation to the ICC. See BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 207.
283. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 78-82; SADAT, supra note 200, at 112-19.
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initiate their own investigations or prosecutions of Rome Statute violations.
284
The manner in which any "situation" 285 is referred to the Prosecutor by a
State Party or U.N. Security Council or if the case is started by the Prosecutor
proprio motu286 will determine which jurisdictional rationale to adjudicate is
implicated and the processes that the Prosecutor must follow in order to commence
an investigation. If a situation is referred to the Office of the Prosecutor by a State
Party or initiated proprio motu, the Prosecutor's jurisdiction to adjudicate requires
implicit State Party consent, in that either the territorial State in which the
suspected violations of the Rome Statute occurred or the State of the suspect's
nationality is a State Party to the Rome Statute or has consented ad hoc to ICC's
jurisdiction.287 While universal jurisdiction to adjudicate is not completely
eliminated from the justification of the Prosecutor's jurisdiction to adjudicate
situations or cases referred by State Parties or started by proprio motu motion, 288
the Prosecutor's jurisdiction to adjudicate State party referrals and proprio motu
motions is "layered... [with] a State consent regime based on two additional []
principles of jurisdiction: the territorial principle and the nationality principle",
considered the two most fundamental jurisdictional principles of criminal law,
289
284. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 79-80; 86. Considering that the ICC makes the final decision
on its jurisdiction to adjudicate, incentives include the avoidance of adverse international media
exposure, diplomatic hardship, a duty to cooperate with the ICC, and legitimizing domestic legal
system.
285. To protect the independence of the Prosecutor and legitimacy of the ICC, situations, not cases
or suspects, are referred to the Office of the Prosecutor by a State Party or U.N. Security Council. Id. at
79-80.
286. If an investigation is started by a proprio motu motion of the Prosecutor, it is not limited to
"situations", because this allows victims and interested parties to "avail themselves of the Court". Id. at
80.
287. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 12(2); BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 80. It is an implicit
consent from the State Party, because upon ratification of the Rome State domestically, the State Party
has proactively and explicitly accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crimes specifically
enumerated and defined in the Rome Statute without the availability of reservations. Rome Statute,
supra note 207, art. 5-9, 12(1), 120.
288. Universal jurisdiction plays a role in not only the ICC's jurisdiction to prescribe certain
conduct-as discussed above in section on universal international jurisdiction-but also in the
Prosecutor's jurisdiction to adjudicate situations/cases referred to the Office of the Prosecutor by a
State Party or by proprio motu motion. Supra note 220 and accompanying text. In other words,
universal jurisdiction is not completely excluded from an ICC case that started from a State Party
referral or from a Prosecutor's proprio motu motion, because the States Parties-even absent their
presumed territorial and nationality jurisdiction to adjudicate such crimes-still have universal
jurisdiction to adjudicate genocide, crimes against humanity, etc., as these crimes arejus cogens, and
punishable by all States pursuant to customary international criminal law. Hence, a State Party that
refers a case or a Prosecutor that starts their own investigation could, theoretically, need not find that
the crimes occurred on the territory or by a national of a State Party in order to justify the adjudication,
but this requirement was artificially imposed pursuant to the Rome Statute to ease the concerns of some
States during negotiations.
289. SADAT, supra note 200, at 116-17; BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 80-81. Broomball also
argues that, practically speaking, an additional precondition exist for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction
to adjudicate, that being the approval of the U.N. Security Council in situations referred to the ICC via
State Party or by Prosecutor proprio motu motions. Under Article 16, no investigation or prosecution
may be commenced or continued if the U.N. Security Council passes a Chapter VII resolution
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In contrast, a referral from the U.N. Security Council does not require any explicit
or implicit consent from any State Parties to justify the Prosecutor's jurisdiction to
adjudicate, because the U.N. Security Council, acting pursuant to its Chapter VII
powers to protect international peace and security,290 can refer a situation to the
Office of the Prosecutor that has occurred on the territory of a State or non-State
Party and/or by a national of a State or non-State Party. Under U.N. Security
Council referrals, the Prosecutor has jurisdiction to adjudicate anyone, anywhere in
the world.291 So, it can be said that situations investigated or prosecuted by the
Prosecutor pursuant to a U.N. Security Council referral is universal jurisdiction to
adjudicate in its purest form.
2 9 2
Turning to the varied procedures that the Prosecutor must follow in regard to
investigations and prosecutions, referrals of situations to the Office of the
Prosecutor by State Parties or by the U.N. Security Council must overcome a lower
threshold in order for the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation or prosecution, in
that the Prosecutor must only establish that a reasonable basis exist for an
investigation or prosecution to commence pursuant to Article 53. 293 Moreover,
State Parties, the U.N. Security Council, and even the Pre-Trial Chamber in limited
circumstances, can request reconsideration of situations referred to the Prosecutor
that the Prosecutor subsequently concluded were void of a reasonable basis to
investigate or prosecute. 294 Proprio motu investigations or prosecutions, on the
other hand, must adhere to a much stricter procedure whereby the Pre-Trial
Chambers "closely supervise cases in which the Prosecutor exercises his or her
proprio motu investigative powers." 295 In addition to the requirement that the
Prosecutor must find a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation or
prosecution pursuant to Article 53, the Prosecutor must apply for the Pre-Trial
Chamber's approval for an investigation, which gives rise to further inquiry into
the facts and law of the case by the Judiciary, and only after approval by the Pre-
Trial Chamber may the Prosecutor proceed with the investigation or initiate a
296prosecution. 1 6 The more stringent procedure put upon the Prosecutor in respect to
requesting the ICC to withdrawal from adjudicating a particular situation. However, this requires an
affirmative, unified action by the overly political, divergent U.N. Security Council in order to stop a
potential or ongoing investigation/prosecution. Plus, there still is not a literal requirement that the
Office of the Prosecutor must receive authorization from the U.N. Security Council prospectively in
order to adjudicate a situation. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 16; BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at
81-82.
290. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 13(b). The Security Council can only refer a situation
pursuant to their Chapter VII powers to protect international peace and security, not pursuant to any
other powers bestowed to the U.N. Security Council by the U.N. Charter. BROOMHALL, supra note 59,
at 79.
291. SADAT, supra note 200, at 116-17.
292. Id. at 116-17.
293. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 53(1-2).
294. Id. at art. 53(3).
295. SADAT, supra note 200, at 95.
296. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 15. Broomhall believes the structural differences between
referrals from a State Party and U.N. Security Council vs. cases started proprio motu by the Prosecutor
boils down to the difficulty the Prosecutor has in obtaining Article 54 powers, which include the power
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proprio motu investigations and prosecutions resulted from the fear that despite the
benefits of an independent Prosecutor, political motivations and other non-legal
impulses could contaminate the Prosecutor's judgment, thus outside checks on the
Prosecutor's proprio motu powers were deemed necessary.297
Overarching the entirety of the ICC's jurisdiction to adjudicate is the principle
of complimentarity, a concept constructed by the Rome Statute Framers.298 The
principle of complimentarity is not to be confused as meaning concurrent. Rather,
complimentarity defines the admissibility of a situation or case to the ICC and sets
the ground rules for ICC's jurisdiction to adjudicate in a State- centric world where
a State or multiple States and the ICC will possess simultaneous jurisdiction to
adjudicate a situation or case. 299 The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction to
adjudicate a situation only if: 1.) a State that has jurisdiction over a situation "is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigations" or a State with
jurisdiction over the situation "decided not to prosecute" it; 2.) the situation is of
"sufficient gravity" for the ICC to adjudicate and; 3.) the alleged suspect has not
already been tried for the same conduct at issue.30 0 Particular to situations referred
by State Parties and prosecutions or investigations commenced proprio motu,30 1 if
the Prosecutor begins an investigation, the Prosecutor must notify the State or
States that "would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned" of a
pending ICC investigation, and if a State contacted ask for the Prosecutor to defer,
the Prosecutor must defer the investigation barring Pre-Trial Chamber
authorization to the contrary. 30 2 However, the Prosecutor may revisit a deferred
investigation if there is a "significant change of circumstances based on the State's
to make cooperation requests upon State Parties. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 79, n. 41.
297. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 79-80.
298. To reiterate in different words, to understand complimentarity correctly-and the whole ICC's
jurisdiction to adjudicate for that matter-, remember that there is jurisdiction on one hand and
admissibility on the other hand, within the context of the ICC. The ICC can have jurisdiction over a
situation, but complimentarity will make the ICC's jurisdiction inadmissible. However, no situation
would ever be admissible without the ICC having jurisdiction over it. Sadat gives a great discussion on
jurisdiction and admissibility concepts under the ICC. SADAT, supra note 200, at 122-27.
299. Id. at 119. From the beginning of the Rome Statute, it is said that the ICC is "complimentary"
to domestic/national jurisdictions, and thus the principle of complimentarity conceptually defines when
ICC jurisdiction to adjudicate is permissible or if a State has primacy of jurisdiction. Rome Statute,
supra note 207, pmbl., art. 1.
300. Id. at art. 17(1)(a-d); SADAT, supra note 200, at 119. A detailed discussion on the principle of
complimentarity and also how complimentarity gives incentives for States to adjudicate international
crimes is done by Broomhall. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 86-93.
301. The Rome Statute is vague on how the principle of complimentarity relates differently, if at
all, to situations referred to the Prosecutor via a State Party, U.N. Security Council, or cases started
proprio motu. While Article 17 on complimentarity does not refer to a distinction between the three
types, Article 18 on complimentarity only applies to proprio motu or State Party referral
investigations/prosecutions. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 17-18. Sadat suggests that maybe
complimentarity is bypassed in situations referred to the Prosecutor by the U.N. Security Council, and if
not bypassed, the situation is on the '"fast track' to investigation and potential prosecution, because
Article 18 does not apply. SADAT, supra note 200, at 123. Boiler, on the other hand, states that the
Prosecutor is under no deferral obligations or the principle of complimentarity if the situation is referred
to the Prosecutor via U.N. Security Council. Boller, supra note 63, at 287.
302. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 18(1-2).
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unwillingness or inability to carry out the investigation., 30 3 The hopeful end result
of having a procedure of complimentarity is that the investigation or prosecution of
international crimes will occur one way or another, because either a sovereign
State will take control of its opportunity to head up an investigation and
prosecution of an international crime or the ICC will step into its place by
exercising its jurisdiction to adjudicate the criminal conduct.
As highlighted from this Note's look at the ICC, many of the criticism lodged
against the ad hoc tribunals are not applicable to the ICC. Of most importance, the
ex post facto institutional criticisms that dealt with the creation of ad hoc tribunals,
or tribunals post-crime, is erased with the permanent ICC. First, it seemed illogical
to put in such a tremendous amount of time, effort, and money to create the ICTY
and ICTR, all for the adjudication of international crimes that occurred in
individual conflicts of the past, rather than putting that time, money, and effort into
creating a tribunal that would prospectively handle all future international crimes
under its jurisdiction. However, this is exactly what the Rome Statute and ICC did,
thus avoiding this criticism altogether. Second, having a permanent international
criminal court validates and solidifies the international community's commitment




Lastly, making the ICC a permanent criminal tribunal confers legitimacy on its
future actions and fairness to potential defendants, because a permanent institution
alerts potential international criminals that the world is ready to punish them if
they choose to commit international crimes.
The ICC possesses additional advantages over its ad hoc predecessors.
Although the ICC has not handled enough cases yet to know its true speed and
efficiency, it will nevertheless surely be able to adjudicate crimes, from time of
commission to judgment, faster than the ICTY and ICTR because, unlike the ad
hoc tribunals, the ICC is already established. In contrast, bringing justice to
Rwanda and to the former Yugoslavia was delayed while the protracted political
and logistical effort to create the ad hoc tribunals was underway, which
unreasonably elongated the overall time it took these institutions to handle
international criminal violations. Along the same line, lack of cooperation severely
affected the ICTY's ability to function as a judicial entity, and the Rome Statute
Framers addressed this issue by incorporating into the Rome Statute an elaborate
305international cooperation regime. The creation of the Rome Statute itself, a clear
and uniform criminal code that the ICC must use primarily in its court rooms,
306
spares the ICC of dealing with the legality problems that the ad hoc tribunals were
303. Id. at art. 18(3).
304. Of course, this potentially will include the world's commitment to adjudicate instances of
aggression, but as stated earlier, the ICC has some work to do on defining aggression before the ICC
can adjudicate cases of aggression. Supra note 252.
305. See Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 86-111. However, despite this enforcement mechanism
put in place, enforcement is still a weakness for the ICC as will be discussed later in this Note.
306. As discussed earlier in this Note, the use of customary international criminal law by the ICC
remains an option; however, such use is not to be the primary law applied in the ICC, and is only
supplementary. Supra section IV. B.
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forced to face, as highlighted earlier. For instance, the ICC, unlike the ICTY and
ICTR, will not be compelled to use confusing, ill-created customary international
criminal law. In addition, the ICC will not have to decipher if certain violations of
conventional international criminal laws is a criminal offense, or just illegal
breaches. For the foregoing reasons, the ICC, as it presently stands, is without
question a vast improvement over the ad hoc tribunals.
D. The Flaws of The ICC: Is the ICC the Answer?
The amazing amount of perseverance and cooperation necessary to create the
Rome Statute resulted in an enormous international accomplishment when the ICC
became reality on July 1, 2002.307 Yet, it would be a disservice to the world's
aspiration for a fully functioning, coherent international criminal system to call the
ICC the answer. Substantively, structurally, and of gravest concern, conceptually,
the ICC faces an uphill struggle that will not be overcome without either a
revolution in the international legal order or momentous alterations to the ICC's
structure. The struggle that awaits the ICC stems from two factors: internal defects
within the ICC and the external realities of the Westphalian world order.
Internally, the ICC must confront some troubling issues. Of chief concern is
that justifying the ICC's ability to go from "jurisdiction to prescribe" to
"jurisdiction to adjudicate" is a complicated mess in comparison to domestic
courts. Of course, this complicated mess stems from the self-inflicted negotiated
compromises made between those who supported sovereignty and those who
supported the international rule of law. However, the principle of complimentarity,
the multitude of jurisdictional preconditions, and all the other jurisdictional merry-
go-rounds in the Rome Statute obscures when the ICC can adjudicate the subject
matter of the Rome Statute or when it must defer to national proceedings. 30 8 This
ultimately will impair the ICC's ability to operate without controversy. 319 In this
respect, the ICC is a setback from its ad hoc tribunal predecessors, where both the
ICTY and ICTR had primacy of jurisdiction over national proceedings, which
inevitably means that the ICC will have to deal with significantly more
jurisdictional battles than both ad hoc tribunals combined. 310 The Rome Statute
does not provide any countermeasures to State Parties that abuse the
complimentarity system, whereby a State Party can feasibly launch a bogus
investigation of an alleged international crime in order to deflect ICC intervention
and/or to prevent any judicial action from taking place at all.311 Additionally, the
307. Establishment of the Court, supra note 3.
308. See BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 83; SADAT, supra note 200, at 110-11, 114 ("Yet the
Statute does not propose a bright line test for sorting the international from the national; that is, there is
no 'interstate commerce clause requirement' such as we find in U.S. federal criminal law, ").
Amazingly, the Rome Statute's most explicit indication of when the ICC possesses jurisdiction to
adjudicate is where the Rome Statute vaguely says that the ICC can adjudicate "the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole." Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207, art.
5(1).
309. See BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 83; SADAT, supra note 200, at 110-11, 114.
310. SADAT, supra note 200, at 85, 280.
311. Id. at 124. Although the Rome Statute states that the State Party must "genuinely" be
unwilling or unable to prosecute in order for the ICC to adjudicate, there is question as to what
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confusion surrounding when the ICC has jurisdiction to adjudicate is another
reason supporting the conclusion that the ICC may be an unattractive forum to
adjudicate international crimes. Limited financial resources, an inexperienced
judicial system, potential adjudication away from the territory of the crime, and the
inevitable difficulties in extraterritorially gathering evidence, running
investigations, and apprehending suspects are all extremely valid reasons against
bringing a case to the ICC.
3 12
The most troubling internal problem with the ICC is its jurisdiction to
enforce,313 which "is paltry, at best,... ' '314 Unlike the ICC's jurisdiction to
prescribe and adjudicate, the ICC's jurisdiction to enforce is far from ground-
breaking, for the ICC depends almost completely on State Party cooperation to
fulfill even the most basic judicial functions. 315 While there is nothing theoretically
wrong with having a State-dependent enforcement structure, the ICC gives little
motivating incentives to State Parties to comply or harsh penalties for not
complying, and consequently, the ICC will go through the same enforcement
hardships that afflicted the ad hoc tribunals. 316 Given that States are afforded
enough discretion and power to undercut the ICC's enforcement mechanism freely
and purposefully - if so desired-, the ICC's jurisdiction to enforce is uncomfortably
at the whim of sovereign nations and ill-fated by design.
317
The blame for all of these internal structural and substantive problems
belongs with the Rome Statute Framers who attempted to achieve compromise
between what the former President of the ICTY believes are completely
"genuinely" means and if the ICC is able to prove one way or another if the State Party is "genuinely"
unwilling or unable to adjudicate themselves? Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 17(1)(a-b); see SADAT,
supra note 200, at 124.
312. SADAT, supra note 200, at 114.
313. Jurisdiction to enforce, in this Note, should be construed very broadly. It includes enforcing
anything and everything that would come up during an investigation, pre-trial process, and/or trial.
Anything, big or small, that a tribunal must enforce in order to work is encompassed under the term
"jurisdiction to enforce".
314. SADAT, supra note 200, at 11.
315. The ICC lacks an independent police force, and accordingly, cannot undertake the most basic
judicial operations without State Party cooperation, including execute arrest warrants, freeze assets,
order the production of documents, force witness to appear, issue subpoenas, impose penalties on State
Parties that do not comply with the Rome Statute, or undertake judicial orders on the territories of State
Parties, to name a few. SADAT, supra note 200, at 120-22; BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 151-162
(giving detailed insight in the ad hoc tribunal enforcement problems, the enforcement mechanism of the
ICC, and concluding that the enforcement mechanism depends heavily on cooperation and is subject to
the old world order of sovereignty); Cassese, supra note 197, at 435 ("The second shortcoming is more
serious. Like any other international criminal tribunal, the ICC relies heavily upon state cooperation, to
the extent that it might be crippled in the absence of such cooperation.").
316. The ICC can look simply to the troubles the ICTY and ICTR experienced to foretell the ICC's
future in this regard, because both ad hoc tribunals were also dependent on sovereign States for
enforcement measures. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 151-162.
317. Stephan Rademaker, Unwitting Part to Genocide:The International Criminal Court is
Complicating Efforts to Save Darfur, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2007, at A25 (illustrating the power of a
State-China in this instance-to frustrate an ICC's international criminal investigation in Sudan, all in
the name of protecting China's domestic and foreign interest in Sudanese oil).
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incompatible interests: sovereignty and international rule of law. 318 As the ICC
grows older and as these internal issues slowly develop into mammoth
impediments, it will become even more evident that the Rome Statute Framers
should have charted a different course for the ICC, specifically one that did not
include unworkable compromises.
Perhaps the most egregious misstep of the Rome Statute Framers was in their
misunderstanding of how a permanent international criminal court should
conceptually be constructed in light of the undeniable external reality of the
Westphalian international world order. 3 19  As a consequence of this
misunderstanding, the ICC is ill-equipped for success in our State-centric world of
international law because it frustrates the very essence of sovereignty, and
accordingly, the odds are not in its favor that it can survive in this Westphalian
world order.320
Doubts exist as to whether the Westphalian State-centric international world
order still persists as it once did. There is a popular belief that the impact of
globalization, the expanding recognition of human rights, and the growing
legitimacy of international law has elevated the influence of multinational
corporations and non-governmental organizations to new heights, and
correspondingly, has chipped away at the authority of sovereign States on the
world stage. 321 Similarly, another common conception is that the end of the Cold
War brought about a new found willingness on the part of the international
community to use the law as a preferred method of fighting international crime,
even if this means violating the Cold War maxim that no one intervenes into the
internal affairs of a sovereign State.322 These beliefs, while true to a certain extent,
318. Cassese, supra note 228, at 6-9 (stating that either one supports sovereignty or one supports
international rule of law, for one cannot support both); see BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 56, 68
(discussing the compromise made between State sovereignty and the international rule of
law/effectiveness during the Rome Statute negotiations).
319. For purposes of this Note, Westphalian world order and State-centric world order are one and
the same. Both refer to the historical and present-day system of world affairs in which sovereign States
dominate everything, including international law, international diplomacy, and international politics.
Supra note 9.
320. It should be noted that this point, and other similar ones, are not endorsements of unabashed
sovereignty. Rather, one of the premises of this Note is that sovereignty still rules, and likely will
always have a strong role in international affairs for the foreseeable future. Hence, an international
criminal law system should construct itself around this undeniable reality.
321. It is popular conception, in and out of the legal world, that the power of sovereign States in the
world is slowly eroding. This sentiment can be found in many different sources across the spectrum.
See generally NON-STATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS (Daphn6 Josselin & William Wallace eds.,
2001); Christyne J. Vachon, Sovereignty Versus Globalization: The International Court of Justice's
Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 691 (1998);
Ken Wiwa, Commentary, Without Borders: In a World With No Borders, The Best-Connected Nation is
King, GLOBE AND MAIL (TORONTO), Sept. 27, 2003 at A27; Jeff Vail, The New Map: Terrorism and
the Decline of the Nation-State in a Post-Cartesian World, http://www.jeffvail.net/thenewmap.doc (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007).
322. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 185-86 ("The end of the Cold War brought with it a change in
the way that issues were articulated, given priority, and responded to at the international level ... More
to the point, the collapse of the system of superpower confrontation has allowed human rights to take a
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are overstatements and mischaracterizations of reality on the ground, for the
prevailing international legal structure remains State-centric:
The end of the Cold War... has led to some attenuation of the link
between territorial integrity and international stability, and has
supported an increased willingness to consider intervention and the
altering of borders... At the same time, the importance of the Cold
War's end as a matter of legal change should not be exaggerated. The
conditions inherent in the post-War order (dividing prohibitions and
their enforcement, norms and behavior, and ultimately law and politics)
have not themselves ceased to exist since 1989. Decisions in
interpreting or applying the law, as well as action authorized through
the Security Council, the (ICC) Assembly of State Parties, or NATO,
unilaterally or otherwise, will continue to depend significantly on the
auto-interpretation of self-interested States and on their calculus of
national strategic, economic, and political costs and benefits... The
same can be said of the "decline of sovereignty" and globalization. The
term 'globalization' may be the 'the clich6 of our times'... While
globalization does have certain power in framing analysis of
undoubtedly real transformations in a number of areas... the
"distinctive attributes of contemporary globalization.., by no means
simply prefigures the demise of the nation-state or even the erosion of
state power". On the contrary, "processes of globalization are closely
associated with, although by no means the sole cause of, a
transformation or reconstitution of the power of the modem nation-
state."... The better view is that the foreseeable future does not hold the
realistic prospect of a significant replacement or realignment of the
institution of sovereignty, at least in any sense relevant to the
establishment of the preconditions for regular, impartial enforcement of
international criminal law. 323
Of particular relevance to international criminal law, the fact that ultimate
power still rest exclusively within the control of sovereign States lend itself to the
conclusion that "there are few signs that the tension between the 'international
order' rationale of international criminal law and the State-centric character of the
'Westphalian' system is likely to abate in the foreseeable future." 324 Specifically,
sovereign States still hold onto two powers that disrupt the proper and effective
implementation of international criminal law: sovereign States maintain a
more prominent place in the discourse and the practice of States and international organizations ... The
increasing prominence, expansion, and refinement of international criminal law, and the project
establishing an ICC... were also facilitated by this change.")
323. Id. at 184-88 (footnotes omitted); see also Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, State
Sovereignty and the International Intervention: Reflection on the Present and Prospects for the Future,
in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, 250, 250-51
(1995); Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters - Non-State Actors, Treaties, and The
Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 145-74 (2005).
324. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 58.
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"'monopoly on legitimate force' and; enjoy the freedom to make legal decisions
based solely upon non- or extra-judicial factors.
325
As discussed elsewhere, the jurisdiction to enforce, or said simply, the ability
to implement judicial decisions, to use military force, and to police other States
remains in the hands of sovereign States, not the international 
community.3 26
Furthermore, sovereign States freely make critical decisions on international
criminal matters based upon "diplomatic, economic, strategic, and 'purely
political' considerations, rather than applying international criminal law
objectively and justly. Without an international constitution that divides powers
among States, a large majority of the "legislative, executive, and adjudicative
functions" exercised in the international arena rest within "the discretion of
States." '327 Until it can be said that the decision-makers on international criminal
issues are reasonably impartial and predictable, and possess the requisite and
unequivocal force to back up their decisions, any international criminal system
must come to terms with "the State-centric character of the 'Westphalian'
system
, 328
Taking into account the continued domination of the State-centric model of
international law, the conceptual blunder committed by the Rome Statute Framers
becomes more apparent. The Rome Statute Framers assumed that the only way to
combat international crime was to convince sovereign States to agree upon the
creation of a completely independent international organization that would have
jurisdiction over international crimes, a jurisdiction traditionally under sole
possession of sovereign States. In other words, the Rome Statute Framers shared
the popular belief that the promotion of international rule of law can only occur at
the expense of sovereignty. While the logic of this idea is not in itself controversial
or unworkable in a perfect world, it is an idea that simply will not work in a State-
centric world because it upsets the very core of sovereignty.
Nowhere is this sentiment better expressed than the U.S. stance on the ICC.
The U.S. views the mere existence of the ICC as an abrogation of its sovereign
independence, mainly because the ICC possesses a power in international criminal
325. Id. at 58, 60.
326. Id. ("In fact, significant delegations of decision-making authority in vital areas of the policing,
security, and military functions of States are not typically made in international law."). Even
international organizations set up to police others States, such as the U.N. and NATO, do not make truly
international decisions on the actions of other States. Rather, these international entities are mechanism
whereby Member States to these organizations exercise their powers behind the veil of an international
organization as a means to mask their decisions of other States. Id. at 60.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 58. Broomhall concludes that if the enforcement of international criminal law
intrinsically means "the revision" of the State-centric Westphalian world order, than "it would require a
deep change in the international order, either through a marked decline in (or delegation of)
sovereignty, or through a substantial convergence of interests among States (giving rise, for example, to
an international police authority)." Id. Such drastic events are highly unlikely to happen, either today or
in the foreseeable future. So, that is where the Roaming ICC proposal comes into play, because it brings
about the enforcement of international criminal law without the need for such drastic events such as
these to occur.
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
jurisdiction-albeit extremely limited-that the U.S. believes only sovereign
States are meant to possess. 3 29 Specifically, the U.S. believes that allowing for the
existence of an entity that is entirely independent from the sovereignty of the U.S.
and permitted to adjudicate international crimes takes away a piece of U.S.
sovereignty. 3 0 The U.S. would rather have sovereign nations, on their own, be
responsible for adjudicating international crimes, or allow sovereign nations the
opportunity to create ad hoc tribunals when needed, as the U.S. proposed should be
done in Darfur, Sudan.33' Yet, given that the ICC does have jurisdiction over
international criminal activity and that the ICC's international criminal jurisdiction
does come at the cost of sovereign States being unable to practice international
criminal jurisdiction in limited circumstances, this fuels the U.S.' perception of the
ICC as an unbridled foreign tyrant that if given one ounce of power, it will grow to
encroach on the sovereignty of all States. 332 The legitimacy of this perception is
not an issue, for the reality of the ICC slowly destroying the U.S.' or any other
nation's sovereignty is beyond comprehension.333 Nonetheless, as demonstrated by
329. Prior to becoming the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton spoke on behalf of
the U.S. Department of State on the topic of the ICC, stating:
[flor a number of reasons, the United States decided that the ICC had unacceptable consequences for
our national sovereignty. Specifically, the ICC is an organization whose precepts go against
fundamental American notions of sovereignty, checks and balances, and national independence. It is an
agreement that is harmful to the national interests of the United States, and harmful to our presence
abroad.
See The United States and the International Criminal Court, U.S. Dep't of State, Nov. 14, 2002,
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm [hereinafter Bolton Speech].
330. Id.
331. Fact Sheet, infra note 334 (trumpeting the use of ad hoc tribunals as an option to the ICC).
Without a doubt, the U.S. is infatuated with the concepts of ad hoc tribunals. Despite it being common
knowledge that ad hoc tribunals are costly, inefficient, and jurisdictionally unsound, the U.S. continues
to run against prevailing world opinion that embraces a permanent international criminal court. This
was demonstrated when the U.S. proposed for an UN resolution to create an ad hoc tribunal for the
international crimes occurring in Darfur, Sudan even though the majority of the UN Security Council
voted to refer the Darfur, Sudan situation to the ICC. U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158d mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doe. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/PVs_1593_DarfurReferral_3lMarch05.pdf; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA
LEONE 5 (2006).
332. See Bolton Speech, supra note 329 ("[O]ne might assume that the ICC is simply a further step
in the orderly march toward the peaceful settlement of international disputes, sought since time
immemorial. But in several respects, the court is poised to assert authority over nation states,. . .Never
before has the United States been asked to place any of that power outside the complete control of our
national government without our consent."); Anne K. Heindel, The Counterproductive Bush
Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 345, 362-63
(2004)(documenting the vehement words of Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security John Bolton that the ICC will destroy U.S. constitution, and that the ICC is a risk to U.S.
sovereignty).
333. Personally, this Note's author believes that countless human rights abuses and international
crimes have been committed in the name of sovereignty or protected by the notion of sovereignty.
Ideally, if States were to stop trumpeting the sovereignty horn, the international rule of law could make
the world a more peaceful and stable place. Raphael Lemkin, as quoted by Samantha Power, best
expressed the ills of State sovereignty in relation to international crimes, "Lemkin was appalled that the
banner of 'state sovereignty' could shield men who tried to wipe out an entire minority. 'Sovereignty,'
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the U.S.' fanatical rejection of the ICC, the existence of this perception within the
U.S. government is not in question, and more likely than not, this perception even
exist within some governments of State Parties to the Rome Statute. Without
substantial changes to the ICC, the perception of the ICC being anti-sovereignty
will put the ICC at odds with a multitude of sovereign States in the future, and
given the power of the sovereign State in the Westphalian world order, the ICC
will find itself in a very perilous position.
Unfortunately for the ICC, this perception might already be working against
it. The U.S. has lodged a litany of legal complaints against the ICC, such as the
overall power of the ICC, the independence of the Office of the Prosecutor, the
jurisdiction of the ICC, and the ICC referral process, to name a few. 334 Despite the
assurances of domestic and international legal organizations-including the
American Bar Association- that the U.S.' concerns are effectively addressed in
the Rome Statute,335 U.S. opposition to the ICC remains firm and may also prove
336 thdestructive. In fact, the U.S. opposition to the ICC is so fervent that the U.S. has
taken proactive steps to nullify and undermine the ICC through legislation 337and
bilateral treaties.338 Most disturbing is the American Servicemembers' Protection
Act, dubbed the "Hague Invasion Act", which not only prohibits any sort of U.S.
governmental cooperation with the ICC, but also authorizes the President to use
military force to extract any U.S. citizens or U.S. protected individuals held in ICC
custody in The Hague, which should not be forgotten is located in The
Netherlands, an U.S. NATO ally! 339 Considering the U.S.' persistent assaults on
Lemkin argued... 'implies conducting an independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools,
construction of roads.., all types of activity directed towards the welfare of people. Sovereignty cannot
be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people."' POWER, supra note 1, at 19.
334. See Fact Sheet: The International Criminal Court, U.S. Dept. of State, May 6, 2002,
http://www.state.gov/s/wci/usreleases/fs/9978.htm (listing the U.S. objections to the ICC) [hereinafter
Fact Sheet].
335. See A.B.A., Recommendation that the United States Government Accede to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, at 5-9, Feb. 19, 2001, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ABARes-onUSFebOl.pdf; Just. Richard J. Goldstone, US
Withdrawal from ICC Undermines Decades of American Leadership in International Justice, The
International Criminal Court Monitor: The Newspaper of the NGO Coalition for the International
Criminal Court (New York), Issue 21, June 2002, at 3, 11, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/monitor2l.200106.english.pdf (giving legitimate legal answers to
each and every U.S. objection to the ICC).
336. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 168 ("Under the Bush Administration, such efforts to obtain a
'fix' have been abandoned, and replaced by a stance of active hostility..."); Diane Marie Amann &
M.N.S. Sellers, The United States ofAmerica and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
381, 385-86 (2002) (cataloging U.S. Senators disparaging and anti-cooperative remarks about the ICC,
including calling the ICC an "international kangaroo court"); Heindel, supra note 332, at 364-65
(alluding to the words of U.S. officials that not only do not support the ICC, but would rather it not
exists).
337. Amann & Sellers, supra note 336, at 384.
338. Heindel, supra note 332, at 365-67; see generally Chet J. Tan, Jr., The Proliferation of
Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements Among Non-Ratifiers of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1115 (2004).
339. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. § 7421 (2002), available at
http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/aspa2002.pdf; see Human Rights Watch, Human Rights
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the ICC and its unresponsiveness to the counterarguments presented by ICC
proponents, it is clear that the objections the U.S. holds against the ICC run deeper
than mere issues with the language in the Rome Statute, and instead are motivated
by the perception of the ICC as anti-sovereignty.
340
The ICC may believe that it can go on successfully without U.S. support,
341
but the likelihood of this occurring is remote. The track record of large, hopeful
international organizations existing without U.S. support is abysmal, considering
that the lack of U.S. support already demolished one great international effort in
the League of Nations 342 and arguably might spoil the greatest international
agreement of all in the United Nations.343 Although a majority of the world's
nations signed and ratified the Rome Statute that brought about the ICC,344 it is not
beyond the realm of possibilities that the U.S. -a single, albeit powerful State-
could destroy the ICC. 345 If the ICC hopes to corral U.S. support, the perception of
the ICC as an international hegemon determined to demolish the sovereignty of all
States must be eradicated. However, the question remains if it is even feasible for
the ICC to squelch this perception? If it cannot, the ICC runs the risk of becoming
the next ICJ, or even worse, a distant memory.
346
News, U.S.: 'Hague Invasion Act' Becomes Law: White House "Stops at Nothing" in Campaign Against
War Crimes Court, http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/aspa080302.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2007).
340. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 183; SADAT, supra note 200, at 280. It is not a surprise that the
U.S.' opposition to the ICC is driven by a perception of the ICC as an infringement on U.S. sovereignty.
During the U.S. Senate deliberation on ratifying the Genocide convention, which received strong
international support and was ratified by many countries, the opposition of the U.S. government to
ratifying the Genocide Convention was an almost carbon copy to the present day opposition of the U.S.
government to acceding to the Rome Statute and ICC. When every single legal or logistical critique put
forward by the U.S. government for not ratifying the Genocide Convention was shot down by
overwhelming evidence, the U.S. government still maintained a position against ratification. There
forward, it became evident that the U.S. opposition stemmed from the perception of the Genocide
Convention as an infringement on U.S. sovereignty. "The core American objection to the treaty, of
course, had little to do with the text, which was no vaguer than any other law that had not yet been
interpreted in a courtroom. Rather, American opposition was rooted in a traditional hostility toward any
infringement on U.S. sovereignty, . . . [i]f the United States ratified the pact, senators worried they
would thus authorize outsiders to poke around in the internal affairs of the United States or embroil the
country in an 'entangling alliance' POWER, supra note I, at 65-9. That quote could, word for word, be
used to describe current U.S. opposition to the ICC. Moreover, the entire situation surrounding the U.S.
and the Genocide convention accurately describe the situation and sentiment revolving around the U.S.
government's present day opposition to the ICC.
341. BRoOMHALL, supra note 59, at 182-83.
342. BROOMHALL, supra note 5 1, at 183; SADAT, supra note 200, at 43.
343. See Tom Regan, US, UN: Can This "Unhappy Marriage" Be Saved?, Christian Sci. Monitor,
June 9, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0609/dailyUpdate.html.
344. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, The State Parties to the Rome
Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/statesparties.html, (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
345. See BROOMHALL, supra note 51, at 183; SADAT, supra note 200, at 43. The fact that one
sovereign State could bring down or even disrupt any large international institution that is supported by
a majority of States also supports the finding that can the international legal order continues to be State-
centric.
346. See Simi Singh, The Future of International Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court
(ICC), 10 TOURO INT'L L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2000) (warning that the ICC could become just as ineffective
institution as the ICJ, and documents reasons why the ICJ is ineffective); but see Douglass Cassel, Is
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IV. ROAMING ICC: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL SYSTEM MADE FOR OUR STATE-
CENTRIC WORLD
A. What Do the Flaws of the ICC Tell Us?
It is not a stretch to label the internal problems and conceptual missteps of the
ICC as alarming, for theses issues raise considerable doubt as to the ability of the
ICC to punish and deter the commission of international crimes. This is not to say
the ICC is a failure, because the Rome Statute and the institution it created will be
remembered as a watershed moment in the history of international criminal law.
However, the world deserves a completely universal international criminal
enforcement mechanism, because an all-inclusive system is a prerequisite to a truly
effective system. Sadly, the current ICC cannot be considered as such. The
question then becomes "what must be done to establish an international criminal
enforcement mechanism that is sufficiently inclusive so as to properly deter and
punish international criminals?"
Currently, the international legal community at large is bickering over the
wrong issues regarding the ICC and the ICC's role in the progression of
international criminal law. The focus of international debate has revolved around
the internal problems with the ICC, specifically the structural and substantive
facets of the Rome Statute discussed earlier.347 While these issues are deserving of
attention, such discussion does little to bring the world to a consensus over how to
create a proper international criminal system, because many of these issues are
secondary to the one issue that is fundamental to the development of an
appropriate international criminal enforcement mechanism. This fundamental issue
is one that this Note has already discussed briefly: How the Westphalian State-
centric world order effects the development of international criminal law? In more
basic terms, how to reconcile sovereignty with the international rule of law?
The reason why the resolution of this quandary is vital to the creation of a
proper international criminal system is straightforward: if the sovereign authority
of States is not upset by the creation of an international criminal system, in that the
international criminal enforcement mechanism is not perceived by States as a
threat to their sovereignty, such a system will have an greatly increased chance of
surviving in our Westphalian world order. Considering the importance of this
issue, it is disappointing that the Rome Statute Framers fell back onto the
There a New World Court?, 1 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 1, 18-31 (2003) (showing that the ICJ's surge
in caseload is an indication of the resurrection in the ICJ's importance); Chris Borgen, Reconsidering
the Reconsideration of the ICJ, Opinio Juris, http://lawofiations.blogspot.com/2005/06/reconsidering-
reconsideration-of-icj.html (arguing that the ICJ is not a very good judicial body, but is the one of the
premier international legislative body).
347. By substantive and structural issues, this Notes means issues regarding the language of the
Rome Statute and the internal structure of the ICC, which turn into arguments over, for instance, the
independence of the Prosecutor, the level of cooperation State Parties must give, the limits of ICC
jurisdiction, etc. Essentially, issues that are not conceptual, but more legal in nature. See Fact Sheet,
supra note 334 (showing that a majority of the U.S.' official objections to the ICC--considered the
main opponent of the ICC-deal with structural and substantive aspect of the Rome Statute and the
ICC); supra section IV, D.
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conventional, but unworkable conclusion that only through compromise of the
uncompromisable-sovereignty and international rule of law-can an international
criminal enforcement mechanism be agreed upon by sovereign States. Thus, the
Rome Statute Framers' decision to promote the establishment of a detached,
independent international institution bestowed with limited, yet significant
international criminal jurisdiction over international crimes not only failed to
resolve the dilemma between sovereignty and the international rule of law, but
created deeper division among the international community. Where some States
were willing to approve of the creation of the ICC at the cost of losing some
sovereignty, other States balked at the idea of an international criminal system that
jeopardized their unbridled sovereignty. The result of the Rome Statute Framers'
miscalculation is a problematic ICC that has not received the support of the
world's most powerful country, the U.S. 348 No matter how misguided the U.S.
may be on the ICC issue, the reality is that an international criminal system
without the U.S. holds a slim chance of being as effective as it would be with the
preeminent international economic, military, and political leader.349 Furthermore, a
true sense of international justice can never be realized without the moral support
and cooperation of the U.S. 350 Does this mean the rest of the world must back
down to U.S. demands in order to achieve any semblance of an international
criminal system? Certainly not, for having it the U.S.' way would abandon the
much needed support of the rest of the world. Instead, this Note proposes a new
option.
To set the stage for this new option, the following section delves deeper into
the philosophical and conceptual pitfalls of the conventional method used to create
international criminal institutions. To date, international efforts towards the
establishment of an international criminal enforcement mechanism focused on
either the ad hoc-Nuremberg, the ICTY, the ICTR-or prospective-the ICC-
creation of an international criminal body without addressing the structural
weakness of such options in a State-centric model of international law. This
structural weakness exists because these prior mechanisms are grounded upon the
murky realm that exists between, and outside, sovereign states. Thus, when the
international community agrees to the formation of an international criminal
enforcement mechanism whereby sovereign States are bound, to one degree or
another, to an entity that exists outside of the realm of all sovereign States, this
agreement is perched precariously beyond the strength of the Westphalian world
order and cannot stand up to the concerns of State actors that stem from the very
core of this order. Using the ICC as an example to clarify, the ICC is an entity that
exists completely detached from the confines of any and all State Parties. The ICC
348. See SADAT, supra note 200, at 280; see generally Eric P. Schwartz, The United States and the
International Criminal Court: The Case for "Dexterous Multilateralism ", 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223 (2003)
(diagramming the U.S. position against the ICC, which is at the forefront of opposition to the ICC).
349. BROOMHALL, supra note 51, at 163-64; SADAT, supra note 200, at 43; see Amann & Sellers,
supra note 336, at 382 (stating that the U.S. will likely continue to distance itself from the ICC, which
severely hampers the ICC's future).
350. SADAT, supra note 200, at 43.
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is on the outside looking in on the sovereignty of all State Parties, or as the U.S.
inartfully, but accurately put it, "the Court... [is] simply 'out there' in the
international system." 351 Yet, despite its outsider status, the ICC can potentially
bind sovereign State Parties to its jurisdiction.352 Little thought has gone into the
creation of an international criminal system tailored to the strength of our State-
centric world, the strength being the domestic authority of each and every
sovereign nation. Few question the power a sovereign State possesses over its
territory, a power which derives from the State exercising dominion over its people
and land. This unquestioned power of sovereign States is the strength of the State-
centric system of international law, and this Note proposes that the ICC reinvent
itself in order to harness this strength.
B. Details of the Roaming ICC
This Note's proposal is for the international legal community to re-
conceptualize the manner in which an international criminal system should exist.
Instead of creating an independent, detached, outside entity that hovers over all
sovereign States, the international community should adopt an international
criminal system that exists within every sovereign State. The heart of the proposal
is a decentralized international criminal system that would facilitate the creation of
temporary courts of law manned by domestic, regional, and international Judges
and Prosecutors that would exercise the same substantive and procedural
international criminal laws in the prosecution and adjudication of an alleged
international criminal violation, regardless of where the court resides
geographically. The "Roaming ICC" proposal does not call for the abandonment of
the current ICC in its entirety, but rather a reformulation of the conceptual
infrastructure of the current ICC to reflect a new thinking of how an international
criminal system should be. Accordingly, the aim of the Roaming ICC proposal is
to make alterations to the framework of the current ICC, not to abolish it, and thus
transform the current ICC into the Roaming ICC.
The Roaming ICC proposal has two essential components. The first
component is the backbone of the Roaming ICC: the adoption of the Roaming ICC
substantive and procedural laws into each State Party's domestic law. The
Roaming ICC's substantive and procedural laws 353 would not be drastically
different from the Rome Statute, except for changes to the Rome Statute's
procedural laws that are necessary to mesh the diversity of international procedural
351. Bolton Speech, supra note 329.
352. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207, art. 3 (inferring that the ICC is separate from
any sovereign State, for it enters into agreements with the Hague for its occupancy, and can leave the
Hague if need be).
353. As any honest lawyer would admit, the difference between substantive and procedural law can
be as clear as mud. For purposes of this Note, Roaming ICC substantive law incorporates the
jurisdictional concepts, general principles of law, and subject matter of the Rome Statute, save any
obvious changes that would need to be made. By procedural, this Note means the rules that govern the
conduct of an ICC trial, not the procedural rules associated with the complimentarity system, or the
procedural rules associated with the ICCs jurisdiction to adjudicate. The Roaming ICC gets rid of these
procedural rules.
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and court room rules.354 More precisely, the Rome Statute's subject matter laws
giving the current ICC jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and aggression 355 would also be the Roaming ICC's substantive law and
the Rome Statute's procedural laws on prosecutorial duties, court room rules, and
pre-trial procedures would become the Roaming ICC's procedural laws, and
altogether, would form the law of the Roaming ICC from which every State Party
would enact into their internal law, word for word. No State Party would be
allowed to make reservations or amendments to either the substantive or
procedural laws of the Roaming ICC, for absolute consistency from one State to
another is critical for the success of the Roaming ICC. 35 6 While this concept of
totally adopting the Rome Statute into the domestic law of a State has been
followed by some current ICC State Parties, 357 others have not taken that course in
regard to the Rome Statute.358 It must be stressed that it is mandatory that the each
State Party to the Roaming ICC adopt the substantive-including relevant
jurisdictional aspects-and procedural components of the Roaming ICC
jurisprudence into the State Party's domestic law without exception. 359 Otherwise,
important jurisdictional aspects of the Roaming ICC would crumble.
The adoption of the Roaming ICC's substantive and procedural law into every
single nation's domestic law may sound impossible, but there are indicators that
this task is not as daunting as it might seem. There are numerous international
treaties and conventions, not to mention the Rome Statute itself, that exhibit the
world community's ability to agree on substantive laws against genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and to a certain degree, aggression. 360 Taking the
354. Because the current ICC is an international, independent body, their procedural laws (i.e.
within the court room, pre-trial, etc.) were developed as such. However, the Roaming ICC, as will be
shown, ends up operating in the domestic jurisdiction of any State Parties, so this facet of the Roaming
ICC would necessitate more international negotiations to come up with internal procedural laws for the
Roaming ICC that all States could agree with. This will be discussed later.
355. As noted, the aggression issue is still unresolved. Supra note 252. However, at the point in
time when the stalemate over defining the crime of aggression is resolved, it would be incorporated into
the Roaming ICC. At present, the crime of aggression would exist within the Roaming ICC as it does in
the current ICC.
356. See Fact Sheet, supra note 334 (showing that the U.S. is critical of the fact that the Rome
Statute does not allow States to add reservations, which in the Roaming ICC would be a similar
requirement).
357. See Implementation Strategies Adopted by: Australia, New Zealand Canada, United Kingdom
and South Africa, INT'L JUSTICE (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY), Dec. 18, 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/chartl.pdf. Of course, it is not total, complete adoption, but
rather a total adoption of the Rome Statute's subject matter laws.
358. See Implementation Strategies Adopted by: Argentina, Spain, France, Switzerland and
Belgium, INT'L JUSTICE (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY), Dec. 18, 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/chart3.pdf.
359. Essentially, every State Party to the Roaming ICC would have mirror image jurisprudences in
regards to the Roaming ICC.
360. See, e.g,. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Genocide
Convention, supra note 187; Hague Convention Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207.These
international laws are examples of already agreed upon substantive laws against genocide, war crimes,
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next step in having each country incorporate these laws without derogation into
their own jurisprudence will take significant amounts of time and effort, but is far
from an insurmountable task. The idea of adopting foreign material into a domestic
jurisprudence is not an uncommon practice in the U.S., for the adoption of
Restatements and Uniform Acts into the law of individual U.S. states occurs
frequently and parallels the same logic as adopting Roaming ICC substantive and
procedural law into the national law of all Roaming ICC State Parties. 361 However,
crafting a procedural system that the Roaming ICC could use in any State and that
Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense attorneys of varied legal background could work
with will take careful negotiations and a tremendous amount of effort to
accomplish, especially considering the gulf of differences between civil and
common law criminal systems. Nevertheless, the current ICC contains procedural
laws that a majority of the international community has already agreed to, and
additions and/or modifications to this already existing procedural law is a good
starting point from which to form an uniform, workable procedural system that
every State Party could agree to implementing.
The second component of the Roaming ICC proposal exhibits what is the
most radical difference between the Roaming ICC and the current ICC: the
transition from a centralized to a decentralized legal entity. Two Articles in the
Rome Statute allude to the possibility of the current ICC carrying out its judicial
functions within a State Party's territory, but instead of this possibility being the
exception, the Roaming ICC proposal would make this practice the rule.362 In
addition to each Roaming ICC State Party adopting the substantive and procedural
law of the Roaming ICC into their domestic jurisprudence, each State Party must
also agree to three contractual obligations in the Roaming ICC agreement: the
State Party must allow Roaming ICC proceedings to occur within their territory;
the State Party must fulfill their designated duties and obligations if a Roaming
ICC proceeding were to occur in their territory; and the State Party must accept
that international and regional Judges, Prosecutors, and other staff will enter its
territory to fulfill their duties and obligations in a Roaming ICC proceeding.
Making the Roaming ICC a decentralized court that could set up operation in the
jurisdiction of any Roaming ICC State Party on demand is a change that
unequivocally capitalizes on the strength of the State-centric system of
international law, because pursuant to the Roaming ICC contractual agreement, the
Roaming ICC would undertake its judicial proceeding within the domain of the
State Party where the international crime occurred. The intended consequence
being that the territorial jurisdiction and expertise of this State Party would be
utilized in order to effectuate the Roaming ICC process.
crimes against humanity, and aggression that could be adopted into each and every Roaming ICC State
Parties' jurisprudence.
361. See generally Kristen D. Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 423 (2004) (describing the philosophy and practice of adopting
Restatements into U.S. state's jurisprudence, and the same practice could be used by Roaming ICC
State Parties in adoption of Roaming ICC substantive and procedural laws).
362. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 3-4.
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The basic setup of the Roaming ICC system would be a three-tiered
hierarchy, with varying amount of judicial and prosecutorial authority dispersed
throughout the branches of the Roaming ICC. Each level of the Roaming ICC
would contain a panel of Judges and a Prosecutor's Office.363 The highest level
would be the Roaming ICC Presidential Authority made up of internationally
chosen Judges and an internationally chosen Prosecutor's Office that would control
ultimate prosecutorial discretion in all Roaming ICC cases. 364 The second highest
level of the Roaming ICC system would be made up of multiple Roaming ICC
Regional Authorities that would represent large regional territories of the world,
such as Africa, Europe, Asia, North America, etc. Each Regional Authority,
accordingly, would have Judges and Prosecutors nominated by and chosen from
their respective region. Finally, the lowest level of the Roaming ICC framework
would comprise the many Roaming ICC State Authorities that represent each State
Party, with their own domestic Judges and Prosecutors.
An example of the course of events that would occur if an alleged
international crime happened under the Roaming ICC regime will help elaborate
on the structure and inner-working of the Roaming ICC. An alleged act of
genocide occurs in State Party A in Region A. Either the Prosecutors Office for
State A, the Regional Prosecutor's Office for Region A, the Presidential
Prosecutor's Office, or a collaborative team of these offices may start an
investigation into the alleged genocide. 365 The three prosecutorial offices shall
cooperate to decide if a prosecution should go forward, but ultimate prosecutorial
discretion on any prosecution would belong with the Presidential Prosecutor's
363. Every Judge and Prosecutor would be trained in the laws and procedures of the Roaming ICC,
thus equally useful in any State Party they may find themselves in. Also, membership requirements for
Judges and Prosecutors will be the same as the current ICC membership requirements. As for all the
other organs of the current ICC, they could stay centralized in the Presidential Authority under the
Roaming ICC proposal, such as the Registry, defense counsel assignment department, victims and civil
parties unit, witness protection unit, investigator's office, etc. However, these units would be able to
work outside of the centralized unit, such as the Registry could have a satellite unit set up where
Roaming ICC proceedings were taking place. This does not discount the possibility that Regional and
State Party authorities would have similar departments and services.
364. All the Prosecutor Offices across the Roaming ICC network would cooperate per the Roaming
ICC agreement and would defer to each other in certain circumstances. However, ultimate Prosecutorial
discretion is best left to the Presidential Prosecutor's Office, because this office would be the most
protected from the political and social implications on the ground where the international crime
occurred and would presumably be the most objective in deciding if an international crime did occur
and if it should be adjudicated. Again, information would flow freely among the Prosecutor's Offices,
and the Presidential Prosecutor's Office would be obligated to consult with the State Party and Regional
Prosecutor's Office in a majority of instances. The possibility exists that a procedure could be put in
place where, if the State Party and Regional Prosecutor Office agree on one course of action and the
Presidential Prosecutor's Office desires another course, the State Party and Regional Prosecutor's
Office could overrule the Presidential Prosecutor's Office or appeal to a Pre-Trial Chambers for
resolution.
365. Similar to the current ICC, each Prosecutor's Office, depending on which level it is from, will
need permission by a Judge from its Roaming ICC level at certain stages in the investigation process in
order to proceed with the investigation. However, when the Prosecutor's Office would need this
permission is a detail not worth going into in this Note.
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Office.3 66 In addition, the Presidential Prosecutor's Office would have ultimate
discretion to decide if the Presidential Prosecutor's Office, the Regional
Prosecutor's Office for Region A, or the Prosecutor's Office for State Party A shall
lead the prosecution of the case. 36 7 Once the investigation turns into an official
prosecution, a Pre-Trial Judge from State Party A would be appointed to supervise
pre-trial litigation, who would possess the same basic powers and responsibilities
as a Pre-Trial Judge at the ICC.3 68 Additionally, a panel of one Presidential
Authority judge, one Region A judge, and one State Party A judge would be
formed to handle select appeals lodged by parties against decision handed down by
the Pre-Trial Judge. As a trial becomes closer to reality, a panel of Trial Judges
would be formed consisting of one Judge from State Party A, one from Region A,
and one from the Presidential Authority. The Judge from the Presidency shall be
chief Judge, but each Judge would have equal weight in deciding procedural and
substantive issues that arise as well as the ultimate judgment of the case. This
mixed panel of Judges is just an extension of a concept already used by the UN-
sponsored hybrid international criminal tribunals in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and
East Timor where domestic and international judges work on panels together.
369
366. However, there could be a procedure whereby the Roaming ICC State Party Prosecutor and
the Regional Authority Prosecutor can bind forces to overrule a decision of the Presidency Prosecutor,
which will alleviate U.S. concerns about overzealous international Prosecutors. Also, the idea of
domestic and international prosecutors working together is not just a theory, but an idea currently at
work at the UN-Cambodia criminal tribunal. See UN-Cambodia Agreement, infra note 369, art. 6.
367. The Presidential Prosecutor's Office would make a determination like this upon consideration
of resources, time/effort, effectiveness, suitable distance from the area where the international crimes
took place, etc., Whatever Prosecutor that ends up prosecuting the case will be treated as a Prosecutor
of the forum State Party. Furthermore, there will be no set rules on how the makeup of the Prosecutor's
team should be, such as what office must make up what percentage of the Prosecutorial team.
368. The background of this Pre-Trial Judge is debatable, but the existence of one is required. The
Pre-Trial Judge could be from the same Authority "level" as the lead Prosecutor that prosecutes the case
in chief, but could be from any Authority level. The Pre-Trial Judge would monitor the investigation of
the alleged international crime, tackle the multiple pre-trial procedural issues that arise from
investigations and preparation for trial, and confirm the indictment.
369. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.- Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html; Agreement Between the United
Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, UN-Cambodia, June 6, 2003, art. 3,
5, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/228 B, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/AgreementbetweenUN and RGC.pdf
[hereinafter UN-Cambodia Agreement]; Agreement On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses in East Timor, U.N. Transitional Administration in East
Timor, § 22, U.N. Doc. UJNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) (pursuant to U.N. SCOR Res. 1272), available
at http:// www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/RegOO15E.pdf, see David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the
Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, AsIAPACFIC ISSUES, No. 61 (East-
West Center, Honolulu, HI), Aug. 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api06l.pdf [hereinafter AsiaPacific]. Cohen's piece
criticizes the hybrid tribunal idea, but mainly for funding reasons, which would not be an issue for the
Roaming ICC, because the Roaming ICC structure will be able to pool resources from all three levels of
the Roaming ICC-State, Regional, and Presidential-; thus alleviating and spreading out financial
concerns associated with international criminal trials. Infra section V, D, 4. There has also been
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The Roaming ICC proceedings would take place in State A in a pre-existing
forum within State A. 370 Due to the alleged genocide occurring in State Party A in
violations of State Party A's Roaming ICC laws adopted by State Party A's
legislature or equal body, State Party A would have the obligation to carry out all
logistical and necessary aspects of the trial, which would include arrest and
detention of suspects, obtaining and securing evidence, victim and witness
protection, forum security, subsequent enforcement of court decisions, etc.371 After
a judgment is reached in the case, the Roaming ICC proceedings within State A
would be over, and the entire operation would be shut down. This entire Roaming
ICC investigation, pre-trial, and trial process would be replicated in any State Party
where an international crime occurred, or any State Party for that matter.
Additionally, given the immense, yet decentralized structure of the Roaming ICC,
many Roaming ICC proceedings could occur simultaneously in the territory of
multiple Roaming ICC State Parties, assuming the need was present.
In regard to appeals, the Roaming ICC Appeals process would institute a
different procedure from the current ICC. In order to avoid domestic bias and to
afford the defendant the most practical opportunities to prove his or her innocence
or correct procedural errors made at trial, the Roaming ICC appellate process
would be two-tiered with the first appeal of the presumed genocide conviction in
State Party A made to an panel of Judges solely from the Region A Authority, and
the final appeal would face a panel of Judges solely from the Presidential
Authority. To ease the worries of some Roaming ICC State Parties that there
would be regional or international review of a Roaming ICC judgment reached
within the territory of the State Party, appeals could only be made for procedural
errors or grave misapplications of Roaming ICC substantive law that would be
tantamount to subversion of the Roaming ICC process.
Having laid out an example of a hypothetical Roaming ICC proceeding, there
is a noticeable parallel between the Roaming ICC and the UN-Lebanon tribunal.
The UN-Lebanon tribunal is a hybrid international criminal tribunal currently
under development, and like other UN hybrid tribunals, is the creation of an
agreement between the UN and Lebanon to form an international criminal tribunal
additionally criticism regarding the rift between the Cambodian and international Judges over
procedural matters. See Seth Mydans, Unwieldy Court Further Complicates Khmer Rouge Trial, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/25/news/cambo.php. However, this
issue would not be a problem for the Roaming ICC, because negotiations prior to the world-wide
adoption of the Roaming ICC's substantive and procedural laws would smooth out these types of
issues. Also, one must remember that these tribunals are not all the same. For example, the UN-
Cambodia criminal court would best be called a "mixed" or internationalized domestic criminal court,
because it is not an international criminal tribunal in the strict sense. See SCHABAS, supra note 331, at 6.
370. If a violation occurs over separate countries, a decision by the Presidential Authority about the
most suitable forum or where the most substantial violations occurred would decide the correct State
Party forum. The possibility of a Roaming ICC proceeding not taking place where the international
crime occurred will be addressed later in this Note. Infra section V, D, 1.
371. The Presidency and Regional Authority would be able to provide additional funds, manpower,
and cooperation needed to carry out these functions (i.e. use their Victim's Unit or relevant personnel to
assist the State Parties victim representation and protection efforts).
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composed of international and domestic Judges and Prosecutors.3 72 The objective
of this tribunal is to handle the prosecution and adjudication of the Hariri
assassination and related criminal offenses.373 However, unlike other UN hybrid
tribunals, the UN-Lebanon tribunal will apply Lebanese criminal penal law
exclusively, rather than applying a mixture of international and domestic criminal
law. 374
The similarities between these two concepts is that the Roaming ICC system
would be the mass institutionalization of the idea behind the UN-Lebanon tribunal,
which in turn would facilitate the duplication of UN-Lebanon-like tribunals
anywhere in the world where an international crime occurs or in any State Party
hosting a Roaming ICC proceeding. Quite literally, the UN-Lebanon tribunal
would be an example of the Roaming ICC system in action, specifically if a
Roaming ICC proceeding was to take place in Lebanon.375 Additionally, like the
UN-Lebanon tribunal, a Roaming ICC proceeding would apply exclusively the
local criminal law as well. However, the local criminal law applied would be the
aforementioned Roaming ICC substantive and procedural law that every State
Party would have already incorporated in its domestic law with verbatim precision.
This correlation between the Roaming ICC and the UN-Lebanon tribunal indicates
that there is an undercurrent of approval within the international community for the
Roaming ICC proposal, because the international community has already
legitimized and accepted-as evidenced by the planned creation of the UN-
Lebanon tribunal-a fundamental precept of the Roaming ICC concept.
There are further tangible indications that the international community would
embrace the Roaming ICC. The UN-Cambodian Tribunal that is now underway is
best described as a "mixed" or internationalized domestic criminal tribunal, which
means that despite substantial international presence at the tribunal, it is for all
tenses and purposes a domestic criminal court. 376 The very name of this tribunal
indicates as such, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
372. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, annex, pmbl., art. 1, 8, 11, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/893 (Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter UN-Lebanon Report]. Additionally, the UN-Lebanon tribunal
would be independent of the United Nations and the Lebanese judiciary, and would have primacy of
jurisdiction over domestic Lebanese courts. Id., 6, attach. art. 4.
373. Id., 1.
374. Id., attach, art. 2; see Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, UN-
Cambodia, art. 3 new-8, Oct. 27, 2004, Reach Kram No. NS/RKM/0801/12 (2001) (Cambodia),
available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KRLaw-as-amended 27 Oct 2004_Eng.pdf
[hereinafter UN-Cambodian Statute]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN-Sierra Leone,
arts. 2-5, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N. Doc S/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.
375. At time of publishing, the seat of this UN-Lebanon Tribunal has not been determined
precisely. Along with the tribunal being located in Lebanon, there remains the possibility that the
tribunal will be seated in The Hague, Utrecht, or elsewhere in Europe. However, regardless where this
court takes place, many of the points made here still apply.
376. SCHABAS, supra note 331, at 6; UN-Cambodia Agreement, supra note 369, pmbl, art. 1, 31;
UN-Cambodian Statute, supra note 374, art. 2 new.
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(ECCC).377 Each organ and department within this tribunal is equally represented
by international and Cambodian personnel.378 While it remains to be seen if this
particular tribunal will be a total success, the existence of the ECCC further
supports the potential reality of the Roaming ICC. Specifically, the ECCC would
be another example of the Roaming ICC in action, because a Roaming ICC
tribunal in Cambodia would similarly be operated in total by an equal or equitable
distribution of international, regional, and domestic personnel. The ECCC-in its
makeup and conceptual foundation-is more or less a carbon copy of a Roaming
ICC tribunal at work, and as the ECCC continues towards becoming a genuine
success, the Roaming ICC proposal gradually gains legitimacy as well.
To dispel any confusion about the nature of the Roaming ICC, once a
Roaming ICC proceeding begins operation in a State Party's territory, this does not
mean that this proceeding is a defacto State Party proceeding and/or subject to all
of the State Party's domestic laws. For example, a Roaming ICC proceeding taking
place in the U.S. does not mean that the person tried would be subject to or receive
the benefit of all U.S. domestic laws, such as the 6th Amendment right to a jury
trial. The Roaming ICC proceeding would be technically separate from the State
Party. Theoretically, it is best to envision the State Party as an "active host" to the
Roaming ICC proceeding. The State Party would contribute its jurisdictional
supremacy-such as its police forces, investigators, subpoena powers-, its
prosecutors and judges, its court rooms, and so on, to the Roaming ICC for use
during the proceeding. This arrangement would be much like the relationship
between The Netherlands and the ICJ, ICTY, and the ICC, where Dutch authorities
and jurisdiction are often used for the benefit of these institutions, but the whole of
Dutch law does not apply to either these institutions or the individuals being
prosecuted. 7
C. What the Roaming ICC is Not
Just as important as it is to lay out what the Roaming ICC would be, it is also
important to distinguish the Roaming ICC from other similar proposals. First, the
Roaming ICC is not a "community of courts" idea, where the international
criminal enforcement mechanism is, essentially, a web of domestic courts
practicing international criminal jurisdiction over international crimes. 380 The
377. UN-Cambodia Agreement, supra note 369.
378. UN-Cambodia Agreement, supra note 369, art. 3, 5-6; UN-Cambodian Statute, supra note
374, art. 10 new, 16, 23 new.
379. The Dutch-ICJ/ICTYIICC arrangement is not completely parallel to the Roaming ICC/State
Party arrangement, for those tried at either the ICTY or ICC are not being tried for violation of any
Dutch criminal law, which an individual being tried at a Roaming ICC proceeding would be adjudicated
with, theoretically, if tried in The Netherlands. This would be so under the Roaming ICC system
because The Netherlands would have incorporated Roaming ICC's substantive and procedural laws into
its own jurisprudence, so the person tried would be-technically speaking-prosecuted for violation of
this law, regardless of where the events took place. This idea is further elaborated below. Infra section
IV (D) (l).
380. See Burke-White, supra note 60, at 75-97. While some of the fundamental principles of the
community of courts idea are present in the Roaming ICC, the difference is that the Roaming ICC
involves international participation at a much larger scale and requires far more organization than the
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community of courts concept differs in that it lacks active international
participation and oversight, and is better described as an organic coalition of
381domestic sovereign States practicing international criminal law on their own.
The extensive involvement of the international community is necessary, because
sovereign States, when left alone, have proven themselves to be untrustworthy in
doing the job of the international community in fighting international crime.
382
Even international pressure on sovereign States to use domestic measures to punish
the commission of international crimes has not shamed States into action. 383 The
Roaming ICC, on the other hand, utilizes active international participation in the
development of a system whereby an agreement between sovereign States and the
international community 384 will obligate States to work with the international
community in prosecuting and punishing international criminals. Specifically,
sovereign States will assist by allowing the international community to
"piggyback" onto the undisputed territorial authority and power of the sovereign
State, enabling both the State and the international community to fight
international crime in a collective manner. The Roaming ICC, basically, is the
concrete institutionalization of an agreement between sovereign States and the
international community to work together in enforcing international criminal law.
Additionally, the Roaming ICC is not a disjointed series of independent
hybrid courts, or an agreement between the current ICC and an individual State to
allow the ICC to set up a pseudo-hybrid court in the individual State.385 These
community of courts idea. Also, it is unknown what type of international criminal jurisdiction would be
practice under the community of courts idea, be it territorial, nationality, or universal.
381. Id. at 86 ("The emerging community of courts is largely self-organizing and self-regulating.
Though some of the principles that regulate the community are found in the Rome Statute, the
community itself lacks any controlling or regulating authority. Therefore, the relationships and
interactions among these courts are essential to the effectiveness of the emerging system of
international criminal justice").
382. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text. Additionally, even assuming many domestic
States were to practice international criminal law through whatever jurisdictional rationale, without a
standard uniform procedure to be used by these domestic States and without an international oversight
organization, these multiple domestic States end up applying diverse interpretations of international
criminal law and apply them in overly diverse ways. See, e.g., Redress Memo, supra note 35; New
Redress Memo, supra note 35.
383. See, e.g., Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art, Human Rights Watch Reports
(Human Rights Watch, New York, NY), June, 2006, at 1-2, available at
http:/ihrw.org/reports/2006/ij0606/index.htm; Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A
Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 589, 589-595 (2003).
384. It is odd to use the term "international community" outside of the context of the Roaming ICC,
because the international community is an abstract term, not a tangible entity, like a sovereign State.
However, in the context of the Roaming ICC, the international community is the combination of every
other State outside of the State where the trial would occur.
385. See Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A
Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 182, 204-212 (2006). Lipscomb also
makes mention of Article 3 and 4 as a basis for moving the ICC out of The Hague. However,
Lipscomb's idea focuses on a one time use of these Articles as a statutory basis from which to create an
ICC-Hybrid Tribunal in the Sudan. This Note's Roaming ICC proposal uses these Articles to promote a
much more radical departure from the current ICC, where these Articles would be the springboard from
which the current ICC would transform into a cohesive network of "ready to mix", but temporary
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ideas, while following similar logic and promoting similar objectives as the
Roaming ICC, are far less organized and developed than a potential Roaming ICC
regime. To use the analogy of a hybrid tribunal to differentiate the Roaming ICC
from these hybrid tribunals ideas: under the Roaming ICC framework, every State
Party would have a pre-existing organization-the Roaming ICC State Authority,
which in the instance of the U.S., could be an alliance between the Department of
Justice and Federal Judiciary- to receive and work with the incoming constituents
of the Roaming ICC Regional and Presidential Authorities, primarily being the
Prosecutors and Judges from those authorities. The next series of steps from this
point would include the State Party overseeing, if feasible, logistics for the trial,
386
the formation of the Judge's panel by the joint collaboration between each
Roaming ICC Authority, and the joint decision by the Prosecutor's Offices from
the varying levels of the Roaming ICC on which Prosecutor's Office will take on
which duties. Therefore, a hybrid tribunal of sorts would materialize more or less
overnight after the Roaming ICC decides to investigate and potentially prosecute
an international crime, given that the infrastructure needed for an investigation,
pre-trial, and trial would already be in place within the State Party-save some
minor aspects-and only the makeup of the various Judges' Panel, Prosecutorial
team, and Defense team would be left undetermined.387
Finally, the Roaming ICC is not a compromise between sovereignty and the
international rule of law. The Rome Statute Framers' believed that only through
compromise of these two diametrically opposed interests could an effective
international criminal enforcement mechanism become reality. The Rome Statute
Framer's belief deserves criticism, because there is no compromise in a game of
"tug of war". One either wins or loses. The Roaming ICC proposal flips the
paradigm away from compromise by creating an international criminal system
structurally and conceptually built into the Westphalian world of sovereign States.
In other words, the Roaming ICC is a system that ensures the international rule of
law through the powers of sovereign States. Neither sovereignty nor the
international rule of law is required to compromise in order to create the Roaming
ICC. Consequently, sovereign States do not feel trampled by the international rule
of law, and the international rule of law is not sacrificed in the name of
sovereignty.
hybrid tribunals in every State Party. Id. at 206-07.
386. Logistics, as already mentioned, would include all aspects necessary to undertake a trial, from
the mundane to the critical, from providing a physical forum for the proceedings to apprehending
suspects. However, some substantial assistance would be provided by the Roaming ICC Registry and
other organs of the Roaming ICC Presidency, such as paperwork, international investigators, assistants
to the Judges, etc.
387. While it might be only of academic interest, technically speaking, the Roaming ICC would
"enter" the sovereign State in order to adjudicate the alleged international crime. It would not be as if,
using the U.S. as an example, the U.S. was adjudicating international crimes with assistance from the
Roaming ICC's Presidential and Regional Authorities. However, in actuality, the perception might be
as such, because the U.S. would be responsible for ensuring the trial runs effectively, plus an American




D. Advantages of the Roaming ICC
The Roaming ICC possesses clear advantages over the current ICC, mainly
due to the construct of the Roaming ICC being a workable international criminal
system tailored to a State-centric world. The advantages, discussed below, are not
only numerous, but substantial.
1. Jurisdictional Prowess: An Enhancement on Jurisdiction to Prescribe and
to Adjudicate
The Roaming ICC would constitute a welcomed improvement over the
current ICC in terms of its jurisdiction to prescribe and its jurisdiction to
adjudicate. In regard to prescriptive jurisdiction, this Note has made much of the
groundbreaking nature of the current ICC's jurisdiction to prescribe, namely that
the Rome Statute exercised universal international jurisdiction when the Rome
Statute Framers prescribed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression as internationally criminal wherever it takes place. The Roaming ICC
does not wish to tarnish or alter this accomplishment, 388 but enhance this feat by
making the Rome Statute's subject matter laws perfectly uniform in every State
Party's jurisprudence. As a result, the Roaming ICC's prescriptive jurisdiction
would be impervious to challenge or criticism, and furthermore, would utterly
validate the truly international reprehensibility of these crimes by making them
verbatim entries into the national law of every State on Earth. 389 Additionally, if
the law of every State Party is identical in respect to these international crimes,
then the legitimacy of the Roaming ICC moving from prescription to adjudication
is significantly improved, because it will mirror the treatment domestic courts give
domestic criminal laws where the jurisdiction to prescribe is almost always
followed by the jurisdiction to adjudicate.39 °
Jurisdictionally speaking, the greatest improvement of the Roaming ICC over
the current ICC is its jurisdiction to adjudicate. The Roaming ICC will work from
a superb jurisdictional position to adjudicate almost all situations of international
criminal violations, because in a majority of circumstances, all the organs of the
Roaming ICC framework will premise their jurisdiction to adjudicate on the most
credible justification of them all: the territorial jurisdiction of the domestic
388. Included in the Roaming ICC's desire not to tarnish or alter the Rome Statute/ICC's
accomplishments in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe, the Roaming ICC proposal would not change
anything in regards to the current ICC's relationship with customary international criminal law. The
exact same structural concept that allows customary international criminal law to coexist with the Rome
Statute would be incorporated in the Roaming ICC system. See supra section IV, B.
389. As already stressed, but worthy of more emphasis, the idea of adopting a substantive and
procedural jurisprudence into every State's laws, word for word, sounds impossible on several levels.
However, the world is not that far off from being able to do just this. The Rome Statute codified certain
international crimes to an extent not demonstrated before, and the procedural experiences of the ICTY,
ICTR, and in the future, ICC will bring the world closer to an agreement on the procedural aspects of
adjudicating international crimes. Thus, the next step is to undertake the Roaming ICC proposal, and
focus on negotiations-no matter how long-geared towards realizing this proposal's promise.
390. Supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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Roaming ICC State Party to adjudicate violations of their own domestic laws. '91
In the clear cut case of an international crime being committed within a
Roaming ICC State Party, the suspect staying in the State Party where the crime
was committed, and the decision to prosecute this individual is made after an
investigation has concluded, then the State Party will apprehend the suspect, thus
initiating the Roaming ICC adjudicative process. The Roaming ICC State Party
will apprehend the suspect, because the afflicted State Party has a general interest
and legitimate reason to adjudicate infractions of their own laws within their own
borders, specifically in this case, violation of their Roaming ICC laws. As the
suspect sits in custody,392 the Roaming ICC State Party will be obligated pursuant
to the Roaming ICC agreement to let the Regional and Presidential Authorities
enter its territory in order to fulfill their respective adjudicative and prosecutorial
roles under the Roaming ICC framework. Thus, when this type of clear cut
violation occurs, the Roaming ICC State Party has its unquestionable territorial
jurisdiction to adjudicate this infraction, and concurrently, the Regional and
Presidential Authorities also legitimize their jurisdiction to adjudicate the suspect
by linking itself, or said differently, by partnering itself with the State Party's
definitive jurisdiction to adjudicate.
Although a majority of international crimes will occur in this manner
described above-for instance, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Nazi
Germany-in the absence of such a clear cut scenario, the Roaming ICC
framework has other jurisdictional justification to adjudicate as well. In the case of
a suspect fleeing the territory of the Roaming ICC State Party where the crime was
committed or the territorial State Party clearly unwilling to investigate or
prosecute, other Roaming ICC State Parties will have a jurisdictional basis for
capturing and adjudicating the suspect if the suspect enters their territory, or for
offering to accept the proceedings from the State Party unwilling to adjudicate the
suspect. This jurisdictional basis spawns from the fact that the Roaming ICC
jurisprudence would be a part of every Roaming ICC State Party's domestic law,
and as already stressed, will be perfectly consistent from one country to another.
As a consequence of every nation having the exact same Roaming ICC law, the
concept of vicarious jurisdiction would exist for every State Party across the
Roaming ICC network.
Vicarious jurisdiction possesses similar characteristics as universal
jurisdiction, but is a distinct jurisdictional theory altogether. Under the concept of
vicarious jurisdiction, a Roaming ICC State Party-State B-ends up prosecuting
an individual who committed an international crime in another Roaming ICC State
Party, State A. State B can prosecute this suspect because of the failure of State
A-who initially possessed primacy of jurisdiction to adjudicate because the
391. BARRY E. CARTER ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 650-653 (4th ed. Aspen Publishers 2003)
(highlighting the elements of territorial jurisdiction, and the power of territorial jurisdiction).
392. There could be circumstances where a Roaming ICC investigation/pre-trial goes on without
the presence of the defendant(s) in custody. However, their presence in custody would be mandatory for
trial to begin. For literary ease, this Note assumes for this example that the suspect(s) is in custody.
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offense happened on its territory-to adjudicate the suspect warrants and triggers
State B to step in and adjudicate the suspect in State A's place. 393  Vicarious
jurisdiction, an concept present in German and Austrian jurisprudence,394 differs
from universal jurisdiction, because State B initially possesses a claim to
adjudicate the suspect despite State A having primacy of jurisdiction. 395 State B
has an initial claim to adjudicate the suspect, because the suspect breached State
B's Roaming ICC laws, but with the operative events occurring in another
Roaming ICC jurisdiction, in State A. Conceptually, the vicarious jurisdiction idea
comes from the theory that the sovereign authority of a State to adjudicate the
commission of an international crime that occurs in its territory passes to the
international community, or another State, once the territorial State abrogates its
sovereign duty to adjudicate recognized international crimes. 39 6 Vicarious
jurisdiction would be a codified jurisdictional concept under the Roaming ICC, for
all Roaming ICC State Parties would have the same domestic laws in regard to
Roaming ICC law. As a result of this codification, the ability but denial of State A
to prosecute a suspect for committing a Roaming ICC crime within State A, or the
fleeing of this suspect from a violation in State A into State B, would justify and
motivate State B in apprehending or offering to prosecute the individual for
violation of Roaming ICC laws in State Party A. The motivation for State B to
apprehend or to offer to prosecute this suspect comes from not only the suspect
violating the Roaming ICC laws present in State A's jurisprudence, but the
verbatim Roaming ICC laws in State B's jurisprudence as well. Otherwise, State
B's failure to adjudicate this suspect would intrinsically undermine the validity of
State B's Roaming ICC laws. Furthermore, vicarious jurisdiction would pass from
Roaming ICC State Party to Roaming ICC State Party at each failure of any of the
State Parties to apprehend and prosecute, so the suspect could face prosecution in
State C, State D, and so on, never finding a safe haven. 397 As a result of codifying
vicarious jurisdiction, the Roaming ICC framework still maintains jurisdictional
prowess in the face of fleeing suspects or a Roaming ICC State Party unwilling to
prosecute.
The more complex situation is where a Roaming ICC State Party refuses to
investigate or prosecute a Roaming ICC crime that occurred within its territory, the
suspect staying within this State Party's territory, and this State Party is unwilling
to extradite the suspect to another Roaming ICC State Party for prosecution.
However, this is an issue of potential military or hostile intervention into the
territory of the Roaming ICC State Party unwilling to extradite, because the only
393. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 512-13.
394. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Allgemeiner Teil [AlT] § 7 (2) 1-2 (Germany);
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Allgemeiner Teil [AIT] § 65 (1)-(3) (Austria).
395. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 512-13.
396. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct.
24, 2005), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7325911 html; Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, xi-xiii (Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf; Sammons, supra note 49, at 122-24.
397. Bottini, supra note 13, at 511-12 (discussing that a major goal of international criminal law is
to eliminate safe haven, which unfortunately are a reality in today's world).
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way the suspect could face justice is if another State Party breaches the territorial
sovereignty of the unwilling State Party in order to capture this individual. The
Roaming ICC is not designed to answer a dilemma of military or hostile
intervention, because the Roaming ICC is an international criminal enforcement
mechanism, not an end run around acts of war. No system is capable of solving all
international criminal situations - including the Roaming ICC - considering the
unpredictable and overtly political nature of world affairs. Plainly put, the
Roaming ICC can only go so far.
Nevertheless, the Roaming ICC system would incorporate normative
measures to handle a situation like this, and could resort to its vast membership to
bring about an acceptable solution. If a State Party refuses to cooperate with the
Roaming ICC, fails to live up to their Roaming ICC contractual obligations, or
refuses to extradite a suspect to a Roaming ICC State Party willing to prosecute,
the initial step would be to allow individual State Parties to engage the
uncooperative State Party in diplomacy. There are two valid reasons why other
State Parties would be motivated to persuade the uncooperative State Party to
change its way. First, all Roaming ICC State Parties will have a vested interest in
maintaining the integrity of the Roaming ICC system, because it takes just one
State Party being allowed to skirt its Roaming ICC contractual obligations to make
the whole system unreliable and tarnished for the rest. Hence, the State Parties that
want the Roaming ICC to work and/or are relying on the Roaming ICC to work
when needed will have a self-interest in making other States Parties cooperate.
Second, the idea of vicarious jurisdiction would persist even in this above
described scenario, because the suspect has still violated the laws of all Roaming
ICC State Parties, but unfortunately in a State Party unwilling to do anything about
it. 398 Allowing a State Party to harbor an individual accused of violating a law that
all nations have specifically adopted into their own domestic law directly
undermines the validity of such a law; therefore, other Roaming ICC States Parties
will want to persuade the uncooperative State Party to cooperate for everyone's
benefit, least of which the persuading States' own benefit.
With these two reasons, other States will have plenty of diplomatic leverage
and normative pressure to exert over an uncooperative State Party. Roaming ICC
State Parties can inform the uncooperative State Party that not only is the State
Party doing damage to its reputation by failing to live up to its contractual
Roaming ICC obligations, but it is doing damage to its future ability to contract or
have other States believe them at all in future negotiations of any sort.
Furthermore, other State Parties can stake a claim over the harbored suspect
pursuant to vicarious jurisdiction, which will put the uncooperative State Party on
notice that there is much too lose and nothing to gain by staying uncooperative. As
a precautionary measure, States could insert "Roaming ICC compliance"
provisions into trade, economic cooperation, maritime, or any other kind of
398. The only true way around a scenario like this would be to include a provision in the Roaming
ICC agreement that all States will obey extradition requests, but such a provision would most likely be
unacceptable to many sovereign States.
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bilateral or multilateral treaties such that the benefit of a treaty will only flow to a
country if the country is compliant with the Roaming ICC. As a last resort, the
Roaming ICC would be able to refer the situation to the UN Security Council for
resolution, which could include economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed upon
the uncooperative State Party. As can be seen, despite the complexity of this type
of situation, the Roaming ICC will still have plenty of concrete normative options
at is disposal to solve this dilemma.
Finally, the Roaming ICC jurisdiction to adjudicate will be substantially
simpler than the current ICC, because the current ICC's confusing and complex
referral/deferral/complimentarity process will be eradicated under the Roaming
ICC. The potential for political firestorms between current ICC State Parties and
the Prosecutor's Office regarding future deferrals will be extremely high, and such
political skirmishes will inevitably delay justice from happening. One of the main
legal arguments put forward by the U.S. against the current ICC is the
discretionary ability of the Prosecutor to avoid deferring a case to a national court,
thus allowing the ICC to proceed with an internal ICC proceeding against the
wishes of a State Party. 399 In contrasts, deferrals will never be an issue under the
Roaming ICC framework, because the actual judicial proceeding will take place in
the affected forum, or in a neighboring State Party. As such, politics about
deferrals and over-zealous Prosecutors will not be an issue that will bog down the
Roaming ICC.
2. Internal Strength: A Reliable Jurisdiction to Enforce
Despite amendments within the Rome Statute to require cooperation with the
current ICC's investigation and prosecution of suspects, 400 the Rome Statute
cannot guarantee that the current ICC will not be plagued with the same
enforcement problems that faced the ad hoc tribunals, particularly the ICTY.
Evidence gathering, evidence protection, witness and victims security, witness
summoning, enforcement of arrest warrants, the ability to arrest, and other
necessary elements to any judicial proceeding were far from foregone conclusions
for the ad hoc tribunals,0 1 and the ICC is vulnerable to the same issues.40 2
Cooperation agreements, while in principle seem to be a solution, cannot be trusted
when it comes to international criminal matters, because it leaves far too much
discretion with sovereign States. Although these necessary elements are never
completely certain of occurring in any international judicial proceeding, the mere
fact that a Roaming ICC proceeding will be administered primarily by a Roaming
ICC State Party within that State Party's territory increases the odds that every part
of an investigation, pre-trial, and trial will transpire. Seldom is it a worry in the
399. Fact Sheet, supra note 334 (pointing out that a major U.S. objection to the ICC is the
Prosecutor's ability to avoid having to defer a case).
400. See Rome Statute, supra note 207, pt. 9.
401. See Cervoni, supra note 72, at 510.
402. See Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools:
Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings, 2 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 403, n.26 (2004) (forecasting that the ICC mechanism will experience the same enforcement
flaws that plagued the ICTY).
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domestic criminal context if a trial will take place, because of doubts that the
suspect can be arrested, or evidence can be secured, or prosecutors will want to
uphold the law. The goal of the Roaming ICC is to bring that level of certainty to
the enforcement of international criminal law by relying on the State Party's
experience, knowledge, and overall ability to facilitate an investigation and judicial
proceeding within its own borders.
3. True Sense of Justice
The practice of prosecuting international crimes outside of the area in which
the crimes took place has been substantially discredited.4 °3 Using the two ad hoc
tribunals as examples, the prosecution of international criminals in The Hague and
in Arusha created a multitude of problems in the affected areas of Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia. These severely traumatized populations felt disconnected from
the proceedings, unaffected by the sentencing of these criminals thousands of miles
away. 404 The supreme goal of criminal justice is to make the affected community
whole and the ICTR and ICTY not only missed accomplishing this goal, but
caused joint opposition among the affected communities against the tribunals.4 5
There are no assurances that the current ICC's proceedings will not produce the
exact same feelings among the communities ravaged by genocide, or the like,
because the ICC will also be operating, from a distance, in The Hague. However,
the Roaming ICC would not encounter such issues. The proceeding of any
violation of the Roaming ICC laws would most likely take place where the crimes
occurred. In the few situations where a Roaming ICC investigation and prosecution
were to take place elsewhere, such proceedings would invariably take place in a
nearby Roaming ICC State Party. Due to this feature of the Roaming ICC, affected
communities will be more likely to rally around the proceedings, instead of
opposing them.
4. Caseload Capacity and Pooling of Resources
As it stands today, the ICC, as a centralized, singular institution, holds neither
the resources nor capability to handle adequately a plethora of simultaneous
international criminal cases.40 6 If international criminal cases start to pile up, the
current ICC's inability to take on a large number of cases at once, and do so
effectively, will force the ICC to make one of two unattractive decisions: it can put
a finite limit on its caseload capacity, and hope national jurisdictions fill the void
or; allow itself to become overloaded, which inevitably will result in undesirable
consequences, such as delays in justice for the afflicted communities and
403. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 300-08 (2003);
Lipscomb, supra note 376, at 193-99.
404. See Developments in the Law-International Criminal Law: I. The Promises of International
Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV 1957, 1971-72 (2001) (emphasizing that having the prosecution forum
far away from the affected communities, such as the scenario with the ICTY and ICTR, creates a void
in justice, and galvanizes the communities against the tribunals).
405. Id. at 1972.
406. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 547 (describing the logistic problems that the ICC will face in
light of how the ICC is set up).
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unreasonably long detention periods for suspects. 40 7 In contrast to the current ICC,
the Roaming ICC is built to handle any number of international criminal cases
simultaneously given that the Roaming ICC is a decentralized entity that possesses
all the resources of its State Parties, its Regional Authorities, and the Presidential
Authority. As such, the burden of simultaneous international criminal cases will be
dispersed; therefore, Roaming ICC cases could occur in Somalia, Brazil, Albania,
Vietnam, and Mexico all at once without one case detracting or harming another.
Another benefit of being larger and more decentralized than the current ICC is
that the Roaming ICC would have a much larger pool of money to facilitate its
investigations and trials, and create a funding mechanism that all States would
support. While unnecessary here to determine the exact percentage each Roaming
ICC Authority would pay towards financing a Roaming ICC proceeding, the
breadth and the setup of the Roaming ICC structure will make certain that the
financial fears that hang over the head of the Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and East
Timor tribunals will not be replicated in Roaming ICC system. 40 8 In most
circumstances, a Roaming ICC proceeding would be drastically cheaper than any
other international tribunal, because a Roaming ICC investigation and trial would
rely on the already financed, preexisting legal infrastructure of the State Party
where the trial would take place to fund a majority of the trial and investigation
costs. For example, the State Party's Judges, Prosecutors, investigators,
administrative officers, court rooms, detention facilities, and so on would already
be paid for, and would simply be reassigned to a Roaming ICC case. Conversely,
the Regional and Presidential Authorities would be financially responsible for the
peoples, goods, and services each Authority contributed towards the fulfillment of
its obligations in a Roaming ICC proceeding, and additionally, would partly
reimburse the forum State Party for the Roaming ICC's use of its preexisting legal
infrastructure. 409 This reimbursement would give the forum State Party extra
incentives to hold up their end of the Roaming ICC agreement as well.
In situations where a Roaming ICC proceeding takes place in a State Party
where the international crimes did not occur, the afflicted State Party would be
responsible for paying in part the hosting State Party.410 Such an arrangement
would give a financial enticement to the hosting State to accept the role as forum
407. See Howard Morrison, Experimental Justice: Do International Tribunals Work?, 3-4,
http://www.leginetcy.com/articles/Experimental%20Justice-
Do%20Intemational%20Tribunals%20Work.pdf (discussing the delay of justice issues associated with
the ad hoc tribunals).
408. AsiaPacific, supra note 369, at 1; Rob Sharp, Funding Crisis Threatens Khmer Rouge Trials,
THE INDEP., Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/ftmding-crisis-
threatens-khmer-rouge-trials-794486.html; see Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 368, art. 6 (stating
the Sierra Leone Tribunal will be financed by voluntary contributions by States, which to a legal mind,
is incomprehensible, considering that allows for the possibility of a trial to end because of a lack of
money).
409. Each Regional Authority would be funded in part by the States in the Region, and the
Presidential Authority would be funded by all State Parties.
410. The Roaming ICC agreement would not prohibit any other financial agreement between the
three Authorities, as long as it furthers the goal of international justice.
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State Party, and allow for the afflicted State to put its resources towards punishing
those responsible. Finally, as a last resort, if any State Party is or becomes
financially or technically unable to fulfill their obligations in a Roaming ICC
proceeding, the Regional and Presidential Authorities would assume the
investigation and judicial responsibilities as well as the financial burden of the
indigent State Party, if need be.
E. Attractive to Opponents of the Current ICC
For State and non-State opponents of the current ICC, like the U.S., the
Roaming ICC alternative is less objectionable to the principle of sovereignty, and
therefore, more likely to be adopted by all nations. The Roaming ICC effectively
addresses two primary concerns shared by opponents of the current ICC: the
infringement of an external, independent international institution on the
sovereignty of the State, and the legitimacy of the jurisdiction asserted in an
international criminal prosecution. For many States, like the U.S., it is unnerving to
envision an independent, foreign legal entity potentially having international
criminal jurisdiction over its citizens, mainly because the sovereign State would be
cut out of having direct involvement in the judicial proceedings. 41 1 The hallmark
of the Roaming ICC is that it is a conceptually decentralized court that temporarily
"creates itself' within the territory of the crime or any State Party, so the Roaming
ICC cannot be labeled external or foreign. Additionally, the Roaming ICC depends
on the State Party in which it sits not only for the performance of a majority of
investigatory and judicially necessary functions, but also on the allocation of
domestic Judges and Prosecutor from the territorial State Party. Therefore, the
Roaming ICC is not an independent hegemony asserting its authority over
sovereign States. Instead, the Roaming ICC is set up to incorporate the sovereign
influence of the State Party in which it sits, which includes everything from
411. One of the U.S.' grounds for opposing the ICC is that the ICC may attempt to gain jurisdiction
over its soldiers, military personnel, high ranking military leaders, or foreign policy makers working
abroad. Bolton Speech, supra note 329. This is a uniquely American concern, for no country maintains
a military force abroad to the extent that the U.S. does. Under the Roaming ICC, it is imaginable that a
U.S. military official or civilian foreign policy maker could be investigated and potentially prosecuted
in a foreign Roaming ICC State Party. However, there are safeguards and incentives in place that would
appease both the U.S. and international community if such a scenario would take place. First, the
Roaming ICC State Party that initially began an investigation or prosecution against the U.S. military
official could extradite the U.S. military official to the U.S., and the entire Roaming ICC process could
take place in the U.S. The sending country would be assured, by the structural safeguards within the
Roaming ICC agreement, that the U.S. and the international community would adjudicate the U.S.
military official together, rather than the U.S. simply taking the soldier back with no assurances that any
judicial proceedings will take place at all. Second, regardless if Roaming ICC proceeding took place in
the extraditing country or in the U.S., it would be the exact same proceeding, so there would be no
worry that the U.S. would hold a kangaroo court of some sort. The inverse of this, if the U.S. official
were to stay in the Roaming ICC State Party that initially investigated or prosecuted the U.S. military
official, and the U.S. did not seek extradition, the U.S. would at least be assured that the exact same
proceedings would take place regardless where the Roaming ICC proceedings occurs. Additionally,
because the U.S. would take part in the negotiations surrounding the jurisprudence of the Roaming ICC,
the U.S. would indirectly influence all future Roaming ICC proceedings wherever they took place, even
if it was a Roaming ICC prosecution against a U.S. general in Burundi, for instance.
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domestic investigators to a sitting domestic Judge. Essentially, the Roaming ICC
provides State Parties with both a sense of ownership over the Roaming ICC
proceedings taking place within its territory and with "checks and balances" on the
amount of influence that the Roaming ICC Presidential and Regional Authorities
can assert, yet still maintaining a system whereby the international community can
counteract any misgivings on the part of the State Party.
Much to the liking of opponents of the current ICC, through the adoption of
the Roaming ICC laws into the domestic jurisprudence of all State Parties and the
dependence of a Roaming ICC proceeding on the domestic State Party to help "run
the show", the Roaming ICC proposal adds an element of territorial legitimacy to
the entire process of enforcing international criminal law, Objections as to the
legitimacy of universal prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction used by the
current ICC are answered, because the Roaming ICC attaches itself onto the
unquestioned territorial power of the State Party, and the State Party's own
internal, pre-existing mechanisms, to enforce Roaming ICC's criminal laws.
F. Attractive to Proponents of the Current ICC
It has been emphasized that the Roaming ICC proposal will gain the support
of State and non-State opponents of the current ICC, because it calls for the active
involvement of the sovereign State as a "check and balance" on unadulterated
international intervention and provides jurisdictional legitimacy not found in the
current ICC. However, their support will not come at the cost of losing the support
of those States and non-States that are proponents of the current ICC. A chief
reason that the proponents of the current ICC support the current ICC and not
domestic courts applying international criminal law on their own is that the current
ICC ensures that the location of the trial will not impact the substance of or the
manner in which the law is applied, and allow for a completely transparent
proceeding. Even though a Roaming ICC trial could take place in Mongolia or
Chile, the Roaming ICC framework would also ensure the consistent application of
the same rules and laws, and provide a transparent trial for the whole world to
witness.
First of all, a Roaming ICC proceeding will not be completely left to the
devices of the State Party, for every Roaming ICC proceeding will include the
prosecutorial and judicial participation of the Roaming ICC Presidential and
Regional Authorities. Secondly, given that each Roaming ICC proceeding will
apply the exact same substantive law wherever the trial takes place, there will be
no concern that a genocide trial in Sudan, for instance, will apply different
substantive international criminal laws against genocide than the laws applied at a
genocide trial in Laos. The manner in which a Roaming ICC proceeding occurs
will not be of concern either, because the same procedural standards and practices
-for instance, rights of defendants, pre-trial process, etc.-will be used during
every Roaming ICC investigation, pre-trial, trial, and appeal regardless of its
geographic location. Moreover, a future Roaming ICC trial in Nicaragua can use a
past Roaming ICC trial in Indonesia for guidance, because every Roaming ICC
Judge, Prosecutor, and Defense attorney will know that it can rely on Roaming
ICC case law in light of the standardized laws and rules applied at every Roaming
ICC proceeding. In light of regional and international officials participating in
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many facets of a Roaming ICC proceeding, all Roaming ICC proceedings will
supply a level of transparency that is not provided to the international community
attempting to monitor a domestic State practicing international criminal law on its
own. Such a level of transparency will deter Roaming ICC State Parties from
actively undermining a Roaming ICC proceeding as well. Even if a State Party did
disrupt a Roaming ICC proceeding, the level of transparency afforded would give
the international community opportunity to bear legal and political pressure on the
State Party to alter its harmful policies.
All of these above attributes, which are very important to proponents of the
current ICC, are only realized if all the world's States agree to the substantive and
procedural laws to be used by the Roaming ICC framework, and subsequently
enact them into every State Parties' domestic law. Yet, the hard work and years
that it might take to accomplish such a task will ensure legal consistency within the
Roaming ICC framework, and accordingly, alleviate any apprehension that
Roaming ICC judicial proceedings will be varied and unfair.
V. CONCLUSION: APPEASES BOTH SIDES OF THE DEBATE
As this Note has traced the development of international criminal law,
specifically the international institutions trusted to adjudicate and enforce them, the
consistent theme throughout has been the battle between sovereignty and the
international rule of law. No matter what the answer to the riddle on enforcing
international criminal law may be, it is undeniable that the conflict between
sovereignty and the international rule of law sits squarely on top of the answer.
Regardless of the approach, the clash between sovereignty and international rule of
law has to be resolved in order to reach the solution.
For centuries, the dominant thought on enforcing international criminal law
assuming that countries even agreed on what international criminal law is has
surrounded compromise. How far can we push sovereignty on the creation of an
international criminal system without sovereign States walking away from the
table? How far can we undermine international rule of law in creating an
international criminal enforcement mechanism until those that support
international criminal law walk away from the table? The magical middle ground
was sought, but never to be attained. The focus must switch from compromise to
engineering an international criminal enforcement mechanism that does not need to
stomp on either sovereignty or the international rule of law in order to become a
reality.
The Roaming ICC has, at the very least, made strides towards achieving this
engineering feat.412 Tallying all of the advantages of the Roaming ICC, both
proponents of sovereignty and proponents of the international rule of law will get
an international criminal system that will appease both sides.413 For the proponents
412. Obviously, the Roaming ICC proposal is in a rude, preliminary form as offered in this Note.
Yet, the theory still has the potential to accomplish what it claims it can accomplish.
413. Throughout this Note, the proponents of sovereignty and the opponents of the current ICC are
one in the same. Conversely, proponents of the international rule of law and the proponents of the
current ICC are one in the same as well.
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of the international rule of law, the Roaming ICC will be an effective,
comprehensive, and transparent international criminal system that is capable of
delivering consistent and fair judicial proceedings to every corner of the globe.
More importantly, the Roaming ICC will provide advantages, such as ability to
avoid disenfranchising the local population and a better ability to sustain a judicial
proceeding, that international rule of law proponents wish were included in the
current ICC. For the defenders of sovereignty, the Roaming ICC will not be a
foreign entity bent on snatching their citizens away to a far away court. Rather, the
Roaming ICC will hold judicial proceedings right in the sovereign State Party's
own territory and allow their own Judges and their own Prosecutor to assert
influence over every prosecutorial and judicial decision. Most beneficial to the
proponents of both sovereignty and the international rule of law is the
jurisdictional solution offered by the Roaming ICC, for the Roaming ICC
jurisdiction to adjudicate will either be grounded in a Roaming ICC State Party's
territorial jurisdiction414 or vicarious jurisdiction,4 15 thus creating a quasi-
universal jurisdictional system that both sides of the divide will embrace.
Many of the components of the Roaming ICC proposal may not be earth-
shattering concepts in their own right, but the Roaming ICC is a conceptual
amalgamation of these components that is truly unique. 416 The Roaming ICC takes
many of these already used ideas, and extrapolates on them. The Roaming ICC
seizes on many of these already discussed concepts, and institutionalizes them. The
end result is a coherent system of international criminal enforcement that ensures
the highest level of realistic certainty that sovereign States will work with the
international community to fight international crime on a consistent and uniform
basis, wherever such crime occurs.4t 7
Finally, the reality of creating a Roaming ICC is not far-fetched, for the
substantive law necessary to create the Roaming ICC is already in existence. True,
time will be needed to fashion a set of procedural laws that all Roaming ICC State
414. Pleases the opponents of the ICC.
415. Pleases the proponents of the ICC.
416. For instance, international criminal prosecution via universal jurisdiction is not a ground-
breaking concept, but accomplishing the end result of that concept through an agreement that codifies
an alliance between the use of territorial and vicarious jurisdiction is a ground-breaking idea. Hybrid
tribunals is not a revolutionary idea, but creating an international criminal enforcement mechanism that
would allow for the creation of hybrid tribunals overnight through an agreement between sovereign
States and the international community is revolutionary.
417. Another way to think of the Roaming ICC is that it is a structural guarantee on the promise of
suppression convention. In an ideal world, suppression convention would be all the world would need
to fight international crimes, because every State would prosecute international crimes that occurred
within their territory or extradite the international criminal to a State that would prosecute them. Yet,
sovereign States were free to disobey their obligations set forth in these suppression conventions,
because there was no real consequences for disobeying. The Roaming ICC creates a framework
agreement between all sovereign States and the international community that gives motivation to
sovereign States to allow for the joint adjudication of international crimes by the State itself and the
international community-represented by the Presidential and Regional Authorities-within their
territory, and further ensures that these adjudications will always takes place, and always be fair and
consistent.
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Parties will accept, and even more time to allow the adoption of the entirety of
Roaming ICC's laws into the domestic law of each nation. However, the time
necessary to accomplish these feats is a small price to pay if the end result is a
system that both proponents of sovereignty and the international rule of law will
support. And an even smaller price to pay for a system that is capable of and
designed to eradicate international crime in a State-centric world of international
law.
THE EVOLUTION AND ENDPOINT OF RESPONSIBILITY: THE FCPA,
SOX, SOCIALIST-ORIENTED GOVERNMENTS, GRATUITOUS
PROMISES, AND A NOVEL CSR CODE
Aaron Einhorn'
Multinational corporations (MNC) have emerged as engines of global
development. Over the past fifty years, the number of multinational corporations,
the value of multinationals' investments in foreign countries, and the amount of
multinationals' wealth have increased dramatically.1  MNCs in developed
countries have taken advantage of well educated and inexpensive labor in
developing countries, allowing them to cut costs and generate higher profit
margins.2 The end of the Cold War ushered previously closed economies across
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China into the global economy,
opening untapped markets.3 Trade liberalization, engineered by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and its member states, has fostered new business
relationships and eased corporate access to markets, goods, and services. Foreign
direct investment (FDI), defined as "a lasting interest by a resident entity in one
economy... in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor," has
grown exponentially. 4 In 1989, global FDI stood just below $200 billion.5 Seven
* Managing Editor, 2006-2007, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
1. See Earl H. Fry, North American Economic Integration: Policy Options, 9 POLICY PAPERS ON
THE AMERICAS 8, 2 (2003) (estimating also that, in 2002, approximately 65,000 multinationals operated
850,000 subsidiaries around the world); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational
Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 57 (2002) (highlighting that, while
nineteen countries had revenues greater than General Motors and only three corporations were among
the world's twenty-eight largest economic entities in 1991, in 2000 only seven countries had revenues
greater than General Motors and fifteen corporations were among the world's twenty-eight largest
economic entities); Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005), in UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D (2005) (reporting that in 1970 FDI
worldwide totaled $13.4 billion whereas in 1985 it totaled $58.0 billion and in 2005 totaled $945
billion, down from a high of $ 1.4 trillion in 2000); see also PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON,
GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION (Polity Press 2d ed. 1999) (discussing how, between 1945 and the
present, the world economy has become more closely integrated).
2. PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MAP IN THE 2 1 sT
CENTURY 26-51 (4th ed. 2003).
3. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 180-94 (2003) (discussing
how a transition to market economies has had positive and negative effects on the economies of former
communist states); Peter Wilkin, Revising the Democratic Revolution - Into the Americas, 24 THIRD
WORLD Q. 655, 656 (2003). One hundred and thirteen countries joined the World Trade Organization
at its inception in 1995. One-hundred fifty states are now members.
4. ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT
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years later FDI doubled to just below $400 billion, and by the year 2000 reached
$1.1 trillion.6 While only ten countries' FDI totals surpassed $10 billion in 1985,
corporations in thirty three countries invested over $10 billion abroad in the year
2000.7
The wealth corporations have enjoyed has not existed in isolation. Rather,
greater corporate wealth has produced greater corporate power that corporations
have exercised in both positive and negative manners.
Greater corporate power has cultivated unprecedented advances in health and
education over the past forty years.8 Corporations have developed new medicines,
revolutionized transportation 9, provided employment to millions, and generally
have assisted in raising the standard of living worldwide. 10 Corporations also have
contributed to rapid technological development, particularly in the area of
communications. Fiber optic systems and the internet have revolutionized the
speed at which ideas and knowledge can flow within countries and across
oceans, " forging a synergistic relationship between corporations and technology
that has propagated new technologies and fed corporate power. 12
At the same time, greater corporate power has been associated with a host of
problems. The wealth multinationals have brought to some countries has bypassed
many other countries.' 3 In some cases, the activities of multinational corporations
in developing countries have retarded economic growth. 14  Multinationals have
been accused of committing various human rights violations, such as carrying out
extra-judicial killings and employing child labor.'5  Corporate activities in
INVESTMENT 7 (3d ed. 1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf
5. Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005), supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. DICKEN, supra note 2, at 56.
8. STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 248.
9. DICKEN, supra note 2, at 91-93 (discussing how rapid modernization of transportation systems
has contributed to economic globalization).
10. STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 248.
11. DICKEN, supra note 2, at 95.
12. Id.
13. While this paper is concerned with the overall growth of FDI as that growth informs corporate
power, rather than with an analysis of whether and to what extent FDI is evenly distributed and
contributes to or hinders growth in certain countries, it is important to note that FDI flows to developing
countries are not even and that growth stemming from the internationalization of corporations has
bypassed many countries. While countries such as Thailand, Singapore, and Peru have enjoyed large
amounts of capital inflows and impressive growth, countries throughout Africa, Central America, South
America, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Rim have seen relatively
stagnant and even decreasing FDI totals, and have not shared in the economic growth and poverty
reduction that many other countries have enjoyed. See Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and
Economy (1970-2005), supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., Ronaldo Munck, Neoliberalism, Necessitarianism and Alternatives in Latin
America: there is no alternative (TINA)?, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 495, 501-03 (2003) (discussing how the
collapse of Argentina's economy in 2001 is largely attributable to the neoliberal prescriptions and the
rapid influx of multinational corporations through privatization of the economy).
15. See e.g, James Glanz & Sabrina Tavernise, Security Firm Faces Criminal Charges in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007.
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developing countries have been associated with environmental degradation,
dangerous work conditions, and mistreatment of indigenous people. 16 However, in
contrast to developed states, developing states have not successfully combated the
harms that have flowed from increased corporate power.17 A number of factors -
including weak domestic and international legal institutions, non-responsive heads
of state, the "race to the bottom,"' 18 and developed countries' economic dominance
- have prevented developing states from effectively addressing the negative
economic and social impacts of corporate activities. 19
The inability of many developing states to manage these problems has
sparked calls for a code of social responsibility that is able to regulate
multinational corporations.2 ° Countries and corporations have responded to these
cries. The United States and member States of the European Union (EU), the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United
16. See Sarah M. Hall, Mulitnational Corporations' Post-UNOCAL Liabilities for Violations of
International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 401, 416-17 (2002); Douglass Cassel, International
Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can International Law Truly Effect Global Political and Economic
Stability? Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1963,
1964-66 (1996); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 128 (Anchor Books 1999) (stating that
the rationale of the market mechanism, by which corporations operate, is geared to private goods, like
clothes and food, rather than public goods, like the environment).
17. In the United States, for example, from 1897 to 1934 the United States Supreme Court struck
down numerous state laws regulating working conditions under the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court's rulings held that the states
cannot use their police powers to enact legislation that interferes with employers' and employees' rights
to contract. As examples, the Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute forbidding employment in
bakeries for more than 60 hours a week, struck down labor legislation forbidding discrimination by
employers for union activity and prohibiting employers from requiring employees to sign "yellow dog"
contracts, and ruled that a federal statute prescribing minimum wages for women violated due process.
Many of the issues that the courts refused to address - unhealthy working conditions, discrimination,
and wages - are problems plaguing developing countries. In 1937, however, the Court reversed fifty
years of precedence. After its landmark opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Supreme Court
began upholding as constitutional legislation that protected workers' rights and consumers' rights and
that interfered with the previously unfettered rights of business. Statutes that set a state minimum wage
for women, prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of "filled milk", fixed maximum fees for
employment agencies, and regulated opticians were now held to be constitutional. Since 1937, the
judiciary and legislators have established huge bodies of law that protect workers and consumers and
that regulate corporate power. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 274-304 (9th ed.
West Publishing, 2001).
18. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 671-74 (1998). Discussions on bilateral
investment treaties often refer to a "race to the bottom." Competition over foreign direct investment
(FDI) can be fierce. This competition prompts countries to offer increasingly attractive incentives to
corporations in order to receive FDI. Thus, country A may allow company XYZ to repatriate profits.
Country B may then allow company XYZ to repatriate profits and may lower taxation of profits to 2%.
In turn, country A lowers taxation to 1% and frees company XYZ from pollution controls. This
competition for FDI via added concessions will continue until the costs of such concessions exceeds
their benefits.
19. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
20. Id. at 448.
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Nations (UN), and the International Labor Organization (ILO) have developed
codes that place non-binding social responsibilities on corporations.21 In addition,
many corporations voluntarily have drafted and adopted their own codes of
conduct, though, similar to measures drafted by intergovernmental organizations
(IGO), these codes are not legally binding.22
Because existing codes of conduct have limited ability to prevent and redress
corporate human rights abuses, the debate on whether to draft and how to structure
a binding corporate social responsibility (CSR) code continues. This article enters
that debate. It discusses events and circumstances occurring within the United
States, other countries, and the international community which, when viewed in
light of one another, suggest that states and corporations are moving towards
creating an enforceable code of corporate social responsibility. After discussing
these forces, this article offers an organizational framework for developing a CSR
code.
The article's first section examines corruption and bribery. It discusses
problems corruption creates in developed states and charts the evolution of U.S.
and international measures to combat corruption; measures which have placed
greater responsibilities upon corporations. The article's second section takes a
similar approach, first discussing broad corporate governance concerns that
surfaced over the past decade and then considering how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX), and similar measures in Europe, have addressed these concerns.
After charting how the United States and European Union have placed greater
responsibilities upon corporations, the article analyzes a different force
contributing to the development of a CSR code. The article's third section
explains how the rise of socialist-oriented (SO) governments in Latin America will
advance progress towards a code of corporate social responsibility. Next, the
article's fourth section discusses human rights abuses and social harms that have
accompanied the spread of MNCs through developing states. This section then
analyses the various CSR measures the international community and multinational
corporations have adopted to counter these harms. The paper's fifth section
explains why the CSR measures that states, intergovernmental organizations, and
multinationals have enacted cannot successfully regulate corporate activity and
proposes a new and potentially useful framework for developing a CSR code.
Last, the sixth and final section ties together the information presented in previous
sections, summarizes how that information supports the article's thesis, and draws
conclusions.
I. CORRUPTION: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES
While corruption is more pervasive in developing countries, it also produces
serious problems in developed states.23 When the magnitude of multinational
21. See infra notes 205,212, 215,218.
22. See infra notes 229, 230, 231, 232.
23. In developing states, corruption's effects are more varied and acute than in developed states.
Corruption undermines effective business practices and corrodes political institutions, leading to tainted
judiciaries, vote buying, venal police more concerned with collecting bribes than pursuing criminals,
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corporations' bribery of foreign officials came to light in the United States during
the 1970s, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or the Act).
In 1998, the U.S. adopted a second round of amendments to the FCPA, enlarging
its jurisdiction and expanding its substance. By the turn of the century, states
worldwide had joined the battle against bribery, ratifying several anti-corruption
treaties. Analysis of how anti-corruption measures have evolved reveals that, over
time, states have placed greater responsibilities on corporations and have cut more
deeply into corporate power. This trend of imposing greater responsibilities on
corporations, when viewed in light of other events such as enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the rise of SO governments in Latin America, and the
development of non-binding CSR codes, suggests a binding code of corporate
social responsibility lies on the horizon.
A. Problems Caused by Corruption
Corruption breeds various problems. When multinational corporations bribe
foreign officials to obtain contracts or secure more relaxed regulations, their venal
activities undermine effective business practices. 24  Bribery "can damage a
company's image, lead to costly lawsuits, cause the cancellation of contracts, and
result in the appropriation of valuable assets overseas. 25  Bribery also inflates
operating expenses, creating new costs companies would not absorb if they
obtained business legally, and wastes valuable resources.26 Instead of devoting
earnings to research and development, infrastructure, or shareholder dividends,
companies that pay bribes direct profits into foreign officials' pockets.27 As is
common in other regulatory contexts, a "race to the bottom" ensues.28  Officials
demand greater and greater sums. Corporations, competing with one another for
business, pay larger and larger bribes for access to markets and favorable treatment
until the marginal benefit of new payments decreases to zero.29 Such behavior is
not good for business.
In 1976, more than four hundred U.S. companies admitted to paying over
$300 million in bribes to foreign officials during the first half of the 1970s. 30 Gulf
Oil Corporation admitted to paying bribes in various countries, including $4
and weak rule of law. In-depth discussion of the effects of corruption in developing states is beyond the
scope of this paper. For a detailed analysis, see Tim Harford, Why Poor Countries are Poor, 37
REASON 32, 36 (2006); Robert Zuzowski, Corruption in Post-Communist Europe: Immorality Breeds
Poverty, 30 J. OF SOC. POL. AND ECON. STUD. 9, 12-15 (2005).
24. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977).
25. Id. at 5.
26. Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International Bribery and
Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 70-71 (2001).
27. Id. at 70-71.
28. Cf Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antinomies of the
Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 731, 751 (1998) (stating that
smaller countries with weaker economies often feel pressured to offer incentives that they cannot
afford).
29. Cf Guzman, supra note 18, at 671-74. Although Guzman discusses the race to the bottom in
the context of bilateral treaties, the concept applies to the spiraling effects of corruption.
30. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4
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million to the governing political party in South Korea; General Tire & Rubber
Company admitted to bribes in Algeria, Mexico and Venezuela; and Exxon
Corporation disclosed bribes in fifteen countries, including $19 million in Italy
alone.3' Most dramatically, the SEC discovered that Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation, at that time the largest defense contractor in the United States, had
been bribing prime ministers, presidents, and other high-ranking political figures in
several countries.32 By the end of 1976, updated studies revealed four hundred and
fifty U.S. companies had paid over $450 million in bribes since the decade
began.33
This pervasive corruption sparked government action. In 1977, officially
recognizing that "corporate bribery is bad business" and that it affects "the very
stability of business overseas" as well as "our domestic competitive climate, 34
the United States Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to reign in
corruption.35
B. The U.S. Response to Corruption: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act consists of two general sections: one that
establishes record keeping and internal controls regulations and another that
prohibits bribery of foreign officials. While the FCPA was first passed in 1977,
amendments in 198836 and 1998 refined the Act and broadened its scope.
Comparison of the 1977 and 1998 versions reveals the United States has placed
greater and greater responsibilities on corporations.
1. The FCPA at the Time of its Passage
The first section of the FCPA creates record keeping and internal controls
standards. Since the Act's inception, this section has required issuers with
securities registered under the Securities and Exchange Acts to "make and keep
books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
31. DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE
FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 4 (2d ed. 1999).
32. Id. at 4-5; Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 595-96 (2002).
33. CRUVER, supra note 31, at 3.
34. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED
DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/1977sen.htm
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 95-114].
35. Pub L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2.
36. Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of
Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 189-92 (1994). The 1988 amendments made several changes to the Act.
Some changes moderated the FCPA's anti-bribery restrictions, such as inclusion of an affirmative
defense allowing a corporation to avoid prosecution if its payments to a foreign official are allowed
under the written laws of that foreign official's country. Other amendments made the Act more
punitive, such as a significant fine increase. While these amendments are notable, this paper does not
discuss the 1988 amendments. Rather, this paper is concerned with the 1998 amendments, as those
amendments not only expanded the FCPA's scope more significantly, but also are the most recent
amendments and, as such, inform the trend towards imposing greater responsibilities upon corporations.
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reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer., 37 The Act
broadly defines records to include "accounts, correspondence, memorandums,
tapes, disks, paper, books, and other documents or transcribed information of any
type.... , Both qualitative omissions, such as omission of a questionable payment
to a foreign official, and qualitative omissions, such as mischaracterization of a
payment, are proscribed under the record keeping provision. 39  Since 1977, the
FCPA also has required issuers to "devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls" in order to improve corporate accountability and allow
corporate directors, officers, and shareholders to detect and prevent the unlawful
use of an issuer's assets. 40  An issuer violates this provision if it knowingly
circumvents or fails to implement a system of internal accounting controls.
4 1
The accounting and control provisions, one of the first federal laws to
mandate compliance with corporate governance standards, have allowed the SEC
to detect, investigate, and prosecute bribery.42 For example, in 1996 the SEC
brought an action against Montedison, an Italian industrial conglomerate whose
shares are traded domestically within the United States.43 The SEC alleged
Montedison violated the record keeping provision by disguising several hundred
million dollars in bribes to Italian politicians.44 Five years later Montedison settled
with the SEC, agreeing to pay a $300,000 fine.45 Similarly, in 1997 the SEC filed
a complaint against Triton Indonesia, a subsidiary of Triton Energy Corporation,
alleging it "failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting
controls. '46 Triton agreed to a final judgment that enjoins it from violating the
FCPA and exacts a $300,000 fine. 47 More recently, the SEC issued a cease-and-
37. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(A); see also15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(7) (defming "reasonable detail" as
"such level of detail.., as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.").
38. 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(37).
39. CRUVER, supra note 31, at 26-27.
40. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B). The Act specifically states that issuers must "provide reasonable
assurances that: (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles...; and (iii) access to assets is permitted only
in accordance with management's general or specific authorization ......
41. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(5).
42. Schroth, supra note 32, at 599-601 (noting that these are the first laws requiring corporate
compliance with corporate governance standards, and giving the SEC the ability to regulate the internal
management of domestic corporations); see also H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 7, 9-16 (1998) (dubbing the FCPA "a
significant expansion of the SEC's regulatory authority over the internal management of public
corporations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.").
43. SEC v. Montedison, Litigation Release No. 16948, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. 1380 (March 30, 2001) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl6948.htm.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., Litiation Release No. 15266, Accounting and Auditing
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desist order and levied a $100,000 fine against Chiquita Brands as a result of
internal control violations by its Colombian subsidiary, Banadex.48
While the record keeping and internal controls measures have helped to
combat bribery, the heart of the FCPA lies in its anti-bribery provisions. Since
1977, Congress has applied the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions to both "issuers'"
and "domestic concerns. 49  An issuer is any entity that must register under
Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act or that must file reports under
Section 15(d) of that Act. 50 Domestic concerns include U.S. nationals; a juridical
entity organized under U.S. law or with its principal place of business within the
United States; and any officer, agent, employee, or stockholder of a domestic
concern.5 1 Under this definition, a domestic concern employed by a foreign entity
or subsidiary is amenable to suit under the anti-bribery provisions while his or her
principal or employer is not.52
Although Congress expanded the FCPA in 1998, since 1977 Congress has
required the government to prove the same five, general elements to establish a
violation of the Act. First, the entity making a payment must act corruptly. 3
While the Act does not define the term "corruptly", the Eighth Circuit has stated
that, for purposes of the FCPA, a corrupt act is "intended to induce the recipient to
misuse his official position or to influence someone else to do so" or is "done
voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose of accomplishing either an
unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or
means."
54
Second, the entity must use the mail or any other means of interstate
commerce in furtherance of an offer, payment, or promise to pay anything of
value. 55 Cases not involving the FCPA have held that, under the federal mail fraud
statute, a use of the mail that is merely "incident to an essential part of the scheme"
constitutes use of the mail.5 6 More directly, a United States citizen who traveled to
Nigeria with six gold watches intended as bribes for Nigerian officials made use of
interstate commerce. 7  These expansive definitions impose heightened
responsibilities upon corporations.
The third element the government must establish is an offer, payment, or
promise of value made to any foreign official, foreign political party, party official,
48. In re Chiquita Brands International, Inc., FCPA Civil Enforcement Actions by the Securities
and Exchange Commission at 3, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/append/ix/appendixb.pdf.
49. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
NoRMs 7 (ABA Publishing, 2005).
50. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-l(a).
51. DEMING, supra note 49, at 8-9.
52. Id. at 9.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a).
54. United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
56. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989).
57. Alder v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23419 (S.D. Cal. 1998), affirmed
219 F.3d 869, 878 (9th Cir. 2000).
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or foreign candidate for political office. 58 This element is satisfied if an issuer or
domestic concern knows that a portion of an offer, payment, or promise of value,
although not directly being used to bribe a foreign official, will be re-given or re-
promised to a foreign official, foreign political party, foreign party official, or
foreign candidate for political office. 59  Thus, this element imposes vicarious
liability on issuers and domestic concerns, holding issuers and domestic concerns
responsible for the acts of third parties who are not amenable to suit under the Act.
For purposes of vicarious liability, knowledge exists if an issuer or domestic
concern is aware a third party is committing bribery, firmly believes that bribery is
substantially certain to occur, or perceives a high probability that bribery will
occur. 60
Vicarious liability demands greater corporate responsibility; compels more
scrupulous oversight of a parent company's subsidiaries, agents, and affiliates; and
holds multinationals accountable when they fail to discharge their obligations. For
example, in 2004 the SEC lodged a complaint against Vetco Gray, Inc., a foreign
corporation traded publicly in the U.S. 61 The complaint alleged Vecto Gray was
vicariously liable for payments it made to its foreign subsidiaries because it knew
the subsidiaries used the payments to secure oil contracts in Nigeria, Angola, and
Kazakhstan through bribery.62 Vecto Gray agreed to a $5.9 million settlement the
day the SEC filed its complaint in Federal District Court.6 3 Similarly, if an issuer
or domestic concern makes a payment to a foreign sales agent while consciously
disregarding information suggesting the agent will use that money to make an
improper payment, the issuer or domestic concern likely has violated the Act's
vicarious liability provision.64
Since 1977, the fourth element of the anti-bribery regulations has required
payments to be made for the purpose of influencing an official act or decision;
inducing the official to do any act in violation of his lawful duty; or inducing an
official to use his power to affect a government act or decision.65 The issuer or
domestic concern need not offer payment for the purpose of influencing the foreign
official's own government. Rather, pursuant to the Act's broad language, if an
issuer or domestic concern pays a foreign official for the purpose of influencing
the U.S. government or a private enterprise, and if all other elements are met, that
payment would violate the Act.66
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(I)(2), 78dd-2(a)(1)(2).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(h)(3), 78dd-2(h)(3).
61. SEC v. ABB Ltd, Complaint at 2, July 6, 2004, available at
http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp 8775.pdf.
62. Id.
63. SEC Sues ABB Ltd. in Foreign Bribery Case, Litigation Release No. 18775, July 6, 2004,
available at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl 8775.htm.
64. DEMING, supra note 49, at 33.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
66. DEMING, supra note 49, at 14.
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Fifth, to establish a violation of the FCPA the government must prove the
issuer or domestic concern, in offering a payment, sought to obtain or retain
67business for any person. This sweeping language has made it easier to address
"the concern of Congress with the immorality, inefficiency, and unethical character
of bribery....6 Two cases illustrate this point. First, in SEC v. Monsanto, the
SEC concluded that Monsanto's authorization of $50,000 in illicit payments from
an Indonesian consulting firm to a senior Indonesian official, in exchange for
repeal of legislation that had adversely affected Monsanto's business, constituted a
payment offered to assist in obtaining business. 69 Similarly, in United States v.
Kay the Fifth Circuit stated that "Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly
to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining
or retaining business for some person. 7 °  The court held that bribes paid to
customs officials in order to receive reduced customs and tax rates fall within the
Act's proscription if "the bribery was intended to produce an effect-here, through
tax savings-that would 'assist in obtaining or retaining business."'
71
2. The 1998 Amendments
In 1998, Congress amended the FCPA to conform to the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Convention).72 The 1998 amendments broadened the Act's
jurisdiction and substance, permitting the government to investigate and prosecute
more acts of corruption. This enlargement reflects acknowledgement that deeper,
more extensive measures are necessary to regulate corporate activities, and
comports with the United States' and international community's pattern of placing
greater responsibilities upon multinational corporations.
The 1998 amendments made three important changes to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. First, the amendments greatly enlarged the Act's jurisdiction over
U.S. nationals and foreign persons. With regard to U.S. nationals, the Act added a
new subsection stating that:
"[i]t shall also be unlawful for any issuer organized under the laws of
the United States... or for any United States person that is an officer,
director, employee, or agent of such issuer or a stockholder thereof
acting on behalf of such issuer, to corruptly do any act outside the
United States in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to any of the
persons or entities set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of...
subsection (a)... for the purposes set forth therein, irrespective of
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
68. U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2004).
69. SEC v. Monsanto Company, SEC Sues Monsanto Company for Paying a Bribe, Litigation
Release No. 19023 (Jan. 6,2005) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19023.htm.
70. Kay, supra note 68, at 755.
71. Id. at 756.
72. CRUVER, supra note 31, at 74.
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whether such issuer... officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder
makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce....'73 (emphasis added).
This subsection expands the FCPA's nationality jurisdiction. Now, the SEC
can investigate and prosecute issuers and persons acting on behalf of issuers
74
regardless of whether the mails or interstate commerce are used in any way.
Accordingly, if a corporate executive acting on behalf of an issuer, while in a
foreign county, orally offered to fly a foreign official and his family to Spain for
vacation in exchange for the foreign official's opposition to a new minimum wage
law, the executive's offer would violate the Act even though he neither made the
offer in the United States nor utilized the mail or interstate commerce.
The 1998 amendments also broadened the Act's jurisdiction over foreign
persons. Before 1998, foreign issuers organized under U.S. law were the only
foreign entities over whom the United States could assert jurisdiction.76 Since the
amendments, the U.S. can exercise jurisdiction over any person who violates the
Act while in U.S. territory.77 This expansion strengthens the SEC's ability to
combat corruption 78 and is consistent with the United States' and international
community's trend of placing greater responsibilities on corporations.
A recent SEC action against an Indonesian national illustrates the Act's
expanded jurisdiction. In 2001, the SEC and the Department of Justice filed a joint
civil injunction in U.S. District Court against KPMG Siddharta Siddharta &
Harsono (KPMG-SSH), an Indonesian accounting firm, and against Sonny
Harsono, a partner in the firm. 7 9 The complaint alleged Mr. Harsono agreed to pay
an Indonesian tax official $75,000 in order to reduce the official's tax assessment
against one of KPMG-SSH's clients.8 ° Soon after it initiated an action, the SEC
entered an uncontested final judgment against the defendants.81
The 1998 amendments also broadened the Act's substance in two important
ways. First, whereas the FCPA previously was limited to payments made for the
purpose of "influencing" or "inducing" an "act or decision," it now also proscribes
payments made for the purpose of "securing any improper advantage." 82 This
language captures more conduct than the 1977 version and helps to prevent false
claims that a corporation made payments for a legal purpose. For example,
payments made to have the first bid on a government contract, or to arrange a
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(g); see also 78dd-2(i), 78dd-3(a).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Pub L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
78. See Brown, supra note 42, at 19, 29-30.
79. United States & SEC v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono, Litigation Release No. 17127
(Sept. 12, 2001) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/Ir17127.htm.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3)(A)(iii), 78dd-2(a)(3)(A)(iii), 78dd-3(a)(3)(A)(iii)
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favorable location for a factory, likely would be made for the purpose of "securing
any improper advantage" and violate the Act.83
Second, while the Act always has prohibited payments to foreign officials, the
1998 amendments expanded the definition of "foreign official" to include "any
officer or employee.., of a public international organization, or any person acting
in an official capacity or on behalf of any such... public international
organization." 84  By defining "foreign official" to include representatives of
international organizations, Congress has recognized that international
organizations play a vital role and their officials are susceptible to bribery.
C. International Anti-Corruption Measures
The international community has joined the fight against corruption. Over the
past ten years, several IGOs have implemented anti-bribery conventions. The
OECD, recognizing that "bribery... raises serious moral and political concerns,
undermines.., economic development, and distorts international competitive
conditions," drafted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions 85 Likewise, the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption (IA Convention), ratified by thirty three Latin
American and Caribbean states, stresses that "fighting corruption strengthens
democratic institutions and prevents distortions in the economy. 86 The Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (CoE Convention), ratified by
fifty two countries,87 and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UN
Convention), which one hundred forty countries have signed though only fifty one
have ratified, express similar concerns.88 Regulations in these conventions in
some ways exceed regulations in the FCPA.
Each of these conventions requires signatories to cooperate in fighting
corruption. The OECD Convention requires states to "provide prompt and
effective legal assistance" to one another.89 Signatories must cooperate with
criminal investigations, non-criminal investigations, and other proceedings that fall
within the scope of the Convention.9" The UN Convention and the IA Convention
incorporate similar duties. The UN Convention obliges states to furnish one
another with as much legal assistance as their domestic laws allow.9 Article XIV
of the IA Convention requires Parties to provide "mutual technical cooperation",
83. Id.
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f), 78dd-2(h)(2), 78dd-3(f).
85. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions
pmbl., Dec. 18, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
86. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption pmbl., Mar. 29, 1996, 35 1.L.M. 724
[hereinafter IA Convention].
87. Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505
[hereinafter CoE Convention].
88. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct.
31, 2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004), available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
89. OECD Convention, supra note 85, at art. 9.
90. Id.
91. U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at art. 46.
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which includes sharing knowledge of how to fight corruption most effectively,92
Collectively, these provisions demonstrate that countries worldwide are committed
to closely regulating multinationals' activities within their borders.
Each of these conventions also requires signatories to establish systems for
monitoring compliance. 93 OECD states must create "a programme of systematic
follow-up to monitor and promote full implementation of the Convention. 9 4 The
UN Convention creates a "Conference of the States Parties to the Convention,"
which must develop processes for reviewing compliance and exchanging ideas on
how to further the Convention's goals. 95 The CoE Convention simply requires
signatories to "monitor the implementation of th[e] Convention," while the
Follow-up on the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and its Program
for Cooperation require signatories to review compliance with the IA Convention
periodically. 96 These monitoring systems, absent from the FCPA, illustrate the
intemational community's commitment to fighting corruption and regulating
MNCs more closely.
D. Conclusion
Corruption undermines efficient business practices and wastes valuable
resources. Efforts to combat corruption have intensified gradually. The United
States first outlawed corporate bribery of foreign officials in 1977 with passage of
the FCPA. Since then, the U.S. has placed greater and greater anti-corruption
responsibilities on corporations, broadening the Act's jurisdiction and expanding
its substance. States worldwide have followed suit, adopting treaties which, in
some areas, exceed the FCPA's exacting standards. When the evolution of anti-
corruption measures is viewed in light of the development of heightened corporate
governance standards, and in light of events such as the rise of socialist-oriented
governments in Latin America and the passage of non-binding CSR measures, the
creation of a corporate social responsibility code appears on the horizon.
II. BEHIND SOX: REASONS FOR IMPOSING EVEN MORE CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY
At the start of the 2 1st century, broad corporate governance problems captured
the attention of the United States and the international community. Responses to
these problems, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and similar measures developed
by the United Kingdom and the European Union, established new corporate
governance and management systems, and placed greater responsibilities upon
corporations. Analysis of these corporate governance regulations, when viewed in
92. IA Convention, supra note 86, at art. XIV.
93. U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at art. 63; CoE Convention, supra note 87, at art. 24; OECD
Convention, supra note 85, at art. 12; Follow-up on the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
and its Program for Cooperation AG/RES. 1784 (XXXI-O/01), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 244 (2002).
94. OECD Convention, supra note 85, at art. 12.
95. U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at art. 63.
96. CoE Convention, supra note 87, at art. 24; Follow-up on the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption and its Program for Cooperation AG/RES. 1784 (XXXI-O/01), reprinted in 41
I.L.M. 244 (2002).
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light of the evolution of anti-corruption legislation, the rise of socialist-oriented
governments in Latin America, and the development of non-binding CSR
measures, reveals the international community is moving towards a binding CSR
code.
A. Broad Corporate Governance Problems
Corporate governance problems at the beginning of the twenty-first century
undermined democratic institutions and weakened confidence in the U.S.
economy. 97 While these problems varied in character and severity, combined they
contributed to investment losses, the closure of many businesses, and the
weakening of the U.S. and global economies. 98
The main corporate governance problem was deceitful accounting practices,
such as those employed by Enron and other corporations.99 While Enron grew
tremendously during the 1990s and early part of the twenty-first century, it
obtained much of its profits through fraudulently constructed transactions. 1°° To
improve its financial appearance to investors, Enron fabricated special purpose
entities that operated as partnerships with outside interests, allowing Enron to treat
them as independent entities, remove them from its consolidated balance sheet, and
hide losses. 101  Arthur Anderson, Enron's auditors, approved these "creative
compliance" techniques that were designed to impassion investors and deceive the
public. 0 2 Shortly after Enron filed for bankruptcy, investigations revealed these
entities were concealing $13.15 billion in debt and an additional $27 billion in
liabilities. 10 3 Enron's collapse was not an isolated incident. In 2002, WorldCom
admitted it had overstated its earnings by $11 billion and declared bankruptcy
while claiming $110 billion in assets, the largest bankruptcy in American
97. Justin O'Brien, Governing the Corporation: Regulation and Corporate Governance in an Age
of Scandal and Global Markets, in GOVERNING THE CORPORATION 3 (Justin O'Brien ed., 2005).
98. See J.R. Romanko, The Way We Live Now: 6-9-02: Salient Facts; Down from the Peaks, N.Y
TIMES, June 6, 2002, at 34 (citing an unemployment rate in April, 2002, of 6% compared to 3.9% in
April, 2000); Daniel Altman, U.S. Jobless Rate Increases to 6.4%, Highest in 9 Years, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 2003, at AI; Scott Bernard Nelson, Fed Holds Rates Steady - For Now Revises Stance, Calls U.S.
Economy Fragile, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 2002, at DI (quoting the federal reserve as saying, "[t]he
softening in the growth of aggregate demand that emerged this spring has been prolonged in large
measure by weakness in financial markets and heightened uncertainty related to problems in corporate
reporting and governance.").
99. Enron Corporation began as a natural gas company, expanded its operations worldwide,
pressed into other industries, and was touted as a model for the new, competitive, corporate America.
100. DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE
AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 175-76 (Oxford University Press, 2005).
101. Peter T. Muchlinski, Enron and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the
Internationalization of Governance and Disclosure Regimes, 37 CONN. L. REV. 725, 730-31 (2005).
Enron's use and proliferation of SPEs grew out of SEC guidelines stating that corporations can treat
SPEs independently under accounting practices if an owner of a company that does business with the
SPE contributes an equity investment of at least 3% of the SPE's assets and if the independent owner
maintains control over the SPE.
102. Doreen McBamet, After Enron: Corporate Governance, Creative Compliance and the Uses of
Corporate Social Responsibility, in GOVERNING THE CORPORATION 209 (Justin O'Brien ed., 2005).
103. Jonathan Shirley, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (2004).
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history.' 0 4 Similar events unfolded at Global Crossing, a company that invested in
fiber optic cables and filed for bankruptcy in January, 2002 with billions of dollars
in assets and liabilities. 10 5  Authorities also uncovered hidden transactions and
veiled debts outside the balance sheet of Adelphia Inc., a prominent cable
company. 106
Another serious corporate governance problem for many corporations was
their auditor selection processes. Before SOX, a company's chief financial officer




However, most big accounting firms not only performed audits, but also earned
significant revenue through consulting. By 1998, Wall Street's major accounting
firms garnered only 38% of their revenue through audits.' 0 8  This change
practically transformed auditing firms into "consulting companies that did a little
auditing on the side,"' 1 9 in an arrangement that reposed considerable power in
CFOs. Whereas CFOs previously hesitated to discharge auditors who did not
approve certain corporate structures and transactions out of fear that discharge
would prompt closer analysis of accounts, concern among investors, and market
backlash, by the year 2000 CFOs could threaten to cut consulting business if
auditors refused to approve questionable transactions. 10  As auditors grew
reluctant to investigate suspect accounting practices, the balance of power shifted
heavily towards CFOs and their corporations.
A final corporate governance problem that has drawn attention in recent years
is vast increases in executive compensation. While CEOs of S&P 500 companies
earned thirty times more than non-managerial workers in 1970, by 1996 those
same CEOs were earning two hundred and ten times more than the average
worker, with the gap widening further in recent years."' The significance of these
figures does not lie in the sheer difference in pay. Rather, their importance also
stems from the fact that, unlike professional athletes, actors, and others whose
salaries also have grown considerably in recent years, CEOs "essentially set their
own compensation.""12
104. SKEEL, supra note 100, at 175-76.
105. Shirley, supra note 103, at 503-04.
106. Id. at 504.
107. SKEEL, supra note 100, at 179.
108. Id. at 166-67.
109. Id. (noting that in 2000 and 2001, Arthur Anderson, Enron's now defunct accounting firm,
earned $25 million a year from Enron for its consulting services and an additional $25 million for
audits).
110. Id.
111. Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 440-41
(2003); David Leonhardt, The Imperial Chief Executive is Suddenly in the Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2002, at Al (stating that top CEOs made approximately 410 times what the average worker
was paid in 2001); Ken Belson, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Learning How to Talk About Salary
in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2002, at 12 (highlighting that executives in Japan make approximately
12 times what the average worker is paid in Japan, whereas executives in the United States made
approximately 180 times what the average worker is paid in the U.S.).
112. Stephen M. Bainbride, Book Note, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1619 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
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These practices prompted close scrutiny of corporate activities, undermined
confidence in corporations, and hurt corporate earnings. As concerns grew,
corporate ills damaged private citizens and the economy." 3 In July 2002, as the
negative impacts of poor corporate governance were spreading across the United
States, "14 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "to address the systemic and
structural weaknesses affecting our capital markets which were revealed by
repeated failures.., in recent months and years," and "[to] increase corporate
responsibility."' 15
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A New Code of Corporate Responsibility
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been heralded as "the most significant piece of
securities legislation since the 1930s. ' ' 116 It has redefined the rules for publicly
traded companies, instituting sweeping changes in corporate governance and
accounting practices. 117  More specifically, auditor controls, certification
procedures, and internal controls requirements have placed greater responsibilities
on corporations." 8
One way SOX has tightened oversight of corporations is through stricter
regulation of audit committees. Until recently, most audit committees convened
COMPENSATION (2004)).
113. See Brian Kim, Sarbanes Oxley Act, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 237 (2003) (noting that
twenty thousand Enron executives lost $1.2 billion from their 401(k) plans during Enron's dissolution);
John Paul Lucci, Enron: The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International Ricochet of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 212 (2003) ("[flinancial scandals involving WorldCom, Qwest,
Global Crossing, Tyco, and Enron ultimately cost shareholders $460 billion."); Ethan G. Zelizer, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Accounting for Corporate Corruption?, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 27, 30 (2002)
(stating that WorldCom's accounting and governance problems resulted in the loss of 20,000 jobs); see
also SEN, supra note 16, at 94 (explaining that unemployment's negative effects spread far beyond loss
of income).
114. See Romanko, supra note 98 at 34 (citing an unemployment rate in April, 2002, of 6%
compared to 3.9% in April, 2000); Altman, supra note 98, at Al; Nelson, supra note 98, at D1 (quoting
the federal reserve as saying "[T]he softening in the growth of aggregate demand that emerged this
spring has been prolonged in large measure by weakness in financial markets and heightened
uncertainty related to problems in corporate reporting and govemance.").
115. S. REP. No. 107-205 (2002).
116. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A
PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm#2.
117. ROBERT R. MOELLER, SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE NEW INTERNAL AUDITING RULES 3
(2004).
118. See THOMAS E. HARTMAN, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA OF SARBANES-OXLEY 3
(2006) (discussing a survey of corporate executives which reveals that a large majority of executives
regard SOX's corporate governance and public disclosure reforms as "too strict", as companies with an
annual revenue under $1 billion experienced a 174% increase in "the cost of being public" from 2001-
2005); Jonathan Treadway, New Regulations Affecting the Banking Industry: Problems with Potential
Application of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Small, Non-Public Banking
Organizations, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 165, 183 (2004) (describing how many small banking firms have
decided not to go public because of the extra expenses that accompany SOX's pervasive regulations);
William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private ", 55
EMORY L.J. 141, 141 (2005) (stating that section 404 compliance cost an average of $823,200 in 2004).
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infrequently and merely rubber stamped the auditor's work.1 19 Many audit
committee members even appeared personally tied to their companies' CEOs.1
20
Sarbanes-Oxley changed this relationship by requiring corporations to develop
independent audit committees. 121 Now, under Section 301, audit committee
members cannot hold any position within a company other than their position as a
member of the audit committee. 122 Likewise, audit committee members may not
"accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer" nor
"be an affiliated person of the issuer" or its subsidiaries. 123 Each audit committee
has plenary responsibility for appointing, overseeing, and setting compensation for
its corporation's public accounting firm. 124 Also, each audit committee must craft
a procedure for funneling employees' complaints of questionable accounting
practices to corporate officers. 125 Furthermore, each audit committee must have at
least one "financial expert," or explain its reasons for not doing so. 126
In addition, Section 201 of SOX prohibits external auditors from providing
additional, non-audit services, including bookkeeping, financial information
systems design, appraisals, investment advice, and "any other service that the
Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible."' 127 Collectively, Sections 201
and 301 create a new corporate governance framework and place new
responsibilities on corporations.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's certification provision also tightens regulation of
corporations. This provision requires each issuer's principal executive and
principal financial officer(s) to certify that he or she has reviewed each annual or
quarterly report and that, based on the officer's knowledge, all material facts in the
report are true, no material facts are omitted, and all financial information is
correct "in all material respects."' 128 By forcing corporate officers to certify their
corporation's financial condition, this provision undercuts an executive's ability to
claim ignorance of faulty financial statements and exacts greater corporate
responsibility.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's internal controls provisions impose SOX's
deepest, most comprehensive regulations. 129  Pursuant to Section 302, each
119. MOELLER, supra note 117, at 59.
120. Id. at 59.
121. Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad To Regulate
Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REV. 849, 873 (2004).
122. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 776 § 301 (2002) (codified
in scattered sections of 1, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter SOX].
123. Id. at 776, § 301.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 790, § 407. To qualify as a financial expert one must have experience auditing
"comparable issuers", "experience with internal accounting controls", and "an understanding of audit
committee functions."
127. Id. at 771-72, § 201.
128. Id. at 777, § 302.
129. See 68 Fed. Reg. 36636 (June 18, 2003) (defining internal controls as "a process designed by,
or under the supervision of ... principal executive and financial officers . . .and effected by the ...
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principal executive and principal financial officer must confirm that he or she has
designed internal controls. 130 These controls must ensure the principal executives
and principal officers know material financial information about the corporation
and its subsidiaries. 13 1  Principal executives and principal officers also must
confirm they have evaluated the effectiveness of these controls. 132 In addition,
Section 302 requires each principal executive and principal officer to confirm that
any significant cause for alarm over the adequacy of the controls has been
disclosed. 133
In addition, pursuant to Section 404, corporate management must: 1) state in
their annual reports management's responsibility for "establishing and maintaining
an adequate internal control structure;" 2) assess the effectiveness of the internal
controls in their annual reports; and 3) have their public accounting fnns "attest to,
and report on" management's assessment. 134
Comparison of the FCPA's and SOX's internal controls provisions reveals the
trend towards placing greater responsibilities on corporations. The FCPA's internal
controls provisions, initially drafted thirty years ago, simply declare that issuers
must design and maintain internal controls, but does not require evaluation or
analysis. 135 Conversely, sections 302 and 404 of SOX together require corporate
executives to state their responsibility for designing internal controls, to create
such controls, to assess and evaluate these controls, and to draw conclusions about
their effectiveness. 136 While the FCPA places responsibility for internal controls
upon the corporation in general, 137 SOX specifically charges executive officers
with internal controls duties. 138  Thus, internal controls have been transformed
from a recitation of general duties lodged upon the corporation as a whole to a
statement of specific duties 139 imposed on corporate executives in particular.
Although the audit committee, certification, and internal controls provisions
have placed the greatest responsibilities on corporations, other sections of SOX
have had a similar effect. An ethics provision requires corporations to "disclose
whether or not, and if not, the reason therefor," they have "adopted a code of ethics
board of directors ... to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and
the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles... ").
130. SOX at 777, § 302.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id; see also Final Rule: Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual
Reports, Securities Act and Exchange Release Nos. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,726
(Aug. 29, 2002) (specifying that CEOs and CFOs may not delegate their Section 302 duties to any
subordinate).
134. SOX at 789, § 404.
135. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B).
136. SOX at 777, § 301; SOX at 789 § 404.
137. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B).
138. SOX at 777, § 301; SOX at 789 § 404.
139. See 68 Fed Reg. 36636 (adopting rules for the implementation of Section 404).
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for senior financial officers." 140 In addition, pursuant to section 402, corporations
no longer may "extend or maintain credit... in the form of a personal loan to... any
director or executive officer," even if done indirectly through a subsidiary. '
4 ' This
proscription creates new corporate responsibilities. Finally, Section 806 of
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits corporations and their constituents from discharging,
demoting, suspending, harassing, threatening, or otherwise discriminating against
any employee who informs the government of corporate conduct that may violate
an SEC regulation or a federal law involving fraud against shareholders. This
section also provides civil remedies to employees who allege discrimination and
subsequently are sued by their employer, 42 federalizing state statutes protecting
whistle blowers."4 3  Section 806 shifts power from the corporation to its
constituents, a change that is consistent with calls for corporations to assume a new
set of corporate social responsibilities to their employees, communities, and
environments.
C. Corporate Governance Measures in Other Countries
Two years after enactment of SOX, the United Kingdom and the European
Union passed new corporate governance measures. These regulations, consistent
with U.S. regulations, impose greater responsibilities upon corporations.
The United Kingdom's Companies (Audit, Investigation, and Enterprise) Act
of 2004 (the Companies Act) severs close ties between corporations and auditing
firms.'44 Although it does not forbid auditors from performing non-audit services
like section 201 of SOX, it does empower the Secretary of State to pass regulations
requiring corporations to disclose auditors' non-audit services. 14' The Companies
Act also gives auditors unfettered access to company accounts, and allows them to
require corporate executives to provide them with any information needed to
perform their duties 146 In addition, pursuant to the Companies Act's certification
provision, each corporate director must state in his director's report that, "so far as
[he] is aware, there is no relevant audit information of which the company's
auditors are unaware." The director also must certify he has taken all measures
necessary for making himself "aware of any relevant audit information" and for
establishing "that the company's auditors are aware of [such] information."
147
Other provisions set criteria for recognizing supervisory audit bodies, permit the
Secretary of State to make grants to entities that issue accounting standards or
investigate departures from accounting standards, and, with approval by the
140. SOX at 789, § 406; see also MOELLER, supra note 117, at 71-79 (discussing the efforts of
many corporations to establish corporate wide ethics programs in order to increase external legitimacy,
the risk environments that corporations face, the need for an ethics program, and how to establish such a
program).
141. SOX at 787, § 402.
142. Id. at § 806.
143. Karmel, supra note 121, at 867.
144. Companies (Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act of 2004, art. 7, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/40027--b.htm#7 [hereinafter Companies Act].
145. Id.
146. Id. atart. 8.
147. Id. at art. 9.
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Secretary of State, empower individual investigators to compel the production of
documents during investigations. 14
8
The European Union also has adopted measures that place greater
responsibilities on corporations. EU Council Directive 2006/43 (the Directive)
includes several provisions affirming that auditors must operate independently of
their employers. Member States must prohibit auditors from auditing companies
with whom they have "any direct or indirect financial, business, employment or
other relationship."'149 Also, owners and shareholders may not intervene "in the
execution of a statutory audit in any way which jeopardises the independence and
objectivity of the statutory auditor." 150 In addition, the Directive requires member
states to "ensure that all statutory auditors and audit firms are subject to a system
of quality assurance" that operates independent of the auditors and audit firms.
Section 101 of SOX establishes a non-profit organization, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, "to oversee audit of public companies... in
order to protect the interests of investors ... ,,151 The Directive mandates the
creation of a similar body. It calls for "a system of public oversight for statutory
auditors and audit firms," which will "apply to all statutory auditors and audit
firms" and "have ultimate responsibility for.., the approval and registration of
statutory auditors and audit firms, the adoption of standards on professional
ethics... and.., investigative and disciplinary systems."r 1 5 2 By adopting these
measures, the EU has followed the lead of the United States in placing greater
responsibilities upon corporations.
D. Conclusion: Continued Progressive Placement of Heightened Responsibilities
upon Corporations
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to corporate governance
problems that arose in the United States during recent years. SOX tightens
corporate structures, strengthens corporate governance, and places greater
responsibilities on corporations than does the FCPA. Thus, U.S. regulation of
corporate activities has escalated gradually and a similar trend exists
internationally. Although less prescriptive than SOX, the Companies Act and the
Directive also create new corporate governance standards. This evolution of
placing greater responsibilities on corporations, when viewed in light of events
such as the rise of socialist- oriented governments in Latin America, corporate
rights abuses, and the passage of non-binding CSR codes, suggests the
international community will develop a binding CSR code to govern the social
impacts of corporate activities.
148. Id. at arts. 1, 16,21.
149. Council Directive 2006/43, art. 22, 2006 O.J. (L 157) 87 (EC).
150. Id. at art. 24.
151. SOXat750,§ 101.
152. Council Directive 2006/43, supra note 149, at art. 32.
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III. THE GROWTH OF SOCIALIST-ORIENTED GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
Following a wave of democratization in Latin America during the 1980s,
many countries in Latin America adopted neoliberal economic policies.
153
Neoliberal policies reduce a country's economic protections and open its economy
to the international marketplace with minimal government interference. 154 Such
policies were recommended for developing countries by the International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other leading international economic institutions
during the 1990s. 155 In many cases, these institutions conditioned loans and
assistance on countries' willingness to adopt austere macroeconomic fiscal
policies, rapidly privatize state-owned businesses, and quickly liberalize capital
markets. 15 6 Many Latin American countries followed these neoliberal mandates,
curtailing social services,157 removing restraints from capital markets, 158 and
privatizing huge, state-owned industries. 1
59
These measures succeeded for several years and helped to produce economic
growth throughout Latin America. 160  Corporations invested heavily in Latin
America during the 1990s. In 1990, inward FDI to Latin American countries
totaled just over $10 billion. 16' Ten years later, inward FDI had jumped to $114
billion. 162 This spread of foreign corporations was partly attributable to neoliberal
reforms, particularly rapid privatization of many state-run industries. 163 In Brazil,
for example, over one hundred state-owned companies with a value of $61.5
billion were privatized during the 1990s. 164 Similarly, one hundred companies
with a value of approximately $23 billion were privatized in Argentina during the
1990s.165
153. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 59 (2d ed., 1989)
(highlighting the election of civilian presidents in Peru, Argentina, and Brazil during the 1980s and
citing Chile as the only "major exception" to the general rule that Latin America had democratized by
1985).
154. STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 6-8, 74.
155. Id. at 6-8.
156. Id., at 53.
157. Sergio Cabrera Morales, Las Noventa: Hacia la Segunda Dcada Perdida, IN
GLOBALIZACION, EXCLUSION Y DEMOCRACIA EN AMlRICA LATINA 169-170 (Heinz Dieterich ed.,
1997).
158. AUGUSTO DE LA TORRE ET AL., CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT: WHITHER LATIN AMERICA
8, 18 (2006), available at http://www.nber.org/books/lASE05/delatorre-et-a15-23-06.pdf
159. SYBIL RHODES, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND FREE-MARKET CAPITALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 26-
29 (2006) (discussing the rapid privatization of state-owned businesses, particularly the
telecommunications industry, in Latin America during the 1990s).
160. See STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 53 (stating that neoliberal policies initially sparked growth in
Latin America); Gross Domestic Product by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005), in UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D (2005).
161. Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005), supra note 5.
162. Id.
163. Germano Mendes de Paula et al., Economic Liberalization and Changes in Corporate Control
in Latin America, 44 THE DEVELOPING ECONS. 467, 485-87 (2002).
164. Id. at 477-78.
165. Id.
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However, soon after neoliberal policies produced growth in Latin America,
they began to fail. The neoliberal prescription of cutting social spending in order
to maintain macroeconomic health destroyed the social service infrastructures of
many countries.' 66 By the end of the 1990s, sluggish and in many cases negative
economic growth had spread throughout the area. 167  Neoliberal reforms and
extensive FDI received some blame for this economic downturn, 16  enabling
leaders who espoused socialist-oriented policies to assume power in Latin
America. 169 This trend began with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in
1999, and since has spread to eight countries in Central and South America.
170
The degree to which these countries follow socialist policies and values differs
greatly.' 7 1  However, each has adopted SO policies that show their interest in
countering perceived U.S. dominance in the region, protecting workers' rights,
safeguarding national resources, and maintaining control over their economies.1
7 2
Venezuela elected Hugo Chavez as President in 1999.173 Since taking office,
Chavez has spent billions of dollars on education and health care, and has made
"life increasingly miserable for foreign - above all American - companies." 174
Most recently, Chavez announced plans to nationalize Venezuela's
telecommunications and electricity industries, and to transform Venezuela into a
socialist country. 175 Venezuela generally is considered the most SO country in
166. Anthony Hall, From Fome Zero to Bolsa Familia, Social Policies and Poverty Alleviation
Under Lula, 38 J. LATIN AMER. STUDIES 689 (2006).
167. See Latin Focus Consensus Forcast, available at: http://www.latin-
focus.com/latinfocus/countries (showing statistics indicating that GDP failed to grow in Brazil between
1995 and 2002; Argentina's economy was stagnant during 2001 and, during the first quarter of 2002, its
annual economic growth rate declined 16%; and between the middle of 1998 and the middle of 1999,
Venezuela went from experiencing moderately positive to moderately negative economic growth, and
by 2003 was experiencing sharp negative growth before its economy recovered).
168. Francisco Panizza, Unarmed Utopia Revisited: The Resurgence of Left-of-Centre Politics in
Latin America, 53 POL. STUD. 716, 727 (2005); Jorge Castafieda, Latin America's Left Turn, 85:3
FOREIGN AFF. 28 (2006).
169. Consider that Hugo Chavez was elected President of Venezuela shortly after the country went
from experiencing moderately positive to moderately negative economic growth; that Luiz Inhcio Lula
da Silva was elected President of Brazil after a 7 year period during which, after rising and then falling,
Brazil's GDP remained constant; and that Argentina elected Nestor Kirchner after it experienced
economic collapse.
170. Castafieda, supra note 168; Chris Kraul, Ecuador's New President Targets Foreign Debt
Relief L.A, TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at A6.
171. See generally Castafieda, supra note 168.
172. Panizza, supra note 168, at 727.
173. While this article is concerned with economic and social rights in Venezuela since Chavez
came to power, rather than with political rights, it is important to note Venezuela has been criticized by
states and international organizations, including the Organization of American States, for depriving
people of their liberty, condoning extra-judicial killings, and generally failing to protect political rights.
See IACHR, Press Release: IACHR Reports on the Situation of Human Rights at the Conclusion of Its
Session, No. 35/05, Oct. 28, 2005.
174. See Christian Parenti, Hugo Chavez and Petro Populism, NATION, Apr. 11, 2005, at 17
(stating Venezuela has spent billions on social programs that have taught 1.3 million people to read,
provided medical care to millions, and improved infrastructure); Castafieda, supra note 168.
175. Simon Romero, Chavez Begins New Term Vowing Socialism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at
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Latin America; Jorge Castafieda, the Foreign Minister of Mexico under President
Vicente Fox and current professor at New York University, has called Chavez a
populist leader who "does very little for the poor of his own country, 176 and who
pursues "big-time spending, authoritarian governance and militant anti-
Americanism."' 177  However, if Chavez moderates his stance and redirects his
focus on protecting social and economic rights towards development of a CSR
code, a change which seems more likely since Venezuelans rejected a referendum
that would have given Chavez greater constitutional powers, he could wield
tremendous influence in the region. Such pragmatism would advance efforts
toward placing social responsibilities upon corporations.
Luiz In~cio Lula da Silva was elected President of Brazil in 2002, the first
left-wing Brazilian president since 1970.178 Lula has developed socialist policies
"without rejecting the precepts of capitalism." 179  Local-level councils provide
input that shape his party's national agenda, and his government supports the
Landless Rural Worker's Movement, the world's largest movement of rural poor
and a strong advocate of agrarian reform. Lula also has weakened ties with the
United States and strengthened ties with other developing countries such as China,
India, and South Africa, hoping to counter U.S. influence in the region." 0 Thus,
although Brazil follows capitalist ideology, its government also is concerned with
protecting its citizens' social rights and projecting its socialist perspective into the
international community. 18  Because a CSR code would help Brazil's government
achieve these goals, Lula's rise strengthens the likelihood that the international
community will develop a code of corporate social responsibility.
Nestor Kirchner was elected President of Argentina in 2002, following the
former president's resignation in 2001 and the country's economic collapse.'
82
Kirchner initially challenged the IMF, stating that foreign investors would receive
only a small portion of the debt Argentina owed them because he wanted to
conserve funds for social programs. 183  Kirchner later changed his position,
announcing Argentina would pay its debt early, and, in January 2006, made the
A16.
176. See Castafieda, supra note 168.
177. Jorge G. Castafieda, Good Neighbor Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, at A3 1.
178. Panizza, supra note 168, at 716.
179. The Region's Leftward Shift: Identifying, Denying, and Interpreting Divisions, LATIN AM.
WKLY REP., Jan. 31, 2006.
180. Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil Moves to Form "Bloc" Against U.S.: Seeks "South-South"
Cooperation, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at A15.
181. See Simon Romero, Brazil's Objections Slow Chavez's Plans for Regional Bank, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2007, at A12 (noting that Brazil has sought to diminish the clout of a Bank of the South, and
calling Lula a "longtime socialist who embraced market friendly policies once in power... "); Hall,
supra note 166 (discussing how Brazil's enthusiasm for social safety nets has followed the failure of
neoliberal policies and the accompanying destruction of social infrastructure).
182. Panizza, supra note 168, at 717.
183. Colin McMahon, Tension Builds as Argentina Tries to Renegotiate its Defaulted Debt, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 1, 2004; Todd Benson, Argentina Starting Drive to Emerge from Fault, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2005, at C4.
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
country's last payment. 184 Argentina's debt payment showed its willingness to
work within the existing international economic system and pleased foreign
investors. However, Argentina is wary of neoliberal dictates, opposes a free-trade
agreement, and in some instances has aligned closely with Venezuela.'1 5 Thus,
Argentina accepts that foreign investment is necessary for long-term economic
growth, though it also questions and challenges the neoliberal agenda. The new
President of Argentina, Cristina Kirchner, has continued many of the same policies
that her husband developed. Because a CSR code could protect Argentines from
the activities of MNCs and soften neoliberal policies, the election of Kirchner's
government strengthens the likelihood that Argentina will endorse and the
international community will develop a CSR code.
Bolivia recently elected Evo Morales as President. During his campaign,
Morales promised to depart from twenty years of neoliberal reforms that failed to
pull Bolivia from poverty, and to turn towards socialist-oriented policies.' 18 6 Since
taking office, Morales has nationalized Bolivia's oil and gas industry, ordering
troops to occupy foreign-run fields.' 87 Morales has indicated he may nationalize
other sectors as well, such as the mining and forest industries. 88 An Amyara
Indian and past leader of the coca union, Morales also has championed the rights
of the poor and of indigenous people. He has declared that coca, widely used in
Bolivia as a mild medicinal herb, should be treated as a legitimate product, rather
than as an illicit drug. He also has fought multinationals' exploitation of Bolivia's
natural resources. 189 Bolivia's ratification of a CSR code that governs the conduct
of MNCs operating within its borders would further its socialist objectives while
providing it with foreign investment. Accordingly, the election of Morales furthers
the likelihood that developed states, developing states, and multinationals will
adopt a CSR code.
Other countries in Central and South America also have elected SO leaders in
recent years. Ecuador's recently elected president, Rafael Correa, has challenged
foreign corporate interests and supported socialist-oriented policies. 190  For
184. Larry Rohter, As Argentina's Debt Dwindles, President's Power Grows Steadily, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2006, at Al; Colon McMahon, For Argentina, Debt Cut is Payback Time, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13,
2006, at C5.
185. Moises Naim, The Lost Continent, 157 FOREIGN POL'Y, 40 (2006).
186. Daphne Eviatar, Liberating Pachamama: Corporate Greed, Bolivia, and Peasant Resistance,
38:2 DISSENT 22, 25 (2006); MARK WEISBRODT & LUIs SANDOVAL, BOLIVIA'S CHALLENGES 6 (2006)
(stating that Bolivia is South America's poorest country, with an average per capita income of $2,800 as
compared to an average of $8,200 in all of Latin America, with 64% of Bolivians living below the
poverty line).
187. Hector E. Schamis, Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions, 17:4 J. OF DEMOCRACY
20, 32 (2006).
188. Tyler Bridges, Farmers' Fears Highlight Growing Rift with Morales, MIAMI HERALD, June
14, 2006 (noting that foreign mining companies, such as Apex Silver, Coeur d'Alne and Newmont,
together have invested $750 million in Bolivia, at least part of which they stand to lose upon
nationalization.
189. Eviatar, supra note 186, at 26-27.
190. Chris Kraul, Ecuador's New President Targets Foreign Debt Relief L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2007, at A6.
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example, a recent election for Ecuador's constituent assembly gave Correa "a clear
mandate to write a new constitution reflecting '21' century socialism,"'' and
Correa opposes a free trade agreement with the United States. 192 In November,
2006, Nicaragua elected Daniel Ortega, an SO politician, leader of the communist
Sandinista National Liberation Front during the 1980's, and former president of the
county, as its new President. 193 Peru, Chile, and Uruguay also have elected centre-
left leaders over the past few years. 194 The election of these governments should
further efforts to develop a CSR code.
Leaders critical of neoliberal prescriptions and supportive of SO policies have
come to power in Latin America over the past decade. To varying degrees, they
have pursued policies that benefit lower classes and workers, have protected their
domestic industries from the influence of foreign MNCs and, in some cases, have
nationalized major sectors of their economies. Their efforts to combat the harms
that have accompanied the growth of FDI and spread of MNCs in Latin America
are consistent with the goals of a CSR code. Accordingly, the rise of SO
governments in Latin America, when viewed in light of the trend towards placing
greater responsibilities upon corporations, and in light of the adoption of non-
binding CSR codes by IGOS and MNCs, should advance development of a code of
corporate social responsibility.
IV. CORPORATE ABUSES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, THE FAILURE OF THE
RULE OF LAW, AND NON-BINDING CSR MEASURES AS MEANS OF PROTECTING
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
Multinational corporations have been accused of committing human rights
abuses on various occasions and in various countries over the past decade. The
international community has drafted several non-binding corporate human rights
obligations to address these abuses. Likewise, MNCs voluntarily have drafted and
adopted non-binding codes of social conduct. These measures demonstrate that
states and corporations worldwide understand that the absence of an enforceable
regulatory framework for MNCs has created problems. Even more importantly,
these measures show states are willing to place social responsibilities on MNCs,
and MNCs are willing to accept such obligations.
A. Concerns Over Rights Abuses and the Failure of the Rule of Law
Multinational corporations have been accused of violating civil and political
rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; and environmental rights. For
example, it was alleged that U.S. parent company Unocal and its French subsidiary
191. Ecuador: Correa's Victory, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2007.
192. Correa Plans Many Changes: Ecuador is Not Anti-American, New Leader Says, S. FLORIDA
SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2007 at 25A.
193. Adam Thompson, Long Road Back to Power, FIN. TIMES Jan. 8, 2007, at 32.
194. Latin America, 2006, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at A12 (noting that both Michelle
Bachelet, who recently was elected President of Chile, and Alan Garcia, who was elected as President
of Peru, have pursued free-trade agreements with the United States); Castaneda, supra note 168 (noting
that Tabare Vazquez, who was elected President of Uruguay in 2004, has both denounced neoliberalism
and explored the possibility of a free-trade agreement with the United States).
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knew the Burmese government was using slave labor, raping women, confiscating
property, and uprooting communities in order to assist Unocal's construction of a
gas pipeline.1 95 Local forces in Nigeria hired by Shell carried out large-scale,
extra-judicial killings and destroyed villages in order to secure Shell's investment
in the country. 196 In India, Dabhol Power Corporation (majority owned by Enron)
hired police forces who arbitrarily detained non-violent protestors. 197 A
subcontractor of the Gap in El Salvador employed workers in sweatshop
conditions. 198 British Petroleum admitted to hiring Columbia's military to protect
its oil operations in the country, with disregard for whether the military also would
protect basic human rights. 199 Children worldwide are engaged in labor.20 0 Most
recently, Blackwater USA has been accused of opening fire without provocation
while providing private security services in Iraq, killing 17 citizens. 20 1 Other
violations include exposing workers to sulfur dioxide in Peru and dumping waste
into the waters of Ecuador and Indonesia.2 °2 These are not isolated instances of
misconduct, but rather samples drawn from a larger pool of human rights
violations. However, at the present only states, and in a few instances individuals,
203are treated as having human rights obligations.
B. Intergovernmental Organizations' Non-binding Corporate Social
Responsibility Measures
Concern over human rights abuses associated with corporate activities has
prompted states to develop non-binding CSR codes. The stakeholder governance
style of European companies, under which corporations consider relationships
with employees, consumers, and the environment when making decisions, has
made Europe a natural leader in this process.20 4 In 1999, the European Parliament
adopted a "Code of conduct for European enterprises in developing countries" (the
Code).20 5 While the Code does not establish specific, binding corporate social
responsibilities, it does erect the foundation for enforceable regulations. The Code
195. Hall, supra note 16, at 416-17.
196. Cassel, supra note 16, at 1965-68.
197. Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multinational
Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 513-14 (2000).
198. Cassel, supra note 16, at 1968-69.
199. Stephens, supra note 1, at 52.
200. James J. Silk & Meron Makonnen, Economic Exploitation of Children: A Role for
International Human Rights Law?, ST. Louis U. PUBLIC L. REv. 359, 359 (2003).
201. John M. Broder, State Dept. Plans Tighter Control of Security Firm, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6,
2007, at Al.
202. Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under
United States Law: Concepts and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 514-16 (2002);
Stephens, supra note 1, at 53.
203. Ratner, supra note 19, at 462-65.
204. Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-
American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 493, 498 (2005). Europe's stakeholder
governance orientation is in contrast to the shareholder orientation U.S. companies follow, which
centers on maximizing shareholder wealth.
205. Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries:
Towards a European Code of Conduct, 1999 O.J. (C 104) 180 [herereinafter EU Code].
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recommends the EU endorse "existing minimum applicable international
standards" the ILO, UN, and OECD have set for regulating the social impacts of
corporate activities, and calls on the EU to work with these organizations "to
ensure more powerful and effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 20 6
Provisions also stress that an EU CSR code should protect the rights of indigenous
peoples and create social labels for products.2 °7 A paper the Commission of
European Communities issued in 2001 (the Green Paper) supplements the Code,
declaring that "[c]orporate social responsibility should... not... substitute for
social rights or environmental standards, including the development of new...
legislation.9
20 8
The United States also has adopted non-binding measures that place greater
social responsibilities on corporations. It recently signed the Voluntary Principles
on Security and Human Rights (the Voluntary Principles) with the United
Kingdom. The Voluntary Principles establish high CSR standards for businesses
in the extractive and energy sectors and tout the constructive role businesses can
play in protecting social rights.20 9 The Voluntary Principles ask businesses in the
extractive and energy sectors to establish procedures for assessing the risk that the
corporation, its agents, or its host country might commit a human rights violation;
to ensure that public security forces the government provides for the corporation's
benefit do not commit human rights violations; and to "record and report any
credible allegations of human rights abuses by public security in their areas of
operation to appropriate host government authorities. 21 °
More recently, in response to allegations that Blackwater USA opened fire
without provocation while providing private security services in Iraq, killing 17
citizens, the U.S. State Department announced new policies that would ensure
tighter control of the company. According to these measures, State Department
monitors must accompany all Blackwater convoys in and around Baghdad, all
Blackwater vehicles must be equipped with State Department video cameras, and
recordings of all radio transmissions between Blackwater convoys and military and
civilian agencies supervising those convoys in Iraq must be saved.211
Intergovernmental organizations also have begun to develop non-binding
CSR codes. Every OECD country plus nine non-member countries have signed
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations (the Guidelines). The
Guidelines encourage corporations to voluntarily adopt certain standards. They
suggest that "enterprises should.., respect the human rights of those affected by
their activities consistent with the host government's international obligations and
206. Id. at arts. 12, 29. Relevant standards cover human rights, labor, and the environment.
207. Id. at arts. 7, 12, 14.
208. Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 22,
COM (201) 366 final [hereinafter Green Paper].
209. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
(Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931 .htm [hereinafter Voluntary Principles].
210. Id.
211. Broder, supra note 201.
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commitments. 212 Enterprises also should "[r]espect" employees' freedom to join
trade unions, "[c]ontribute" to the "abolition of child labor", and end workplace
discrimination.2 13 Other terms enounce high environmental, corruption, and
consumer protection standards that corporations should follow.
214
In two separate documents, the Global Compact (the Compact) and the UN
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms), the United Nations also
has announced CSR guidelines. The Compact "asks companies to embrace,
support and enact within their sphere of influence" ten core human rights, labor,
environmental, and anti-corruption values that are derived from international
215treaties. While the Compact states lofty goals, its vagueness and lack of
enforceability undermine its effectiveness. 21 6 These weaknesses, common to CSR
codes that IGOs and corporations develop, have strengthened calls for "holding
companies accountable through legal rules for the human rights and environmental
impact of their policies," an idea echoed in the UN Norms. 217 The UN Norms
assert that, although "[s]tates have the primary responsibility.., to protect human
rights, transnational corporations and other business entities, as organs of society"
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, must also secure human rights
"[w]ithin their respective spheres of activity and influence.... ,218 Using legally
binding language, the Norms declare that corporations "shall" ensure non-
discriminatory treatment, security of persons, workers' rights, respect for human
rights and national sovereignty, and environmental protections. 21 9 However, states
have not yet adopted the Norms, and they are not in force.22 °
212. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporation: Revision 2000, art. 2(2), June 27, 2000, 40
I.L.M. 237, 240 available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf [hereinafter OECD
Guidelines].
213. Id. at art. 4.
214. Id. at arts. 5-7.
215. UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL COMPACT, TEN PRINCIPLES, available at
http://www.unzlobalcompact.org (Feb. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Global Compact]. The Ten Principles are
pulled from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The ILO's Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the UN
Convention Against Corruption.
216. Id.
217. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, Address at University
of Tubingen Second Global Ethic Lecture (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.weltethos.org/st_9_xx/9_144.htm.
218. See, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter
UN Norms].
219. Id. at 2-14.
220. See Office High Comm'r Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.41RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005) (requesting "the Secretary-General to appoint a special
representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises, for an initial period of two years [t]o identify and clarify standards of corporate
responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with
regard to human rights); Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The
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Finally, while the ILO always has protected worker's rights, 221 in recent years
it has imposed more corporate social responsibilities directly on employers. For
example, the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy establishes a comprehensive framework of
employment promotion, training, wage, workplace safety and security, and
collective bargaining standards for MNCs in developing countries to follow, with
the goal of "encourag[ing] the positive contributions which multinational
enterprises can make to economic and social progress.... 222  More recently
adopted, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
"[d]eclares that all Members... have an obligation.., to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith the principles concerning the fundamental rights of ILO
Conventions. 223 These rights include "freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.'
224
The 1995 Mines Convention requires employers to "eliminate risks" and to
"ensure that the mine... provide[s] conditions for safe operation and a healthy
working environment. 225  Recognizing that undeveloped laws in host countries
may not protect employees, the Mines Convention also provides that, "where
appropriate," employers must supplement national standards with "technical
standards, guidelines or codes of practice. 226  Likewise, under the 2001
Agriculture Convention, employers must "ensure the safety and health of workers
in every aspect related to work."
C. Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct
Finally, many corporations have drafted and implemented voluntary, self-
imposed codes of conduct. The Sullivan Principles, one of the first CSR codes
United Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 287, 298
(2006).
221. See, e.g., Constitution of the International Labor Organization, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712,
15 U.N.T.S. 35; Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
222. International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labor
Office, 204th Sess., Nov. 1977, as revised by the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess., Nov. 17, 2000 [hereinafter Tripartite
Declaration], available at http://www.oit.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf.
223. International Labor Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and Its Follow-Up, adopted by the International Labor Conference, 86th Sess., 18 June 1998, art. 2




225. Convention Concerning Safety and Health in Mines, June 22, 1995, arts. 6-7, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 106-8 (1999), 2029 U.N.T.S. 209, 212 [hereinafter Mines Convention].
226. Id. at 211.
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
MNCs voluntarily adopted, was developed to help promote ethical corporate
behavior in South Africa during apartheid.227 Since formation of the Sullivan
Principles, many MNCs have written and passed their own CSR codes.228 These
codes vary greatly. While some merely describe good practices to which the
corporation should aspire, others state specific human rights principles.
Royal Dutch Shell's CSR code states broad principles, emphasizing the
importance of "be[ing] good neighbors" to local communities, "respect[ing] the
human rights of [its] employees", and "'conduct[ing] business as responsible
corporate members of society., 229 Similarly, YUM! Brands Inc, owner of Pizza
Hut, Taco Bell, and Kentucky Fried Chicken, has a loosely worded Supplier Code
of Conduct stating that suppliers "are expected to ensure that their workers have
safe and healthy working conditions" and "should not use workers under the legal
age for employment for the type of work being performed. 23 ° Conversely, The
Gap's Vendor Code of Conduct contains eight articles that set specific standards
for its vendors and factories. Its code outlaws discrimination based on "race, color,
gender, nationality, religion, age, maternity, or marital status" in a manner that
largely comports with articles 2 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and prohibits "involuntary labor of any kind" in a manner that largely
comports with article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 231  Although less detailed than The Gap's Code of Vendor Conduct,
Adidas' Workplace Standards specifically state that "[b]usiness partners must not
employ children who are less than 15 years old" and that "[w]ages must equal or




Attention on human rights abuses associated with the activities of
multinational corporations has increased over the past decade. Corporations have
been censured for participation in and failure to prevent extra-judicial killings,
environmental degradation, labor rights violations, and other human rights abuses.
227. Henry J. Richardson II1, Reverend Leon Sullivan's Race, Principles, and International Law: A
Comment, 15 TEMPLE INT'L AND COMP. L.J. 55, 57-61 (describing how the Sullivan Principles required
corporations to give their black workers in South Africa "the same rights, treatment, advancement, and
employment benefits as would be basically required in the United States under its constitutional equal
protection standards," and required corporations to undertake infrastructure projects for the benefit of
their workers).
228. Natasha Rossell Jaffe & Jordan D. Weiss, The Self-Regulating Corporation: How Corporate
Codes Can Save Our Children, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 893, 909-10 (2006).
229. Shell Code of Conduct, available at http://www.shell.com/static/envirosoc-
en/downloads/makingiLhappen/our commitments-and standards/code of conduct/english.pdf.
230. YUM! Brands, Inc., Supplier Code of Conduct, available at
http://www.pizzahut.com/SupplierCode.aspx.
231. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19. 1966, art. 8(3), 999 U.N.T.S.
171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Resolutions,
Part I, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Gap Inc. Code of Vendor Conduct, Arts. III, IV, available at
http://www.gapinc.com/public/documents/code vendor_conduct.pdf.
232. Adidas Group, Workplace Standards, available at http://www.adidas-
group.com/en/sustainability/Overview/our-standards/standards-of engagement.asp.
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In response, IGOs and MNCs have accepted that corporations should be held
accountable to citizens of developing countries for their actions and have adopted
non-binding CSR measures. The process of developing and analyzing these
measures has furthered dialogue on the form a CSR code should take. When
viewed in light of the trend towards placing greater responsibilities on
corporations, beginning with the FCPA and extending to SOX, and in light of the
rise of SO governments in Latin America, the adoption of CSR codes by
intergovernmental organizations and MNCs suggests the international community
is moving towards developing a binding code of corporate social responsibility.
V. THE FINAL FRONTIER: A CODE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Although the international community is moving toward creating a binding
CSR code, designing such a code will be difficult. Various hurdles complicate and
block its development. These hurdles include MNCs' ambiguous responsibilities
under international law,233 disagreement over the degree to which corporations
may pursue goals other than maximizing profit, 234 corporate resistance to costly
CSR regulations,235 developed states' reluctance to impose CSR regulations on
their multinationals, 236 many developing states' resistance to measures that might
hurt their competitiveness as a destination for FDI vis a vis other states, 237 and still
other obstacles as well. As countries, IGOs, and scholars debate whether a binding
CSR code is both palatable and possible, and disagree over the structure such a
code should take, they must balance the competing interests that complicate
development a CSR code.
Below, I propose a framework for an enforceable CSR code. This framework
does not analyze and resolve every problem countries, corporations, and civil
society organizations will encounter as they construct a binding CSR code.
However, this framework does present a novel, potentially useful structure for
developing and implementing an enforceable code of corporate social
responsibility.
A. Weaknesses of Existing Corporate Social Responsibility Measures
The social responsibility measures countries and corporations have adopted in
recent years are praiseworthy. They recognize that corporations not only have a
responsibility to maximize profits, but also to protect their workers, communities,
and surrounding environments. Nonetheless, various weaknesses limit the
effectiveness of existing CSR measures.
The voluntary guidelines that states and IGOs have enacted are
unenforceable.238 Countries and corporations that sign these measures do not
233. See Ratner, supra note 19, at 511.
234. See Backer, supra note 220, at 298-99.
235. Sorcha MacLeod, Corporate Social Responsibility Within the European Union Framework, 23
WIS. INT'L L.J. 541, 551-52 (2005).
236. Backer, supra note 220, at 381-83.
237. Guzman, supra note 18, at 671-74.
238. See EU Code, supra note 205; Green Paper, supra note 208; Voluntary Principles, supra note
209; OECD Guidelines, supra note 212; Global Compact, supra note 215; U.N. Norms, supra note 218.
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accept binding obligations. Thus, countries and corporations can sign to curry
political capital, and then choose the degree to which they will abide by their
gratuitous promises. Furthermore, these codes are universal, applying identical
standards to all countries regardless of each country's particular culture, needs, and
resources.239 This approach eschews reality in favor of utopian, largely western
measures that corporations in many states cannot fulfill.
For example, it is naive to believe that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms
operating in Saudi Arabia could comply with western employment discrimination
standards, or that a CSR code could eradicate child labor in Africa and Asia. If
employment discrimination were outlawed universally and discrimination against
women in Saudi Arabia occurred, the code's enforcement body would face two
unappealing choices: it could prosecute the transgressing MNC, offending Saudi
sovereignty and values, or it could exculpate the MNC, undermining the
enforcement body's authority and legitimacy.24 °  Furthermore, universal
compliance could cause more harm than good. "In the poorest nations an abrupt
halt to child labor is likely to cause children to suffer acute poverty and hunger,"
241and may push children into black market labor and prostitution. Placing
stringent, western environmental standards on developing countries, standards
many developed states have begun to follow only during the last ten years, would
protect the environment while retarding economic growth.242
Corporations' CSR codes pose even greater enforcement difficulties. These
guidelines not only are self-drafted and self-adopted, but also self-enforced,
leaving corporations to implement, monitor, and enforce them in a perverse
concentration of power.243 Moreover, voluntary corporate codes apply only to the
small percentage of MNCs that create them, offer a moral platform for egregious
rights abuses, 2 44 and either may not reach foreign subsidiaries or only reach
foreign subsidiaries.24 5
239. See EU Code, supra note 205; OECD Guidelines, supra note 212; UN. Norms, supra note
218.
240. Consider that the U.N. and international community have failed to prevent mass killings in
recent years in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Darfur. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON
S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTs ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE
NUREMBERG LEGACY 56 (2d ed., 200 1).
241. Kaushik Basu, Compacts, Conventions, and Codes: Initiatives for Higher International Labor
Standards, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 487, 491 (2001).
242. Tracy M. Schmidt, Transnational Corporate Responsibility for International Environmental
and Human Rights Violations: Will the United Nations' "Norms" Provide the Required Means?, 36
CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 217, 220-21 (2005).
243. Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 401 (2005).
244. Richardson, supra note 227, at 58, 62.
245. Murphy, supra note 243, at 401; see e.g. Gap Inc. Code of Vendor Conduct, supra note 231;
Adidas Group, Workplace Standards, supra note 232; The Coca Cola Company, Supplier Guiding
Principles, available at http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/citizenship/supplier-guiding-principles.html.
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B. Proposed Framework for a Creating a Binding Code of Corporate Social
Responsibility
Analysis of the problems with existing CSR measures reveals that, while a
CSR code must be legally binding to regulate corporations effectively, a code also
must remain flexible to prevent self-implosion. Below, I propose a two-level
framework, an implementation process, and an enforcement mechanism that can be
used to construct a CSR code that is binding, pliant, and effective at holding MNCs
legally accountable for the social impacts of their activities.
1. Level One: Non-Binding, Universal Human Rights Standards
The first level of a CSR code should state baseline, non-binding human rights
standards. These standards should be phrased as aspirations that MNCs should
strive to follow and states should promote. Level one standards could be modeled
after the Global Compact, though should include more details than the Compact's
ten general principles.246 Level one should avoid the specific terms and binding
language the UN Norms employ.247 Provisions should define common political
and bodily (e.g. slavery, rape, extrajudicial killings), labor (e.g. wages, child labor,
occupational safety), social (e.g. indigenous people) and environmental (e.g. water
and air pollution, damming) human rights standards. Articulating baseline
standards will further dialogue and agreement on MNCs' human rights duties and
provide structure for developing state-tailored, enforceable responsibilities in the
second level of the proposed framework.248
2. Level Two: Binding, State Specific Codes
Level two should contain the code's substantive, binding terms. Because
OECD countries produce a large majority of the world's multinational corporations
and FDI, I suggest matching one representative from an OECD country with one
representative from each non-OECD, ratifying host state (host state). 249 Together,
through input from MNCs and civil society, these teams of two should adopt
legally binding CSR duties based on level one's standards. These duties should
regulate the activities of MNCs operating in each host state and should be tailored
to each host state's unique needs, culture, and resources. This level must use
enforceable, binding language ("MNCs shall..."), clearly informing states and
MNCs that noncompliance will result in penalties.
By tailoring binding measures to each country's dynamics, the code would
account for different conceptions of an adequate standard of living, discrimination,
and bribery. If child labor is needed in a given country to help feed and shelter
families, that country's team of two may permit it under certain conditions that
246. Global Compact, supra note 215.
247. U.N. Norms, supra note 218.
248. Bennett Freeman et al., A New Approach To Corporate Responsibility: The Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT'L. COMP. L. REV. 423, 433-35 (2001).
249. Outward FDI Flows (1970-2005), in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D (2005) (reporting that, in 2005, 83% of all FDI came from developed
countries).
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perhaps demand parental permission, prohibit overtime, and require MNCs to hire
independent managers who monitor the treatment of children. 5 ° Countries
plagued by corruption can enact stringent bribery laws while permitting generic
occupational safety standards because their governments already address that issue.
Thus, industry specific standards are not needed. Instead, country specific
standards would provide flexibility while, at the same time, mandatory language
would make adherence to these standards legally binding.
Some may contend flexibility will provide a platform for countries to set
weak standards. However, a realistic approach tailored to each state's unique
history, resources, cultures, and needs is vital; compliance with modest but
realizable standards is better than disregard for unattainable ideals. 251 Moreover,
the code can prevent the watering down of human rights duties by pairing together
OECD and host state representatives whose countries have few investment
connections, and thus little interest in collusion. Every few years the teams of two
should evaluate the customized duties. If tighter child labor laws are needed, the
government can enact such measures; if the cost of living has increased, the teams
can raise minimum wages.
Others may contend host states competing for FDI would not ratify a code
that regulates MNCs more closely and, in turn, hurts their competitiveness vis a vis
other countries.252 However, a code can encourage ratification through an
investment freeze that prohibits ratifying states from making new investments in
non-ratifying countries. An investment freeze would goad states that have not
ratified the treaty to ratify it through fear of stagnant foreign investment. As more
states ratify, non-ratifying states would become increasingly isolated. Faced with
either isolation or integration, many states would choose integration and ratify the
code knowing their sovereignty, cultures, economy, and needs would not be
jeopardized. Still, the details of an investment freeze would need refinement to
prevent ratifying states from losing investment opportunities. Perhaps the freeze
should be implemented after fifty states have ratified the code, or limited to certain
sectors of each non-ratifying state's economy.
3. The Code Committee
An executive body should oversee the code's procedural niceties,
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. I suggest creating a code
committee to handle these tasks. The committee could consist of 11 members
representing the four major stakeholder groups corporations, developed
countries, developing countries, and civil society and could be elected by
ratifying states every few years, with one vote per state. Four members should hail
from OECD states, three from developing states, and two each from MNCs and
250. See Basu, supra note 241, at 491 (noting that "[p]arents do not typically send their children to
work out of sloth but rather out of desperation.").
251. See Id. at 496 (emphasizing the need for democratization of international organizations in
order to account for the interests of developing states).
252. Guzman, supra note 18, at 671-74.
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NGOs. This arrangement would balance power within the committee and prevent
an individual stakeholder group from assuming control.
The committee could be charged with various tasks. It could approve all
OECD and host state "teams of two" in order to combat collusion between OECD
countries and host states and ensure representatives are disinterested. The
committee also could field complaints about countries' level two codes, such as
allegations that a code is watered down or ignored, and either resolve the issue
amicably or refer it to a tribunal. Amendments to procedural matters, such as the
process for selecting country representatives, committee members, and tribunal
members, and amendments to substantive matters, such as increases in level one's
baseline standards, could be approved by a majority vote of the committee. As the
code is drafted and implemented, additional responsibilities would be conferred
upon the committee.
4. Enforcement
States' level two human rights obligations must be legally binding and
enforceable. Unenforceable obligations lack capacity to punish violations and
foment change; perhaps galvanizing MNCs around shared norms, but failing to
ensure that practice follows speech.253 Empowering a tribunal with enforcement
authority will deter violations, promote responsible corporate activity, and
compensate the injured. Moreover, consistent and fair enforcement will increase
the code's legitimacy, preventing the emasculation and loss of authority that
plague many international treaties.
Any entity, including individuals, NGOs, businesses, and states, should be
allowed to bring a complaint alleging a corporation violated its level two corporate
social responsibilities. The code should require complaints to be brought initially
before the representative of the host state where the supposed violation occurred
and that representative's OECD counterpart. Because MNCs often do not intend
to violate human rights and, especially when violations are committed by
contractors or licensees, MNCs may not be aware that violations are occurring, the
team of two should discuss the situation with the MNC and attempt to resolve it
amicably.25 4 If the MNC accepts responsibility and works with the team of two in
creating and implementing a solution, referral to a tribunal would not be
necessary. 255  This initial, non-confrontational process is fashioned after the
OECD's national contact points system. 25 6 It would be an efficient, cost-effective,
and fair method of settling many complaints, especially baseless claims, minor
infractions, and violations corporations are willing to address. The country
253. Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Corporations: Corporate
Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. INT'L L.J. 1075, 1078 (2002).
254. See Ratner, supra note 19, at 518-520 (noting that corporations can have varying levels of
knowledge of rights abuses based on how much control parents have over their subsidiaries).
255. See e.g., Voluntary Principles, supra note 209 (establishing a voluntary guide that encourages
collaboration between the extractive industry and host states).
256. OECD Guidelines, supra note 212, at Part 2: Implementation Procedures of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, art. I.
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representatives should report to the committee every six months on the
corporation's compliance with remedial measures.
In some cases, however, human rights violations may be especially egregious,
the corporation may deny responsibility, or the team of two may disagree on an
appropriate resolution. An informal enforcement process would not be adequate in
such instances. Instead, the complaint should be referred to a tribunal that
adjudicates alleged code violations. Each ratifying country could nominate one
judge who, after receiving the committee's approval, would be available to serve
on tribunals. Seven judges could decide each case by majority vote; perhaps two
nominated by the host state, two by the home state, two by the complainant, and
one by the MNC, to ensure fair representation. All MNCs incorporated as
businesses in ratifying states would be subject to the court's jurisdiction, allowing
the court to collect money judgments from MNCs and grant injunctive relief.
Beyond these details, the committee would need to fine tune the judicial
process and resolve difficult questions. May the committee or a tribunal override
the OECD and host state representatives' enforcement decisions, either placing a
claim on the tribunal's docket or releasing a case from tribunal back to the
representatives? On how many tribunals may a single judge serve? How should
tribunal proceedings be drafted? Would appeals be possible? What types of
damages would be available? May tribunals enforce creative remedies, such as
requiring a MNC to provide education for child laborers? May tribunals issue
advisory opinions?
C. Conclusion
Existing CSR codes have weaknesses, such as a lack of enforceability and a
universal application, that limit their effectiveness. These weaknesses require a
new framework for structuring a CSR code. The dual level approach presented in
this section provides such a framework, placing legally binding duties on
corporations while tailoring those duties to each country's individual culture,
needs, and resources. The code committee and enforcement mechanisms
strengthen the proposed framework's ability to regulate the social effects of
corporate activities. Admittedly, this framework is not a panacea and leaves many
questions unanswered. However, this section's goal is not to propose a final
solution for structuring a CSR code. Rather, it is to contribute to the discussion on
how to place corporate social responsibilities on multinational corporations.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, as corporations have amassed wealth and power,
the United States and the international community slowly have responded by
placing greater responsibilities on corporations. First, a pandemic of corporate
bribery prompted the United States to pass the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in
1977, and to expand the act's jurisdiction and substance in 1998, placing various
anti-bribery responsibilities on corporations. The international community
followed suit, drafting similar measures. Soon after the U.S. and international
community developed anti-corruption measures, corporate governance problems in
the United States led to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Sarbanes-Oxley
places new duties on corporations, tightens regulations, and demands even greater
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corporate responsibility. The U.K. and the EU also have grown concerned with
corporate governance problems, and have adopted measures similar to SOX to
solve these problems.
While states worldwide have been placing heightened responsibilities on
corporations, governments throughout Latin America have adopted socialist-
oriented policies. Their efforts to protect their workers and economies from harms
that have accompanied the spread of multinationals in Latin America are consistent
with interest in greater corporate social responsibility and a CSR code. At the
same time, the international community and multinational corporations have
drafted various non-binding measures that are rooted in the FCPA's and SOX's
trend towards placing greater responsibilities on corporations, though these
measures impose a new type of responsibility on MNCs - social responsibility for
employees, communities, the environment, and society.
Although existing CSR measures are commendable, they also are
unenforceable. If states, the international community, MNCs, and civil society
truly wish to regulate the social problems that have accompanied corporations into
developing countries, these stakeholders must work together to overcome
weaknesses in existing measures and to develop a binding CSR code. This article
offers a dual level framework for constructing such a code that hopefully can
contribute to the dialogue on how to ensure that, as corporate power grows,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Systemic risk may be the "scariest" term in a central banker's vocabulary.
2
What is systemic risk? Consider the returns on a single investment, the actual
return on an investment has two components: expected return plus (or minus) an
unexpected return or risk return.3 This risk return may be broken down into two
categories: unsystemic and systemic.4 Unsystemic risk is sometimes called
idiosyncratic risk; it is the kind of risk that is specific to an asset.5 This kind of
risk is diversifiable because variance in asset returns tend to be reduced in a
portfolio with an increasing number of different assets. 6 In contrast, systemic or
market risk is non-diversifiable. 7 An increase in adverse systemic risk affects the
returns on all assets sensitive to systemic risk in the globalized economy.8 The
term "systemic risk" is used in Global Governance of Financial Systems to denote
a specific kind of systemic risk "arising from the mispricing of risk in financial
markets, which often means that risk is underpriced in relation to its cost and that
1. D.N.M., Ecole Nationale Supdrieure du Pdtrole et des Moteurs (2008); M.Sc., Colorado
School of Mines (2008); J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2007); B.A., University of
Virginia (2002).
2. Caroline Baum, Fed Cuts Rates to Address Greater of Two Evils, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 19, 2007
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=colurmistbaum&sid=aYDiXuOxdpWo.
3. STEPHEN A. Ross, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY F. JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE
286 (Michele Janicek ed., 6th ed. 2002).
4. Id. In other words, where R is the actual rate of return and R' is the expected or risk-free,
return and U is the uncertainty or risk premium, then R = R' + U. U may be positive or negative. In this
note and in the book reviewed herein, adverse systemic risk, or an unexpected lower than expected
yield, is used interchangeably with the more general term "systemic risk."
5. In other words, if m is systemic risk and & is unsystemic risk, then U = m + s. Id. at 288.
6. Id. at 262.
7. Id. at 263.
8. Sensitivity to systemic risk is quantified in some financial models as 3. Id. at 271.
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the underpricing of risk results in too much of it being created in financial
markets." 9
In Global Governance of Financial Systems: the International Regulation of
Systematic Risk, authors Kern Alexander (a lawyer and economist), Rahul
Dhumale and John Eatwell (economists) (the Authors), argue three principal
points: (1) current international and domestic efforts to contain the generation of
systemic risk in financial systems are inadequate; (2) this inadequacy increases
systemic risk; and (3) an international regulatory response is required.1 0 This book
note considers the first two arguments and related points in section II and the latter
in III.
II. THE FAILURE OF REGULATORS TO PREVENT THE CREATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK
Systemic risk is "created by individual financial institutions [and] the
aggregate amount of risk created by all financial institutions in global financial
markets."" As firms enter into risky investments 2 , the aggregate of these risks
accumulates, becoming a "negative externality that imposes costs on society at
large because [these] firms fail to price into their speculative activities the full
costs associated with their risky behavior." 13 Moreover, "adequate regulation [to
prevent systemic risk] at the international level has not accompanied" the
globalization of financial services and capital flows. 14
Adequate regulation could have prevented many recent examples of systemic
risk causing events that followed from a failure of the current regulatory regime.
Two specific examples may be posited as illustrations of the Authors' thesis: one
considered by the Authors, the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s and the
other a more recent event, the United States Subprime Mortgage Crisis of 2007.
Both of these display at least three common themes associated with a failure to
regulate the generation of systemic risk in financial systems. First, there was an
"underpricing of risk" by lenders and an absence of effective regulation to compel
the pricing of risk associated with their lending practices. 15 Second, there were
9. KERN ALEXANDER, RAHuL DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 14 (2006) [hereinafter
"GLOBAL GOVERNANCE"].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id.
13. Id. at24.
14. Id. at 3.
15. For information on the Asian Crisis see GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 204
("Following liberalization, banking systems in many countries have experienced significant problems
with large capital inflows in the absence of adequate internal controls and prudential oversight to
contain the increased risk of new and expanded activities."). For the U.S. Crisis, see Martin Feldstein,
Liquidity Now!, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2007, at A19, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118955944544924579.html ("Credit risk in financial markets had been
underpriced for years, with low credit spreads on risky bonds and inexpensive credit insurance
derivatives provided by investors seeking to raise their portfolio returns. With such underpricing of
risk, hedge funds and private equity firms substantially increased their leverage.").
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failures in the banking sector once these risks were realized. 16 Third, in at least
some instances, there was some degree of expectation on the part of the lenders
that the government would intervene if the debtors defaulted. 17 These shared
common characteristics preceded a common result: fear of a broader and
international economic downturn, with either "systemic risk"' 8 (United States) or
"contagion"' 9 (Asia) being the associated buzzword.
These domestic financial crises soon become global financial crises given the
interconnectedness of financial markets. The globalization of financial systems
has "made financial institutions more interdependent and thus more exposed to
systemic risk that can arise from bank failures and to volatility in cash flows."
20
This globalization of systemic risk is especially pronounced in some sectors, most
importantly, in the banking industry:"
21
The Authors point out that the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s would
have been avoided if the regulators in the affected nations had planned their
liberalization programs with greater foresight.22 Specifically, regulators should
have implemented "prudential policies" that would have established "better risk
16. For information on the Asian Crisis see GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 205
(excessive lending lead to a "buildup of nonperforming loans"). For the U.S. Crisis, see Associated
Press, As Foreclosures Surge, Mortgage Lenders Pressured to Offer Borrowers Relief, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/24/business/NA-FIN-US-Avoiding-
Foreclosure.php ("24 percent of the roughly 82,000 loans [issued by Countrywide] were in
foreclosure."), See also Feldstein, supra note 15 ("The subprime mortgage defaults have triggered a
widespread flight from risky assets, with a substantial widening of all credit spreads, and a general
freezing of credit markets.").
17. For information on the Asian Crisis see GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 205 ("[T]he
belief that financial institutions were protected by the government raised moral hazard issues."). For
the U.S. Crisis, see Nouriel Roubini's Global EconoMonitor, Who is to Blame for the Mortgage
Carnage and Coming Financial Disaster? Unregulated Free Market Fundamentalism Zealotry,
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini/184125 (Mar. 19, 2007) ("The sub-prime and overall
mortgage carnage is now likely to lead to a financial crisis whose cleanup and bailout costs will make
the S&L bailout bill look like spare change. We are only at the beginning of this fallout but, already,
several proposals and bills in Congress have been submitted to help millions of sub-prime homeowners
on the verge of bankruptcy and foreclosure."). See also Jeanne Sahadi, Subprime Bailout: Taxpayer
Toll, CNN.coM, Oct. 22, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/22/real-estate/bailout-cost/?postversion=2007102212.
18. "[I]n August [of 2007], the negative performance of the financial markets was related mostly
to a sharp increase in perceptions about systemic risks." Posting of Greg Ip to Real Time Economics,
August vs. October: Credit Crunch vs. Slowdown, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2007/10/22 (Oct. 22,
2007, 10:54 EDT).
19. Taimur Baig and Ilan Goldfajn, Financial Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis, 42 IMF
STAFF PAPERS 167, 181 (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/Pubs/FT/staffp/1999/06-
99/pdf/baig.pdf ("The spreads on dollar-denominated debt [among afflicted Asian economies],
representing default risk, display[s] the most striking degree of correlations and evidence of
contagion."); see also Definitions and Causes of Contagion,
http://wwwl .worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/definitions.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008) ("Contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-
country spillover effects.").
20. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 14.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 204.
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management measures at the microeconomic level. 23 The inexperienced Asian
banks lacked such effective policies and the "absence of adequate internal
controls" on risk taking further increased risk-taking by these banks, leading over
time to a "buildup of nonperforming loans." 24 These banks' risky investments
adversely impacted international financial systems and amounted to the
externalization of the full social cost of these risky investments onto the broader
national and international economy. 25
Government intervention after a financial crisis in contrast to a prudential
regulatory standards intended to prevent a financial crisis, may serve to increase
the moral hazard problem.26 For example, in the 1990s some Asian governments
prescribed lending to specific non-performing market sectors. -7  Under the
guidance of these government directives, the foreign depositors assumed that the
same government institutions would protect the banks' holdings in these market
sectors in the event of failure. 28 Not only do such firms undervalue risk, but the
moral hazard created by the perception that the government would bail them out in
the event of a market failure further increases the underpricing of risk by banks and
thus the degree of systemic risk borne by the international economy._9
The Authors argue that the current international regulatory framework for
"banking supervision" is "especially" flawed .30 The Basel Committee on Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Practices (Basel Committee) "exercises either direct or
indirect influence over the development of banking law and regulation for most
countries.' Its most recent set of proposals, known as "Basel II," the Basel
Committee intended to make the "regulatory capital 32 held by banks more sensitive
to [] economic risks. ' 33  But despite Basel H's superficial similarity with the
Authors' concern: the lack of an effective international regulatory framework for
banking, Basel H is a fundamentally flawed attempt to limit systemic risk. More
specifically, the Authors argue that Basel H is flawed on institutional and
substantive grounds.
First, the Basel Committee that proposed Basel HI has several critical
institutional flaws. Chief among these flaws is the Basel Committee's imbalanced
decision-making structure. For example, "the Basel Committee is composed of the
central bank governors and national bank regulators of the... thirteen richest
developed countries. 34 Nations outside of the Committee have no direct influence
23. Id. at 205.
24. Id. at 204-05.
25. See id. at 24.




30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 37.
32. Regulatory capital accounting is distinguished from banks' true economic capital. See id- at
224. It is the capital that is weighed in determining a bank's capital adequacy requirements- See id
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at 41.
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on the Basel Committee's deliberations. 35  Additionally, the Basel Committee
decision-making procedures are secretive and lack transparency.3 6  Finally, the
Committee also has a record of "uneven implementation and enforcement., 37 The
result of this flawed institutional structure has been a slow and half-hearted
adoption of the Basel Committee's standards among national regulators and, more
importantly, the Committee's regulations ignore the development needs or banking
realities in non-developed nations.38
Moreover, Basel II's substantive rules do not effectively address the problem
of systemic risk. Prior to Basel II, the Basel Committee attempted to control credit
risk by implementing minimum capital adequacy standards. 39 These standards
were later criticized for being overly rigid.40 Ostensibly, Basel II aims to address
the rigidity problem with more flexible capital adequacy standards. 4 1 As such,
Basel II presents a regulatory framework consisting of "mutually reinforcing
pillars" intended to create a flexible, yet effective framework for banking
regulation.2
First, Basel II provides banks two options for making their regulatory capital
determination. 43 The first is a standardized approach paralleling the "one-size-fits-
all" pre-Basel II standards,44 with some modifications.45 The second capital
determination model allows banks to use their own internal ratings. 46 The Authors
note that the second internal determination model results in "greater risk
sensitivity., 47 However, this model is flawed: first, it is overly flexible on the
individual firm level in that there is little guidance on principles individual firms
35. See id. at 42.
36. Id. at 44.
37. Id. at 44.
38. See id. at 45.
39. See id. at 228.
40. See id. at 230. The 1988 Basel Capital Accord (supplanted by Basel II in 2002) required
banks "actively engaged in international transactions to hold capital equal to at least 8 percent of risk-
weighted assets in an effort to prevent banks from increasing credit risk through greater leverage." Id.
at 228.
41. See id. at 230.
42. Id. at 230. See also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,, The Basel I: International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, 4, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm (June 2004) [hereinafter "Basel IlAccord'].
43. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 231.
44. Id.
45. Id. For example, the pre-Basel II rules provided no credit conversion factor on loan
commitments of less than a years duration. Basel II, however, "imposes a 20 percent credit conversion
factor." Id.
46. Id. For example, a bank may estimate each borrower's creditworthiness and then calculate an
estimate for future losses. Id.
47. Id. at 232.
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may use to guide their capital determination needs48; second, the lack of principled
guidance for national regulators may lead to regulatory arbitrage. 9
The second pillar of Basel II also requires supervisory review of internal bank
decisions. These include "efforts by banks to assess their capital adequacy and by
supervisors to review such assessments., 50 The purpose of supervisory review is
twofold: (1) to "ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks in
their business" and (2) "to encourage banks to develop and use better risk
management techniques in monitoring and managing their risks.' The third
pillar of Basel II is market discipline.52 This pillar complements "the minimum
capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2)."" 3
This pillar sets forth disclosure requirements that allow "market participants to
assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk
exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of [banking]
institution[s]. '54
The end result of applying the first pillar of determining regulatory capital
coupled with the third pillar, market discipline, results in the "homogeneity of
financial markets." 55  Banks comporting with the first pillar will construct risk
determination models that are based on similar analytical models.56 Furthermore,
the third pillar encourages banks to follow similar disclosure standards and adjust
their operations accordingly. The result is similar modeling methodologies that
will lead banks to react to the same objective market information in a uniform
manner. 57  This model-driven behavior "encourage[s] firms to act as a herd,
charging toward the cliff edge together.",58 The resulting homogeneity in financial
48. Specifically, the use of credit rating agencies is criticized by the Authors. Id. at 231 ("[T]hese
private agents may act either in their own interests or in that of the borrower in hopes of maximizing
their own gains by issuing favorable [credit risk] ratings."). The Authors' caution echoes more recent
comments made by Former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, blasting these same credit
agencies for facilitating the global credit crisis that commenced in 2007. Von Norbert Kuls & Claus
Tigges, Die Ratingagenturen Wissen Nicht Was SieTun, FAZ.NET, Sep. 22, 2007,
http://www.faz.net/s/Rub034D6E2A72C942018B05D0420E6C983 1/Doc-EF5A672F689134A84842B
34B3471D2713-ATpl-Ecommon-Scontent.html (,,Die Ursache des Problems war, dass die Leute
glaubten, die Ratingagenturen verstinden etwas vom ihrem Geschaft. Die wissen aber nicht, was sic
tun.") (quoting Alan Greenspan). According to Greenspan, these credit agencies mispriced credit risk
and the market, unfortunately, believed their ratings. Id. Any regulatory overhaul - national or
internation in scope should, therefore, take into account the skewed incentives credit agencies currently
have.
49. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 233.
50. Basel IIAccord, supra note 41, 11.
51. Id. 720.
52. Id. 1 809.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 260.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 261. Moreover, the Authors note, homogeneity is a growing problem outside of the
banking regulations proposed by Basel II. See id. ("As financial markets become seamless ... banks,
securities firms, insurance companies, pension funds, and so on" are adopting standard analytical
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markets will exaggerate the amplitude of the market's reaction to objective
financial data resulting to increased systemic risk.59
The tendency of Basel II's first and third pillars to encourage dangerous
homogeneity makes the second pillar, supervisory review of bank capital
determination models, all the more important.6 ° On this point, the Authors argue
that the scope of the Basel Committee supervisors' regulatory discretion is too
broad and may result in "inconsistent or ineffective standards." 61 In light of Basel
II's institutional construction, the Basel Committee supervisor's are narrowly
exposed to the risk-taker with inadequate consideration of those who are most
vulnerable to the risk-taker's actions. 
62
The Author's posit a market-based approach to pricing and regulating the risk
inherent in banking. In Chapter 9, Reforming the Basel Accord and the Use of
Subordinated Debt: Making Markets Work for the Regulator, the Authors consider
whether requiring banks to hold subordinated debt would increase market
discipline. 63 These debt issuances would be "unsecured, uninsured, and junior to
deposits." 64 This debt would create a class of "financially sophisticated class of
creditors with better incentives for monitoring financial institutions" and the risk
associated with their investments.65  Ultimately, the Authors find that a
subordinated debt requirement would provide banking regulators a strong, market
based figure that would allow them to regulate risk more effectively.
66
It is not just the Basel Committee and banking regulation that is flawed. In
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 (i.e., Global Governance and International Standard Setting,
The International Legal Framework for International Financial Regulation, and
International Soft Law and the Formation of Binding International Financial
Regulation, respectively) the Authors examine the current institutional and legal
framework for financial regulation. The Authors find that the current system of
principles in gauging risk.) By applying the same or similar rules in gauging risk, homogeneity
becomes a factor affecting all financial systems falling to the same risk gauging fads. Id. As an
example of this regulatory fad, the Authors quote the Chairman of the United Kingdom's Financial
Services Authority, Sir Howard Davies as stating: "[o]ur general view is that the capital treatment
should be the same, where the risks are the same." Id. Excessive reliance on quantitative models has
been blamed for the collapse of equity markets in August 2007. David Rocker, Letter to the Editor,
Wall Street Borrows, Main Street Pays, BARRONS, Sep. 17, 2007,
http://online.barrons.com/article/SBI 18981089018628145.html ("Since most of these firms [using
similar quantitative models] analyzed a common market history, a strong correlation of longs and shorts
developed throughout the quant-fund industry. As more capital was deployed in the strategy, a self-
reinforcing spiral was created: Demand for 'positive' stocks increased, boosting their prices, and selling
in 'negative' stocks increased, pressuring their prices.").




63. Id. at 227.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 237.
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international financial regulation is inadequate at addressing systemic risk.67
Current "international regulatory efforts" amount to little more than "haphazard
responses to specific crises that threaten" global financial stability. 68 Institutional
regulatory bodies were designed to address specific economic issues, but necessity
has forced them to expand their regulatory jurisdiction. For example, the
International Monetary Fund, originally founded to "foster international trade and
economic reconstruction in war-ravaged member countries," 69 has expanded its
original role, outside of its initial legal authority, to "setting standards for the
management of systemic risk.",70  Because the IMF was not designed for this
function, it is no surprise that it has "failed to accomplish the overall objective of
effectively managing systemic risk." 71
In Chapters 6 through 9, the Authors expand upon specific issues relating to
their thesis. In Chapter 6, Incentives versus Rules: Alternative Approaches to
International Financial Regulation, they opine upon the best means of regulation,
weighing rule-based regulation against incentive-based regulation. 72 In Chapter 7,
The Economics of Systemic Risk in International Settlements, the Authors consider
a context in which a lack of incentive-based rules might increase the likelihood of
systemic risk.73 They posit that payment settlement systems are the "channels
through which funds are transferred between financial institutions in the form of
electronic debit and credit-book entries., 74  The key issue is whether payment
systems should follow a collateralized overdraft system, which is favored in the
European Union, or a non-collateralized overdraft system with fees charged for
overdrafts, which the United Stated has adopted. 75 The Authors lean toward a
collateralized overdraft system because it "internalizes the costs of risks in
payments systems by reducing the threat of gridlock" that would occur in the case
of a non-collateralized financial institution's failure and its impact on
interconnected finance systems. 
76
In Chapter 8, A Microeconomic Examination of Financial Fragility: A Test of
Capital Adequacy Standards, the Authors conduct a quantitative analysis of capital
adequacy standards.77  They find that rules-based capital adequacy standards
appear to have led, especially in East Asia, cosmetic changes in capital ratios and
other unintended consequences arising from regulatory efforts in those nations.78
67. See id. at 32-33.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 84.
70. Id. at 93.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 181.
73. See id. at 184.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 185.
76. Id. at 200.
77. See id. at 201.
78, See id. at 225-26. These East Asian nations are Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. Id. at
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The Authors provide two methods for addressing the problem of systemic
risk. First, in Chapter 5, Strengthening the Global Financial System through
Institutional and Legal Reform, they present guidance on addressing the problem
through the creation, by way of treaty, of a Global Financial Governance Council
("GFGC").7 9 Unlike most of the current international financial institutions ("IFI"),
the GFGC would operate in full transparency and would provide "representatives
from all states" to have authority in developing "international standards and rules
for financial regulation to existing international supervisory bodies." 80
Overstretched IFIs like the IMF and World Bank should then return to their
founding purposes instead of reaching into areas they are ill-equipped to regulate.
Second, at the close of the book in Chapter 11, Summing Up and Conclusion:
The New Financial Architecture - Promise or Threat?, the Authors provide a more
general proposal. 81 Here, the Authors present five specific guidelines for the
international financial regulators of the future. First, regulators must increase
financial heterogeneity. 82 This may be done by creating a regulatory body "with
the powers to develop [a] flexible structure of rules and rule making."
83
Additionally, the Authors argue this body should have broad enforcement and
monitoring powers. 84  Second, there should be an international lender of last
resort.85 However, the moral hazard associated with "liquidity without strings"
must be tempered by "powerful rules on risk taking." 86 Third, a "new financial
architecture should encompass macroeconomic concerns." 87  Fourth, the
regulators' rules "need to make greater use of the new work on extreme, rare
events. 88 Fifth, the scope of the regulators' activity should be the international
market itself. 89
Finally, in Chapter 10, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Financial
Institutions: the Role of International Standards, the Authors focus on corporate
governance issues. Consistent with their arguments throughout the book, the
Authors argue that the role of financial regulators should be to promote the public
good in light of principal-agent problems inherent when asymmetrical information
disparities exists between management and other stakeholders in a bank or
corporation. 9°
79. Id. at 162.
80. Id. at 163.
81. See id. at 268.
82. Id. at 269.
83. Id.
84. See id.





90. See id. at 244.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Subprime Mortgage Crisis of 2007 presents another
illustration of the need for an international regulatory response to the problem of
systemic risk generated in international financial markets. As in the Asian
Financial Crisis of the 1990s, the mortgage market of the mid-2000s in the United
States was characterized by a "underpricing of risk" by lending institutions. 91 The
subprime chicken came home to roost in 2007 with mortgagors defaulting on their
loans in droves,92 and a resulting homogenous panic from risky assets bearing
these assets in their portfolio. 93 The effects soon spread to credit markets, with the
end result a general freezing of credit markets. 94  With credit more costly,
companies and individuals find it more difficult to borrow on the margin; the final
impact: it is expected that economic growth world-wide will decelerate. 95 The
broader impact of this American-originated financial crisis has yet to fully
materialize; it is, however, evident that the crisis will have an adverse impact on
the world economy, at the minimum through its direct impact on world credit
markets. 96
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke has recently testified before the
U.S. House of Representatives, stating that "[t]he recent problems in subprime
lending have underscored the need not only for better disclosure and new rules but
also for more-uniform enforcement in the fragmented market structure of brokers
and lenders." 97 The United States Treasury Department has also recognized the
problem and "is seeking public input on how to overhaul the way Washington
oversees Wall Street, as the agency works to create a blueprint for a more-effective
regulatory structure." 98 Expost and narrowly tailored solutions to the systemic risk
91. Feldstein, supra note 15.
92. Bob Ivry, Half of 450,000 Subprime Mortgages Could Default, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sep. 23,
2007, at E7 ("[M]ore than a quarter of subprime borrowers [out of 450,000] default on their adjustable
loans before the rates reset.").,
93. Id.
94. See Is the Credit Crunch Finally Over?, BBC NEWS, Sep. 20, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7003139.stm.
95. Id. ("The tightening up of credit and worries about mortgage repayments may make everyone
more nervous about borrowing money to buy big-ticket items like cars.").
96. See Carter Dougherty, Ripple Effects from U.S. Mortgage Crisis hit Pacific Rim, Int'l Herald
Trib., Aug. 1, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/01/business/stocks.php; see, e.g., James Kanter, Central Banks Act
Again to Combat Subprime Crisis, Int'l Herald Trib., Aug. 10, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/10/business/subprime.php ("BNP Paribas, the large French bank,
was freezing $2.2 billion held in three funds with exposure to U.S. subprime mortgages spark[ing]
concerns that the risk was spreading well beyond America's shores.").
97. Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating Mortgage Foreclosures
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 110th Cong. 78 (2007) (Statement of Ben S. Bemanke,
Chairman, Board of Govms., Fed. Reserve System), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/benanke20070920a.htm..
98. Deborah Solomon, Treasury Seeks Input on Regulation Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 119214182307756559.html.
VOL. 35:3/4
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
created by the underpricing of risk in U.S. mortgage lending are inadequate. The
Authors persuasively argue that the solution to the underpricing of risk and the
systemic risk it generates requires an ex ante, systematic, and international
regulatory response. Purely "domestic" reforms "will be inadequate if not
accompanied by major institutional and legal reforms at the international level." 99
Without such international regulatory efforts, the failure of domestic regulators to
require financial firms to properly price risk will provide fertile ground for the
generation of more international financial crises. With domestic regulators at the
forefront of financial regulation, we will likely see more "haphazard responses to
specific crises that threaten" global financial markets.100 The Subprime Crisis
looming heavy on international financial markets, American and other financial
regulators should consider the argument presciently and persuasively made in
Global Governance of Financial Systems.
99. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 3.
100. Id. at 32-33.
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